Introduction

At the end of April 2022, the Madago Raya operation task force fatally shot Askar alias Pak Guru who was a member of East Indonesia Mujahideen (MIT) in a shootout in Parigi Moutoung Regency, Central Sulawesi. His death brought the number of MIT members down to two men. Pivotal to this was the joint operation between the Indonesian National Police (Polri) and the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI). However, TNI was not immediately involved in the operation initially codenamed “Camar Maleo” in January 2015. TNI only became involved upon Polri’s request for assistance in September 2015. By then, the operation was re-coded as “Camar Maleo III”. Assistance was requested as Polri encountered difficulties in conducting the mission due to the difficult terrain, exacerbated with its personnel lacking skills in jungle warfare. More adapt to such terrain and warfare, TNI’s involvement was expected to improve the success of the operation.

Within months of its involvement, TNI slain Santoso, the leader of MIT. Despite its initial success, the operation protracted for seven years with two members still on the run. Many hoped for the Madago Raya operation to end soon. Locals have voiced their concerns about the never-ending operation because it has disrupted their daily lives. Upon assessing the current situation in Poso, TNI Commander-in-Chief Gen. Andika Perkasa believes that the situation in Poso is now more stable. Thus, he hopes that the police would call for the termination of the operation. Gen. Andika added that TNI has gradually began to withdraw its forces from Poso since March 2022.

This operation piqued debates on the involvement of the military in counterterrorism. Engaging TNI in counterterrorism is a sensitive issue in Indonesia due to its repressive nature during the New Order. This article will not only discuss the common concerns about involving the military, but also identifies other factors which should be addressed.

The Debates on TNI’s Involvement in Counterterrorism

The relatively successful, though protracted, operation should bring us to discussions on enhancing the effectiveness of the military for future operations. Although TNI is well-known for its capabilities in jungle warfare, its personnel were still impeded by Poso’s difficult terrain. However, discussions on military effectiveness are often downplayed particularly due to various socio-political issues. Instead, the bulk of the attention is on limiting the military’s role in counterterrorism because of fears that granting a greater involvement for the military would lead to extensive human rights violations and the return of the military to its internal security role.

Under the mandate of the revised law on terrorism, Law No. 15/2018, the Indonesian government is supposed to issue a Presidential Regulation (Perpres) on the Rules of Engagement (RoE) of the military in counterterrorism operations. This Perpres should have been issued a year after the ratification of the revised law. Yet, it has been four years since the ratification and there are currently no updates on when the Perpres would be issued. Unfortunately, the Perpres issue would only become news headlines following any related incidents. For instance, in March 2022, House Commission I member Maj. Gen. (Rtd) T.B. Hasanuddin called for the government to expedite the issuance of the Perpres on TNI in counterterrorism following the death of eight civilians in Papua who were killed by an armed criminal group (KKB) in Papua. He asserted that the military should be deployed in operations against KKB and the Perpres would serve as a legal protection for the military in carrying out its duties. He even used a strong rhetoric that KKB has violated human rights due to their brutalities. Ironically, human rights violations have always been the main concern of involving the military in counterterrorism operations. By highlighting the brutal acts of KKB against innocent civilians, it serves to neutralize any concerns about the military’s human right abuses. Additionally, it shifts the discourse to the urgent need to deploy the military against KKB threats.

In recent years, the Indonesian government has released a draft of the Perpres several times. This enabled the public to assess the draft and provide feedbacks. Civil society organisations in Indonesia opposed the draft due to the clauses that they believe will allow TNI to be involved in all stages of counterterrorism measures, including preventive, enforcement, and rehabilitation programmes. They asserted that it would only exacerbate the overlapping responsibilities already shared by key stakeholders such as Polri, National Intelligence Agency (BIN), and National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT).

Intense opposition to the draft is ostensibly due to the men behind the draft itself. According to a 2020 investigation, the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Legal, and Human Rights assigned the Ministry of Defence to craft the draft of the Perpres. The Ministry also involved other relevant stakeholders from the military to provide suggestions, such as the TNI Headquarter, TNI’s Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), TNI’s Legal Office, and representatives from the special forces. Due to the military dominance, the draft represents the institutional belief and interests of TNI. Despite attempts to accommodate public opinions, there is little impact to the draft as drafters are dominated by the military officers. It was also found that TNI lobbied house members to support the draft.

Pondering Beyond the Established Debates

Ironically, the prolonged debates also created a “gray area” for TNI in conducting its activities. The existing regulations are truly vague which emphasizes an urgent need for a Perpres that can draw clear boundaries. Regardless of the on-going criticism, TNI has carried out various counterterrorism efforts, including counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation programmes. The territorial command structures, which enables TNI to have its own representatives at each regional level down to the village level, regularly carry out Management Territorial (Pembinaan Teritorial or Binter) to improve the living conditions of the people and encourage them to support and protect the national ideology of Pancasila. In Poso, they conducted various activities to “win the hearts and minds” of locals and distance them from the influence of MIT members. These activities included renovating houses, providing health care services, and holding seminars on the dangers of radicalism and terrorism. TNI will not be changing its policy of using Binter to counter terrorism especially when it has always been an intrinsic part of TNI’s mandate since its establishment.

The Perpres is also urgently needed to provide legal protection for the newly minted unit, Special Operations Command (Koopsus). TNI reinvigorated the Special Operations Command (Koopsus) in 2019 in which 80% of Koopsus’ duty was claimed to be on intelligence and surveillance. On paper, Koopsus is not an official intelligence agency, hence there would be limitations on how it conducts missions. Interestingly, one of the early deployments of Koopsus was an evacuation of Indonesians from Wuhan, China. This deployment was not a counterterrorism operation per se. Nevertheless, Koopsus’ capabilities were necessary in the operation as a pre-emptive measure against unwanted terrorist attacks during the evacuation process. Without a clear and legitimate regulation, similar deployments in the future might be subjected to criticism as public will assume that the deployment is beyond the scope of the unit’s duties.

We cannot deny the fact that increasing TNI’s involvement in counterterrorism will allow the military to gain more state resources and justify the existence of its territorial command structures which has always been the target of military reformers. These issues are relevant and should be addressed accordingly. However, it has been more than four years since the revised law on terrorism was ratified and the debates remain stagnant. There are also other areas of debates that should have been explored to understand what should be done to improve the military’s capabilities and maximise their contributions to the country’s counterterrorism efforts.

There is also a concern that discussions on military effectiveness might be exploited by the military to gain more material benefits for the institution. However, enhancing military effectiveness is not only about increasing military budget and acquiring advance equipment. It is also to ensure that the military can adapt to the changing threats and environment, receive adequate training and education, and develop appropriate doctrines. Koopsus, for instance, comprises of personnel from the military’s special forces of each service, but it would take time for the personnel to adjust themselves with the unit’s joint doctrine. Training and experiences would be valuable for the unit to improve its capabilities.

Notably, discussions on military effectiveness tend to be minimal among public. Further, there are limited academics or activists who have the knowledge and technical expertise that could enhance the military effectiveness. The military would, thus, be better suited and should be given a degree of autonomy to technical issues. Nevertheless, the involvement of civilians who have such knowledge is also important to create a good mechanism for checks and balances. By doing so, the debates will not only revolve around socio-political issues but also ensuring that the country has a capable and functioning military.

Lastly, there is a valid fear that involving the military would only exacerbate the perennial problem of overlapping responsibilities among relevant stakeholders. However, overlapping responsibilities cannot be solely blamed on the military. It has always been an acute problem among governmental and non-governmental agencies. The government should ensure the implementation of Perpres No. 7/2021 on the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE). One of the clauses stipulates the creation of an integrated database on P/CVE efforts. This would supplement the upcoming Perpres on TNI’s Rules of Engagement (RoE) in counterterrorism.

Conclusion

Deploying the military is not the ultimate solution to eradicate terrorism in Indonesia. However, TNI’s role is inevitable when threats escalate beyond the capabilities of Polri. Current debates on TNI’s involvement in counterterrorism often sidestep discussions on the effectiveness of TNI in such operations. Instead, debates largely centre on limiting its role for fear of human rights abuses by TNI. What is crucial for Indonesia’s counterterrorism efforts is firstly for the issuance of PerPres on RoE to be expedited. The much-needed PerPres will not only enforce boundaries on the military but also provide legal protection to TNI when carrying out its duties. Secondly, debates on military effectiveness should be intensified with the involvement of capable civilian authorities. Such discussions should go beyond increasing military budget and acquiring advance equipment. Through such discussions, TNI would be capable of mitigating future threats to Indonesia including terrorism. Lastly, there must be stronger efforts to deconflict overlapping responsibilities in counterterrorism. This would include the implementation of regulations facilitating the creation of an integrated database on P/CVE.

Introduction

Since the introduction of information technology and the Internet, radicalisation and violent extremism (VE) have transcended from the real world to cyberspace. Moreover, the on-going COVID-19 pandemic has also facilitated an increase in online radicalisation at the comforts of their own homes including in Malaysia.

Despite the lockdowns, there must be continued, or even heightened, vigilance as VE is seemingly unaffected by the pandemic. Instead, violent extremists have exploited trauma and disruptionsstemming from the pandemic.  Unfortunately, such trauma and disruptions provide fertile ground for extremist propaganda to manifest, potentially leading to radicalisation. A case in point is the recent attack in a New Zealand supermarket by an Islamic State (IS) sympathizer which demonstrates how IS ideology still appeals to disgruntled Muslims residing in western countries. Worryingly, this is overlayed with fears of a resurgence of bloodshed in the wake of the Taliban’s announcement of an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan.

VE groups have broadened their narratives surrounding the pandemic situation. Here, three new narratives are highlighted: 1) The notion of deeming those who are radicalized as contagious and can spread via simple human interactions. Such notion heightens stigmatization rather than encouraging engagements and interventions with such individuals. 2) Exploiting the mistrust, unhappiness, and mutual grievances from the pandemic to pique the interests of potential members and reinforce current members worldview. 3) Generation of symbols and conspiracy theories amidst the uncertainties of the pandemic.

