Introduction

Asia-Pacific is the world’s largest producer and consumer of coal. Countries continue to use it for the simplest economic factors: its low cost and reliability. For example, more than 40% of electricity is generated by coal-fired plants in Indonesia, Vietnam and India.

The benefits of coal appear to outweigh its cost—it is a ubiquitous natural resource, frequently subsidised and it provides the minimum amount of electric power needed. Indeed, for regions aiming to electrify rural areas, coal can appear as a cheap, stable option.

However, policymakers need to consider whether to continue relying on coal due to the multidimensional risks it poses. The ongoing climate crisis necessitates countries to opt for cleaner pathways to sustainable development.

Proponents of continued coal use must confront rising evidence against their position. Evidence shows that renewables are becoming cheaper than coal and driving economic opportunities, especially with burgeoning support from financial institutions that, in turn, makes coal’s future unsustainable.

But rapid transition to renewables could also stress existing grids and lead to blackouts or price increases. In Europe and Britain, for example, the increased use of wind and solar energy has led to significant challenges in matching electricity supply and demand in real-time to maintain system stability.

This shows that the integration of renewable energy into existing power grids requires adequate upgrades to overcome curtailment or instability.

Additionally, many mining, transport and power generation jobs could be affected by coal phase-out. If these jobs vanish faster than the workers’ ability to find new ones, social unrest could ensue.

Is it possible, therefore, to balance economic development with coal phase-out? If so, how?

The Hidden Cost of Coal

Initial economic gains from reliance on coal mask the long-term health and environmental costs the use of coal imposes. It has been estimated that outdoor air pollution – primarily from coal burning – costs Asia up to US$5tn annually in health expenses and lost labour.

For instance, coal emissions has caused respiratory diseases over Indo-Gangetic Plain and much of Northern China, leading to learning loss for children and lost days of work for adults, while also putting intense pressure on hospitals.

This is why the use of coal as a source of energy should not be approached exclusively from an economic angle. If officials are solely focusing on its cheap price, they risk ignoring the “externalities”—costs incurred by society, rather than power companies.

Meanwhile, coal leaves a long-term footprint on public finance. Many new plants risk becoming stranded assets despite government support. At the same time, building solar and onshore wind power plants is becoming cheaper than building unsubsidised new coal plants.

Global lenders and insurers, too, are limiting financing for coal, forcing developers to face higher borrowing costs.

The evidence is stacked against continued use of coal. Symptoms of the climate crisis, including flooding, heat waves, cyclones and the like are already imposing economic losses as much as 2.4% of GDP. If the global temperature rises above 1.5°C, the impact on the economy would be catastrophic.

Renewables: A Viable Alternative

But can renewables truly replace coal?

In recent years, evidence shows that solar photovoltaic (PV) module prices have declined by almost 85% since 2010.

The world’s cheapest solar power in many Chinese provinces sells at US$0.03-0.05 per kilowatt-hour, cheaper than even coal with battery storage.

Meanwhile, Vietnam added more than 17GW of solar capacity in 2021 – nearly doubling its total – after it set feed-in tariffs and the wholesale electricity price declined approximate

Furthermore, Bangladesh’s 100MW solar power plant in Sonagazi delivers electricity at a cost of $0.10 per kilowatt-hour, cheaper than the coal-fired Matarbari 1,200MW Ultra Super Critical Power Plant that charges $0.76 per kilowatt-hour.

As insinuated above, however, switching to renewables is not without implications.

Both wind and solar energy are inconsistent; long-term weather patterns such as monsoons and dry spells could cause operational challenges to power grids. Although batteries have significantly decreased in price, they are still marking up the overall system cost at scale.

Moreover, the integration of wind and solar energy has been poor in many archipelagic countries – like Indonesia and the Philippines – due to their fragmented geography, which makes national grid interconnection technically difficult and expensive. Besides, transmission infrastructures in these countries are still poorly developed to accommodate remote projects.

