Introduction

In April 2021, Indonesian police arrested a splinter cell of FPI consisting 14 members for planning to attack government and private businesses using 3.5 kilograms of TATP explosives.  A study by PAKAR uncovered three contributing factors that led to the creation of this splinter cell: internal conflict, grievance and inaction. PAKAR is an Indonesian-based NGO researching on terrorism in the country. PAKAR’s study also revealed that the collapse of this splinter cell resulted from the government’s pre-emptive arrests.

Internal Conflict Between Senior FPI Leaders

This FPI splinter cell was formed out of an internal conflict between two FPI leaders, Husein Hasni and Muhsin bin Zeid Alatas. Respectively, they were the deputy head of jihad department of FPI in Jakarta and the leader of FPI in Jakarta. Conflict arose when Husein protested against Muhsin for illegally occupying Tengku Murdiansyah’s land for Muhsin’s centre of religious activities. As Tengku Murdiansyah’s college friend, Husein reminded Muhsin that Muhsin had no right to do so. Consequently, Husein was expelled from FPI without  prior consultations regarding his position, with Husein claiming that he has yet to receive any termination letter from other FPI leaders. FPI spokesman, Munarman, is seemingly covering up this conflict by publicly stating that Husein’s expulsion was due to Husein’s suspected link to the Indonesian intelligence agency. This chain of events ultimately resulted in the formation of a splinter cell led by Husein.

Grievance Over the Arrest of HRS

On December 12, 2020 Indonesian police arrested FPI leader, Muhammad Rizieq Shihab aka HRS, for violating COVID-19 health protocols by holding sermons and rallies with thousands of participants after returning from exile in Saudi Arabia on November 14, 2020. The arrest angered HRS’ supporters including Husein. They protested the arrest and demanded the release of HRS by the government in the 1812 mass rally held in front of the Presidential Palace on December 18, 2020. When the government rejected their request, Husein and nine other Jakarta FPI members decided to pursue the matter independently. To punish the government, they planned to attack police, a state-run gas company (PT PGN) and its natural gas pipelines in Sukabumi, and Wayang Windu Geothermal Plant in Pangalengan, West Java. These attacks were intended to deter foreign investors to Indonesia. They also planned to attack stores and gas stations owned by Chinese Indonesians as they believed the Chinese Indonesians were to be blamed for creating economic inequality in Indonesia. Additionally, they planned to attack the AQUA beverage factory in Sukabumi, West Java for its link to Danone, a France-based multinational company in retaliation of French President Emmanuel Macron’s alleged insult of Islam.

Inaction Against the Government

Husein’s cell decided to pursue terrorism to channel their anger and hatred against their enemies, particularly when the central leadership of FPI was silent about the perceived unfair treatment of HRS by the government. Husein’s cell was not the only one tired of waiting for instructions to attack from FPI central. Another FPI cell in Bandung immediately joined forces when invited by Husein and submitted to his leadership. This Bandung cell was led by Nabil Al Jufri, Husein’s friend. Husein’s cell, thus, increased to 14 including Husein. Sharing their resources, Husein provided a bomb expert and TATP explosives, while Nabil amassed a team of operatives called the silent team led by Asep Komara.

Pre-emptive Arrests Leading to Downfall of the Cell

Husein’s cell was eventually dismantled after its members’ arrests. The police were well aware that Husein and his men had assembled TATP explosives in his house in Condet, East Jakarta. This was due to the police closely monitoring FPI members since the arrival of HRS in Indonesia. Husein’s cell was, thus, heavily monitored while evidences of their planned attacks were collected. By April 1, 2021 Husein and his men were arrested before they could launch any attacks.

Personal Approach Sufficient to Steer FPI Members from Violence

Though the government has banned FPI, its tens of thousands of members remain active in campaigning for the implementation of Islamic law, espousing intolerance and hatred against the government.  As demonstrated by the two splinter cells, their members’ grievances against the government could drive them to separate from the larger FPI community, forming terrorist cells. To prevent this, by working with society leaders, Indonesian police need to approach splintering members and persuade them not to take any violent actions against their perceived enemies. This proved successful in preventing FPI members from following Husein’s path of violence. On February 3, 2021 Husein and Nabil visited the head of the moral police of Bandung FPI, Budi, to garner his support for their attack plans. Husein encouraged Budi to take action against the police but was declined. Budi then shared that previously on December 18, 2020, the police had approached him personally and requested him to not to participate in any protest against HRS’ arrest that was to be held in Jakarta. Additionally, one of Budi’s student’s parents also had persuaded him not to do so.