The traditional approach to preventing and countering VE has always been through hard modalities such as the law, policies, and regulations. However, considering the current pandemic, key actors within the community and the nuclear family unit should also be responsible for preventing and countering VE. One such endeavour would be the community’s provision of support to vulnerable individuals such as youths. However, this is no simple task as technological advancement has allowed vulnerable individuals to shut themselves off from the physical world, trapping them in online echo chambers that could prepare them for violence. The following sections outline the rigid approach taken by Malaysia in dealing with violent extremism, both online and offline.

Hard Approach –Legal Measures

In the war against terror, Malaysia had passed two significant legislations, namely the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015 (POTA) and the Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act 2015 (SMATA). Like others, Malaysia focused on mitigating VE by incorporating laws, regulations and policies. The POTA 2015, which was enacted under Article 149 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution, allows Malaysian authorities to imprison terror suspects without charge for two years without a trial and the possibility of judicial review [Section 13(1)(b)]. The incarceration, however, will be reviewed by the King-appointed Prevention of Terrorism Board [Section 19(1)]. SOSMA is another law created to deal with VE and is a preventive statute that was enacted to safeguard residents’ lives and properties. The Act establishes unique procedures for dealing with security offences and recognises the considerable threats that terrorism, sabotage, and espionage pose to internal security and public order.

In 2007, the Penal Code was revised to cover terrorism-related offences under Chapter VIA. Performing terrorist actions (Section 130C), giving devices to terrorist groups (Section 130D), recruiting terrorists or participating in terrorist acts (Section 130E), providing training and guidance to terrorist groups, and those committing terrorist acts were cited as new offences among others (Section 130F). The Criminal Procedure Code was also changed in light of the new anti-terrorism provision in the Penal Code, granting the police and the Public Prosecutor a broad range of investigative authorities, including the ability to intercept communications. Sections 106A and 106C gave authorities the power to intercept, hold, and open mail and messages sent by telecommunications, with any intercepted communications becoming admissible as evidence in terrorism trials. Without proper human rights, content-based safeguards, these powers could be used with a low threshold of proof. A criticism of such powers is that, if they are based on these unconstrained definitions, investigations into alleged terrorist activities that are defined broadly could lead to a slew of civil liberty violations.

Soft Approach and Public Engagements

The war on terror has always been military detention and neutralisation of terrorists. However, it is ideal to complement such hard approach with a de-radicalisation strategy or soft approach focused more on human security than national security. This strategy would target marginalised communities that are vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist groups. Thus, the role of communities in preventing and responding to terrorism has been prominent in current government strategies.                                                                                                            One non-legal measure in preventing VE is engaging non-governmental actors, the private sector and academics while providing knowledge for the push and pull factors in terrorist recruitment. Another preventive measure is the counter-propaganda strategy, which aims to confront disinformation campaigns and promote non-violent values by providing counter and alternative narratives. A community can also attain a similar sense of security provided by the government, albeit from a different method such as the softer approaches, including defining mainstream boundaries through creating acceptable boundaries and passive observation of the environment to ensure compliance. In other words, community policing. Though similar to the rigid approach through securitisation, communities can achieve the same outcome via social justice.

Public engagement efforts include a wide range of initiatives, such as actively involving communities, schools, universities, youth agencies, police, and families of violent offenders and those considered at risk of radicalisation. Together with Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Singapore, Malaysia has state-sponsored de-radicalisation programs that provide counter-terrorism intervention for mid-ranking and grassroots members of radical organisations .Support ranges from various mechanisms such as mentoring, life skills, skills counselling, anger management training, education opportunities, sports, job placement/employment assistance, family support, drug or alcohol rehabilitation program and housing support. Such integration of soft and hard legal approaches to oppose extremist ideologies and ideas with proper guidance and vital religious precepts is reported to achieve a high success rate of 97.5 per cent.

In early 2016, Malaysia also built a counter-messaging centre intended to erode IS’s appeal by exposing the group’s message of hate and violence while also promoting inclusiveness. Furthermore, in an attempt to harmonise a softer approach, the National Security Council (NSC) created the Counter-Terrorism Policy in 2017, which emphasises five points, namely condemning all forms of terrorism, guaranteeing security for hostages’ lives and properties, prioritising negotiated solutions, avoiding hostage exchanges to settle the problem, and striking action as a last resort if negotiations fail. However, despite non-legal preventive actions or bottom-up strategy, Malaysia, unlike Indonesia, appears to place greater emphasis on securitisation mechanisms or a law enforcement-centric approach rather than close partnership with civil society.

Conclusion

Combatting violent extremism would be effective with the inclusion of community and civil society. However, relying on a rigid approach or securitisation by the government alone would be problematic to prevent and counter violent extremism. Therefore, legal and non-legal approaches must be in synergy to effectively counter and prevent terrorism. Such synergy would lead to more public-private sector and civil society collaboration and cooperation. Furthermore, before communities can rebuild their faith and trust in government, governments must put their faith and trust in them. If and when this occurs, community-based counterterrorism will become more common and effective. Perhaps the time has come for the government to realise the potential of the community as a whole in countering the narratives of violent extremism. If there is one thing that we can learn from this pandemic, terrorism will always find ways to evolve.

Introduction

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the spread of violent extremist ideology has increased. Because of social restrictions, there has been a shift in tactics used by violent extremists to spread their ideologies and conduct their activities. For instance, violent extremist organizations are now more reliant on technology and social media to spread their ideologies. Also, the pandemic has altered the domestic threat landscape and provided a platform for people of various ideologies to openly advance agendas and propagate justifications for radical and nationalistic misinformation, fake news, and conspiracy theories. The potential rise in online terrorist content and a broader acceptance of it, ostensibly due to the significant number of lives affected by the pandemic, increases the chances of radicalization. Unfortunately, Malaysia is not spared from this threat.

Trends of Radicalization during COVID-19

The internet is a double-edged sword. While increasing access to knowledge, it also promotes radicalization and indoctrination through digital media. Its low cost, dynamic, globally-connected, and decentralized networks facilitate online radicalization. Additionally, the emergence of technology has created pathways for diverse ideologies to take root. Social media, for example, serves as a tool for jihadi recruitment. From personal interviews with local law enforcement agencies, Malaysia is experiencing similar trends.

Since 2019, violent extremist groups have exploited the prevailing pandemic to advance their cause. Violent extremists are riding on the rising public anger due to the pandemic towards governments. By leveraging on this public anger while providing “solutions”, violent extremist groups intend to increase opportunities to overthrow governments while increasing public support for themselves. Not only does the pandemic aid violent extremist groups in their attempts to destabilize national security, but it is also an opportune time for groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) to rebuild after years of counterterrorism efforts against them.

Additionally, violent extremist groups have adapted their narratives around the pandemic. There is a growing sentiment that radicalized individuals are contagious and can spread the “disease” through interactions like the coronavirus. Unfortunately, this breeds mistrust towards specific communities, establishing the fertile ground for recruitment by violent extremist groups. Such groups would exploit the mistrust and mutual grievances to garner support from potential recruits while reinforcing their members’ worldviews.

This phenomenon is also experienced in Muslim-majority Malaysia particularly in certain Malay communities. These communities generally propagate the belief that COVID-19 is “God’s punishment” for those who do not share their ideologies. They also propagate anti-vaccine propaganda.

Malaysia is currently facing threats from several violent extremist groups, including Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Abu Sayyaf Group, and IS. Additionally, Malaysia’s political instability has exposed the country to the possibility of politically-driven radicalization, in addition to religious-based extremism. Noteworthily, politically-driven radicalization has yet to culminate to terrorism in Malaysia. From personal interviews, the authors found that in Malaysia, such radicalization is connected with a range of issues, including politics, religion, race and gender relations, and the government’s failure to manage the pandemic effectively.

The abrupt change of government in Malaysia has also created several uncertainties, affecting the drafting and implementation of P/CVE policies by government agencies such as the police and intelligence. The change of government has led to a change in priorities and agenda within the new government. The new government has shifted their focus from hard policing to soft policing and has called for the participation of civil society to join the government in being first responders of radicalization and terrorist attacks. Malaysia is also concerned about JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir in Indonesia as his release might reactivate JI networks in Malaysia. Currently, the JI network in Malaysia has shifted its allegiance to IS-linked groups in Southeast Asia and have decentralized cells operating in both online and offline domains.

The nexus between violent extremism developments in Indonesia and Malaysia is evident. In the latest Indonesian church bombing in March 2021, Malaysian sympathizers have supported calls for more powerful bombs to be used for future attacks in their social media accounts which includes both Malaysian and Indonesian followers. As Indonesian extremists target the police and non-Muslims, there is a possibility that the Malaysian followers may adopt such notions, potentially leading to the police and non-Muslims being targeted in Malaysia.

Furthermore, prior to COVID-19, there was an increasing trend of violent extremism in East Malaysia due to the increasing support for such groups in Sabah and the southern Philippines. These groups have established Tawau and Sandakan in Sabah as new transit points for their entry into Southern Philippines and Myanmar. Users of these transit points include both Malaysians and foreigners of diverse nationalities including those from distant conflict zones. The list of those arrested includes Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iraq, Myanmar, the Philippines, Turkey, Yemen and Xinjiang.   It is likely that these transit points will be utilized again once travel restrictions are lifted. In addressing this growing threat from its citizens and foreigners, the Malaysian government has ratified the international treaties on terrorism from the United Nations Security Council Standing Committee on Terrorism.