Technical barriers can be overcome with proper planning, however. Grid-flexibility strategies

Such strategies have been pursued by various countries. Singapore’s Energy Market Authority mandates generators to provide advanced output forecasts, aiding system operators in balancing supply and demand in real time. In Australia’s National Electricity Market, regional interconnectors allow excess solar power to flow between the five regions: South Australia, Victoria, Tasmania, New South Wales and Queensland, thus decreasing the use of coal.

A Balanced Path Forward

From a practical standpoint, at this stage, perhaps it is easier for countries to manage and adjust coal projects to suit today’s standards rather than outrightly banning coal use.

Firstly, governments could phase out domestic coal subsidies and redirect those funds to grid upgrades and renewable energy in underserved rural communities. Governments could also undertake the process of retiring the oldest and least efficient coal plants first. Sri Lanka, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia have indicated intentions to phase out unabated coal in the 2040s despite ongoing struggles to finance renewable energy projects.

Secondly, carbon pricing could change the dispatch combination and move more generation to renewable. The Japanese carbon tax, officially named “Tax for Climate Change Mitigation” (launched in 2012), saw the carbon tax yield revenue jumped from JPY40bn (US$276m) in 2013 to JPY260bn (US$1.7bn) in 2016. All the carbon tax revenue has been channelled towards efforts to reduce energy-originated CO₂ emissions.

Thirdly, it is crucial to empower communities to produce, consume, store and sell renewable energy that can support energy transition and, at the same time, contribute to fighting poverty.

In Kulonprogo municipality, Indonesia, there are mini-hydro power plants in villages that successfully reduce residents’ electricity expenses. These plants were developed through a collaboration among private companies, local government, the community and tech companies.

Fourthly, a moratorium on new coal projects would enable governments to finalise accountable long-term energy strategies that are consistent with the vision of the Paris Agreement.

Fifthly, countries could collaborate together to focus on enhancing regional institutions – for example, the ASEAN Power Grid – which should help to pool resources and minimise variability.

On that note, and sixthly, countries could mobilise green financing opportunities from multilateral development banks, such as loan guarantees that lower their risk exposure. An example of this was the Green Climate Fund’s approval of a US$204m fund for projects in 46 Asian countries that allowed lend

Unbiased Weighing Options

In some cases, the initial cost of solar and wind energy could exceed the sunk cost of the existing coal plants, especially where financing is scarce. The reliability of renewable grids remains an issue until storage or demand-management alternatives are u

Still, these challenges seem to be manageable in the next 20 years. The IEA’s 2023 World Energy Outlook notes that in significant parts of Southeast Asia, new solar-plus-battery projects could be 15-20% cheaper than existing ones. There are also projections that continued improvements would lead to reductions in the cost of renewable energy by at least 25% by 2030.

The pressure is not imaginary. By 2050, an unmitigated warming in Asia could reduce economic output by 5% owing to crop failures, heat stress on labour and damage to infrastructure due to storms. Would governments gamble on coal today and risk climate disasters tomorrow?

By not transitioning, countries are stacking the odds tremendously against themselves: Typhoon Yagi, which struck Southeast Asia and South China in early September 2024, caused US$15bn in economic damages across the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and southern China. In the future, climate events would only become more frequent and severe without aggressive bu

The Asia-Pacific region must critically rethink its reliance on coal. While coal has long supported economic growth and electrification, its hidden costs – health burdens, environmental damage and rising climate-related losses – are becoming too great to ignore.

Although renewables offer a viable path forward, challenges like weak grids, fragmented geographies and integration issues mean the transition must be carefully managed, not rushed. Some practical solutions are already offered above, including instituting a moratorium on new coal projects, redirecting coal subsidies to grid upgrades, increasing rural access to renewables, enhancing regional cooperation and expanding access to green financing. With strategic planning, the region can shift toward a cleaner energy future without sacrificing economic stability.

Introduction

Electric vehicles (EV) from China are gaining popularity in Indonesia, with 66% of consumers viewing them positively. This is driven by their affordability, innovative features and comfort.

Wuling Motors leads as Indonesia’s most popular EV brand, winning awards and achieving high sales. Other Chinese brands like BYD, DFSK, Seres, Chery and Neta are also making significant strides in the market.

