Introduction

Women have been involved in the rehabilitation of terrorist inmates for years in Indonesia. This piece will zoom in on the profile of four such women, whose missions are to the break the chains of extremism and guide ex-inmates back into a normal life.

Nurani Ruhendi

In the heart of Nusakambangan Island’s Super Maximum Security Prison, Nurani Ruhendi, a 31 year old deradicalization activist, recently completed a challenging assignment.

Tasked with the responsibility of guiding inmates through an intricate process of rehabilitation, Nurani, fondly known as Rani, does not complain about her challenging duty. On the contrary, she expresses satisfaction and joy when recounting her experiences.

The term “inmates” in this piece refers specifically to those jailed for terrorism acts.

For Rani, interacting with inmates is not merely a routine task, but a mood booster. Rani is entrusted with the unique responsibility of visiting and mentoring these inmates within the prison walls.

When Rani first assumed this role at the age of 26, she realized that this was not ordinary mentoring. She actively engages in the deradicalization process inside the prison, beginning as early as the inmates’ arrival to the Nusakambangan facility after sentencing.

Rani oversees and mentors around 50 terrorism inmates across 11 correctional facilities in Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Central Java, out of a total of 104 facilities in 25 Provinces. Despite the challenges, Rani embraces her responsibilities with enthusiasm, easily overcoming any fatigue.

Terrorism inmates are often reserved initially, resisting engagement with prison staff, including Rani and her team. To these inmates, the staff is perceived as the extension of the Indonesian government, which is considered as thaghut in radical Islamist worldview.

Deradicalization is indeed a lengthy process. Rejection from inmates must be handled delicately, processed with a heart-to-heart approach, in an attempt to convince them that they do need help.

“When there is a former inmate who was once resistant, and we guide them slowly until they firmly pledge allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia, commit and express gratitude for the facilitated mindset shift, it feels incredibly rewarding as if all of our hard work has paid off,” said Rani.

Natalia Aga

Natalia Aga, a 32-year-old with a background in psychology, shares a similar commitment with Rani. Her role involves providing guidance to inmates while they are still inside prisons. Understanding their needs is key to Natalia’s mission to win their hearts and minds.

Inmates often harbor certain unfavorable views towards women, a challenge that Natalia acknowledges. Establishing personal connections is vital and it means giving extra effort due to communication limitations posed by different point of views.

Despite the demanding workload and the negative energy pervasive within the prison, Natalia and her colleagues strive to overcome these hurdles, viewing them as challenges to fulfilling their mission of providing guidance.

“Work rhythms are quite intense, we must be ready to go and meet with inmates at any moment. This prison cannot be described as having positive vibes—on the contrary, it exudes significant negative energy that affects our mood. But this becomes a challenge for us to overcome so that we can carry out our mission of providing guidance,” explains Natalia.

Aysha

In the heart of the prison system, where many work tirelessly to rehabilitate inmates within prison walls, Aysha stands apart. Her mission extends beyond confinement, as she is tasked to guide former inmates as they transition back into society. Aysha’s journey begins after these individuals pledge allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia, securing their parole.

Her responsibilities involve coordinating with various governmental bodies to ensure an inmate’s administrative and documentation requirements are in order, including proofs of their citizenship and identity. These are pre-requisite before an inmate could apply for parole.

She is also in charge of the reintegration process of former inmates. This includes reaching out to their families. This is a crucial step in the post-prison life as their successful reintegration into society hinges on the support they receive.

Aysha firmly believes that these individuals are victims of manipulation by terrorist group, succumbing to indoctrination that exploits religion as a tool. Many fell into the trap, willing to sacrifice themselves in acts of bombing, stabbing, shooting and other forms of violence. However, Aysha remains dedicated to helping them realize that the state is extending a helping hand to empower them once more.

Her altruistic intentions, however, face hurdles. Some parolees shut their doors, refusing assistance for various reasons. Others choose not to opt for parole, maintaining their radical stance. Even in the face of rejection, the government remains vigilant, keeping a watchful eye on these individuals.

Despite encountering resistance, Aysha is motivated to win over those shrouded in the fog of extremism. She views them not as irredeemable, but as human beings who have fallen victim to the indoctrination of extremist ideologies propagated by terrorist networks.

A touching incident in Central Java serves as a testament to Aysha’s determination. Initially resistant, an individual eventually opened up to dialogue and engagement.

In Aysha’s words, “There were several cases in Central Java, they initially resisted because they were still radicalized. That is okay, we should not force them. But we continued to approach them until they finally opened the door and talked to us, eventually participating in our activities.”

Aysha’s commitment sheds light on the complexity of post-terrorism inmates’ reintegration, demonstrating that compassion and persistence can gradually dismantle the walls built by extremist ideologies.

Dyah Ayu Kartika

Dyah Ayu Kartika, a terrorism researcher, underscores the pivotal role women play in the deradicalization process. Kartika emphasizes that, “Especially for female terrorist inmates, an initial approach by female officers proves instrumental. This strategy lays the groundwork before subsequent sessions where they engage with male facilitators.”

By prioritizing female engagement early in the deradicalization journey, it not only fosters a more empathetic connection but also sets the stage for more comprehensive sessions with diverse speakers. These subsequent sessions cover a spectrum of subjects, including religion, personality development and skills enhancement, many of which are conducted by male facilitators.

Kartika also emphasizes that there are currently no specific programs dedicated to female inmates. Consequently, they often resort to improvisation in various aspects, particularly in terms of support following their pledge of loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia.

“The declaration of loyalty to the state thus needs to be followed up by sustained and carefully planned programs,” Kartika adds in a paper, because resources to help female inmates are even scarcer than those available to men.

This approach not only recognizes the unique needs of female inmates, but also highlights the importance of a holistic and gender-sensitive methodology in the ongoing fight against terrorism. In their quiet battles, they redefine narratives, proving that within echoes of despair, the symphony of redemption prevails. National Counterterrorism Agency spokesperson, Prof. Dr. Irfan Idris, emphasizes crucial aspects relating to women’s role in counter-terrorism efforts. “Efforts by women to prevent radicalism are often overlooked, despite their visible and discreet contributions, particularly in areas susceptible to terrorism.”

Introduction:

Malaysia recorded roughly 500 terrorism-related arrests between 2013 and 2022, with the highest number between 2015 and 2018. The high number of arrests during those seven years was a consequential outcome of the Daesh global uprising. The Malaysian authorities’ focus back then was to circumvent the threat of terrorism permeating Malaysia. Many arrests were made to prevent various planned attacks, attempts to leave for Syria and dissemination of Daesh ideology. In recent years, especially since 2020, Malaysia has observed a decline in the number of arrests for terrorist-related charges in Malaysia possibly due to effectiveness of mass arrest in intimidating them and movement restrictions due to Covid-19. In 2023, a majority of the detainees have been released, and they are currently facing a new challenge of returning to society as “ex-terrorists” (to prevent unnecessary stigma, the term ex-detainee is used from here onwards) as they have completed their prison sentencing which typically lasts at least two years for rehabilitation purpose . Some served longer prison sentences due to the severity of the involvement and ideology. Therefore, the focus has now shifted towards assisting these individuals to reintegrate into society.

This article highlights the challenges faced by several ex-detainees charged with terrorism-related acts in Malaysia and their coping mechanisms to mitigate these challenges. The content presented here is retrieved from an ongoing research project funded by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (DFAT) Office of the Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism (OCT).

