Introduction

On 12 January 2021, Malaysia’s King, Al-Sultan Abdullah, consented to Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin’s request to declare a state of Emergency throughout the entire country. As it stands, the Emergency is scheduled to last until 1 August 2021. The King also consented to the formation of an independent committee to advise him on when to end the Emergency. This was Prime Minister Muhyiddin’s second request for a declaration of Emergency, having unsuccessfully done so back in October 2020.

Emergencies of the Past

Contextually, this is the fifth time that a state of Emergency has been declared in the country since its independence, as well as its third nationwide emergency. The first Emergency was declared in 1964 due to the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia over the latter’s opposition towards the formation of Malaysia. Subsequent Emergencies were centred around domestic politics, including two declared upon the states of Sarawak and Kelantan due to power struggles, and one that lasted from 1969 to 1971 due to the bloody 13th May racial riots that resulted in the suspension of the Parliament and the executive powers being thrusted upon the specially-formed National Operations Council.

What’s the Emergency?

Officially, the Emergency was promulgated to provide the Government of Malaysia the “necessary powers to curb and prevent further spread of COVID-19 pandemic”. This followed after daily COVID-19 case numbers shot well into the thousands since the turn of the year. This is troubling as the country had only registered an estimated total of 13,000 cases at the start of Q4 2020, which has grown to almost 200,000 at the time of writing. As a consequence, the country’s health system was at its “breaking point” when the declaration was made.

To be noted, however, is that the civilian government (Cabinet) will be maintained in the current Emergency.

But with Emergency powers now in effect, the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) personnel are now empowered to detain those who violate Movement Control Order (MCO) SOPs — essentially granting them police powers. However, as the MAF’s primary role is war-fighting and patrolling in potentially hostile environments, this development has raised concerns on the potential ramifications of the military policing civilians in a non-conflict zone. Further compounding this worry is how the Emergency Ordinance provides officials with immunity against prosecution for acts done in good faith, leaving little to no room for legal recourse. Contextually, MAF personnel were first deployed in March 2020 to assist the police in manning roadblocks to restrict movement to and from certain areas following the implementation of the first MCO.

Furthermore, discussions have begun with private-sector hospitals on how they can be further involved in the management of COVID-19 patients to reduce the stresses on the public health system. Discussions have also begun with insurance providers to expand coverage schemes to include COVID-19 hospitalisation costs. While some argue that this could have and should have been done sooner, they are positive developments nonetheless.

Besides this, the government is also mulling increasing the penalty for violations of MCO SOPs from the current RM1,000 ceiling. This, according to Senior Minister Ismail Sabri, is meant to address cases involving entertainment outlets that set aside the paltry figure in anticipation of any raids on their premises, and employers who refuse to allow their migrant workers to undergo COVID-19 tests and fail to provide them with conducive lodging facilities. The introduction of a stiffer penalty will ostensibly create a greater deterrent effect and simultaneously compel SOP adherence.

A potential corollary benefit for greater fines for businesses would be addressing the perceptions of disproportionality in punishment. For instance, previous cases where a company manufacturing gloves was fined a paltry RM1,000 after failing to comply with COVID-19 preventive measures, including alleged failure to provide safe housing for its workers — and the ordinary man on the street being fined the same amount.

The House is Not in Order

With the Emergency in effect, both Houses of Parliament and all state legislative assemblies will no longer be sitting, while Parliamentary select committees can continue to function. In lieu of the ordinary legislative processes which promise debate and close scrutiny to any Bill tabled, Emergency Ordinances will now take its place and carry the full weight of the law.

On one hand, proponents of the Emergency are putting forth that this will allow the Government to legislate more effectively, and side-stepping any unnecessary politicking and impasses. This could prove important as the country’s political situation gravitates closer to Parliamentary deadlocks than ever before in history, and any delay in passing legislations could very well come at a high cost.

On the other hand, critics argue that this essentially grants the current administration a freehand to legislate through Emergency Ordinances at the expense of democratic checks and balances. They further argue that it remains to be seen why the government requires Emergency powers to handle the pandemic, given that it had announced stricter MCO SOPs just a day before the King proclaimed the Emergency.