The Malaysian government has supported other international efforts to combat violent extremism. This includes supporting ASEAN’s collaboration with Canada and Russia to combat International Terrorism and the establishment of the ASIA-Europe meeting (ASEM), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Counter-Terrorism Taskforce and Commonwealth Committee on Terrorism (CCT).  Malaysia has also supported regional efforts, including the ASEAN Political and Security Blueprint (2015-2025), The 2017 Manila Declaration, and the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism (ASEAN PoA PCRVE). One notable international initiative that Malaysia developed was the 2015 Langkawi Declaration on the Global Movement of Moderates. This declaration outlines measures to promote moderation and curb extremism globally. Malaysia’s support for these initiatives stems from its long history of grievances concerning the political, economic, racial, ethnic, and religious and ease of spreading hate-related ideologies.

Malaysian Legal Landscape and Threat of Terrorism

To combat violent extremism in Malaysia, the government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) and the Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act (SMATA) in 2015. These legislations adhere closely to UNSC 2178.  Previously, in 2012, the Internal Security Act of 1960 (ISA), widely used for violent extremism offences, was replaced by the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) 2012. The difference between SOSMA and POTA is that the former is a procedural law while the latter is a detention law.

SOSMA, in lieu of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), governs the procedures for arrest, temporary detention, investigation, and trial of an individual in cases involving offences against the state, terrorism, organized crime, and human trafficking. In other words, SOSMA is explicitly used for violent extremism cases, while CPC is used for general offences. Notably, in 2007, Chapter VIA was added to the Penal Code to address security concerns related to violent extremism and espionage.

Despite these general laws in addressing terrorism, upholding the rule of law remains challenging particularly during COVID-19. Violent extremists have sought to profit from disturbances caused by COVID-19 by riding the wavetops of divisiveness and hate speech, magnified by the pandemic. The threat has become even more challenging to contain, as low-cost, low-tech attacks against soft targets by so-called lone wolves have become increasingly prevalent. Since 2020, only seven have been arrested for violent extremism offences. However, only four people were charged, with the rest released due to lack of evidence. According to the authors’ interviews with law enforcement officials, the pandemic was initially seen as a blessing in disguise as violent extremists in Malaysia were seemingly more concerned about sustaining their daily lives than conducting attacks. However, as aforementioned, the pandemic awards terrorist groups here time to rebuild, readying them for attacks. Any attacks conducted in the short-term will be particularly detrimental for Malaysia as the country is reeling from 1) high COVID-19 infection rates, 2) political instability, and 3) economic downturn due to the pandemic.

Additionally, the travel and social restrictions seemingly have an added effect of reducing the number of attacks in Malaysia. Coincidentally, the number of violent extremism-related arrests have also reduced during this period. However, the actual threat of violent extremism should not be measured by the number of arrests or a rule-based approach. Instead, an indicator should be based on monitoring social media platforms and social messaging platforms commonly used by violent extremist groups such as Facebook, Telegram and WhatsApp. Based on personal interviews with Normah Ishak, Malaysia’s first female counterterrorism chief, the Malaysian Special Branch will continue this policy of active monitoring under her leadership to maintain peace and security in the country.

The Malaysian law enforcement authorities (LEAs) have also adopted a soft approach in mitigating this threat. This was implemented in 2016 by Datuk Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay, Normah Ishak’s predecessor. The Religious Rehabilitation Program that was subsequently developed is based on reeducation and rehabilitation of those found guilty of violent extremism. Reeducation is aimed at correcting political and religious misconceptions while rehabilitation entails comprehensive monitoring of these individuals following their release. Additionally, upon their release, these individuals will be assisted in their reintegration into society. From personal interviews with the authors, LEA officials shared their belief that as with general crime offenders, convicted violent extremists should be given a second chance at life. A soft approach would better serve to convince these offenders to give up their pursuit of violence.

Facilitating this second chance highlights the need to involve other stakeholders such as religious, educational, cultural, and youth leaders. Additionally, to enhance detection of violent extremism, these stakeholders should be given appropriate training to pick up any red flags within their localities. This stems from the importance of community and society-based monitoring.

Nationally, the Ministry of Home Affairs’ pending national action plan is crucial in aiding and guiding the approach taken by relevant LEAs. Taking a soft approach is clearly in tandem with the growing danger of lone-wolf attacks, which are more challenging to detect. By involving the community, early intervention is possible as they would be the first to identify any indications of would-be violent extremists.

A Four-Part Series on Extremism and Online Recruitment – Part 4: Mothers and the Internet

Introduction

On Sunday, 28 March 2021, a bomb was detonated in front of the Sacred Heart of Jesus Cathedral in Makassar, South Sulawesi. A newlywed couple, Lukman and Yogi, added themselves to the long lists of suicide bombers in the country. Since the era of Jama’ah Islamiyah, families in Indonesia have been encouraged to participate in terrorism.  Previously,  marriage alliances among jihadists was one of the primary institutions to protect the sustainability of the terrorist organisation and its networks, including the production of next generation mujaheddins. In such circumstances, women simply played the role of child bearing and rearing.

However, women are increasingly playing greater roles in terrorism, demonstrating gender equality between men and women. Additionally, women continue to make significant non-military contributions such as propagandists, recruiters, facilitators, enablers, and as wives and mothers. To confound matters, technological advancement can contribute to the radicalization of children. Children are, thus, caught in between their mother’s influence and that from the internet.

The Increasing Roles of Mothers as a Source of Influence

Mothers have been suggested to employ ‘a robust and methodical indoctrination infrastructure’ to envision their children to strive for the establishment of a caliphate.  Here, mothers play two critical roles.

First, mothers strongly embrace the transmission of ideology to their children. Indirectly, through their commitment to such ideology or organization, mothers and fathers can influence the behaviours of their children who would constantly imitate their parents. This demonstrates   why families are a primary avenue for developing individuals’ social and psychological attributes.

Second, mothers not only represent role models for their children to imitate, but mothers also can effectively persuade their children to comply with the religious responsibility of taking part in jihad. Interviews with the children whose families were involved in the series of suicide bombing in Surabaya in 2018 found that they became attracted to violent ideology through their parents. Notably, their mothers force-fed the children to watch videos depicting the violence that occurred in countries such as Syria, Iraq, and France. As these children were intentionally home-schooled, their mothers indoctrinated them with their ideologies while encouraging them to seek martyrdom. Unfortunately, as evident from these bombings, children are deemed by terrorist organizations in Indonesia to be effective tools for conducting terrorist operations.

Three Significant Ways Terrorists Use the Internet

The increasing roles of mothers and the growing involvement of children in terrorism benefit from technological advancement such as the internet and social media. In general, the internet has been significantly used by terrorist groups in three ways.

First, the internet enables active indoctrination by parents through online platforms that enable access to extremist videos and contents. As seen in the Surabaya bombings, mothers could extensively utilise the visual method of learning through videos for teaching radical values to their home-schooled children. They teach their children to watch such videos routinely and quote the contents as references for their children’s life norm lessons.

Second, terrorist groups extensively use the internet to recruit children and to build the children’s capabilities. There has been an increasing trend of using digital platforms as a breeding ground for developing radical interpretations and augmenting extremism. Such online platforms facilitate the young generation to learn and interact extensively with peers. An example is the case of Ivan Ahmadi Hasugian (Ivan) who attacked a priest in a church in Medan with an axe in early 2016 after his plan to carry out suicide bombing failed. He later shared that he learned the tactic from the internet as  he aimed to mimic the church attacker in Northern France that occurred one month before his attack.

Third, terrorist groups have also exploited the internet to support their technical streams such as fund-raising and weapon procurements. In terms of online fund-raising, terrorists gather money in two ways. First, the groups conduct online fund-raising activities on social media or encrypted chat forums by inviting their communities to donate funds and support to the families of convicted and deceased terrorists through charity groups. Second,  the internet can aid terrorist groups by facilitating international financial transactions through cryptocurrencies and internet-based payment services, or even executing unlawful cyberspace activities, such as hacking and carding, in order to gain large profits for them. In the case of the Surabaya bombing attacks, the terrorist families procured weapons and chemical substances to be used for crafting improvised bombs. They also planned the attacks through online e-commerce platforms to hinder detection from authorities.

Social Media as an Enabler to Strengthen Social Friendships among Youths

Social media is also important for terrorist groups. Terrorists have exploited online communication to impart values, norms, and customs among followers, members and potential recruits. Creating an online space for open conversations strengthens the groups bond through dialogues such as those concerning infidels, personal issues, recruitment, propaganda, and religious discussions.

Furthermore, terrorist groups leverage the use of social media by using encrypted communication applications with typically leaderless forums to complement face-to-face communication. The use of such chat groups benefits them in three ways. First, terrorists utilize private conversations among selected members to steer them towards extremism. Second, virtual interactions on particular applications, like Telegram and WhatsApp, facilitate greater outreach to wider audiences, including diaspora communities, migrant workers, sympathizers, and supporters. Third, younger terrorists prefer such forms of communication because the online community with 24-hour access enables them to build emotional bonds among friends, thus convincing themselves that they are not alone in striving for their jihad goals. Justification of their beliefs is essential to their self-esteem, increasing their likelihood of conducting their attacks.

Previous research on social media usage among Indonesian jihadists shows the increasing use of social media since the inception of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014. Initially, Facebook Fan Pages were created to support IS. Examples of Facebook pages were Para Pendukung Khilafah, We Are All Islamic State, Khabar Dunia Islam which promoted violence and supported international networks, including expanding groups based in Indonesia. Support was subsequently moved to encrypted media to communicate among members, including Telegram and WhatsApp after such Facebook pages were shut down. These platforms are not only more secure, but they could accommodate as many as 200 members.