Challenges faced by Ex-Detainees

Trauma of Arrest

Selected ex-detainees expressed shock at the moment of arrest as they believed they did not commit a crime that was outrageously harmful such as theft or murder, but ideology related offence. This consequently leads to a risk of trauma as they perceived they had been mistreated by the authority. From the author’s interviews, ex-detainees’ belief can be aligned during the prison rehabilitation program which aimed to correct their understandings of Islam. Such efforts contribute to alleviating negative thoughts regarding their arrests. Unfortunately, there were still instances of ex-detainees who remain adamant on their violent ideology despite undergoing this program which has also been recorded in another research. Ostensibly, intervention to prevent prolonged trauma is not an immediate and linear process for selected ex-detainees. Instead, they may require a more intensive and long-term assistance to overcome such trauma. This, thus, emphasizes the need for psychological intervention to be taken into greater consideration in the rehabilitation program.

Prison Trauma

Prison’s ominous environment, proprietary to its structure and system which is meant to punish criminal offenders, may have affected the ex-detainees severely causing a deteriorating mental state long after release. In the author’s interview, the ex-detainees recounted many grim stories, including witnessing attempted suicide, sharing space with other notorious criminals, and being aggravated and subjected to constant dehumanisation by the guards in prison. This is merely a reflection of the prison structure and system in Malaysia. To overcome this issue, active measures need to be taken to improve the prison facilities and amenities to prevent long-term traumas among detainees.

Financial Struggle and Social Stigma Post-Release

Ex-detainees interviewed in this study cited financial struggles as a prevailing problem because they may come from lower socio-economic backgrounds which restricted their economic opportunities. To overcome this issue, the current rehabilitation module includes skills-based trainings for detainees. Additionally, most of the ex-detainees and their family members reported that they suffered from social stigma, caused by uncensored media reports of their arrests, placing them at further risk of isolation from society and returning to normalcy. One ex-detainee expressed her frustration with the local news for publicising her image in a handcuff which she found to be denigrating. Exacerbating this is when stigma is expressed by their own family members. Some ex-detainees’ relatives hesitated to contact or assist them due to fear of arrest and fear that their relationships be publicly known. 

Coping Mechanisms

Two common coping mechanisms reported by the ex-detainees that benefited them during imprisonment and post-release are religion/faith and familial/social support. From interviews in this study, strong faith in God equipped ex-detainees to develop resilience when facing difficulties. Learning the Quran and Hadiths enabled ex-detainees to perceive their hardships as tests from God. This is akin to what is felt by detainees in Indonesia. Their belief that their fate is destined by God facilitates them in construing that they are in servitude of a greater purpose, and their miseries are ephemeral. This instilled an optimistic outlook towards self and built their resilience.

The second most effective coping mechanism was social support. Social support, inclusive of positive feedback and encouragement from loved ones, are palpable means of sustaining a sense of mastery or competence within individuals going through adversities. These are imperative to building resilience among detainees to endure harrowing prison experiences. Although some ex-detainees had difficulties in reaching out to their relatives for help, others were privileged to have devoted family members who provided ceaseless support to them. Ex-detainees with strong familial support had expressed a more positive attitude towards self-growth and willingness to return to society.

Way Forward

Leveraging on the two coping mechanisms could facilitate successful reintegration of ex-detainees. Programs in prison should, thus, include faith-building and social activities to bolster a sense of identity and resilience among the inmates to ensure well-being during imprisonment and post-release. These programs could be particularly beneficial for inmates who have lost considerable support from their loved ones. Additionally, there is a need to restrict uncensored publications within various media outlets to prevent residual stigmas impacting ex-detainees. Otherwise, an ex-detainee’s successful reintegration into society would be impeded.

Introduction

On the last Pancasila Day (1 June 2023), 76 terror convicts at Gunung Sindur prison in Bogor declared their loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia and relinquished their baiat (pledge of allegiance) to violent extremist leaders. The number of participants in this ceremony was multiple times higher compared to similar events in other prisons. Usman Haidar bin Seff (Ustadz Fahim), a prominent Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)-linked cleric and Farid Okbah, former board member of the government-affiliated council Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council/MUI) were among them.

The well-prepared ceremony was designed with a psychological approach intended to strengthen the commitment of inmates to support Indonesia. This was exemplified via three activities.

First, national songs were played to remind participants of the sacrifices for Indonesia to achieve independence.

Second, During the ceremony, officials also demonstrated their acceptance of the terror inmates as regular members of Indonesia’s society. Notably, R. Andika Dwi Prasetya, a representative of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, hugged each inmate during the event. Such an act functions to instill a sense of acceptance and ostensibly forgiveness for their past acts of terrorism. Andika also spoke to inmates in a manner that could resonate with them. In his remark, he invited participants to give shalawat (greetings) to Prophet Muhammad and prayed for participants using phrases they were familiar with. For example, he prayed for Allah to consider the willingness of inmates to support Indonesia as a basis for them to enter heaven.

Third, the ceremony entailed inmates’ active participation. They were invited to perform Indonesian traditional dances and read poetries, while wearing traditional costumes, signifying their allegiance to Indonesia’s unity in diversity (bhinneka tunggal ika) principle.

What Next?

The ceremony is a culmination of multiagency efforts in conducting in-prison deradicalization programs as well as a point in the inmates’ journey towards deradicalization. Moving forward, what measures and steps must be considered for these 76 inmates, as well as future terrorist prisoners who wish to relinquish their allegiance to the violent cause?

The points below are worth noting.

Regular monitoring during and post imprisonment is crucial as continued psychological and theological assessments are necessary. Relinquishing baiat to a violent extremist cause, while pledging allegiance to Indonesia, does not guarantee that they will not fall back to the old ways.

Furthermore, it is more challenging for those who had played important roles in their groups or had been involved for years to change their worldviews. Of the 76 inmates, Ustadz Fahim is a likely example. Before being nabbed in 2021, he actively preached violent ideologies and supported JI founder Abu Bakar Ba’ashir. His frequent sermons garnered a substantial following that his supporters continued to preach his ideas while he was incarcerated. His experience to be a combatant in Afghanistan also gave him more credit on the view of his followers. These staunch supporters could prove to be a hurdle for Ustadz Fahim to truly abandon his past worldview, as they might assert pressure on him to return to his violent ways.

While incarcerated, monitoring should also be extended to individuals and family members who regularly visit and interact with inmates. This is to ascertain whether they present a negative influence on inmates. Indeed, family members could serve as either a dampener or reinforcer of the inmates’ radical beliefs.

A study conducted from 2016 to 2018, in which I participated as a primary investigator, discovered that several wives supported what their husbands’ violent activities in the past. A wife in Central Java, for example, did not consider the killing a pastor, which her husband committed, a mistake. She has held this view since before and event after her husband’s imprisonment.

Similarly, several wives in Central Sulawesi, supports terror operations carried out by their jailed husbands. These wives from Poso believed that Muslims are being oppressed by the Christians, who make up the majority of local population. In an interview, an inmate’s wife stated, “Over here there is no one who is a brainwashing. We are all victims of slaughter, so this is for defense so we don’t get slaughtered”. The wives espoused such views to justify the terror act the husbands carried out.

Based on this finding, the wives of the 76 inmates in Gunung Sindur should also be the primary subjects of deradicalization and receive relevant intervention from the authorities, in parallel with their husbands.

In terms of monitoring of visitors who wish to see terror inmates, it is true that prison administrations have applied strict visitor restrictions, such as only allowing family members to enter prison. Nevertheless, it is mostly enforced in maximum security prisons like Nusa Kambangan and not in medium- and low-risk prisons. Observation and data collected display the same result, showing that individuals outside family members can visit prisoners.

Gunung Sindur prison has collaborated with the mobile brigade of the police to check visitors; however, their responsibility seems to focus on inspecting what the visitors bring rather than identifying potential affiliations of them. In addition, their task also cover visitors of drug convicts, not specifically terror inmates.