This has been facilitated by the Indonesian government that is actively supporting EV adoption through substantial subsidies and incentives, totaling US$445.6 million, and has attracted large investments, such as the US$1.3 billion from BYD. Local production initiatives – such as Chery’s in Bekasi – and partnerships like Sokonindo aim to bolster Indonesia’s position in the global EV supply chain.

The focus extends to electric motorcycles, with several manufacturers establishing factories in Indonesia. PT. Sunra Asia Pacific Hi-Tech, PT. RPM and PT. Yadea Teknologi Indonesia are leading this initiative, with Luyuan planning a significant market entry through domestic partnerships.

Agreements

The influx of Chinese EV manufacturers into Indonesia is a result of recent cooperation agreements between the two countries, which have spurred efforts to enhance investment cooperation, particularly in EV batteries, automotive manufacturing and spare parts production. This is reflected in an MoU signed during Jokowi’s visit to Beijing in 2023. However, discussions on EV cooperation had been ongoing between the two countries since before this visit.

Furthermore, B2B collaborations have been established – such as between China’s GAC Aion New Energy Automobile Co. Ltd. and Indonesia’s PT. Indomobil Energi Baru – to distribute GAC Aion EV in Indonesia. This partnership aims to provide environmentally friendly vehicles including sedans, SUVs and supercars.

Additionally, another Chinese company, Zeekr, has partnered with PT. Premium Auto Prima as the Brand Holder Agent (APM) to introduce SUV and MPV models in Indonesia.

Other renowned manufacturers like Great Wall Motor will also enter the Indonesian automotive market in the second quarter of 2024 with a specific focus on hybrid models.

The growing entry of Chinese can also be attributed to the government’s efforts to revise the incentive scheme for electric vehicle manufacturers, such as relaxing VAT taxes, adjusting the Domestic Component Level and relaxing Completely Built Up (CBU) vehicle imports, all of which aim to attract foreign investors to invest in the country.

This also causes Chinese EVs to flood the Indonesian market compared to products from Japan or South Korea. This popularity is due to the low price of Chinese EVs compared to the price set by producers from other countries. In fact, Chinese EVs are even cheaper than normal cars in circulation today. This competitive price can be attributed to low production costs and component quality.

The increasing popularity of Chinese EVs in Indonesia actually plays well into the government’s goals to reduce independency on foss

Challenges

The use of EVs in Indonesia still faces a number of challenges. For example, 71.2% of respondents in a survey two years ago considered it difficult to find public EV charging stations. This concern proves true even today, as charging stations remain limited an unequally distributed.

As of April 2024, the number of charging station stood at 1,380 units and almost half (656) were located in Java. Interestingly, charging stations remain limited in Sulawesi and Maluku, the two places where Indonesia’s nickels are mined and processed. This seems to suggest that the local population has not really benefitted from the downstream products of nickel extracted from their areas.

Moreover, 62% of respondents expressed concerns about the high price and maintenance cost, which goes to show their unfamiliarity with the minimum cost of charging an EV. In addition, a number of respondents also acknowledged the limited range and distance that EVS can cover as well as concerns about the long charging time for EV battery.

Another challenge concerns the handling of battery waste. The government needs to be more proactive and agile in creating clear regulations regarding the processing of battery waste, whether they will be recycled or repurposed to support sustainable battery use. Without clear regulations and adequate supervision, battery waste could potentially lead to new environmental issues.

Besides, the burgeoning presence of Chinese EVs in Indonesia could have several implications on the latter’s political and economic landscape.

Firstly, it would create inconsistent policy dynamics. The competition between manufacturers from China and other countries over EV imports and production would result in the inconsistencies of Indonesia’s policy frameworks, as manufacturers from Japan and South Korea would require different conditions. This lack of coherence in policies can lead to uncertainties for investors and hinder the sector’s sustainable growth as well as competitiveness.

Another important point is concerns over the exploitation of nickel resources in Indonesia, a crucial component for EV batteries. Indonesia’s abundant nickel reserves present a double-edged sword in the context of EV production. The rush to exploit nickel reserves without standardized environmental and labor regulations raises significant concerns about sustainability and social responsibility. The lack of standardized practices combined with the prevalence of cheap nickel prices raise concerns about environmental sustainability and fair economic practices. Indonesia risks becoming merely a raw material supplier without substantial value addition if proper regulations and strategic industrial policies are not implemented.