Generally, encrypted communication platforms hugely benefit jihadist groups in several ways, from religious conversations and private news sharing to the opportunity of promoting online businesses and even to recruit individuals who were prepared to join IS in Syria. These were evident from the following incidents. Previously, there was an Indonesian telegram group named “Wa Aiddu” called for those who wanted to devote themselves to Syria. Ika Puspitasari, a female terrorist convicted in 2017, used Telegram and WhatsApp to be involved in religious study groups which reinforced her extremist views while she engaged with other jihadists. In September 2014, she pledged her allegiance to IS through Telegram. She subsequently graduated from simply joining these virtual groups to initiating other groups in Telegram and WhatsApp to organize fund-raising to finance attacks including bomb-making.  Similarly, Rizky Kurniawan, a local IS follower, was exposed to extremist ideologies after joining a WhatsApp group called MENITI TAUHID in 2017. The group taught him to understand and adopt ideas about false democracy, jihad and IS. Another terrorist, Agus Melasi led several telegram groups like “Penyaringan” to recruit followers and “Istiqomah Jihad”, a private chat group to discuss a plan of crafting a TATP bomb, arrows, and hand-crafted weapon.

Conclusion

Understanding and anticipating the next evolution of online violent extremism is essential in developing future strategic counter-terrorism policies. Drawing lessons from the aforementioned incidents, policymakers and practitioners should also focus on identifying mitigation strategies against the flourishing use of sophisticated technology and social media which terrorist groups abuse to facilitate their indoctrination tactics. This is predominantly utilised by women in the family to involve children in terrorism.

The vast growth of modern technology benefits terrorist groups as a communication and learning launchpad to reinvigorate radical values, norms and customs inside the family unit. It is necessary to complement existing counter-terrorism strategies by monitoring the education pathways of youths both offline and online. Online accounts used for disseminating teachings through videos, private forums, and audios strongly influence the children to engage. Unfortunately, this cannot be eliminated through counter-narratives and censorship techniques. The government should enforce additional efforts targeted at parents in order to strengthen family values that promote moderate religious ethics and customs. This is essential in response to the evolving global trends and threats of violent extremism that recently highlight the tactics of lone-actor attacks inspired by their terrorist ‘idols.’

Furthermore, robust counter-terrorism policies addressing the abuses of modern technology and social media are also required. Despite the extensive benefits of the internet, there is an urgent call to develop effective mitigation strategies through strategic collaborations among domestic agencies and international counterparts. It is also important to create an intervention strategy corroborated with the private sector. For instance, imposing restrictions and policies for e-commerce business in knowing their customers and filtering the limit of purchasing weapons and chemical substances that can be assembled into bombs or used as hazardous materials.

Part 1: Linguistic Appeal of Propaganda

Part 2: Quest for Significance

Part 3: Online Recruitment of Filipino Youths

A Four-Part Series on Extremism and Online Recruitment – Part 3: Online Recruitment of Filipino Youths

Introduction

The Islamic State (IS) significantly benefits from the internet: its online contents can be simultaneously accessed anytime, anywhere, across multiple devices. Within Southeast Asia, the Islamic State-East Asia (IS-EA, a regional chapter of IS) maximizes the utilization of the internet, specifically via social media, to disseminate their politicoreligious propaganda and to recruit. Compared to the internet, traditional media was more expensive, had limited outreach, and impeded youth recruitment globally. Due to their prowess, IS-EA is even feared in its use of social media. Unfortunately, Filipino youths are not spared from IS-EA’s influence.

Telegram Still Prevalent for Online Recruitment of Filipino Youths and Terrorism Financing

Currently, Telegram continues to play a role in bolstering support and encouraging more attacks in new areas, including sub-Saharan Africa and the Indo-Pacific region. This is evident from the prevalence of pro-IS chat groups in Telegram and its use to recruit and coordinate attacks globally as observed from the November 2015 Paris attacks and 2016 Brussels bombings. Pro-IS chat groups such as the Furqan network facilitates rapid transmission of key messages including the 2019 interview of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi to their followers. Additionally, the authors had recently shared information on potential terrorist plots communicated via Telegram to authorities in countries such as the US and the Philippines. In the Philippines, suicide bombing tactics by female terrorists and guides on Improvised Explosive Devices assembly are commonly disseminated to IS-EA followers through Telegram.

Similarly, Telegram is also instrumental in IS-EA’s recruitment and terrorism financing efforts in the Philippines. To recruit Filipino youths, IS-EA has called for youths to establish a state based on their warped interpretation of Islam which would not only make the country more insular but adversarial to almost all other countries. Exploiting their financial vulnerabilities, these youths were also promised financial gains for their participation. Additionally, chat groups such as the “Expansion of the Caliphate in East Asia‟, “Sharq Asia‟ and “East Asia Wilayah‟ were created to attract foreign recruits to travel to the Philippines.

During the Marawi Siege, Telegram was also instrumental in channeling funds to support IS-EA efforts while displaying the close rapport between similar-minded terrorists from Indonesia and Malaysia. Via Telegram, a member of terrorist group Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) based in Indonesia was tasked to collect funds from individuals he did not know in various cities in Indonesia from January to March 2017. Notably, this request came from a former Malaysian lecturer participating in the siege. Such interstate coordination will likely continue due to their challenging nature to uncover. Among others, uncovering them is dependent on close coordination between authorities from various countries.

Skillfully Tying Physical and Online Efforts for Recruitment

Addressing youth recruitment by IS-EA requires simultaneous efforts on both the physical and virtual worlds. This is because of IS-EA skillfully tapping on both avenues to recruit youths. IS-EA online youth recruitment started as early as 2016 on platforms such as Facebook. Such platforms had proven successful as they have been previously used by the group for fundraising efforts. Additionally, to increase its outreach, the local dialects of Maranao, Yakan and Tausug were frequently used on these platforms. To further target Filipino youths, recruiters have also targeted them on online gaming platforms. This entailed building from being part of the same team or alliance in online games to becoming friends offline, before inviting potential recruits to their terrorist cell.

Simultaneously in the physical world, IS-EA notably recruits children using non-coercive means by gradually exposing them to the group’s ideology, worldview and apocalyptic vision. The organization convenes public events aimed at raising awareness of the group, attracting children by offering them toys, candy or ice cream just for showing up. Additionally, IS-EA child soldiers and youth recruits from economically disadvantaged families in the Philippines to provide timely surveillance information, accompanied by photos and videos, in exchange for receiving not only either cash incentives or crystal methamphetamine (locally called “shabu”), but also to get something as basic as regular top-ups or reloads for their prepaid mobile phones. This not only allows these recruits to continue playing addictive online games, but also being “groomed” by recruiters via in-game chat functions.

Such close nexus was demonstrated during the Marawi Siege. The IS-EA fighters used social media to announce the start of the Marawi Siege. For example, the first news that militants had taken to the streets of the Islamic City of Marawi on May 23, 2017, came from Facebook. Pictures of masked men carrying assault rifles and waving the black flag of the Islamic State were swirling across social media well before Philippine and international news channels picked up the story. By the time the military and the media had begun to respond, Marawi’s residents were already streaming out of the city by the tens of thousands to seek refuge from the violence. In the months leading up to the siege, there had already been speculation that extremist groups were trying to use social media to reach and recruit Muslims across Mindanao.

The online recruitment of Muslim youths for the siege accompanied offline efforts. The authors uncovered that a heavy volume of cash was needed to sustain the IS-EA fighters during the Marawi Siege, as families demanded hefty payments in exchange for support. Moreover, like their foreign counterparts, the Maute terrorists were focused on expanding their area of control, taking hold of natural resources and commercial centres, producing and distributing illegal drugs, and the stockpiling of weapons and ammunition. Military sources pointed out that each of the Maute-supporting family received PhP50,000 (~USD1,030.00). Separately, individual youth fighters recruited from these families received PhP30,000 upon joining IS-EA and those who made it to the main battle area received Php70,000. Additionally, there were more than 2,000 child soldiers who were training in secluded areas around Marawi City with at least USD 6million paid in cash to the desperate Maranao and Filipino parents.

Online Radicalization of Filipino Youths

After the Marawi Siege, IS-EA factions relied on the traditional revenue sources they employed prior to pledging allegiance to IS, including remittances and criminal activities such as kidnap for ransom and extortion. According to law enforcement officials, this steady stream of income supports the online radicalization of Filipino youths. Based on a 2018 study, it was found that 1) online networks replicated offline communities and 2) extremist messaging in the Philippines is highly localized, and connects with local grievances that spring from the municipal or provincial level. To replicate offline communities digitally, most recruiters use networks such as Facebook to target individuals they already have a connection with.

Government Intervention to Disrupt Online Recruitment

The Philippine Government intends to disrupt online youth recruitment by terrorist organizations through tapping bilateral partnerships with its closest defense ally, the United States. However, efforts to disrupt online youth recruitment by relying on one defense ally alone may prove insufficient in the long-run. One example of such bilateral efforts is several countering violent extremism–themed programmes in Mindanao conducted by Equal Access International (EAI). EAI trained local civil society members in Mindanao to design and implement locally based countering violent extremism (CVE) campaigns. Additionally, through EAI’s two tech camps, the designated local fellows were given funding to carry out their peace promotion projects. Another example is the Philippine military efforts to disrupt online youth recruitment which is funded by Countering Violent Extremism efforts of the Operation Pacific Eagle–Philippines (OPE-P), an overseas contingency operation. The OPE-P is a counterterrorism campaign conducted by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies, to support the Philippine government and its military forces in their efforts to counter IS-EA and other priority violent extremist organizations in the Philippines.

Policy Recommendations

Community partnerships are a crucial component of effective disruption of online youth recruitment. At the core of this critical disruption is to empower mothers who are the first to identify changes in the behavior of their own sons and daughters who are constantly exposed to the internet and may also be active users of various online games which can be exploited by extremist recruiters. Community leaders need to actively work with parents and teachers to help spot and disrupt the online youth recruitment of radical groups as early as possible.

Online gamers also need more tools and better access to in-app mechanisms to instantly report and notify game creators about extremist content or “grooming” towards radicalization done via in-game chat functions. P/CVE experts need to be more pro-active in partnering with online gaming communities to enable gamers to challenge the statements that extremists have shared on various online gaming platforms. Policymakers may also push for the creation of an opensource software that will enable all online games to automatically identify and remove extremist content from their gaming platforms.