The stake is higher as supporters of violent extremist groups typically continue to give support and try to engage with prisoners. The reason for this varies, including their sense of brotherhood with inmates and their determination to help the latter retain their radical beliefs.

Many give material support as well. In certain events such as Ramadhan, they care packages containing things like dates to prison. Interestingly, such care packages were purchased with money collected from donation which was marketed on social media, the campaign of which also states that the packages would be delivered to prisons.

Lastly, correctional officers and related institutions need to undertake efforts to help inmates prepare for their economic resilience after their release, not only during their imprisonment period. Thus far, prison administrations have offered multiple entrepreneurship training and skill development to each prisoner.

In a Semarang prison, in West Java, for example, prison officers allow terror convicts to sell Turkish kebabs to visitors. Similarly, the prison in East Jakarta facilitates inmates to sell cooked food inside prisons. The food was prepared by the wives and transported to prison while they are visiting their husbands. In a Sidoarjo prison, terror inmates are facilitated to manage fishponds and small farming. Additionally, many inmates across the country also produce Arabic calligraphy for sale.

Nevertheless, many in-prison entrepreneurship programs could not be continued after inmates’ release due to the inability to sell their products or apply their entrepreneurship knowledge in real society. Prison administration can actually offer wider options. Writing activities, for example, is a possible avenue despite it being a rarity currently in prisons. An ex-JI convict Arif Budi Setyawan has proven just that. He wrote articles, including in English, during his imprisonment and published books after his release.

Other initiatives such as cooking and culinary programs, video editing, information and communications technology (ICT), digital marketing, and others should be considered as well. Current programs tend to target basic common skills and largely ignore these potential areas. Kedung Pane prison in Semarang, for instance, upholds programs such as tailoring, welding, carpentry, fishery and farming, printing, soap making, and mat making, but does not provide programs in ICT.

This situation highlights the necessity to enhance the preparedness of post-prison monitoring, which will be necessary to severe the inmates’ dependence on their old circle. The Indonesian government should also be aware of the existence of charity organizations that are ready to regularly support inmates and their family members, which potentially pulls inmates back to their old communities.

Conclusion

In sum, despite their symbolic abandonment of the violent cause, the deradicalization process of the 76 inmates continues. Intensive follow-up monitoring and deradicalization program targeting the inmates and family members must be conducted. Although in many cases husbands take dominant roles in the family, examples above show that wives of extremists can also influence or reinforce their husbands’ radical beliefs. More worrying is the recidivism rate in the country in the past 20 years, which stood at 11.39%. Thus, there is an imperative to rethink options for sustainable initiatives that meet inmates’ needs in post-prison life that goes beyond just entrepreneurship programs, as not everyone has an acumen to run business. Wider options for alternative educational activities should be facilitated so that they can explore new interests.

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Introduction

Terrorism remains a serious problem in Indonesia. In recent years, women have increasingly become part of the execution stage of these acts of terror.

Between 2009 and 2020, at least 39 Indonesian women were involved in terrorism. However, this figure only represents those who have been prosecuted for such activities. Many more, whose degree of involvement varies, remain undetected.

Notably, there are at least five factors that explain women’s involvement in terrorist activities. These are marriage, the search for redemption, revenge, the pursuit of religious knowledge and the opportunity for gender equality (especially for roles that are traditionally assumed by men).

While women are assuming bigger roles in terrorism, they are also crucial in preventing and countering terrorism. Fortunately, such roles of preventing and countering terrorism are not limited to specific women such as mothers. Any women can play a part including those who were previously involved in terrorism.

This is demonstrated through a case study of how Ibu Kartini Panggabean who was associated with terrorism in Indonesia. She eventually realized the error of possessing such violent belief and now runs a school to counter such belief.

Ibu Kartini’s journey can be broken down to three stages: 1) introduction to extremist beliefs and marriage; 2) involvement in terrorism and her turning point, and; 3) deradicalization and re-engagement with society.

Stage One: Introduction to Extremist Beliefs and Marriage

Ibu Kartini hails from Tebing Tinggi, North Sumatera and has been married for several decades. Since the initial stages of marriage, she knew that her husband harboured radical belief.

Her husband, Khairul Ghazali, is a former terrorist inmate. He was known as an ideologue who also actively participated in high profile terrorist cases, including the heist at the CIMB Niaga bank in Medan and the attack on the Hamparan Perak police station.

But her marriage to Pak Ghazali was not her first exposure to such ideology. Ibu Kartini learned about Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia – NII) during her time in junior high school via exposure from various discussion fora that she participated in. At her public school, she even became known as the girl who refused to salute the Indonesian flag during the flag raising ceremony. This stemmed from her indoctrination that saluting the flag is forbidden in Islam (haram) and could compromise her faith. A scolding from her sociology teacher did little to shake her position on this.

Stage Two: Involvement in Terrorism and Turning Point

During her marriage, Ibu Kartini and her husband migrated to Malaysia for 10 years. Their stay abroad did nothing to their hardened belief. Upon their return, they opened a place for children to recite the Al-Qur’an in Tanjung Balai, Riau. Kartini’s husband was also installed as the Imam of a mosque. Leveraging on these platforms, they began to spread their violent belief.

This came to an abrupt end with the arrest of Ibu Kartini’s husband along with his five other friends. During these arrests, two were shot dead by the police. Her husband was subsequently brought to Jakarta for processsing.

Ibu Kartini was not spared herself. She was detained for a week at the Tanjung Balai police station. Upon her release, she immediately sought to reunite with her husband in Jakarta whom she later found was still in detention.

Seeing her husband behind bars challenged her belief. She was especially troubled by the impact of their detainment on their children and their extended family. She realized how her actions impacted her loved ones and prevented her from meaningful engagements such as fostering children’s education. She was particularly moved when she discovered several of her friends’ children did not attend school, for various reasons. This inspired her to open a school for children in her surrounding areas to receive formal schooling. It was this strong belief in children’s education that convinced her to let go of her radical belief and contact with her previous terrorist network.

Stage Three: Deradicalization and Re-engagement with Society

While Ibu Kartini is determined on this new cause, fortune was also on her side. With little savings, she was gifted a plot of land from her brother-in-law for agricultural use. This was out of concern that her husband might return to the terrorist network if he did not have economic avenues to sustain him and his family.

It was also during this time that she discovered a lack of prayer facility in that plot of land. With the little money she had, she decided to build a musholla, a prayer hall. Eventually, this hut expanded into a pesantren (boarding school) named Al-Hidayah Islamic Boarding School run by both Ibu Kartini and Pak Ghazali, following his release.

The pesantren was inaugurated in 2016 and initially aimed at only providing education to children of terrorist inmates and former terrorist inmates. Gradually, the pesantren accepted students living close by. This demonstrates how their community had grown to accept and trust the couple. 

This trust is also recognized when the local education authority granted an operational permit for the school. To assist with its operations, Al-Hidayah Islamic Boarding School has received support from the police, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (National Counter Terrorism Agency – BNPT), local government as well as the society.

Ibu Kartini: An Agent of Peace

Ibu Kartini and Pak Ghazali’s journey is remarkable albeit arduous and long. Initially spreading radical beliefs to being school administrators teaching children to prevent and counter radical belief.

Ibu Kartini opined that radical belief is difficult to abandon. Once an individual embraces such belief, it would take a gradual yet consistent effort to facilitate a change in worldview. Such effort includes participation in therapy, socializing with the community, attending religious classes and being open to pursue other knowledge for one to see the error of his/her way.