Prior to this, the government had been able to control and reduce the rate of infection with MCO SOPs and military cooperation without resorting to Emergency powers. They were able to coordinate with the private sector to provide financial relief and assistance, as well as employee support.

Meanwhile in the Prime Minister’s address to announce the Emergency, he had warned that “anyone who tries to disrupt the Government’s efforts to manage the COVID-19 pandemic and the country’s economy [will face] stern action against them to uphold national security and welfare of the people”. This raises concern due to the vagueness of what “national security and welfare of the people” entails specifically, and how words such as “disrupt the Government’s efforts” could potentially include legitimate criticisms.

While admittedly all Emergency Ordinances introduced can be annulled by Parliament when it reconvenes, the current state of Emergency and the COVID-19 situation mean that this could further delay the usual six-month limit between Parliamentary sittings.

The Elephant in the Room

While the official reasoning given for the Emergency is to handle the COVID-19 situation, the Emergency also grants Prime Minister Muhyiddin time to breathe and room to manoeuvre as his coalition faces political uncertainty. His Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition now appears to be a minority government with the support of only 108 Members of Parliament (MPs) following the withdrawal of support by three MPs from the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO). The Emergency effectively prevents Prime Minister Muhyiddin’s majority support in the 222-seat Dewan Rakyat from being tested.

In terms of the federal opposition, it remains to be seen whether they are able to capitalise on the situation due to the lack of common ground between the parties. While Opposition Leader Anwar Ibrahim’s Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition has 91 MPs, his continuing feud with two-time former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, whose unregistered Pejuang party has four MPs, and perhaps more importantly, the apparent support of Sabah’s Warisan party (nine MPs) means that there is yet to be a credible alternative who commands the majority support necessary to claim the Prime Minister position.

Election Opportunities

With Prime Minister Muhyiddin reassuring Malaysians that a general election will be held as soon as the “COVID-19 pandemic has subsided or fully recovered and elections are safe to be held”, the status of the Sarawak state assembly—due to dissolve in June this year, thereby requiring a state election to be held by 7 September—remains in limbo. This is as the national vaccination plan is only due to be completed by the end of this year, or early 2022.

With a potential end to the current political impasse in sight, political parties on all sides will be preparing to mobilise and lay the groundwork as soon as restrictions are loosened. For Prime Minister Muhyiddin’s PN coalition, its chances for success at the polls will be highly dependent on its handling of the COVID-19 pandemic while simultaneously mitigating the consequent economic shocks. As it stands, public support for his administration currently hovers at above 60%, down from about 80% in early 2020.

Complicating matters for Prime Minister Muhyiddin is UMNO, currently with 38 MPs, stating that they will not be working with his Bersatu party—which has 31 MPs—in the next general election, and intends to leave the ruling coalition.

Meanwhile, the Pejuang party, established by former Prime Minister Mahathir—who might retain residual support among segments of the Malay electorate—and former Youth Minister Syed Saddiq’s Muda party remain to be registered as political parties. This follows the rejection of their applications by the Registrar of Societies.

Moving into the next general election, what could play on the minds of the electorate will be the cause and aftermath of the Sabah state elections held on 26 September 2020. Triggered by political machinations rather than the ending of term, many view how COVID-19 preventive measures such as wearing face masks and physical distancing measures were not adhered to by politicians from both sides, and the subsequent decision to not require mandatory quarantine for those returning from Sabah, as the trigger for the current wave of COVID-19 infections that continues to plague the country.

This is on top of nearly non-stop politicking since the unexpected change in government in March 2020, which could see frustrated voters making their sentiment clear at the polls or a disenfranchisement in the process.

Conclusion

It is often said that extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures, yet, as it stands, the current administration has yet to sufficiently demonstrate why Emergency powers are needed to address the pandemic, with most, if not all of the measures adopted or being considered thus far able to be achieved through the ordinary legislative processes.

With Prime Minister Muhyiddin reassuring Malaysians that a general election will be held as soon as the pandemic has subsided and elections are safe to be held, the answer to the question of whether the Emergency will prove to be a shrewd decision in the long term will not be known. However, its effects on democracy, the economy and society might perhaps outlive the Emergency itself.