Law enforcement agencies should work to empower local communities with appropriate information and instruments they need to build their own capacity to disrupt, challenge and counter youth recruitment of radical and extremist groups, in both the real world and the virtual world. A whole-of-society approach can be applied to enable law enforcement officials to work directly with communities to exchange information and best practices in thwarting online recruitment by extremist groups that prey on the vulnerable and highly malleable minds of children and youths.

Effective criminal justice responses to threats presented by the use of the internet by terrorists require governments to develop clear national policies and laws dealing with, inter alia: (a) the criminalization of unlawful acts carried out by terrorists over the Internet or related services; (b) the provision of investigative powers for law enforcement agencies engaged in terrorism-related investigations; (c) the regulation of Internet-related services (e.g. ISPs) and content control; (d) the facilitation of international cooperation; (e) the development of specialized judicial or evidential procedures; and (f) the maintenance of international human rights standards.

Part 1: Linguistic Appeal of Propaganda

Part 2: Quest for Significance

Part 4: Mothers and the Internet

A Four-Part Series on Extremism and Online Recruitment – Part 2: Quest for Significance

Introduction

“Cyber void is so full of amazing emptiness that makes us feel fulfilled.” – Munia Khan

Social psychologist Roy Baumeister hypothesized that the desire for interpersonal attachments is a fundamental motivation for humans. This need is deeply ingrained that when our social environments reject us, it will unfavourably affect our adjustment and threaten both our physical health and psychological well-being. In this digital era, one can easily access online communities that not only cater to his/her preferences but also imbibe a sense of being a part of something bigger than oneself.

Unfortunately, there are a few but quite influential online communities which provide the need to belong for their members at the cost of harmful consequences for the intergroup relations in the society. Similar with social change movements such as environmental protection groups, their discontents are directed toward the current societal condition. However, rather than perpetuating democratic values, imbuing their members with hatred and violent narratives toward their perceived enemies are often their approach.

Previously, the presence of online communities suggests an increased attention to political movements particularly among youth. Aligned with this, social media is massively used by extremist groups as a propaganda medium. For instance, ever since Islamic State utilized Twitter in 2012 as their propaganda machine, the public have become more aware of the presence of online extremism. Teenagers and young adults are particularly vulnerable as they are the primary target of recruitment by those extremist groups. But why are these young people vulnerable? What factor attracts these youths to commit to these violent communities? Here, we argue that the quest for significance – or the meaning seeking psychological motivation – is the primary driver for youth extremism.

Why Extremist Communities are Attractive for Young People: Lessons from the Psychology of Violent Extremism

Narratives perpetuating the existence of injustice toward a particular group are ever present in the violent extremist groups. To extremist groups, the current society is not ideal, unfair, and may threaten the existence of their group. Take white supremacist online communities, for example. They believe that hatred and discrimination toward immigrants are necessary to defend the sophisticated Western civilization. In order to avoid its collapse, it is necessary to protect the purity of the Caucasian ethnicity and culture. Similar narratives can be seen in the Salafi-jihadist communities which often emphasize the purity of their religious teachings while propagating against the degradation of the society caused by the Western civilization.

While such political and ideological narratives are useful in characterizing the agenda of each community, it is not sufficient to motivate individuals – particularly youth – to commit atrocities such as violence. Our research demonstrated that Indonesian ideological narrators in extremist groups are less influential compared to operational leaders. While the first primarily focuses on ideological or religious persuasion, the latter may combine religious narratives with the followers’ psychological needs. For example, these operational leaders promising a hero status to members, fulfilling their revenge that they may be seeking, and rewarding their dedication. Religious teachings may be used to justify such needs.

Catering to the followers’ psychological needs is important, simply because it is more attractive. People can sacrifice themselves to a great extent (i.e. martyrdom) for their community where they belong as these groups provide them with a sense of meaning. Therefore, it was posited that personal significance attainment is a primary driver of extremism.

According to the quest for significance theory, the condition of personal insignificance such as perceived alienation by the society, exclusion, loneliness, meaninglessness, and deprivation of psychological needs is agonising and thus a person seeks to overcome such condition by searching for significance. This is relevant to youth recruitment by extremist groups, particularly those who perceived themselves as outcasts, experiencing hollowness in their lives, or simply feeling lonely.  By joining extremist groups, youths are offered solace in times of insignificance and a sense of something to fight for.

An ongoing research conducted by one of the authors found that Indonesian college students’ attitude toward extremism may be linked to their need for personal significance and identity-seeking motivation. In other words, personal significance is important in shaping youths’ attitude toward extremism. These youths were more favourable to extremism when they were encountering personal insignificance. Interestingly, many of these college students came from economically comfortable families. This suggests that condition of insignificance may occur independent of one’s economic status.

Moreover, in a phenomenon called pop-jihadism, youths were persuaded by online extremist propaganda because it was edgy and exciting. They imagined that being a terrorist equated to being a superhero like Iron Man, the Hulk, or Batman. Religious narratives were less important here as the pursuit of excitement became the primary driver. Excitement seeking has been noted as a potential factor for youth radicalization. As an extension to the quest for significance theory, studies have demonstrated that excitement seeking was present in individuals who were willing to commit self-sacrifice and are more supportive of political violence. In this perspective, meaning-seeking motivation stimulates a person to find excitement in political violence.

Extremist propaganda resonates with the diaspora community and youths in particular by facilitating them to negotiate their identities via the internet. Their propaganda is aimed at promulgating their ideological narratives and mobilizing diverse youth groups. Additionally, by developing an online community, it could provide a platform for sharing and reinforcing these narratives. Through such communities, youths may feel that they have contributed to an important social change.

What can We Do?

In the past two decades, many programmes have been proposed and enacted to help youths disengage from the militant extremist groups. Some of these programmes attempted to change their belief systems or ideology. Others focused on providing monetary support. Unfortunately, both may be limited in its effectiveness. Attempts to change one’s ideology may instead elicit resistance. For instance, in response to deradicalization attempts by the Indonesian government, the terrorist detainees considered such attempts as a means to corrupt their cherished beliefs. Monetary support may be useful to motivate youths to disengage from extremist groups, but may have limited viability as a long-term solution. There is also a high risk of recidivism since the ideology still persists in their minds.

To increase the effectiveness, psychological interventions should be amalgamated into such programmes. After all, the primary drivers for youths are psychological. In other words, addressing the narratives (ideology) and networks (engagement with extremist groups) alone in counter-radicalization attempts may not be enough.

Supporting this is positive indications from incorporating psychological interventions in deradicalization programmes. Indonesia, with more than 200 terrorist detainees spread across the country, is beginning to see positive outcomes from doing so. Among others, one key psychological element that is address is the quest for significance.

According to our empirical findings with Indonesian youth terrorist prisoners as participants, support for violent extremism was lower when they derived significance from alternate sources , away from their extremist communities. Often, those who remain committed to the violent extremist groups possessed only a single identity – that is, their extremist group. By awakening their personal significance through other identities, those youth are exposed to alternative means of compensating their personal insignificance.

Familial ties, romantic ties, or pursuit of social status are potential alternative sources of significance. This approach, however, should be individualized because valuable sources of significance may differ from person to person. For instance, a person who values achievement may see their economic status as a more valued source of significance compared to a person who value kinship. On the contrary, those who value familial ties may pursue happiness for their families rather than personal achievements.

Other than providing alternative sources of significance, this strategy also works to improve the social identity complexity. Youths can be made to understand that their affiliation is not only with a single community (extremist community) but actually encompasses multiple ingroups – each may or may not overlap with each other. Such understanding can be followed by the acceptance of diversity in society. This is evident from previous works that demonstrated social identity complexity may improve intergroup relationship and tolerance toward outgroups.

With regards to the need for excitement that is prevalent in youths, it may be important to alter the pursuit of significance – from violence to a non-violent pursuit that may provide an equal sense of excitement. Unfortunately, peaceful or normative quest for significance (e.g. prosocial or humanitarian goals) may not be perceived as equally exciting by those who seek such sensations. Ostensibly, the issue is with the framing of such pursuits that do not invoke a sense of excitement in youths. Instead of framing prosocial goals merely as something good or useful, perhaps these goals can be framed as ae quest to defeat the enemies of humanity in general. In other words, enabling them to perceive themselves as heroes in a noble quest.

Since appealing to the youths’ psychological needs were the primary means of recruitment by extremist groups, it is pertinent to consider psychological factors – such as quest for significance and social identity complexity in helping these youths get out of violent extremism. By doing so, youths are encouraged to adopt alternative sources of meaning and identity, and thus significance. Here, it is important to emphasize that it is insufficient to convince youths to leave their groups by countering their ideological narratives alone.

Part 1: Linguistic Appeal of Propaganda

Part 3: Online Recruitment of Filipino Youths

Part 4: Mothers and the Internet

A Four-Part Series on Extremism and Online Recruitment – Part 1: Linguistic Appeal of Propaganda

Introduction

Formation of groups such as Daesh (also known as the Islamic State, IS) signifies the rise of violent extremism; a global security concern. Southeast Asia is not spared by this militant organization’s brutality and violent ideology. Like in Indonesia and Philippines,

These categories significantly impact the minority Muslim populations living in the West. Daesh exploits the higher likelihood that these individuals may feel marginalized as a minority living in a Western society. On the social level, Daesh has accused and condemned these Muslims for siding the enemy (i.e. the Western political leaders). By supporting the enemy, these Muslims have betrayed the Ummah as these countries have killed Muslims under Daesh’s territory. Through such framing, Daesh attempts to provoke the sense of “otherness” to Muslim viewers who have yet joined their cause and stoking a sense of guilt through their associations with the enemy.

Daesh has also emphasized the potential marginalization Muslims have faced due to their race and religion vis-à-vis personal category. They have repeatedly exaggerated the West’s hostility on Muslims, amplifying the narrative of discrimination to Muslims.  One example centres on the idea of religious oppression, that Muslims in the West cannot freely practise Islam. And due to their religion, these Muslims are incited to believe that they are forced to live in deplorable conditions and in loneliness. This was evident in Daesh’s propaganda provoking the idea that Muslims, specifically in France, have been segregated by their non-Muslim counterparts and forced to live in “despicable” and “humiliating” living conditions.