Ibu Kartini’s strive for children’s education rightfully earned her the title of “agent of peace.” Her experience was lauded by Siti Rofi’ah, an Islamic scholar, who explained that Ibu Kartini critically reassessed her earlier position and had the courage to explore the values of peace in Islam, as opposed to being trapped in her own narrow-mindedness. She also states that the country needs more people like Ibu Kartini to be agents of peace.

Srikandi Lintas Iman (SRILI), a partner of stratsea.com, is a women interfaith community in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The organization strive to empower women and children in various issues including terrorism. To prevent and counter terrorism, SRILI documented Ibu Kartini’s journey which can be assessed on their YouTube channel. This video is a collaboration between SRILI and the Center for Security Studies and Peace, Gadjah Mada University.

Introduction

It is arduous to understand the topology and the commitment of those previously convicted of terrorism to abandon violence. Numerous theories have been developed to explain either deradicalization or disengagement. This article proposes a new tool based on Desifter Theory to facilitate a comprehensive assessment of the individual. Via this theory, individuals would be assessed based on six channels of influences, namely, “Heaven”, “Head”, “Heart”, “Home”, “Habit”, and “Hand” (Figure 1). Such assessments would subsequently determine the type of interventions to be appropriated to the individual (i.e. customized intervention) for their desistance from terrorism.

A Glimpse of the 6H

“Heaven” entails how the individual not only perceives heaven but what they believe must be done to gain acceptance there. Generally, heaven is deemed as an exclusive reward that is difficult to attain. While attaining heaven is based on personal “performance”, daily lives would also be affected their environments, specifically how their country is governed. Therefore, in this channel of influence, individuals’ perceptions of the government and its legitimacy will be assessed.

“Head” refers to how introspective an individual is in finding alternative narratives. Often, terrorists deem their narratives as absolute truths. Through introspection, former terrorists may break away from such absolutism while replacing it with non-violent beliefs.  

“Heart” looks at the level of maturity and the deterrent effect of the criminal justice system. An individual’s level of maturity can change internally or externally. For former terrorists, this would include getting married, having children, continuing education, and even disappointment with their old groups. Meanwhile, the criminal justice system may also deter former terrorists from re-offending. Usually, the length of time an individual serves in prison influences the level of deterrence.

The author’s interpretation of “Home” is family as it is the smallest unit of interaction for former terrorists. Family can be on both sides of the coin; a family can be a supporter of terrorism or can be a pull factor in encouraging former terrorists to abandon violence.

“Habit” consists of networks, social relations, and integration. Addressing this channel is key to enabling former terrorists to abandon their old groups and to join new ones. This is done by understanding how former terrorists change their habits or environment.

Lastly, “Hand” includes factors that support a former terrorist care for themselves and their families upon their release. Special attention should be placed on their economic well-being. The more they can care for themselves, the higher the likelihood of them staying away from their previous group. This also means smoother reintegration with society.

Method

To demonstrate the effectiveness of this assessment tool, the author began by conducting a survey with 124 former terrorists in Indonesia. These former terrorists resided in 12 provinces throughout Indonesia. The impetus of the survey was to understand: 1) their condition and whether they have cut off communication with their terrorist groups, and 2) if they were willing to publicly share their experiences of abandoning terrorism in a bid to prevent others from following their footsteps and to encourage other terrorists to do the same. Of the 124 former terrorists, only 36 were willing to become involved in such efforts within a one-year frame.

To understand how they abandon terrorism, the 36 individuals were next invited to a semi-structured interview and were assessed via a behaviour checklist. Assessment from the checklists include inputs from the individual and those around him such as his wife, neighbors, and companions from the regional police. Questions for the interview and the checklist were developed based on the 6H.

To develop a typology, the author employed a software, atlas.TI, to compile the results of the semi-structured interviews and checklists. This facilitates the development of a gradation of desistance from terrorism of these 36 individuals.

Result

From the semi-structured interviews and checklists, there were 13 factors that were uncovered to influence individuals in desisting from terrorism. Collectively, these 13 factors outline what is manifested in the thoughts and behaviours of the 36 individuals. These 13 factors were subsequently classified into two groups, “Seen” and “Unseen.” This refers to what is visible and not visible in their abandonment of terrorism (Figure 2).

Seen and unseen factors are then manifested into what is still in thought and has become a behavior. A gradation of desistance can then be developed based on the number of factors one possessed.

As outlined in Figure 3, the desifter typology can be classified into four categories: primary desifter, secondary desifter, tertiary desifter, and quarternary desifter. The typology formation is based on the interval between qualifications. For example, primary desifter has n factors between 0-1 (intervals:2). This means that the lesser the n factor, the more likelihood the individual has abandoned terrorism. Therefore, it is desirable for individuals to be in the primary desifter category.

Of the 36 individuals, 21 were classified as secondary desifters (~58.3%) and 11 were classified as tertiary desifters (~30.6%). Notably, there was only one who fell into the Quartinary desifter category (~2.8%).

This highlights two important observations: 1) worryingly, only 3 individuals were in the primary desifter category (~8.3%) and 2) a total of 33.4% of the 36 individuals were in the tertiary and quarternary Desifter categories. This not only highlights a higher risk of them being recidivists but intervention for these individuals are admittedly difficult.

Conclusion

This tool based on Desifter theory provides a means to assess former terrorists and their propensity to recidivism. By assessing former terrorists based on 13 “Seen” and “Unseen” factors, a gradation of desistance from terrorism can be determined. In this study, only about 8.3% of the 36 individuals assessed posed little risk of recidivism. Additionally, extrapolating these results to the entire former terrorist population in Indonesia would, thus, highlight a significant risk of terrorist recidivism and the challenges of deradicalization. However, further research is required to ensure a representative sample size.

Introduction

On 7 December 2022, a former terrorist inmate committed a suicide bombing at a police station in Astana Anyar, Bandung, West Java, killing one police officer and wounding eight people. The perpetrator was later identified as Agus Sujatno or Agus Muslim or Abu Muslim.

The National Police (Polri) Chief General Listyo Sigit Prabowo stated that Agus was imprisoned in Nusakambangan prison for his involvement in the Cicendo Bombing 2017 and finished his sentence in October 2021. Listyo added that Agus was reluctant to join the deradicalization program. This case has raised doubt over the effectiveness of Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) deradicalization program.

Agus and Deradicalization Program

According to fellow former inmate Hendro Fernando, Agus refused to join deradicalization program in prison, earning him the category of “red” or high-risk inmate. After his release, Agus stayed in Sukoharjo, Central Java, with his family. Hendro suggested that Agus re-joined the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) network in Central Java.

Although there are still limited details about Agus’ deradicalization and rehabilitation programs, many people have voiced out their criticism against BNPT, the national body charged with executing deradicalization program. For instance, member of Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) Commission III, Santoso, argued that with regards to its deradicalization program, BNPT tends to focus on spending the allocated budget instead of genuinely trying to foster tolerance. In other words, it focuses on the “output” instead of the “outcome”.

This criticism was echoed by terrorism observer Al Chaidar, who opined that BNPT’s deradicalization program should be re-evaluated. He went further by calling for BNPT’s dissolution if the program is found to be ineffective.

The Mandate of BNPT

Based on the revised law on terrorism, Law No. 5/2018, BNPT has an overarching mandate to implement the country’s counterterrorism (CT) efforts, including formulating and implementing policies; coordinating the policies, and; conducting counter-radicalization and deradicalization programs. 

The public have high expectations toward the agency due to its overarching mandate. BNPT’s deradicalization programs have been heavily criticized because the programs preach to the converted; they mostly engage prisoners who are already disengaged or distancing themselves from violent actions. The programs also tend to focus on instilling the loyalty of the prisoners to the national ideology of Pancasila in a seminar or lecture setting. Nonetheless, BNPT also provides entrepreneurship training for the inmates, hoping that it would be useful for them once they finish their sentences and return to their respective hometowns.