Introduction

While struggling to contain COVID-19 infections, Indonesia like many in the world is facing a “second pandemic.” As a consequence of the pandemic, many Indonesians are suffering from various forms of psychological issues such as anxiety, depression and trauma. Confounding this is the implementation of social distancing measures, a response to the virus’ quick transmission, that impacts access to health services. It is, thus, important to evaluate the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on mental health services in Indonesia and measures to address this issue.

Limited Mental Health Services in Indonesia even Prior to COVID-19

Indonesia possesses 9,831 community health centres, locally known as Puskesmas, spread across 34 provinces. Of which, 92.4% administer mental health programmes. This indicates the Indonesian government’s reliance on them to provide mental health services to the community. Though some form of assistance are rendered to them by the Ministry of Health such as service guidelines and Mental Health and Psychological Support (MHPSS) during the pandemic, it is uncertain how many of these programmes are still running and how effective they are to reach the community. Unfortunately, there is also a lack of in-depth research that evaluates the sustainability of these mental health programmes, especially in areas that are remote and with limited resources.

Key to ensuring the sustainability of such programmes in these community health centres is the availability of resources, namely financial and health personnel. When conducting research in Lombok after it encountered a disaster in 2019, the author found that mental health programmes were not administered in several community health centres because of limited funds. To confound matters, available funds were also redirected to other programmes as mental health was not deemed to be an urgent issue. This was despite the discovery that around 60% of the elderly had developed PTSD; none were treated.

At the national level, the budget for mental health is also insignificant. However, from this meagre sum, 90% of it is allocated for psychiatric hospitals. Additionally, the human resources for mental healthcare are still far from ideal. For every 100,000 citizens, Indonesia only has 0.31 psychiatrists, 0.17 clinical psychologists, and 2.52 trained mental health nurses. Similarly, these numbers are insufficient to serve more than 260 million Indonesians. Furthermore, these specialists are not evenly distributed; most are largely concentrated in Java. With such limited resources, mental health programmes may only be present in name at these community health centres as they lack impactful activities.

With the onset of COVID-19, Indonesia was reported to have experienced a disruption in its mental health services. Globally, disruptions occurred due to reasons including 1) outpatients could not come for their appointments, 2) social restrictions, and 3) a decrease in the number of inpatients due to the cancellation of elective services. Although the types of services that were disrupted and the scale of disruption were not specified, any disruptions could further burden Indonesia’s already fragile mental healthcare system, potentially leading to its breakdown. As an example, the author discovered a psychiatric hospital in a major city in Indonesia was forced to discharge their inpatients earlier due to disruptions. Unfortunately, such disruptions can lead to a knock-on effect of overwhelming Indonesia’s primary healthcare due to a surge in patients. If the primary healthcare was to fail, patients can be left untreated, thus widening the mental health treatment gap in the community.

Tele-psychiatry: An Ideal Replacement of Conventional Mental Health Services Model

Despite the grim mental healthcare situation in Indonesia, there were several innovative strategies to respond to the people’s mental health needs during the pandemic.  First, the Indonesian government launched a psychological service programme called Sejiwa, abbreviated from Sehat Jiwa (literally Mentally Healthy) at the end of April 2020, in collaboration with the Indonesian Psychological Association (HIMPSI). This service entails providing psychological assistance via the telephone, thus improving accessibility. A month into its launch, this programme has received nearly 15,000 calls from all over Indonesia, or an average of about 500 callers per day. Some local governments have also provided online-based mental health services. For example in Jakarta through a programme called Mental Health Friend (Sahabat Jiwa) and in West Java with Online Mental Health Consultation (KJOL).

Second, many mental health practitioners have themselves taken the initiative to provide their services via online communication platforms such as WhatsApp, Zoom, and Meets. These individual initiatives help overcome the absence of such services that are supposed to be integrated into healthcare facilities. The community also benefits from the presence of various psychological consulting applications, for example: Getbetter.Id, Riliv, Kalm, Klee and Kariib. These proliferation of online-based service innovations can further reduce the gap in mental health services.

Demonstrating the potential of such innovations, tele- medicine as well as mental and psychosocial helplines were the two most widely used strategies to manage psychiatric issues during the COVID-19 pandemic. Tele-medicine (or tele-psychiatry specifically for mental health) and the helplines were used in about 70% and 67.7% of respondent countries, respectively. This approach is beneficial for the continued provision of healthcare services in this pandemic, considering the highly-contagious nature of the virus. The conventional mental health services model which emphasizes three factors (i.e. providing face-to-face consultations between therapists and patients, conducting consultations in a healthcare faculty, and is provided by specialists) is, thus, becoming less relevant. Continued emphasis on these three factors will only widen the service gap.