They have also focused on the disparate, unfair treatment of Muslims in the workplace. Unfortunately, such discriminatory labour market practices is a reason for individuals to travel overseas to join terrorist groups in Syria, such as Daesh and Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham. By creating such tensions, Daesh proposes a political / religious reason for these individuals. They claim to offer the “truth” and a “better life” for these disenfranchised. By joining Daesh, they will also have the opportunity to live a “pure life” and obtain “true freedom”, away from the discriminatory acts they encounter in their home countries.

Recruitment from Muslim-majority Malaysia Mainly for Political/Religious Reasons

Unlike their counterparts in the West, Malay Muslims (the predominant community) in Malaysia have been motivated mainly for political/religious reasons.  Interviews with current violent extremist detainees revealed that the main reason for recruitment into Daesh was due to sympathizing with Muslims in conflict zones. They, thus, bought into the narrative of performing jihad by way of fighting for affected Muslims against foreign coalition attacks and the Assad government. To facilitate a more reachable goal, those who cannot migrate have been encouraged to “terrorize” the non-Muslims in their homeland. This was evident when Malaysia encountered its first terrorist attack in 2016 that targeted a nightclub in Rawang, Selangor.

By iterating their members being killed in conflict, Daesh position themselves as victims of war, further justifying any means of “terrorizing the enemy” a justified cause as a way of responding to the attacks against them. By framing these acts as “just’ and “obligatory”, individuals have been presented with the risk of committing a sin or worse, becoming an apostate. To enhance their victimization narrative, there is also evidence of children and women being positioned as predominant victims of war. Descriptions and images of such vulnerable actors can be seen as an appeal to emotion, encouraging the target audiences to uphold justice for these helpless subjects. The inclusion of these two groups of people is not new; for instance, in political discourses, they are often the subjects of vulnerability. There has also been evidence of manipulation of images to amplify the aggressiveness of the enemies. An example is recontextualizing an image of nuclear missiles being tested to demonstrate the destructive nature of the enemies, further reinforcing their enemies’ ‘war-mongering’ characteristic.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendation

Research on extremist propaganda tended to focus on their disseminated contents (i.e. what were they disseminating?). However, it is also important to analyze these contents linguistically to understand how these contents create meaning and construct reality for their intended audiences. This would provide insights into answering why there is continued support for such brutal organizations with the potential of effectively addressing their propaganda.

More attention should be given to potentially impactful words or phrases (i.e. how these terms would resonate with the target audiences); examples include the words kufr and murtad. It is, thus, important to address how these terms were misused and misinterpreted. This prevents readers from being manipulated to taking up their cause. The current, general tactic of preventing such manipulations superficially mention that such organizations misuse holy texts for their cause. It is crucial to go beyond and provide holistic political, historical and social contexts to demystify their ideologies and to address the existing misconceptions surrounding Islam as a result of their actions. However, this requires herculean effort as extremist propaganda is disseminated via numerous means such as 1) online (e.g. social media platforms), 2) face-to-face (e.g. religious classes), and 3) physical write-ups (e.g.  books and comics). Additionally, these countermeasures must cater for each target group (e.g. youths).

Additionally, the demographic differences in Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority highlight how differently personal, social, and political/religious reasons drive recruitment. Therefore, states must consider how these three categories of reasons are key drivers for their citizens’ recruitment into terrorist organizations.

Part 2: Quest for Significance

Part 3: Online Recruitment of Filipino Youths

Part 4: Mothers and the Internet

Women and Children in Terrorism: A Four-Part Analysis (Part 1: Case Study of Indonesia)

Introduction

For decades, the Indonesian authorities had identified the involvement of Indonesian women in terrorism. In the era of Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI), terrorists’ wives have been viewed as loyal supporters for the organization starting from their migration to Afghanistan to their expansion into Southeast Asia.

Figures 1 and 2 reproduced from IPAC Report No. 68

Rational Choices of Women who Joined Religious Terrorism

Terrorists acknowledge the dominant role of women in the organization because women have the capability to transmit and develop psycho-social norms among family members. Children tended to imitate their mothers’ behaviours, especially in initiating a conversation about jihadism, Islam and politics, and even watching extremist videos together. That belief then impacts the ideological perspectives of the children.

Harmon and Holmes-Eber highlighted a sceptic viewpoint within the society that justified the general feminine impressions of women compared to men. This proclamation influences the motivation of terrorist groups to recruit women as mediators in operational and tactical actions. The public views women as victims rather than as perpetrators. Thus, they ignore the gender expectation and self-image of women enabling them to escape attention from authorities. This is the reason why terrorists then exploit them in certain select roles such as messengers, recruiters, and suicide bombers.

Previous research about gender and terrorism revealed the four types of motivations of women who joined a terrorist movement. First, they joined a terrorist group as a way of supporting their husbands who played an important role in these groups. Marriage alliances, including in Indonesia, were the most strategic way to impart the fundamental ideology to family members. The bonding also forced women to demonstrate their proactive efforts in developing extremist values among the family members. Umm Zahra and Umm Umar, two ISIS brides whom ISIS fighters married with, revealed a related motivation. Even if their husbands were killed in battle, they felt proud of their husband’s accomplishments, and never spoke a word of grief or sadness. Such wives were also glorified by the community. The wife of a shaheed (martyr) will be honoured among the community and will be taken care of by ISIS through assistance such as monthly financial support for the widows and their children.

The second motivation is the bonding among women fighters through friendships. Similar to their male counterparts, female terrorists were also encouraged by the social connections they had developed among their peers, including the group-level effects. For instance, women consider relationship matters as important motivators to engage in terrorism. These relationships entail the acquaintances between male and female jihadists which form the groups’ social networks. Furthermore, for women, friendship is critical as it enables them to share a common interest and to forge interpersonal bonds, among others. They could develop this connection through social interactions on campus, or as relatives of activists, and even their co-involvement in crimes. Other factors that also influence the relationship between individuals include socio-demographic variables of education, employment, history of domestic violence, mental illness or substance abuse.

Furthermore, the author examined that self-actualization against saturated feeling and grievance was also a significant motivation for women to join violent extremist groups. This sensation emerged as they attempt to find a way out of socio-economic inequality; psycho-social issues related to unfortunate life experiences like the loss of a loved one, patriarchal authority, domestic violence, or the dishonour of being raped. Social media also confounded this unease and even provoked women to personally select the most extreme option, including joining youth radical groups, which promise an answer for their turmoils. In Indonesia, Siska Nur Azizah and Dita Siska Milenina were two women who were instigated to be ISIS supporters fighting against thogut. They also admitted that their learning about Islam were gathered from social media, encrypted messaging platforms and internet prior to their pledging allegiance to support ISIS.

Lastly, a strong desire for female emancipation also becomes a critical motivation for women who strongly envisioned themselves as terrorist fighters or terror groups supporters. Katharina Kneip discovered that the attraction came from their seeking independence from parental control and Western oppression. As also seen in Indonesia, they also expected honour, respect, and power from the ISIS community and likely pursued equality with men as agents of fundamentalist Islam by revealing their pledge to ISIS. Some women idolized certain figures in their extremist community and made efforts to imitate them because they were attracted by images created on various social media platforms.

Tactical Contributions of Women to Terrorist Groups

The author investigated three prominent roles of female terrorists: instrumental support, operational support and organizational support. Instrumental support consisted of roles that offer tangible items and/or services including funds, fighters, materials, and shelter. Operational support included the skills to prepare and execute an attack including the bomb-making. Also, organizational support referred to the provision of socio-cognitive and interpersonal aspects for network expansion, recruitment, propaganda and also spreading the exchange of ideas and access to information.

Instrumental Support

First, take the case of Jumiatun alias Umi Delima, the wife of Santoso who was a prominent former leader of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur – MIT Poso network, which shows how women become an important figure in assisting their husband’s work. Not only was Jumiatun involved in operations but also financing including accommodating money transfers between the Philippine-based Abu Sayyaf Group and Indonesian-based entities. Another example is the case of Rosmawati alias Umi Yazid and Agustiningsih, who was convicted of terrorist financing crime because of her involvement in the fund-raising activities for operations and logistics.

Operational Support

The cases of two former domestic workers working overseas, Dian Yulia Novi and Ika Puspitasari exemplify this form of support. Both Dian Yulia Novi and Ika Puspitasari alias Tasnima Salsabila were convicted for their failed attempts to conduct suicide bombings in Jakarta and Bali, respectively. Interestingly, not only were both acting on behalf of pro-ISIS elements, their husbands played important roles in instigating their participation in such attacks. Dian was likely acting in support of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), which her husband Solikin was a member of, while Ika was imprisoned for her support of Katibah al-Iman. Besides providing operational support, Ika also offered instrumental support by assisting a terrorist cell led by Abu Jundi, in purchasing weapons, ammunition and explosive materials. It was discovered that she sent her salary worth US$ 615 to Abu Jundi’s account through her husband’s, Zainal Akar, account.

Organizational Support

In 2017, Indonesian women were found to actively supported ISIS through Yayasan Infaq Dakwah Center (IDC), established in 2009, and through a public fund-raising movement called Gerakan Sehari Seribu (GASHIBU). The modus operandi of fund-raising was via social media campaigns such as on Facebook, private forums on Telegram and WhatsApp. Both programs were aimed at ensuring the well-being of the wives and widows of terrorist prisoners by supplying financial compensation for their family’s health insurance, educational scholarships, etc. The focus on women and children enabled these groups to build emotional connections with them which perhaps ease the transmission of extremist values to the next generation.