The public may be more familiar with BNPT as an agency that runs deradicalization programs. In fact, however, BNPT is not the only agency which carries out this mandate. Other organizations are tasked with this as well. The Directorate General of Correction has been working closely with various civil society organizations (CSOs) in designing such programs for inmates. For instance, DGC has been partnering with Search for Common Ground (SCFG) Indonesia in creating a conflict management training program for the inmates.

Unfortunately, the coordination between BNPT and DGC tends to be poor. It remains unclear who should bear the responsibility in managing and implementing the in-prison deradicalization program.

The special CT unit in Polri, Detachment 88, also has its own program under Unit Identifikasi dan Sosialisasi (Directorate of Identification and Socialisation – Idensos). Nevertheless, it is unlikely for inmates or former inmates to participate in both Idensos and BNPT’s deradicalization programs.

Interestingly, in 2021, some former terrorist inmates petitioned to dissolve BNPT. Many of the signatories were former terrorist inmates who are under the care of Idensos. The petition claimed that BNPT’s program is ineffective and that Detachment 88’s program is more effective. Although Detachment 88 asserted that they were unaware of the petition, the petition itself indicates that inmates or former inmates do not view deradicalization program as a collaborative initiative between relevant institutions.

The Challenge of Reintegration Program

In the past few years, Polri has arrested hundreds of terrorist suspects. Polri arrested 232 and 370 terrorist suspects in 2020 and 2021 respectively. The revised law on terrorism has also empowered the security apparatus to carry out preventive detention. However, majority of terrorist suspects will only serve their sentence for three to four years as their involvement in terror plots tend to be limited. Upon their release, monitoring the movements of the former inmates and providing a regular reintegration program can be very challenging as these people are scattered across the country.

Both governmental and non-governmental agencies have attempted to provide reintegration programs for the former inmates. These programs try to assist the former inmates to reintegrate into society. For example, BNPT has developed Kawasan Terpadu Nusantara (Archipelago Integrated Area – KTN) that provides an opportunity for former inmates to work as farmers. KTN has been developed in West Java, Central Java, East Java and West Nusa Tenggara thus far.

Meanwhile, a notable initiative from a non-governmental organization (NGO) is DeBintal Foundation which was established in 2020. DeBintal is run by former terrorist inmates and supervised by Detachment 88. The foundation owns a poultry farm in Bekasi, West Java. Despite the good intention, DeBintal Foundation has received severe criticism from the “high risk” individuals. They accused DeBintal Foundation members as murtad (apostates) because they are working with Detachment 88.

Although there have been several initiatives from the government and NGOs, most of these are based in Jakarta and its neighboring cities. Regular visit to monitor the progress and current conditions of ex-inmates in all parts of Indonesia would be very taxing. Hence, the role of the regional government is important.

 In 2021, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo issued Peraturan Presiden tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme Tahun 2020-2024 (Presidential Regulation on the National Action Plan for the Prevention and Countermeasures of Violent-Based Extremism Leading to Terrorism 2020-2024). The regulation acknowledges the importance of engaging regional government in the country’s Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) efforts.

On this front, BNPT has been working with P/CVE CSOs in assisting the regional government to create their own Regional Action Plan (RAP). There are a few regional governments which have issued their own RAP, such as Aceh, Central Java and Central Sulawesi. These Plans enables the identification of necessary activities and partners in assisting the reintegration process of former inmates. However, it is still a long way to go before we can see all regions to issue their own RAP, as the process to produce one depends on the political will of regional leaders and relevant regional bodies.

Enhancing the Coordinating Role of BNPT

Dissolving BNPT may not be an appropriate solution to enhance Indonesia’s deradicalization program. Although BNPT’s programs are found wanting, Indonesia still needs a coordinating body to manage and organize all of its P/CVE initiatives.

BNPT should focus more on its coordinating role as there have been plenty of valuable initiatives in Indonesia done by both governmental and non-governmental agencies. However, sometimes the initiatives overlap with each other which leads to a waste of resources. BNPT should make the best use of its Indonesia Knowledge Hub (IK-HUB) platform to map out the existing initiatives. The platform is a work in progress and needs a lot of improvements. Relevant users should be able to easily access and navigate the site, as well as understanding the available data on the platform.

Introduction

Suicide bombing attacks are often used by terror groups as a tactic to attack their targets. Explosives are usually placed on the perpetrator’s body and detonated at a target location or near intended victims. In Indonesia, this tactic is commonly used by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), both terrorist groups. Notably, suicide bombings have become increasingly widespread after the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) and its affiliated groups such as JAD.

Originally, such attacks in Indonesia were aimed at far enemies; the United States and its allies. However, such targets became less viable due to increasing challenges such as tightening of security. This led to a shift to more accessible targets, particularly those preventing them from achieving their goals. Unsurprisingly, Indonesia’s National Police (Polri) is on top of their target list. Consequently, Polri has lost officers and its infrastructures damaged due to this crime.

On Wednesday (07/12), Polri was once again targeted via a suicide bombing on the Astana Anyar Sector Police (Polsek) headquarters while officers were carrying out morning routine. There were two fatalities, the perpetrator and an officer, and a total of nine injured officers. This attack was not spontaneously conducted. Instead, it was carefully planned through numerous surveys. This is evident from the time chosen to conduct the attack. Understanding the routine at the headquarters meant higher likelihood of inflicting significant damage.

Perpetrator and Motives

Through investigations, the 35-year-old male perpetrator was a terrorist recidivist. His main motive could be ideological based on collected evidence. This included a motorcycle bearing a message against the Revised Criminal Code.

There are only a handful of similar cases in the past revealing an ideological motive. In 2021, a female youth who attacked the National Police Headquarters was found to have a note revealing her ideological motive. Apart from demonstrating their ideological existence, particularly after the fall of IS in Syria and Iraq, this inhuman way is also a propaganda tool for recruitment into terrorist groups.

Why are Former Terrorists Reengaging in Violence?

Terrorism can be viewed through a Triple H approach, namely “heaven”, “home”, and “habit.” “Heaven” entails the religious legitimization of violence conferring afterworld rewards to perpetrators. “Home” is the actor’s relationship with family members. Here, “home” is a double-edged sword: relationships can help ex-terrorists remain deradicalized or it can drive them back to violence. “Habit” can be understood as habits, environmental influences, and networks that can influence a former terrorist actor towards recidivism.

Largely, former inmates of general crimes would be deterred from reoffending upon their release. This is due to the deterrent effect of imprisonment and the inmates adopting positive behaviours. Unlike general crimes, terrorism is driven by ideology. Indonesian terrorists believe that the criminal justice system they live in, including punishments in correctional institutions, is part of their “holy” struggle. Conversely, the regulations governing the criminalization of terrorists in Law no. 5 of 2018 only regulate criminal acts of terrorism based on their actions, not their pro-violent ideology. It is, thus, unsurprising when former terrorism inmates continue to espouse such ideology after their release.

Many countries generally use two approaches to terrorists from reoffending, namely deradicalization and disengagement. Deradicalization focuses on changing their ideology, while disengagement focuses more on social settings which have implications for their behavior. The author has proposed a new approach called Desistance from Terrorism to study how a person can escape from the snares of terror and -ism.

Desistence can be interpreted as the stage where a criminal stops committing crimes. There are two forms of desistance, namely primary desistance and secondary desistance. Primary desistance can be interpreted as a change in a person’s behavior to stop being a criminal. Not only is this temporary, there is still no clear measurement of the point at which a person stops. Secondary desistance is defined as the process of criminal taking on the role of non-perpetrators of crime. This entails a more permanent change as it requires criminals to constantly evaluate their attitudes.