Innovations such as tele-psychiatry that were developed in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic were found to possess  three characteristics: 1) offering spatial flexibility, 2) entailing health and social aspects, and 3) leveraging on technology. Therefore, it can be argued that this pandemic is a catalyst for the development of tele-psychiatry in Indonesia. In just one year, many have switched from conventional services to adopting this innovation; a feat difficult to achieve under normal conditions.

Towards Sustainability and Scaling up of Tele-psychiatry

However, it should be noted that this innovation is only at its infancy because of the current pandemic. Also known as imposed service innovation, such innovations are not triggered due to the strength or development of services, otherwise known as extant service innovation. Unfortunately, such innovations can end abruptly if the compelling circumstances no longer exists and / or if there is no further effort for development. Moreover, many tele-psychiatric services are currently provided as a private initiative with minimal facilities. Even though such services are beneficial, they will encounter issues in sustainability and scaling up.

Sustainability and scaling up are important due to two reasons. First, regardless of the pandemic, tele-psychiatry is considered a strategy that has the potential to reduce inequalities in mental health services. It is important to highlight that while developing countries such as Indonesia require such innovations, many have yet to implement it on a large-scale. Second, sustainability would be dependent on factors such as relevance of the innovation. Tele-psychiatry’s relevance can be ensured by using the behaviour of current users during the pandemic as a reference to envision the future market. Such massive developments would thus require political will from the government and support by its stakeholders.

Noteworthily, tele-psychiatry is not a strategy that can be applied in all situations, considering the socio-demographics of Indonesia. However, it is an effective stopgap measure to reduce the gap in mental health services that have been disrupted due to the pandemic. Moreover, with the limitations of mental health specialists, tele-psychiatry can be used to reduce spatial and temporal needs of service delivery. What the provincial governments of Jakarta and West Java are implementing should be adopted by other regions, although ideally this service should be meted out in every district / city while working closely with the community health centres to reach the community at the grassroots. Investment in this field will greatly impact everyone as they can access mental health services wherever they are, even after the pandemic.

Introduction

President Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) recent announcement of Indonesia’s vaccination plan sparked several contradictory effects. Economically, Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) strengthen by 0.07% or IDR 14.080/US$ after the plan was announced. Prior to the announcement, IDR weakened by 0.32% or IDR 14.135/US$. Stock spending also increased by 2%.

Conversely, the announcement triggered Indonesians to neglect COVID-19 safety protocols such as physical distancing, washing hands, and wearing face masks. Shortly after the announcement, only 9% of the 512 regencies and municipalities complied with the face mask-wearing rule, and barely 4% adhered to the physical distancing rule. Ominously after the announcement, Indonesia continued to set new daily records of COVID-19 infections. This suggests the early impacts of these safety breaches.

These should serve as a warning for GoI that their vaccination plan may not encourage its citizens to maintain their health, through these safety protocols, despite eliciting a positive effect on Indonesia’s economy. Additionally, it is pertinent for GoI to remember that the main objective of the COVID-19 vaccine is not only for short-medium term outcomes, namely reducing infection rates and strengthening the economy. It is also for medium-long term outcomes where the government, its citizens, and the private sector develop a system to prevent future pandemics while ensuring that issues faced during this pandemic are better handled in the future.

COVID-19: Problems of Health and Environment

There are two problems with COVID-19. First concerns health. COVID-19 infected individuals could either be asymptomatic or symptomatic with symptoms such as pneumonia, dry cough, and high fever. Early research suggests that asymptomatic individuals were 42% less likely to transmit the virus than symptomatic individuals. However, in highly populated cities of developing countries such as Jakarta, Indonesia, these asymptomatic individuals assist in accelerating infections. This is especially so when testing in most countries are targeted at those with symptoms. This means that not only would these asymptomatic individuals perpetuate the pandemic, people infected by these individuals may become symptomatic and are at risk of succumbing to the virus.