Both the government and society leaders do not necessarily need to use ideological counter narrative to steer FPI members away from terrorism. Listening to their concerns and providing them with accurate information on the issue is sufficient at stopping their progression towards terrorism. This approach was successful as their hatred for the government and their intolerance towards non-Muslims or political opponents were not on the same level as those of al-Qaeda or Islamic State supporters. Additionally, their ideologies differ from that of these terrorist groups. For instance, FPI members still practiced a ritual deemed to be heretic by both terrorist groups’ supporters. This is also evident in the link between Husein and a Muslim shaman in Sukabumi, West Java, Ahmad Dimyati aka Abah Popon. Husein and his men allegedly received superpower abilities from Abah Popon, who made them immune to sharp weapons and hydrochloric acid. However, once members have left FPI completely and join either pro-al-Qaeda or Islamic State communities, it becomes imperative for the government and society leaders to use ideological counter narratives to debunk their misinterpretation of Islam.

Transparent Legal Approach as a Deterrent for Violence

The government needs to ensure transparent legal processes in prosecuting all acts of terrorism including those by former FPI members such as Husein’s cell. This is to avoid prejudice from the public. Notably, anti-government groups have portrayed the arrest of these members as fabrication, diverting attention from corruption, and the government’s ambition to criminalize FPI. Upon successful conviction, these former FPI members must be severely punished as a deterrence to prevent others from pursuing violence.

Greater Effort by Government and Civil Society Groups Required to Prevent Future Attacks

It is also pertinent for the government and civil society groups to increase efforts to identify disgruntled FPI members and to persuade them away from terrorism. Without such measures, Indonesia risks these members forming new terrorist cells or joining existing terrorist groups to seek violent redress against the government. This is evident when in 2008-2017, 37 FPI members split from the group and joined various terrorist groups including Jemaah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, the Al-Qaeda Group in the Veranda of Mecca, Jamaah Ansharud Daulah and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur as they eluded interventions by the government and civil society groups.

Introduction

For over a decade, religion continues to be integral to Indonesians. Since 2008, at least 90% of Indonesian respondents believed that religion is “very important” in their lives. In 2020, 98% of Indonesian respondents believed this to be true with the remaining 2% believing that this is “somewhat” true. This, thus, ranks Indonesia as one of the most religious countries in the world.

“Supply” from the Indonesian Government

There are two takeaways from this trend. The first is the state’s continued success in the religionization of public affairs. Here “religionization” is defined as the process of framing public issues such as government regulations as religious issues. Religionization is not a new phenomenon for Indonesia. This can be seen from its formulation of the Pancasila, the state ideology. Recently, 96% of Indonesian respondents stated that “belief in God is necessary in order to be moral and have good values.” This is aligned with the first principle of Pancasila, namely “the belief in the one true God”, which was ostensibly aimed at cultivating good citizens.

It can be argued that religionization intensified during Era Reformasi (Reformation Era). Unlike the Soeharto’s authoritarian New Order which was generally secular, the government administrations of the Reformation Era were accommodative towards religious symbolism. Building such an atmosphere was the numerous years of Soeharto’s suppression of political Islam while only co-opting Islamic political leaders in the last decade of his rule. Additionally, during the Reformation Era, political elites regarded religion as a mobilizer for their political careers. Religion would award them public support at all levels of society.

Keeping to this, Wahid Foundation’s One Decade Report on the Monitoring of Freedom of Religion and Beliefs found that religious events such as mass recitation of the Quran were one of the most organized by the two government administrations in the past decade. These were during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s and Joko Widodo’s second and first term in office, respectively. Additionally, during Joko Widodo’s term, there was a new phenomenon of announcing religious instructions for civil servants in several regions. In 2018, a total of 13 instructions were uncovered. These instructions included requiring civil servants to pray together once the call to prayer has been delivered. Such instructions may be a new support-seeking tactic in preparation for the 2019 legislative and 2020 gubernatorial elections. Unfortunately, one drawback of mixing religion with public affairs is the prevalence of discrimination. During the two terms (2009 – 2018), 88 discriminative regulations at the provincial, district and city levels were uncovered.