Moreover, Indonesia’s role in the EV supply chain is predominantly assembly, with the more technologically advanced components such as batteries and core EV technologies sourced from China. This condition limits Indonesia’s ability to capture higher value-added segments of the EV market, reinforcing dependency on foreign technological expertise and potentially stifling local innovation and industrial growth.

Related to this, the intensifying entry of Chinese EVs could increase Indonesia’s reliance on China. This dependency could include crucial components like batteries, electric drivetrain technologies and charging infrastructure, all primarily sourced from China. This would deepen Indonesia’s dependency on Chinese industrial strategies and market dynamics, potentially limiting its autonomy in shaping domestic EV policies and priorities. If, for example, China’s domestic market is shaken by geopolitical tension, its impacts would reverberate across Indonesia’s EV market.

Another concern relates to the recent announcement by the Indonesian government to implement up to 200% increase in import duty on textile products from China. This might induce a modicum of anxiety on Chinese exporters from all industries and sectors, including EV producers, if not communicated and managed well. For now, however, the impact of this announcement on the EV sector remains to be seen.

Lastly, EV is in no way going to be a panacea to the urban congestion problem in Indonesia’s major cities. The emphasis on increasing private EV ownership, as opposed to developing an effective public transportation system, coul

Conclusion

Indonesia needs coherent policies amidst the influx of Chinese EVs and lack of competition in the sector. Clear policies are vital to attract investments and foster industrial growth.

Addressing nickel resource exploitation is critical. Indonesia should adopt standardized mining practices and fair pricing mechanisms to sustainably manage its reserves, minimizing environmental impact and maximizing economic benefits.

To strengthen its EV supply chain role, Indonesia must focus on developing domestic capabilities beyond just assembly. This includes technology partnerships, R&D in EV components like batteries and incentives for local innovation to reduce reliance on foreign technologies and enhance economic gains. Rather than solely promoting private EV ownership, Indonesia should prioritize enhancing public transportation infrastructure and technologies. This approach – involving investments in mass transit, adopting EVs for its public transport fleets and promoting sustainable mobility solutions – can ease urban congestion and lower emissions.

Introduction

The good relationship between Indonesia and China, which have been on the upward trend in the past decade, manifests crystal clear in the investment sector.

China was christened as the second largest investor in Indonesia in 2022, with US$5.18 billion worth of realized investment recorded, just behind Singapore.

From a number of investments in Indonesia, the mining sector has contributed IDR 136.4 trillion in investment realization in 2022. Part of Indonesia’s appeal is the government’s focus on down streaming of mining products, which has attracted the attention of Chinese investors.

In the midst of growing investments, there is an increasing proposition that China could become Indonesia’s partner in renewable transition. Nonetheless, China’s investment in the mining sector and environmental destructions found in Chinese projects have hampered the realization of such proposition.

Indonesia’s Energy Transition Plan

A party to the Paris Agreement, Indonesia has committed to increase efforts to achieve the net zero emiss

To attain decarbonization, Indonesia needs a significant long-term investment of around US$ 1.3 trillion in various fields of technology. Here, China can play a role in facilitating energy transfers to Indonesia through cooperative efforts in manufacturing, research as well as investment, taking into account the market potential to increase Indonesia’s energy demand.

In Indonesia’s context, the BRI could facilitate investment in the renewable energy industry which can be done by increasing the complexity of the supply chain, targeting industries specializing in energy transition such as the manufacturing of solar panels, electric vehicles and energy storage.

Perhaps due to awareness of the environmental impacts, President Xi Jinping has made pronouncements to stop the development of coal-fired power plants overseas. Several Chinese companies have also started investing in the new and renewable energy sector, such as solar and wind power plants in South Sumatra and South Sulawesi.

Despite this, the amount of Chinese investment in the renewable energy sector is far less than investment in the mining sector and power plant construction, especially coal-fired power plants. Therefore, as the projects in the latter continue to run, a sufficient monitoring regime should be imposed to prevent further environmental destruction on areas and communities surrounding the sites.