In addition to the roles of women involved in a terrorist group, developing organizational support is essential in expanding the network, particularly in relation with children. The Surabaya bombing incident was another mark of family-involved violent extremism which is becoming a trend in the Southeast Asia region. There is an imminent risk of transmitting radical ideology from parents to their children. They believed that this parenting style aligned with their commitment and loyalty to the adopted ideology. Also, they were enchanted by after-life rewards that could see them reuniting in paradise. Unfortunately, children might consider this to be usual family practices because they trust their parents as guardians, and they tend to imitate their parents’ behaviour in shaping their family’s ideological preference. For example, Saifurrasul, 13 years old male who died in Syria in 2016, was the son of Brekele or Saiful Anam, who is currently imprisoned for his contribution in a series of terrorist acts in and around Poso.

What’s Next?

Women provide a unique avenue for terrorist organizations to invigorate their efforts through their significant roles in terrorism and terrorism-financing purposes.

It is, thus, essential that the Indonesian government consider four strategy adjustments to better address this issue. (1) The government, especially the national security forces, should address any biased perspectives of viewing women as victims rather than perpetrators. This should include finetuning investigations of female terrorists by considering their potential convictions for terrorism-financing. (2) Instead of developing policies only in the areas of law and financial regulation, the sociological aspects and non-discrimination of women and children who have been exploited by terrorists must be considered. Though challenging, such exploitations could be uncovered through structured intervention programmes. (3) Encrypted messaging and social media platforms increase access for terrorist recruitment of women and children. Therefore, it is imperative for the government and the private sector to collaborate to improve countermeasures related to vulnerable groups, including those working as female migrant workers. These collaborations should entail securing online communications and social media channels including new payment technologies, e-commerce platforms, and online parcel deliveries to further stem the risk of emerging terrorism and terrorist financing. (4) There should also be greater monitoring efforts of migrant Indonesian workers working overseas including their transnational and domestic movability, and their financial profiles.

Part 2: Striving for Peace in the Philippines amidst Increased Combat-readiness and Continued Recruitment of Women and Children

Part 3: The Invisible Women and Children of Malaysia: The Vulnerability of Stateless Persons to Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Part 4: The Shape of Contemporary Conflict in Southeast Asia: How Violent Extremism has Changed Our Women and Children

Women and Children in Terrorism: A Four-Part Analysis (Part 2: Philippines-ISIS in East Asia and the CPP-NPA Communist-terrorist Network)

Introduction

After the retreat of the IS-Maute forces from the Marawi Siege, there is an estimated number of 165 women who are supporters of ISIS East Asia in the surrounding areas of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte. Based on personal fieldnotes, these women have an average of 6 to 7 children. Most of these women focused on providing safe haven to the ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) composed mostly of Malaysian and Indonesian nationals. Given the refusal of the Indonesian Government to accept women and children of ISIS FTF, these families are expected to make the Philippines their permanent residence.

Increasing Combat-readiness of Female Extremists

The specific skill sets of the ISIS East Asia female combatants have now incorporated Improvised Explosive Device (IED) assembly and conducting suicide bombing activities. In recent suicide bombings in the town of Jolo, Sulu province, female members had assumed significant lead roles in carrying out suicide roles. These women decided to take on more than the usual combat support roles. In most cases, female terrorists are heavily involved in the procurement of weapons and ammunition.

Female combatants also help in the procurement, recruitment, training and the handling of terrorism financing tasks. They, too, conduct intelligence gathering, transporting supplies and arms, logistics, food, resistance, and offering nursing services for the wounded. Despite their participation in combat, they are not expected to be rewarded with authority or political power over the male combatants.

For female combatants of terror groups operating in the Philippines, their skills entail identifying safe havens for fighters and the provision of food, medicines and clothing. Child soldiers, on the other hand, help provide surveillance activities of the police and military units in the area. The nondescript tandem of female terrorists accompanied either by their own babies or other child soldiers is an effective strategy to avoid detection by local authorities.

More recently, Jevilyn Cullamat, the 22-year-old communist-terrorist daughter of a CPP-NPA-NDF-linked Filipino lawmaker was killed in an encounter between government troops and New People’s Army rebels in Surigao del Sur. According to the 3rd Special Forces “Arrowhead” Battalion of the Philippine Army, Jevilyn Cullamat served as an armed medic of the New People’s Army. By recruiting family members, terrorist groups can avoid detection and capture by limiting contact with outsiders and increasing the costs of defection for individual members. Family members also provide an additional source of labour; women and children contribute to terrorist groups through support roles, such as providing food or medical care and maintaining camps, as well as direct participation in attacks.

Women occupy strong political and social roles within their respective terrorist groups. They actively take part in strategic supporting roles that are necessary for warfare. Due to their dedication to daily and mundane tasks, they are highly regarded by other members. These women recruit their sisters and close cousins, their respective husbands, and their own children. For many of these women, the terrorist groups provided a space where they could share their political ideas, a fundamental right that was previously denied to them by their families and communities. These female leaders organized meetings between terrorist women’s groups and meetings between the leaders of terrorist groups contributing to their collective empowerment. Their decision to join terrorist groups can be seen as a way of seeking protection for their families and improving their chances in life. Since these women are given false hopes by terrorist organizations during the recruitment phase and false dreams of a better life, they were pushed to join these terrorist organizations without really fully understanding what they are getting into.

In countries and communities wherein girls and women seek a place of importance or significance, some fall into the trap of being part of what we call the “Sisterhood of Destruction.” Increasingly, more girls and women become masterminds, and not merely accessories to crimes and acts of terror, in the Philippines.

Continued Recruitment of Child Soldiers into Extremism

Children are more vulnerable than adults when a nation faces on-going warfare because family, society, and law cannot fully provide adequate legal and physical protection for children.  This is despite the presence of a UN convention catered to children. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 seeks “…to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities.”

As of 2020, a former ASG member disclosed to the authors that there is an estimated 150 child soldiers in the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) comprising several battalions prepared to go to war at any time.

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) had actively recruited individuals from 15 years of age and above and providing these minors improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and high-powered guns. During the Marawi siege, however, the ASG and ISIS were discovered to have recruited and radicalized child soldiers as young as 6 to 8 years old. Even the youngest child combatants, both girls and boys, served in some of the world’s most destructive war zones. They were utilized as frontline soldiers, spies, cooks, messengers, and porters. Children were instrumental, small and easily unnoticed in suicide bombings and in other surprise attacks.

In the last three years alone, between 2016 to 2019, the Communist Party of the Philippines took pride in being able to recruit over 8,000 students for their underground movement, a former communist rebel stated during a Senate hearing on alleged military red-tagging last November 3, 2020. Jeffrey Celiz, alias “Ka Eric,” told senators that a CPP-NPA-NDF document seized from the National Democratic Front (NDF) consultant Vic Ladlad revealed that majority of the over 8,000 youth recruits came from senior high schools, which pertained to 16 or 17-year-old targets for recruitment and radicalization by the CPP-NPA-NDF communist-terrorist network.

The commonplace perception about child soldiers was that those most likely to be recruited were:

(1) economically poor;

(2) separated from their families;

(3) displaced from their homes;

(4) living in a combat zone; and

(5) with limited access to education.

Globally, while it may be true that the predominant recruitment of child soldiers takes place in areas where there is little or no government presence at all, in the Philippines, the insidiously pervasive nature of the CPP-NPA terrorist network has led to the phenomena of mass recruitment among children and youth leaders from good and God-fearing families enrolled in elite schools and not just public academic institutions.

“90 percent of the cadres of the CPP-NPA-NDF come from schools. Lahat kami dun nanggaling halos (most of us were recruited from schools). We all started through a legal organization, but they are not purely legal,” said Jeffrey Celiz, a former cadre of the CPP-NPA who served the communist-terrorist movement for 27 years.

Early Intervention and Reintegration Programmes for Sustainable Peace

A successful approach in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) demands identification of early signs of radicalization and the mitigation of individual and collective grievances, structural factors and drivers that in the worst case may support or fuel violence. Key actors need to be engaged through cross-sectoral efforts to prevent and counter the spread of radicalization and recruitment in their local communities. Particular focus should be put on the role of women, youth, children, local stakeholders and civil society, including religious and community leaders.

Initiatives aimed at reintegrating individuals willing to leave violent extremism behind and return to their communities should also be enhanced and encouraged — while keeping in sight that, according to a new study, education, not employment, is the key to reducing recidivism among ex-combatants. The authors also identified several factors that are associated with a return to crime among ex-combatants: factors such as anti-social personality traits, weak family ties, lack of educational attainment, and the presence of criminal groups are highly correlated with recidivism.

The success rate of the thousands of former terrorists and former rebels’ reintegration will be key for sustainable peace in a country that has been ravaged by internal armed conflict for over five decades. Ideally, if successfully reintegrated into their local communities, former violent extremists can serve as messengers to their communities and regions, questioning the narrative that made them commit to violent extremist ideologies in the first place. It is our clarion call for government authorities to invest sufficient resources for (1) methodical convictions in terrorism financing; (2) a long-term deradicalization program for radicalized children, youth, and women; and (3) a holistic program to treat post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) for individuals and families afflicted by war and conflict.

Part 1: A More Effective Counterterrorism Strategy for Indonesian Women by Acknowledging Their Motivations and Tactical Contributions

Part 3: The Invisible Women and Children of Malaysia: The Vulnerability of Stateless Persons to Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Part 4: The Shape of Contemporary Conflict in Southeast Asia: How Violent Extremism has Changed Our Women and Children

Women and Children in Terrorism: A Four-Part Analysis (Part 3: Case Study of Malaysia)

Introduction

The complex reality and volatile nature of terrorism and violent extremism (VE) transcends borders in today’s global village. Globally connected, terrorism continues to become more sophisticated, more indiscriminate and more lethal. Since terrorist and violent extremist groups tend to flourish in marginalized areas, using local grievances to recruit young citizens in vulnerable life situations, suffering, for instance, from varying degrees of unemployment, low education and literacy levels, no sector in today’s world is at greater risk and remains severely understudied as the stateless women and children targeted for recruitment and radicalization by terrorist organizations.