Taking a leave from secondary desistance, Desistence from Terrorism looks at multi-factors about a person’s potential to stop being a terrorist. These factors consist of three channels, the first channel contains parameters regarding basic needs, narratives and networks. The second channel is the core channel which consists of family, self-introspection, maturity, economic activity, and deterrence. While the third channel consists of trust in the law, integration, social relations, and situational opportunities. When these three channels are not adequately addressed, the perpetrators will likely return to committing acts of terror.

Based on this and what has been gathered thus far, there were numerous factors that were inadequately addressed which led to the perpetrator conducting the attack on the Astana Anyar Polsek headquarters. These factors include the ideological narrative which is still pro-violence, unmet basic needs, failure to reintegrate into society and continued links with terrorist networks. Therefore, Desistance from Terrorism is a more comprehensive tool to facilitating a long-lasting change in former terrorists.

Recommendations for Stakeholders

As this attack refocuses attention to terrorism, more should be done to ensure public safety. To facilitate this, there are three policy recommendations. The first is for law enforcement agencies, especially the National Police, to immediately strengthen their premises’ security throughout Indonesia (target hardening). This is because of the potential of this attack to trigger similar actions in other regions. Improving security can be done by using crime prevention via a situational approach.

Additionally, it is crucial for stakeholders responsible for intervention to identify the ideological motives of perpetrators. Such interventions must also be tailored specifically to the needs of each perpetrator. Recognizing the need for large resources, civil societies would play a crucial supportive role in this endeavor. Finally, there is a need to increase public awareness and to co-opt them into the fight against terrorism in Indonesia. The recent attack highlights the real threat of terrorism in the country. Terrorism is not a ploy engineered by the authorities but is a social problem continues to exist.  Anyone can potentially become a victim of terrorism, not only security forces because acts of terror occur unexpectedly.

Introduction

On 7 December 2022, two blasts were registered at a police precinct on Jalan Astana Anyar, Bandung (Polsek Astana Anyar), West Java, killing the perpetrator and a police officer as well as injuring nine other officers.

Spot Report, News Coverage and Early Observations

1. On 7 December 2022, two blasts were registered at a police precinct on Jalan Astana Anyar, Bandung (Polsek Astana Anyar). The first, allegedly a suicide bombing, occurred at 8.20 Western Indonesia Time while the second one took place on 10.45.
2. As of 11.30, the blast reportedly killed the perpetrator and a police officer. The attack was carried out during morning assembly (apel pagi) by an individual brandishing a knife who attempted to get into the middle of the assembly.
3. The police believed that the perpetrator brought two explosives but only managed to detonate one. The second blast occurred several hours later as police tried to secure the area and media personnel gathered to cover the development. It was reported later that the second blast was triggered by the police for disposal purpose.
4. The police suspected the involvement of a religiously motivated violent extremist group in the blasts. The National Police’s Head of Public Information Bureau Ahmad Ramadhan stated that the counter-terrorism unit has been engaged to investigate the incidents.
5. An officer of the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) shared  that Jama’ah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) may be behind the attack, as they have carried out similar attacks previously.
6. The police are investigating a blue motorbike alleged to be used by the perpetrator. The police also found a note rejecting the recently passed Revisi Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana (revised criminal code – KUHP), stating that it is a product of an infidel government. Ironically, some of the recently passed KUHP may have religious influences (e.g. outlawing premarital sex).
7. The attack is arguably Indonesia’s most serious terrorist incident by religiously motivated violent extremists in an otherwise peaceful year. A recent notable case before this was the arrest of a female youth attempting to stage a shooting at Istana Negara.
8. This attack also occurred when national perception towards police is on decline, following multiple incidents and blunders that tarnish the reputation of the force this year.

The Perpetrator

The suicide bomber was Agus Sujatno alias Abu Muslim, a former member of Indonesian Islamic State (NII) and a  former treasurer of Jama’ah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) in South Bandung and former Pasir Putih Prison terrorist inmate. This differs from initial reports and chatters pointing to another suspect. Prior to this attack, Agus had been involved in the failed suicide attack in Cicendo, Bandung, that took place on 27 February 2017. He was the bomb maker of that incident.

Agus joined the West Java chapter of JAD in 2015. He learnt about the Islamic State (IS) and “jihad” at a Ponpes Ansorullah, a JAD school in Ciamis, West Java. He studied under the tutelage of West Java JAD leader, the late Fauzan Al Anshori. During his time there, he became acquainted with other JAD members from Jakarta, Indramayu, Solo, and Maluku, such as Iman Namakule.

Simultaneously, he visited JAD leaders imprisoned on Nusa Kambangan Island with Fauzan and other students from the school. He had met with figures such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Aman Abdurrahman from his visits in February and March 2015, respectively.

Upon conclusion of his studies, he returned to Bandung a month after and joined the JAD chapter there.

In the last three months of 2015, Agus attended regular gatherings held by his JAD unit in Yayat Cahdiyat’s house in Ciwidey district on Sundays. But such meetings ended in January 2016 due to the arrest of their cell member, Fakhri Rizqi Rafsanjani alias Usaid. Usaid was arrested on 10 January 2016 for his involvement in the attack of a TV One van in Bandung on New Year’s Eve.

Agus also took part in his JAD unit’s idad (“jihad” preparation) activities held at Al Ma’soem school in Jatinangor. These activities included physical fitness training and swimming.

From early 2016 onwards, Agus also attended large-scale gatherings held once a month by Bandung JAD in Cisarua. These gatherings were led by Syamsul Hadi and Khoirul Anam, the last of which is a leader of a JAD school in Subang.

Agus also trained in martial arts conducted by Bandung JAD in Cimahi.

He started learning bomb-making techniques from online sources in January 2017. He downloaded bomb-making manuals from a Telegram messenger channel ran by the late Bahrun Naim, an Indonesian IS fighter killed in Syria on 19 April 2018. He did that as per order from Yayat Cahdiyat, his fellow JAD cell member and the perpetrator of the aforementioned failed Cicendo suicide attack.

Yayat convinced Agus that they should bomb the West Java provincial police headquarters in Bandung and police office in Cianjur, West Java. These attacks were to avenge the deaths of two Bandung JAD members, Abu Sofi and Abu Faiz. These two were killed in a raid on Jatiluhur dam in Purwakarta on 25 December 2016, where they had concocted a plan to attack police posts in Jakarta.

By late January 2017, Agus began building a bomb laboratory in a rented house in Kebon Gedang, Batununggal. It was in this rented house where he had made his explosives. On 20 February 2017, Agus and Yayat visited Sholeh Abdurrahman alias Abu Fursan in his house whereby Yayat told him that he would conduct a suicide attack on police mobile brigade headquarters in Depok, West Java and requested money to buy a pressure cooker. Sholeh agreed to help.

On 24 February 2017, Yayat and Agus made one pressure cooker and two pipe bombs. When the bombs were ready, Yayat took the pressure cooker bomb with himself while Agus kept the pipe bombs. The same pressure cooker bomb was used in the Cicendo bombing on 27 February 2017, where Yayat was killed.

Police arrested Agus on 7 March 2017 on Cancer Street, Turangga, Bandung for his involvement in the failed attack. On 20 December 2017, the East Jakarta District court sentenced him to four years of imprisonment which he spent in Pasir Putih Prison, Nusa Kambangan Island. While in prison, Agus refused to take part in the deradicalization programs run by Detachment 88 and BNPT. Thus, it is suspected that he still held firmly to his pro- IS ideology when he was released on 14 March 2021.