China’s Investments in the Coal-Fired Power Plants

Majority of Chinese financing in Indonesia is still in non-renewable energy. As high as 86% of Chinese funding is channeled to the development of coal-fired power plants, mostly channeled through the China Development Bank (CDB) and China Export-Import Bank (CHEXIM). Curiously, these two banks also adopt a turnkey arrangement with local firms, requiring Chinese firms to provide technical expertise while denying local firms to participate in the engineering process. This means that technological transfer between Chinese and local firms remain at minimum.

Currently, there are three coal-fired power plant projects being constructed with funding from Chinese companies. These projects are also part and parcel of the BRI projects in Indonesia.

The first is a power plant with a capacity of 3×380 megawatt (MW) at the Morowali Industrial Park which began construction in December 2021. The power plant is a collaboration between PT. Bintang Delapan Indonesia (which also owns PT. Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park [IMIP]) and Tsingshan Holding Group of China.

The second is power plant with a capacity of 4×380 MW on Obi Island, North Maluku, a collaborative project between Harita Group Indonesia and Ningbo Lygend China.

The third is coal-fired power plant with a capacity of 380 MW in North Maluku, built by Weda Bay Industrial Park Indonesia (WBIPI) and three companies from China, namely China Tsingshan Group, Huayou Group and Zhenshi Group.

Apart from these three, other Chinese-funded power plants are also underway in Morowali, Southeast Sulawesi, Konawe and Teluk Weda.

Although the Chinese government has promised in 2021 to stop building new coal-fired power plants overseas, this has not inhibited opportunists to see commercial and legal loopholes to advance certain projects.

The concentration of these projects in Sulawesi and North Maluku means these two areas would be disproportionately affected by the attendant environmental damages. In a larger context, this could slow down Indonesia’s target of meeting 23% of primary energy from clean and renewable energy sources. As these areas are also peripheral (seberang), there is a possibility that any negative developments there would escape national attention, which remains Jakarta- and Java-centric.

To reiterate, despite China’s potential in assisting Indonesia’s transition to renewable energy, it is difficult to agree with such propositions given that it remains a major player in perpetuating non-renewable energy usage such as in coal-fired power plants. One cannot commit to cleaner energy and greener Earth while continuing operations that adversely impact the environment.

Environmental Impacts of Chinese Projects

Furthermore, China has an uphill battle to claim the title of Indonesia’s partner in clean energy due to environmental impacts of its existing projects in the country.

PT. IMIP’s activities in Morowali have caused seawater pollution to the point where it turns black in Kurisa Village, Bahodopi. This is presumably caused by excess from large coal deposits being flushed to the sea by rainwater. As a result, the livelihood of local fishermen is severely impacted, dramatically reducing the quantity of fish catch ever since PT. IMIP operated its coal-fired power plant. Products from fish farms also have also dropped as fish tends to die in hot-temperature seawater, a by-product of the power plant’s cooling system.

It should be noted that PT. IMIP depends on coal-fired power plants for its electricity supply. The construction of three power plants with a capacity of around 1,180 MW has exposed residents of surrounding Fatufia Village to coal dust which has invaded their homes. As if this was not enough, PT. IMIP plans to construct seven more of such power plants.

If no action is taken, this project would inevitably cause further environmental damage and threatens the livelihood and wellbeing of the communities attached to the area. The thought experiment that we must all face is whether mining nickel – an integral component of rechargeable batteries for computers and electric vehicles – is worth the destruction of surrounding ecosystem and communities.

The impact is expected to compound following the government’s Deep Sea Tailing Placement plan, which would allow the dumping of waste in Morowali’s deep sea. More than 7,000 fishermen and 3,000 hectares of coral reefs are projected to be affected. Sea pollution of such scale would certainly damage Indonesia’s diverse ecosystem, as well as the livelihood of those who depend on sea products.