Second, the initial discovery that COVID-19 was due to the human consumption of bats indicates an environmental issue. Although this finding is still debatable, some have expanded on this by suggesting the origins of COVID-19 to be from a wet market that sold livestock and wild animals such as bats in close proximity to each other. The virus proceeded to undergo mutations and eventually infected humans.

These two problems are, however, not new nor are unique to COVID-19. Countries including Indonesia have experienced these issues prior to this pandemic.

In addition to COVID-19, Indonesia continues to experience several health concerns. Of these health concerns such as respiratory diseases, Indonesians are still at risk from dying of diseases that are either preventable or manageable. Attributing to this is the lack of care for personal health, unknowingly due to the lack of education or intentional such as continuing unhealthy habits. Though the severity of these health concerns has been overshadowed by COVID-19, these problems still exist with some not having a vaccine solution.

Indonesia also continues to struggle with environmental problems which can develop into health issues. For example, Indonesia has the highest levels of polluted air quality with 90% caused by motor-vehicle emissions and by forest fires linked to palm-oil plantation developments. Exposing 32 million Indonesian children to such environmental problems have led to a decrease in intelligence quotient (IQ) by 2 points. Additionally, practices of selling wild animals can also be found in Indonesia.

Unfortunately, Indonesia have yet to develop efficient policies to address these issues. For example, Indonesia only have broad health measures targeted at the community level. Such broad measures also lack any instrumentations and details of how such policy works, especially how government and society relate to each other. While GoI allocates 5% of state spending for these community health measures, the society still faces issues with maintaining their health and the environment. These problems highlight how chronic these problems are, particularly when correlation studies as well as comprehensive policies managing both simultaneously are absent. Furthermore, these demonstrate why vaccines are not holistic and sustainable solutions and why Indonesia should further develop health and environment management systems post-COVID-19.

Sustainable Policy: Beyond Vaccines

Herd immunity can develop without vaccines. From history, the Spanish Flu pandemic was eventually mitigated due to the development of herd immunity when most became immune to the virus. The reliance on non-pharmaceutical interventions demonstrate why herd immunity is not solely dependent on medicine, vaccine, or any chemical intervention. Pharmaceutical interventions simply expedite herd immunity. Therefore, herd immunity can be achieved by allowing the human body to build a natural resilience against the pathogen. To achieve this communal protection, it is thus crucial for people to maintain their health such as through good personal hygiene and their environment, reducing the opportunities for pathogens to mutate. Noteworthily, the Spanish Flu also saw the initial use of using face masks as used currently to stem infections.

By understanding that vaccines are not the ultimate solution, the next steps should be for Indonesia to develop policies to manage future pandemics sustainably. These policies should be comprehensively discussed by government, private and societal necessities, as evident in governance where service, profit, and democratic values are integrated.

Sustainable Policy, an upgraded version of Sustainable Development, provides a way forward. Sustainable Policy centres on the principle that sustainability is not only achievable via people, planet, and profit approaches. It is also achieved by ensuring the future viability of our planet and all its diverse communities by education and advocacy. Furthermore, Sustainable Policy is also the belief that the creation of a sustainable society is via protecting and enhancing social, environmental and economic impacts that are important as Indonesia develops. These principles and beliefs of Sustainable Policy should drive policies in Indonesia, especially after this pandemic. Such policies can, thus, assist Indonesia to fully utilize its resources. From past instances, Indonesia has yet to do so. One recent example is how Indonesia has amassed one of the highest number of infections and deaths from COVID-19 in the world despite possessing a tropical climate. A tropical climate should have impeded the spread of COVID-19 as compared to colder climates.

An example of how Sustainable Policy can help Indonesia better mitigate future pandemics is via food management. To improve the health of its citizens, Indonesia can implement a more rigorous food hygiene policy. Learning from the UK government, Indonesia should require merchants to pass a hygiene test before being allowed to sell their food products. With better hygiene awareness, it could ensure higher food safety, thus help prevent a future COVID-19-like pandemic. However, Indonesia will require time to implement such policies due to the need for proper infrastructure and manpower training.