Upon his released, he joined pro-IS militants and unrehabilitated former terrorist inmates in Solo, Central Java, including Yus Karman and Ibadurrahman. Yus Karman and Ibadurrahman aremanagers of Anfiqu Centre (a pro-IS charity) and Hamalatul Quran (a pro-IS school). There, he worked as a parking attendant and bolstered his pro-IS stance. Following that, he returned to Bandung to prepare his attack on the Astana Anyar Police Precinct.

Agus Personal Life

Agus’ father is Wahid (deceased) and his mother is Sa’adah, a housewife. Agus was the first of two children in his family. His younger sister is Derawati Ningsih, a worker at a garment factory in Bandung.

He was married to Fitri Sania but later divorced her. Fitri is currently married to Sholeh Abdurrahman and lives with Sholeh’s parents in Bandung. Agus has a son with Fitri, called Abdulloh Usama who currently lives with Sholeh’s parents too.

Agus’ educational background is as follows:

a. Graduated from SDN Gumuruh 4 in 2001;

b. Graduated from  SMPN 20 Bandung in 2004;

c. Graduated from STM Taman Siswa in 2007; and

d. Enrolled as undergraduate student in Islamic Education at University of Islam Nusantara (UNINUS), but dropped out in the second semester.

Possible Reasons for the Attack

There are three possible reasons for the attack. First, Agus wanted to seek revenge on the police for killing Yayat Cahdiyat on 27 February 2017. Second, he wanted to demonstrate to the public that IS supporters in Indonesia still exist. Third, he wanted to encourage other IS supporters not to give up and continue to attack enemies of IS.

Way Forward

The suicide attack by Agus highlights the security impact and ongoing problem of recidivism. The Indonesian government needs to take steps to prevent similar attacks in the future. The police also needs to identify former inmates with bomb-making skills and monitor their movements. Significant effort must be taken to prevent them from regrouping with their old networks.

Second, the Indonesian government is strongly encouraged to revise the Anti-Terrorism Law Number 5/2018 to include an article stipulating that perpetrators of terrorist crimes are to be imprisoned until they are rehabilitated. This article should also oblige terrorist inmates and their families to take part in the government’s deradicalization program.

Third, this attack highlights the continued perception of Indonesian security agencies as enemies of religiously motivated violent extremists. Notably, this is one of numerous attacks or attempted attacks on police officers and their premises since 2010. This attack is testament for the need for improved security for police officers and infrastructure. However, such improvements could be hindered by a negative national perception towards them.

Malaysia’s Deradicalization & Disengagement Approach

Malaysia employs a combination of deradicalization and disengagement to prepare terrorist inmates for their eventual reintegration into their communities. This combinative approach is evident in the modules developed for terrorist inmates in Malaysia.  These modules were developed by experts from various public-private entities in Malaysia in 2015. Used and referred to both domestically and internationally, these modules have assisted Malaysia to cap its recidivism rate to between 1% to 3% in 2018 while achieving a rehabilitation rate of 97%.  This combinative approach centres on seven factors as illustrated below: 

From Figure 1, these seven factors are used by the Malaysian government to address multiple important aspects to assist terrorist inmates give up their pursuit of violence and prepare them for reintegration upon their release from prison. These factors focus on ideological, religious, educational, vocational, social, creative arts therapy, sports and recreation, and psychological aspects.  Since most violent extremist inmates in Malaysia are Muslims, the Religious Rehabilitation Program was introduced in deradicalization programs to address the religious aspect.

Additionally, most of these programs are based on re-education and rehabilitation. Re-education focuses on correcting political and religious misconceptions of these inmates, while rehabilitation is aimed at monitoring them upon their release. Also, as part of rehabilitation, inmates are assisted to ensure smooth reintegration into their communities. Throughout this process, their family members are also engaged as beneficiaries of financial support particularly when the inmates are still detained.

Malaysia’s CT Efforts Influenced by Political Developments and COVID-19

As time is crucial in deradicalization programs, the running of these programs could be influenced by numerous factors including domestic politics. In the past four years alone, Malaysia has experienced several changes in government and saw the appointment of a new head in the country’s Counter Terrorism department.

In 2011, at the verge of political reforms in Malaysia, there were loud sentiments against the Internal Security Act (ISA), deemed to be ‘draconian.’ This led to the ISA being replaced by the Security Offences on Special Measurement Act (SOSMA) in 2012 followed by the Prevention of Crime Act (POCA) and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). However, the counter terrorism landscape has changed as both laws and deradicalization modules are used as a measurement of effectiveness. These modules are developed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Malaysian National Security Council (MKN), Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM), and Prison Department (Jabatan Penjara). Even though the link between public and private entities began in 2015, academics and experts from NGOs such as IMAN Research, Merdeka Centre, CONCAVE, Wasatiyyah Centre for Peace, KITA, MyRISS, ABIM, and PKPIM were only engaged in 2017 especially with the appointment of Ustaz Zamihan Mat Zain Al-Ghari as deradicalization coordinator former Deputy Prime Minister, Dato Seri Zahid Hamidi.

However, such engagements ended abruptly after Pakatan Harapan’s (PH) landslide win in the 2018 General Election (GE14). Additionally, deradicalization programs were confined to prisons with the involvement of only JAKIM and MKN. Ustaz Zamihan was subsequently reassigned from his position as deradicalization coordinator due to his political views which were critical of the PH government.     

Additionally, the country’s Counter Terrorism Department saw Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay being replaced by Normah Ishak in February 2020. This led to a change in stance for the department. Under Ayob Khan’s purview since 2001, the department adopted zero-tolerance for any form of terrorism in Malaysia. This led to many arrests to prevent and counter violent extremism.  This seemingly changed under Normah Ishak’s directorship. At her helm, there was a significant decrease in the number of raids and arrests which may indicate a decrease in terrorism-related activities. However, if not careful, switching to a softer approach may pose a security risk as a zero-tolerance preventative approach is arguably more ideal for dealing with subversive elements. This is particularly so when the pandemic has led to social restrictions, hindering terrorism. From the author’s interview with a senior Malaysian Special Branch officer, such social restrictions increase opportunities for online radicalization at home and future lone-wolf attacks.

But, Malaysia has continued to remain effective in mitigating terrorism particularly with its  vast experience in dealing with the scourge of terrorism from the time of the communist insurgency and also due to its effective surveillance & monitoring program by MSB. 

With lesser arrests, there are now lesser deradicalization programs being conducted. From the author’s research of such cases since 2014, there were only seven arrests were recorded in 2020 compared to 72 in 2019 and 119 in 2018. Despite the reduced arrests, the Prison Department and the police (PDRM) still encounter challenges in managing and ensuring the effectiveness of deradicalization programs. With limited intellectual resources as private entities are no longer involved, the Prison Department and PDRM continue to rely on their own resources to manage inmates’ rehabilitation activities. The author also argues that this is complicated by their preference to not work with “outsiders” in such programs. Though the Prison Department and PDRM arguably do not entertain encroachments into their “territories”, exceptions are made via ministerial instructions to invite academics into their compounds.

Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic has further hampered the integration of civil society and authorities in PCVE-related matters / activities in Malaysia. Before the pandemic, there was synergy between CSOs and authorities on PCVE including deradicalization programs. CSOs were actively involved in post-prison activities such as preparing inmates for integration, finding employment and emotional support. The PDRM and the Prison Department initiated a series of engagement with NGOs directly under the observation of Ustaz Zamihan. During COVID-19, cooperation between agencies (government and CSOs) lessened and seemed to be confined to webinars, and online forums and conferences. There were also no more field engagements between CSOs and the authorities towards prevention and integration initiatives. Moreover, urgent government initiatives such as the National Action Plan (NAP) on violent extremism excluded the role of CSOs in PCVE and public-private initiatives were discontinued. These initiatives were considered as the new paradigm on deradicalization and were initiated by the Ministry of Home Affairs.  