Due to the historically unstable political, social, and economic conditions in Southern Philippines, further aggravated in the last five decades by the pervasive presence of the CPP-NPA communist-terrorist network that relentlessly attacks and exploits the vulnerabilities of the Muslim-majority ethnic groups or indigenous peoples (IPs), hundreds of thousands of Muslim Filipinos have sought a relatively more peaceful life for Muslims in Sabah, Malaysia — albeit not all through legal immigration. Presently, there are at least 10,000 people in West Malaysia alone who are denied nationality, with unknown numbers of stateless persons in East Malaysia, which includes Sabah. Contrary to the stateless populations in West Malaysia, the circumstances in East Malaysia, especially concerning the mixed migratory context in Sabah, is more difficult to establish and efforts to operationalize a programme had been generally considered more complex, compounded by the fact that UNHCR has not had an office in Sabah since the 1980s. Hannah Arendt saw “statelessness” as the most primary deprivation of all: the loss of a place in this world, a loss that renders opinions insignificant and actions ineffective. In becoming stateless, persons are additionally robbed of the only entity that could guarantee a set of minimum rights, rendering them extremely vulnerable to any kind of abuse and deprivation, since they have no legal status either in their own countries or abroad. Psychologically, “impotence breeds violence,” while politically, “loss of power becomes a temptation to substitute violence for power.”

East Malaysia: A Prime Location for Both Terrorists and Stateless Persons from the Philippines

Based on a 2017 Manila Times report on the Marawi Siege, Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) and their child soldier recruits seeking to enter southern Philippines in order to join Islamic State-affiliated groups find Sabah to be the safest route as an entry point to the porous borders of Mindanao, Philippines. According to Yohanes Sulaiman, a security analyst and lecturer at Indonesia’s Jenderal Achmad Yani University, “The porous Indonesia-Malaysia border and more importantly the stronger connection between Sabah and Mindanao since both shared some close roots as they used to be part of the Sultanate of Sulu in southern Philippines, make Sabah the easy choice.”

“There have already been a lot of movements traditionally of people between Sabah and Mindanao, and the terrorists are just utilizing that network. Remember the fact that the Malaysian government was caught completely off guard a few years ago when a bunch of people affiliated with the Sultanate of Sulu infiltrated Sabah,” Yohanes said, referring to the bloody 2013 Lahad Datu siege by Sulu militants, calling themselves the “Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo” out to stake their ancestral territorial claim over part of Sabah.

Sabah, Sarawak dan Labuanor Malaysian Borneo is the part of Malaysia on the island of Borneo, the world’s third largest island. It consists of the Malaysian states of Sabah, which is closer to the Philippines than to mainland Malaysia, Sarawak in the west, and the Federal Territory of Labuan. Coming from the islands of Jolo, Sulu or the Zamboanga Peninsula, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorists from the Philippines openly boast how they can easily reach Sabah in approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes with their high-powered speedboats; with even less time required if they come from Tawi-Tawi, which is only 273 miles from Sabah. Filipino, Malaysian, and Indonesian fishermen are all accustomed to traversing the dangerous waters of the Celebes and Sulu Seas within 24 hours using regular motorboats.

One thing immediately common to members of terrorist organizations and stateless persons is how they both evade documentation in fear of detention or arrests; and how they know the best escape routes and hiding places to avoid monitoring and surveillance. Given the proximity of Sabah to Mindanao, stateless persons, many of whom are of Muslim Filipino descent, born in East Malaysia but generally with no birth certificate or any government I.D., make perfect targets for recruitment and radicalization by ISIS who offer not only a sense of “collective belonging” but also provide a means for stateless persons to earn a substantial income despite their lack of education. While no ISIS-affiliated attacks were carried out in 2019, Malaysia remains as a source of children and youth targets for ISIS recruitment, as well as a transit point and hub for kidnap-for-ransom activities perpetrated by other terrorist networks.

In Malaysia, the law does not guarantee the right to education for irregular migrant children or stateless children, and thus, they would continuously be denied this right so long as they remain in Malaysia illegally. Stateless persons residing in Malaysia, regardless of country of origin, may legally be refused or denied access to education, jobs or healthcare.

The problem of stateless persons in East Malaysia reflects the imperative for Philippines and Malaysia to work collaboratively to resolve this complex human rights issue. It was a humbling experience for Filipino researchers from Mindanao to interview face to face some of these undocumented persons of Filipino descent who preferred to remain stateless for as long as they could continue to live and work in Sabah. This bleak reality speaks volumes in terms of the intergenerational failure of the Philippine government to make a vast number of Muslim Filipinos feel that they “collectively belong” in their own homeland.

“Mabuti pa na undocumented kami dito sa Sabah kaysa umuwi sa Zamboanga sa Mindanao kay mahirap ang buhay sa Pinas pag Muslim ka, mas OK pa ang buhay ng mga tulisang NPA sa Mindanao, pero pag Muslim ka, hindi maganda ang trato ng gobyerno. Dito sa Sabah, kahit papaano, mas maganda pa rin ang buhay namin bilang mga Muslim.” (‘It’s better for me and my children to be stateless here in Sabah, than for us to go back to Zamboanga in Mindanao where Muslims are discriminated against. NPA terrorists have even more rights in the Philippines than us Muslims. Here (in Sabah), even with no legal documentation, Muslims have a better life under the Malaysian government.’) – Fatimih Husin, an illegal immigrant, and a mother of 5 undocumented children of Filipino descent.

Additionally, the total population of foreign workers in Malaysia at the end of 2017 was estimated at 2.96–3.26 million. Of these, an estimated 1.23–1.46 million are irregular foreign workers, a much lower and narrower range than the estimated 1.9–4.6million reported by other sources. The security threat assessment and analysis on how many stateless women and children in Malaysia are susceptible to VE recruitment and radicalization is complex and subject to large margins of error because data on irregular foreign workers and stateless persons based in Malaysia are relatively scarce, and much of the data that are collected are not shared among key stakeholders.

Officially, there are between one and two million undocumented or irregular migrants in Malaysia and among them, it is estimated about 44,000 children who were born from irregular migrant parents were denied schooling. In 2016, the former Home Minister of Malaysia, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi estimated that there were around 290,000 stateless children in the country. According to another intelligence source in Sabah, an advocate for stateless persons, as of 2017 there were more than 400,000 stateless children of Muslim Filipino descent, who have either undocumented or stateless parents working in the low-paying informal sector in Sabah. Being rendered stateless from birth significantly affects the intellectual development of these children which makes it much harder for them to grow up as productive and law-abiding adults. The exact number of stateless individuals remains unclear given the nature of the problem. Contrary to popular belief, many people who are stateless in Malaysia are not foreigners, refugees or “illegal migrants”; many of them were actually born in the country and have been living in Malaysia most of their lives, according to local media reports.

Way Forward: Bilateral Programmes and More Female Representations

Undocumented and stateless persons are ideal terrorist recruits for ISIS since they have no public records: no birth certificates, no passports, and no real identification cards. In this day and age wherein terrorism transcends borders, ‘statelessness’ no longer exclusively disenfranchises the stateless persons, the illegal migrants and refugees who are rendered “superfluous” — unwanted and unseen — by contemporary politics, but ordinary citizens too, whose security, civil liberties, and rights to life and property are equally exposed to the threat of domestic terrorist attacks that may be carried out by stateless actors in the near future.

On the aspect of reducing risks related to terrorism and counterterrorism, Lucia Zedner aptly points out, “Add to this the risk of marginalizing and alienating those we target and we arrive at the paradoxical situation that counterterrorism policies may make further attack more, not less, likely. So we need to consider what risks are really at stake when we seek to counter terrorist risk.”

While stateless persons, especially the undocumented women and children based in East Malaysia, are more at risk to terrorism and VE, it is nonetheless clear that ISIS has also deployed a relatively sophisticated and modestly successful recruitment strategy that targets Malaysian youth, particularly those enrolled in institutions of higher learning in Peninsular Malaysia; as well as the online recruitment of vulnerable Malaysian women seeking to take part in “female Jihad” by supporting their male relatives, educating their children in the radical ideology they have embraced, and facilitating terrorist operations. In light of these developments, the Middle East Institute also suggests that, “It is urgently necessary for the Malaysian government, university officials and others to join forces in continuing to develop and refine an array of counter-recruitment measures.”

The status of the Muslim stateless persons in Malaysia reflect the status of Muslim youth in France. According to one narrative, when the Muslims migrated to France, they battled poverty in the grim housing estates outside big cities. These youth are locked in a closed cycle of poverty, crime, and lack of opportunities. In the mid-2000s, these youth rose up to make their grievances known. They now press for a fair chance at graduating from school, having a good job, and living in peaceful communities. The cycle of poverty and rioting continues until their demands are accepted.

Bilateral programs promoted by Malaysia and the Philippines can help promote the safety of children as laid out in the Sustainable Development Agenda as a strategic precondition of global development. For example, bilateral projects to address stateless youth can specifically address Target 16.2 of the Sustainable Development Goals (United Nations General Assembly resolution 70/1), which calls for putting an end to all forms of violence against children, including the abuse and exploitation of and trafficking in children. These programs could highlight the crucial role played by children in the creation of peace, justice and robust institutions.

Any successful counterterrorism programme should address both the motivation and the operational capabilities of a terrorist organization. There is an essential need, therefore, for the Malaysian security forces to expand their capabilities to look more carefully at the role of women and children in terrorist organizations. By and large, more female experts in the field of terrorism studies and in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) need to be closely involved as leaders of interagency partners to explore options for this policy area going forward.

Part 1: A More Effective Counterterrorism Strategy for Indonesian Women by Acknowledging Their Motivations and Tactical Contributions

Part 2: Striving for Peace in the Philippines amidst Increased Combat-readiness and Continued Recruitment of Women and Children

Part 4: The Shape of Contemporary Conflict in Southeast Asia: How Violent Extremism has Changed Our Women and Children