Nevertheless, such policies must also be complemented with an equally rigorous environmental policy. This ensures that the cleanliness of venues selling and distributing food are regulated. This is imperative because despite possessing a food safety regulation, 36.55% of distribution facilities in Indonesia did not meet food safety requirements.  Furthermore, only 46 traditional markets in Indonesia possess a certificate of cleanliness. This is far from the target of 15,657 markets.

Collectively, these highlight the need for Sustainable Policy to be discussed by numerous stakeholders such as the government, private sector, and society, both within institutional and non-institutional contexts. Institutional context entails Sustainable Policy to be embedded within the general processes of policymaking while non-institutional context refers to the integrity of those responsible for implementing and upholding Sustainable Policy. Both contexts are essential to be discussed with regards to matters such as state budget. Within the institutional context, institutions must first ensure that state budget is allocated towards health, environmental and social interests. Subsequently, those responsible must ensure that state funds allocated for Sustainable Policy are free from corruption. This reinforces the need for the involvement of GoI, private sector and society to ensure that Sustainable Policy is implemented efficiently.

In this tripartite alliance, the society is essential in tying policies formulated by the government with the financial contributions from the private sector. With a well-functioning tripartite alliance, Sustainable Policy that is implemented will not only be able to response better to similar health threats in the future, but will also instil healthier and more environmentally-friendly lifestyles in future generations.

Introduction

Surging to 678,125 COVID-19 cases prompted two immediate measures from President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). Such numbers have led to relieving the Health Minister of his appointment and an eventual U-turn to ensure that the COVID-19 vaccine is free for all Indonesians. However, it is pertinent to understand how Indonesia possesses the highest number of COVID-19 infections (and still climbing) in Southeast Asia. This commentary highlights four factors that would have prevented Indonesia’s ascend in COVID-19 cases, if had been addressed.

Missteps since the Beginning

Despite numerous countries including those in Southeast Asia reporting cases of COVID-19 in January 2020, Indonesia not only maintained status quo but also denied the presence of the virus in the country. Such stance led Indonesia to continue its detection and prevention phase. Despite referring to Presidential Instruction Number 4 of 2019 (Capacity Enhancement in Preventing, Detecting, and Responding to Outbreaks of Disease, Global Pandemic and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Emergencies) and the 2005 International Health Regulation, no preventive measures were implemented by the government.

While countries closed their borders, Indonesia incentivized domestic and international tourists via provision of travel discounts from 1 March 2020 for the continued travel within and into the country. Complementing this was the proposed disbursement of IDR 72 billion (~USD5.1 million) to international influencers to promote tourism to Indonesia. It was evident that Indonesia was concerned with aiding the recovery of its tourism sector impacted by COVID-19. Shortly after, Indonesia reported its first COVID-19 infection.

Instead of implementing an immediate country-wide quarantine as others have done upon a COVID-19 case, the government seemed torn between prioritizing health and economy. The basis of such uncertainty was because Indonesia was believed to be vulnerable to an economic crisis if a country-wide quarantine was implemented. After a month-long deliberation and basing on inputs from local governments, Indonesia eventually implemented large-scale social restrictions (PSBB).

Unfortunately, the time taken enabled COVID-19 infections to spike. Its capital, Jakarta, for example, implemented PSBB on 10 April 2020 when there were 3,412 cases in Indonesia. Of these cases, 1,719 were from Jakarta.

In addition to the lack of coordination to implement PSBB in all regions, PSBB was also inconsistently implemented. From April to December 2020, Jakarta continuously oscillated between implementing PSBB and partial PSBB. Such back-and-forth indicated that the debate to prioritized health and economy was yet to be resolved. To confound matters, the PSBB implemented in Jakarta was not strictly enforced. For instance, travelling in and out of Jakarta continued despite being prohibited. These collective missteps consequently encouraged many to disregard health protocols, further contributing to the increasing daily COVID-19 infection rates.

Disinformation by the Government

In its attempt to allay its citizens, the Indonesian government became a source of disinformation. Numerous appointment holders within Jokowi’s inner ring frequently released statements downplaying the true extent of the situation. Not only was the severity of COVID-19 joked about, the former Health Minister accused the media of fear-mongering. Noteworthily, the herbal necklace that was claimed to prevent COVID-19 infections without scientific evidence was also heavily endorsed by numerous Indonesian artistes.