Another affected location is Obi Island in North Maluku as a result of Harita Group’s operations in collaboration with China’s GEM and CATL. This project

Obi Island has a sizable population working as fishermen. Pollution from the project’s power plant has turned seawater red and reduced fishermen’s catch. The Harita Group reportedly has also indirectly intimidated the small fishermen, forcing them to operate in areas 20 miles further from their usual location to meet daily needs.

Sadder still, fresh water for consumption is also polluted, imposing further public health risks. One of the water sources near a nickel mine has been contaminated with high levels of hexavalent chromium (Cr6) which can cause liver damage, reproductive disorders and developmental problems when ingested or inhaled. For long-term exposure to this can cause stomach cancer. This doom and gloom picture is not very far off from what was depicted on Erin Brockovich.

Additionally, a fountain in Kawasi, located less than 200 meters from the mining site, tests for a high contamination of Cr6, with 60 parts per billion (ppb). This is in violation of an Indonesian law that allows the maximum contaminant level

Other Chinese-funded energy projects that do not specialize in mining impose stress on the environment as well. The construction of the Batang Toru hydropower plant in Tapanuli, North Sumatra, has eroded the natural habitat of the endangered orangutans, with only 800 of them remaining in the wild. Worse, the hydropower plant is believed to have reduced the volume of water of the Batang Toru River, on which locals depend for their daily supply.

The above depictions of the environmental impacts of China’s projects in Indonesia simply shows that these projects run counter to Indonesia’s commitments to reduce carbon emission before 2030 and both countries’ pledge on the Paris Agreement. China, especially, has also signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) to promote carbon neutrality through renewable energy in 2021 but its commitments are not demonstrated in its projects in Indonesia. Clearly, more needs to be done by both countries.

Conclusion

Indonesia and China should work hand-in-hand to be more environmentally responsible for these kinds of projects. The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report paints a really grim picture for the future of the planet and it is on all the countries to strive harder to reduce carbon emission and reverse environmental degradation. This exposition on what occurs on the ground is a warning sign that neither Indonesian nor China can ignore.

Basically, the implementation of these BRI projects demonstrates that Indonesia needs China and vice versa. The BRI is envisioned, among other things, to encourage China’s domestic economic growth such as by job creation abroad, a role that Indonesia can facilitate due to its ever-growing economic space. Nevertheless, Indonesia should take a firmer stance and force China to fulfill its commitments to the environment and renewable energy. Should China find this difficult to achieve, Indonesia should consider looking at other investors with deep commitments to the sustainability cause. The onus is now on the Indonesian government, which must demonstrate whether all of its international commitment to reverse climate change are truly valued or simply declared to increase its international stature.

In the current context, the Indonesian government must adopt a resolute position in terms of regulations surrounding Chinese investments. The government should review the coal projects and force companies to adopt Environment, Social, and Governance (ESG) aspects in their operations in metal mining. Indonesia should also accelerate its process in adopting energy transition and double down its collaboration with China in new and renewable energy sector.

Not less crucial is to identify the domestic actors who cra

Sponsored Article in Commemoration of Earth Day 2021

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic has not only disrupted businesses globally but also numerous sustainability projects and climate change mitigation goals. Notably, action against climate change is one of UN’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This is rather concerning as to avoid the worst impacts of climate change and for global temperature to stay within 2 degrees Celsius by 2100, global emissions must be reduced to zero by 2030.

For land-scarce Singapore, climate change is an existential threat, given its small size and geographical location near the equator, a hotbed region for tropical storms.  Almost a decade ago, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong expressed his desire for citizens to take up ownership of the environment and approach climate change by adapting the ‘Total Defence’ strategy at the launch of the Clean and Green Singapore 2011 campaign. Eight years later, Prime Minister Lee reiterated in his 2019 National Day Rally that “Both the SAF (Singapore Armed Forces) and climate change defences are existential for us. These are life and death matters.”   Clearly, local policymakers are not sitting on their hands when it comes to climate change.