“Demand” by Society

Secondly, in addition to this “supply” from the government, it is important to consider how the demand by society contributes to this phenomenon. Indicators for this demand is evident from the increasing popularity of Islamic clothing, Muslim-only residential complexes and Syariah-compliant banks.

Driving this demand is the middle-income group whom a majority does not possess religious education backgrounds. Instead, they minimally graduated from public high schools. Insecurity and anxiety have been cited for this increase in religious identity. These sentiments may be due to diverse factors including economic-social insecurity and the politization of numerous issues such as intolerance and inequality. Interestingly, it was shown that there is a negative correlation between a country’s religiosity and GDP. Countries with lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita are more likely to tie belief in God to morality as seen with Indonesia. In these situations, religion becomes an important institution to allay these sentiments.

One concern, however, is the demand’s potential to drive the growth of conservative and hardline groups in Indonesia. The mobilization of conservative and hardline Muslims in Indonesia has been gaining traction since 2016. An explanation for this is that conservative and hardline groups have become more coordinated in simultaneously mobilizing their members and affiliates. Having a higher turnout while organizing such demonstrations to be held after Friday prayers, further empowers sympathizers to participate. This led to large-scale demonstrations as seen since 2016. Additionally, by calling themselves Alumni 212, not only does it serve to create a common shared memory for participants, it also enables the growth of such movement under a single banner. Such growth is further assisted as no formal memberships are required. In other words, any like-minded individuals will be accepted.

Rising Tide of Intolerance in Indonesia

Taken together, moderate Islam is at risk of weakening its position in Indonesia, and thus signalling a rising tide of intolerance. There is preliminary evidence that found higher level of self-declared religiosity to be negatively correlated with a tolerant attitude in Indonesia. Additionally, the same study found that a higher income inequality and extent of poverty are associated with higher level of religious intolerance.

Curbing this rising intolerance, however, cannot be achieved simply by allaying the insecurity and anxiety of Indonesians such as the provision of economic assistance. It should also be through eradicating state-perpetrated discrimination. Allowing and even encouraging discriminative actions by the state provides fodder for intolerance. And there have been studies that indicates how an individual’s behaviour may be an outcome of state policies and society’s corresponding response towards them. By taking a tougher stance on intolerance, it may aid in removing the legitimacy of hardline groups. However, the decentralization of power in Indonesia may prevent this from cascading to the local levels where the influence of Islamic leaders on politicians are still strong.

Despite this emerging trend, the worry that Indonesia may develop into an Islamic state with the imposition of Syariah laws maybe baseless. Though seen in Aceh, it has yet to become a source of inspiration for other localities. Even in Aceh, despite reports of public flogging for unacceptable behaviours, they have not implemented new religious regulations since 2007 while most of the current regulations are centred on the use of Islamic clothing.

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic does not simply entail deadly waves of infections, but also a rising wave of hate and misinformation towards specific groups and identities in Indonesia. Unfortunately, this rising wave will continue to be a heightened challenge during this pandemic. The difficulties in mitigating such contents depend on how extensive COVID-19 impacts the resumption of daily lives. Unfortunately, the rate of Indonesians affected by COVID-19 is still increasing with little indications of slowing down as seen with the implementation of another round of PSBB in Jakarta on 14 September 2020.

As per the Greater Jakarta Metropolitan Regional Police’s data, 443 cases of hoax and hate speech were reported in Jabodetabek (Greater Jakarta Metropolitan). These cases occurred in April-May 2020 just as Jakarta implemented its first partial lockdown; locally known as PSBB. This meant a large increase in numbers when compared to the same period last year.

Diverse Contents of Hate Speech and Misinformation

The contents of these hoaxes and hate speech during COVID-19 are diverse. Not only limited to pouring scorn on the Indonesian government, hoaxes include there being concerted efforts against Islam. This include government efforts to manage COVID-19 being perceived as a guise for communists, Jews and Christians to eradicate Islam. Disturbingly, such hoaxes have tangible outcomes. This was evident from the reactions of a social media posting on the government’s restrictions of public worship at Muslim houses of worship such as mosques and suraus. The widely circulated posting painted the restrictions as a means to break the bonds or silaturrahim between Muslims. In March 2020, numerous cities such as Bandung experienced several protests against these restrictions.