Such actions suggest that the government was focused on instilling a pseudo sense of security for its people. This was ostensibly to prevent any negative sentiments by investors to avert an economic crisis. It also highlighted the Indonesian government’s growing control over information on social media platforms via the engagement of buzzers.

Moreover, upon the announcement of its first COVID-19 case, the government had not then established a centralized information centre with accountable data. Instead, the media had to rely on their own efforts to gather and process data to provide timely and relevant updates. Currently, Indonesia’s Ministry of Health only has established a website on COVID-19 albeit still lacking in information.

The lack of accurate information and the belittling of the situation by the government, thus, contributed to many in the community to downplay the severity of COVID-19 and to have no qualms disregarding health protocols.

Lack of Capability and Accuracy of COVID-19 Tests

In numerous WHO’s weekly reports, Indonesia was recommended to increase its COVID-19 testing capability. At one point, its rate of testing was observed to be only 25 tested for every 1 million individuals. This disparity in testing is still observed today. On 22 December 2020, there were 69,343 suspected COVID-19 cases in Indonesia. However, only 48,806 specimens were tested while specimens were only collected from 30,768 individuals. Therefore, it is rather certain that Indonesia was underreporting its COVID-19 cases. Unfortunately, this would also mean that its 678,125 reported cases may not be an accurate representation of reality.

To confound matters, the level of accuracy of Indonesia’s COVID-19 tests is also questionable. A case in point would be 13 Indonesians were found positive for COVID-19 upon landing in Saudi Arabia in November 2020. These travellers had been certified COVID-19 negative prior their disembarkation. Several incidents were also reported in Taiwan on October and December 2020.

Regrettably, 202 out of 510 laboratories did not report their results on 21 December 2020. This discovery came as medical facilities and manpower continued being overwhelmed in managing COVID-19 cases. This was evident from the limited availability of negative pressure isolation wards, isolation wards without negative pressure, negative pressure ICU rooms equipped with ventilators, negative pressure ICU rooms without ventilators, non-negative pressure ICU rooms equipped with ventilators, and non-negative pressure ICU rooms without ventilators.

The misdirected and inconsistent policies, limited testing capability, inaccurate test results, overwhelmed healthcare sector contributed to Indonesia’s deterioration. When compared with Philippines, which is similar in population size, Indonesia has not only surpassed the latter’s cases, but also has five times more COVID-19 deaths and active cases.

Sole Reliance on COVID-19 Vaccine

As early as September 2020, Indonesia began touting the availability of COVID-19 vaccines by November 2020. Such reliance on vaccines and without other mitigative measures suggest that the government is solely dependent on vaccines as a silver bullet. By early December 2020, only 3 million Sinovac vaccines which has an unknown efficacy rate arrived in Indonesia. Moreover, Indonesia has yet to secure procurements of other vaccines with known efficacy such as Pfizer BioNTech (95% efficacy), AstraZeneca (62-90% efficacy) and Moderna (95% efficacy) unlike its neighbouring countries. Additionally, despite targeting the immunization of 70% of its population to elicit herd immunity, Indonesia still has yet to receive sufficient vaccines to do so.

Despite its reliance on vaccines, the Indonesian government again had to deliberate on the administration of its vaccines. At one point, there were two forms of administration, namely those from the government that were offered free of charge and those that were available to paying customers. Enabling vaccines to be purchased was met with criticisms from various quarters. A chief criticism was the worry of unequal distribution of vaccines to all strata of the community. Eventually, President Jokowi announced that vaccines will not only be free for all Indonesians but would be the first to be vaccinated in a bid to allay fears pertaining to the vaccine’s safety.

It is also still unclear how these vaccines can be effectively rolled out in Indonesia which has a large population and land size. Breaking away from other countries’ vaccination plan, Indonesia has decided to prioritize frontline staff and workers between the ages of 18 to 59 over the elderly. Only time will tell if such a gamble will go in Indonesia’s favour.

Introduction

Amidst COVID-19, there is a disturbing increase in the number domestic violence globally. In Indonesia, findings from a 2020 survey by the National Commission on the Elimination of Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan) indicates a similar trend. As governments prioritized stemming viral spread, such trends suggest an emerging crisis as states transit into a ‘new normal’. Though this emerging crisis was avoidable, it is never too late for states to address it now. To do so, specifically in Indonesia, would require an understanding of how COVID-19 have heightened the occurrences of domestic violence and how there needs to be further emphasis on victims of domestic violence and the community.