In March 2020, Malaysia encountered a change in government with the ascendence of Perikatan Nasional (PN); a new coalition government which comprises both incumbent and opposition parties. This untested government without a confirmed majority focused on two main issues: 1) an uphill battle to contain the COVID-19 pandemic, and 2) to retain their power. Therefore, deradicalization programs were no longer prioritized. This led to the Prison Department and the PDRM to perform their duties in such programs seemingly without clear directions from the government. With the lack of directions and new approaches, arguably, there has yet to be new developments in Malaysia’s deradicalization programs. With the installation of Ismail Sabri as PM9, the same fate awaits deradicalization programs in Malaysia. As the country is transiting from a pandemic to an endemic status, Ismail Sabri’s government is geared towards retaining political power, sustaining the government, and on social and economic recovery rather than on deradicalization. This is particularly so when the new government experienced several state elections and party defections.   

On a positive note, deradicalization programs in the country continue to include a rigorous evaluation process. Unsurprisingly, the chief executors of this evaluation are the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Prison Department and the PDRM. Inmates will be evaluated psychologically, on their religious understanding and the concept of the role of citizens in nation building. PDRM also uses Digital Voice Stress Analysis (DVSA) also known as ‘Lie Detection’; a procedure used for detection of deception and truth verification to determine psychological stress profiles. Meanwhile, the Prison Department routinely measures psychological, moral and rehabilitation effectiveness by using in-house Likert scales. Both of these agencies hold equal shares to completing 80% of the evaluation process, while the Ministry of Home Affairs is responsible for the remaining 20%. Notably, the Ministry of Home Affairs appoints counselors and psychologists from JAKIM and MKN to assist in inmates’ deradicalization. Trained religious leaders and counsellors from various government departments are also seconded to assist in these programs.

Conclusion

As highlighted above, the right approach is central to ensuring the success of rehabilitation and reintegration of violent extremist inmates. Unfortunately, recent deradicalization efforts in Malaysia were hampered by domestic politics and COVID-19. Despite this and the decrease in the number inmates, deradicalization efforts must continue as the terrorism threat remains. This is reinforced by the possibility of terrorism-related activities increasing post-pandemic leading to higher number of arrests. It is, thus, important to strengthen deradicalization efforts in Malaysia now when the threat is seemingly on the decline.

One way to do so is the inclusion of external parties. The involvement of external experts contributes to 1) assist the government in rehabilitation programs and 2) to prevent recidivism. Experts such as academics will be beneficial as their approaches and recommendations are based on analyzing data. They can greatly contribute to measuring the level of radicalization during and post-imprisonment. CSOs are also crucial in curbing the threat of terrorism and its impacts. This is because of their active involvement in community-based programs while also rendering psychological support to released inmates and their families.

Through a synergistic relationship between government and private entities, deradicalization efforts can mature quickly and more holistically while increasing the safety of Malaysians.

Article provided by the Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies (PAKAR), a partner of stratsea.com.

Introduction

In Indonesia, there are several notable cases of former terrorists abandoning violence and striving for peace. This article focuses on former terrorist Ali Fauzi Manzi and his circumstances in becoming an advocate for peace.

Ali Fauzi Manzi’s Initiation into Violence

Ali Fauzi Manzi is the youngest brother of three terrorist perpetrators; Mukhlas, Amrozi, and Ali Imron. These perpetrators were responsible for the 2002 Bali Bombings, which killed 202 people, injured 209, and devastated Kuta, Bali. For their crimes, Mukhlas and Amrozi were executed while Ali Imron is still serving a life sentence.

After the arrest of his three brothers, the Jamaah Islamiyyah (JI) network placed high expectations on Ali Fauzi Manzi to commit acts of terror in Indonesia like his brothers. This was because Ali Fauzi not only possessed militant skills but also due to his reputation, both in Indonesia and abroad. Notably, he was repeatedly successful in entering Indonesia from Mindanao undetected and had attended numerous militant training camps of the Jamaah Islamiyyah (JI) in Malaysia and the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines.

What led Ali Fauzi Manzi to become a JI member? He stated that one crucial factor was the role of kinship or family relations. His interest in joining this terrorist group peaked when he was invited to join by his family, particularly from his three elder siblings. His membership to JI allowed him to forge closer ties with his brothers as they would regularly discuss about their shared interpretations of Islam and undergoing tough militant trainings at various JI camps in several countries.

Another contributing factor was the influence of his peers. Not only does his peers provide him a sense of camaraderie but served as echo chambers reinforcing his believe of JI’s ideology. Interestingly, such peer influence is evident in numerous Indonesian terrorists. Additionally, there are other factors that can lead one to violence. These include the level of exposure to doctrines as takfîr, jihâd qitâl, fa’i, al-walâ’ wa al-barâ’, khilafah islamiyyah, and thâghût (considering who do not share their beliefs as enemies).

Humane Treatment as a Cognitive Opening for Peace

However, fate dictated another path in 2006. After his participation in  the Ambon and Poso riots between 1999-2000, he rejoined his peers at militant training camps in the Philippines. He was eventually arrested by the Philippine authorities in 2004 and extradited to Indonesia as a terrorist detainee in 2006.

Ali Fauzi Manzi recalled being extremely fearful of the imagined violent interrogation sessions and torture that awaited him upon his arrival in Indonesia. However, the reality was vastly different. The humane treatment he received from the Indonesian police led him to rethink his path. He began realizing his mistakes which culminated in him abandoning violence and instead championing peace.

Notably, both Ali Fauzi Manzi and his brother, Ali Imron, have chosen to become peace activists striving to inspire change for those who are still steadfast in their extremist ideology. They are also directly involved in reconciliation efforts with the victims and their families affected by the first Bali Bombing.

To ensure a more sustained peacebuilding effort, Ali Fauzi founded the Peace Circle Foundation (YLP) in 2017, intended to facilitate former terrorists and combatants to pursue peace. Despite his good intentions, Ali Fauzi’s path for peace did not always run smoothly. Initially, the victims and their families were reluctant to accept any attempts of reconciliation, considering the physical, material, and human losses. Through his perseverance and earnest intent, victims and their families eventually accepted Ali Fauzi’s apology and forgave him.

YLP: Building a Peaceful Community

Based in Tenggulun Lamongan, East Java and with 60 administrators, YLP’s primary focus is to facilitate cognitive and behavioural changes in current and former terrorist inmates throughout Indonesia. Complementing this, YLP also actively reach out to their families through numerous initiatives including literacy classes, skills training, dialogue and house visits.  Recognizing their endeavours, the Indonesian government has assisted YLP in the renovation of the Al-Muttaqin Mosque and the Al-Quran Education Park (TPA) as an educational center for local children to instill nationalism (hubul wathan).

Recently, YLP had assisted the Indonesian government in accelerating Covid-19 vaccinations, especially for community members, YLP members, and Al-Islam students located in Tengulun Village, Solokuro District, Lamongan Regency.

Conclusion

Based on Ali Fauzi Manzi’s experiences, there are several factors that are crucial in the pursuit of long-lasting peace: 1) the importance of direct interactions between perpetrators and victims in reconciliation efforts; 2) the need to assist cognitive and behavioural changes in current and former terrorist inmates including their families, and 3) the Indonesian government’s support for community initiatives led by former terrorist inmates. Collectively, these will not only help victims and perpetrators of terrorism find resolution but also helps rebuild trust between the community and former terrorists.