Yet current policy measures have not translated into sustainable results. Singapore may have contributed to 0.11% of global emissions in 2018 compared to China’s 30%, but emissions per capita is at 8.56 tons per capita, making Singapore 27^th out of 142 countries based on IEA data from 2018, worse than China’s 7.95 tons per capita and 39^th spot in the same report. The annual transboundary haze affecting Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia continues unabated without a definite solution, a sign that the region as a whole is not meeting its target for climate change mitigation. Noteworthily, COVID-19 has made food security a higher priority concern for Singapore, especially when 90% of its food is imported and subjected to the volatilities of the global food market, including climate change and the pandemic.

Here, Biochar is proposed as a potential solution applicable to Singapore and Southeast Asia to climate change, food security and energy needs.

Biochar: A Carbon-sequestering, Nutrient-rich Resource

Biochar is a fine-grained, highly porous charcoal that helps soils retain nutrients and water. It is produced using pyrolysis by subjecting organic wastes to high temperature in an oxygen-deprived environment, while generating useful by-products to be reused for energy or component refining for industrial chemicals. The end-product has c

Biochar is particularly beneficial in agriculture. Farmers have a vested interest in increasing and maintaining the soil carbon in their fields as studies have shown a correlation between soil carbon levels and crop yield. Organic soil carbon plays an important role in the chemical comp

From research, Biochar has other interesting uses such as the removal of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs), chemicals harmful to human health, from buildings, a potential building material that can strengthen concrete, and  a novel method to sequester carbon in concrete. Notably, biochar is significant in the recovery of washed-off fertilizer chemicals.  Water hyacinths used in the clean-up of fertilizer chemical contaminants in freshwater bodies are ideal materials for biochar production. Therefore, a future circular economy is envisioned, with environment sustainability at its core: remediation service, fertilizer chemical recovery and reuse, biochar production, and climate change mitigation through carbon sequestration.

A Potential Solution to Three Existential Threats

1) Climate Change Mitigation

Wit

Singapore can benefit economically from funding such projects  while exporting biochar-based technologies to neighbouring countries. One significant contribution could be the mitigation of the  transboundary haze crisis  by converting the large volume of agricultural waste material in the region into biochar instead of resorting to slash-and-burn. Not only will it entail a low-cost production of biochar, but also the production of electricity that could be supplied to rural areas. Additionally, biochar can generate a calculated agriculture value of between USD2.30 and 3.30 per hectare  while reducing fertilizer transportation and spreading costs. Amongst Southeast Asian nations, Philippines has been actively using biochar to remediate mining grounds and prepare rehabilitated grounds for replanting. Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia are each making inroads into biochar usage and production as well.

2) Food security

Singapore has signed an Agreement on the ASEAN Food Security Reserve which included the ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve in October 1979. Despite the pact, agriculture activities in Singapore declined from the 1980s as food import became the cheaper and pragmatic option. In 2019, Singapore Food Agency has set a target of achieving 30% of the country’s nutritional needs through local means by 2030. However, this goal is not enough to ensure food security.

Biochar can provide a win-win strategy for food security. Being alkaline in nature, biochar can deacidify soil, thereby maintaining and saving scarce local arable land from fertilizer overuse through the direct application of Nitrogen-Phosphorous-Potassium (NPK) nutrients. Additionally, direct uptake of biochar carbon by fungi crops and the use of biochar as scaffold for beneficial micro-organisms promote crop growth. More importantly, biochar indirectly improves crop production by reducing soil-borne plant diseases and promoting beneficial soil bacteria growth, thereby boosting soil health.

Biochar research in hydroponics has also shown that not only half of the growth substrate can be replaced with biochar and crop growth can be enhanced, but harmful algal growth can be reduced with its application. By replacing half of the Perlite or woodchip growth substrate with biochar will lead to significant production co

3) Sustainable Energy Needs

In fulfilment of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, Singapore has explored ways to source for more sustainable energy to satisfy the needs of the populace, including importing energy from Malaysia in a trial run. This is on top of increasing solar panel usage locally on HDB rooftops. Given the production of biochar yields sustainable energy production, this is one potential alternative source in which Singapore can import from Malaysia as well.

Therefore, biochar can directly and indirectly address existential threats to Southeast Asia namely, climate change, food security and sustainable energy needs. It is, thus, timely to incorporate biochar into national strategies to ensure a sustainable future.