Throughout the pandemic, the issue of the labour market being flooded by Chinese foreign workers have again gained momentum. The rise of this issue was not only a symptom of hatred towards foreigners but also strengthened anti-ethnic Chinese sentiments that has been simmering beforehand. An example is the arrest of an Indonesian from South Konawe, Sulawesi for disseminating a video alleging the import of Chinese foreign workers into Indonesia. In reality, these Chinese nationals flew to South Konawe from Jakarta, and not from China, to extend their visa. Though the individual may either be naïve or malicious when disseminating the video, it demonstrates the deep suspicions towards Chinese foreign workers. And by proxy, ethnic Indonesian Chinese. This issue has also been leveraged by violent extremists in Indonesia to garner support. In IPAC’s April 2020 report, ISIS networks in Indonesia were exploiting this resentment towards Chinese foreign workers particularly in Southeast Sulawesi and Banten.

By providing a clear target, the disenfranchised are presented with several narratives. The first is that they have, in addition to the Indonesian government, another outlet to vent their frustrations due to the loss of opportunities arising from the pandemic. The second is that the current system of administration is failing and thus the need to embrace an alternative. Such alternatives can drive these disenfranchised towards conservatism, intolerance and discrimination, and violent extremism.

Hatred towards Specific Communities Developed Throughout Indonesia’s History

Hateful contents as experienced throughout this pandemic is not a novel issue to Indonesia. These deep-seated sentiments against the Chinese, Jews, and Christians have long developed throughout Indonesia’s history. Dissemination of such contents have a propensity to intensify at specific moments, particularly times of crisis such as COVID-19 and political contestation.

Throughout such crises in Indonesia, three common sentiments are expressed: 1) anxiety, 2) frustration, and 3) anger. This consequently motivates one to identify those who are guilty and responsible for their predicament. Till today, the Indonesian President and ethnic and religious minorities continue to be held accountable for any crisis in Indonesia without much rational basis. However, unlike the past, the situation now is confounded by social media platforms and massaging apps that enables indiscriminate access, increases the speed of circulation, significantly expand the reach of such contents. No longer are such contents limited to text but have now included images and videos. Nevertheless, history has shown how uncontrolled dissemination of such contents have led to violence.

Key Roles of Businesses to Address Hateful Contents

Particularly during crisis, like government institutions, businesses must focus on systematic efforts to reduce the spread of such contents in the community and towards themselves. By contributing to reduce the spread in the community, businesses promote a conducive and healthy environment for their businesses to thrive. Businesses can also prevent themselves from being a target via careful policy considerations. During crisis, discriminative termination of employment, restrictions on places of worships within their business premises, the contents of their advertisements, and even regulations on office attire potentially serve as fuel for hate speech and misinformation towards these businesses.

Businesses should also adopt anticipative measures by analysing social issues that are related to their industry or their brands during a crisis. This includes understanding hate speech and intolerant contents that are circulating not only in their communities but also amongst their staff. Benefits of doing so includes addressing potential issues while they are still in infancy, possessing more time to develop a comprehensive counterstrategy, and instilling trust and allaying any concerns from their staff. Not only would it promote staff retention, staff would be confident to act as informal brand ambassadors to address any misinformation and hate speech targeted at their employers.

Anticipative measures should also consist of guidelines to prevent the spread of such contents from within their businesses. It is essential for staff to know how to respond when they encounter such contents targeting their companies. Having a consistent response prevents fanning the issue further while conveying seriousness at addressing the issue. It is also essential to outline appropriate company behaviour. This enables staff to have a clear understanding of what behaviours are permitted and the consequences for failure to comply.

A notable case study was an incident involving a bakery franchise in Jakarta on November 2019, a month after President Joko Widodo was officially sworn in after a divisive election. A franchise outlet had controversially refused customer requests for Christmas greetings to be decorated on their cakes. One silver lining of this incident is the voices supporting the outlet’s decision was met with equally loud voices opposing it. This ostensibly signal a deviation of simply being seen as a “silent majority” while also demonstrating heightened tensions within the community. Despite such silver lining, businesses should still avoid such controversies altogether.

Though it may seem daunting, businesses in Indonesia can work with government institutions, civil society organizations (CSOs) and subject matter experts. Businesses, for instance, can collaborate with CSOs to strengthen tolerance and to prevent hate speech and hoaxes in the business sector. Businesses can similarly work with relevant ministries such as the Ministry of Communication and Information, National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) and Ministry of Labour to establish guidelines that are specific for each industry.