Stresses of COVID-19 in Indonesia

A major impact of COVID-19 is that longer hours are now spent at homes. This is attributed to social restrictions such as lockdowns and loss of employment. Unfortunately for some Indonesians, this also places them at risk of losing their homes. Wading further into the unfamiliar, Indonesians are left to figure out how to maintain a sense of normalcy, for example, by working from home while ensuring their children continue with their education, albeit online. Additionally, COVID-19 increases physical isolation of nuclear families. This becomes an added issue as Indonesia is a collectivist society and where religion is important in daily lives. Therefore, not only would Indonesians lose support and care from their extended families but also their religious support network. Collectively, these factors can increase the level of anxiety than pre-COVID conditions.

During this pandemic, Indonesian females tended to experience higher levels of anxiety than their male counterparts. Though there have yet to be detailed studies, the 2020 survey by Komnas Perempuan may provide insights into this phenomenon.

Briefly, respondents of this study claimed to have experienced higher household workloads and were more prone to domestic violence. The study reported numerous forms of violence experienced, with physical and sexual violence being the most frequently experienced followed by psychological violence and economic abuse. Women who were particularly vulnerable to such violence were those from households earning less than IDR 5 million monthly and working in the informal sector, aged between 31-40, caring for more than three children, and living in any of the top 10 provinces with the highest number of COVID-19 infections. Particularly troubling is that less than 10% of the female respondents reported their cases to the authority or sought help during the pandemic. A majority of those who chose to remain quiet were women who minimally possessed a tertiary level qualification. Additionally, 69% of the respondents claimed to not know how to access legal or other forms of assistance.

Despite being well-educated and the ease of access to information, the continued occurrence of domestic violence in Indonesia is ostensibly due to an imbalance of power and control in relationships. Adherence to patriarchy, which is still prevalent in Indonesia, is an important predictor of such violence. Even if Indonesian women were to seek assistance from those close to them, many are reluctant to intervene for fear of intruding into a private matter or their belief that it is still within men’s right to do so. The situation is worsening as victims are forced to spend more time with their perpetrators during COVID-19 thus further limiting their escape strategies.

Indonesia’s response to domestic violence against women is also still far from ideal. Though in need of a comprehensive legislation, the Eradication of Sexual Violence Bill is once again delayed. Proposed in 2016, this bill not only sought to prevent sexual violence but also accords more rights to victims. Without this bill, current investigations on such violence are centred solely on punitive measures for the perpetrator. Though these measures may bring some relieve to victims, whatever relieve could come undone as female victims may have to contend with the victim-blaming culture in Indonesia.

Empowering Victims and the Community

Indonesia cannot simply wait for the Eradication of Sexual Violence Bill to be passed. While waiting for the passing of this bill, the government must work closely with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) on two factors. The first is to adopt an educational approach to empower both victims and the community. Particularly during COVID-19, female victims must be empowered to speak up. This could either be via reporting their abusers to the authorities or seeking assistance to stop the violence. Through time, victims should eventually realise the need to avoid justifying the abuse meted at them.

Education is also pertinent in addressing victim-blaming culture in Indonesia. Victims should not have to endure such biased judgements while coming to terms with their trauma. One method involves including the notion of consent, at the very latest, in university curriculum. Doing so may culminate in reducing unwarranted comments, online and in real life. Additionally, the community should also be taught to recognize signs of domestic violence. Fortunately, these signs include verbal cues which are pertinent especially during times of increased physical isolation such as during COVID-19. And rather than the community reporting on behalf of the victim, it would be ideal for them to assist victims find the courage to do so themselves.

Akin to frontliners, the community should be shown resources for them to direct victims to. It would, thus, be beneficial to have a single, central platform that is accessible via numerous means including on newer mediums such as social media. This is crucial as more time is spent online, particularly during times such as COVID-19. Collectively by doing so, not only does it shift some responsibility to the community, the community are not overburdened by it.

Towards a Centralized Assistance Platform

To initiate the development of such assistance platform, it is crucial to identify “hotspots” of domestic violence in Indonesia. This not only enables a more targeted awareness campaign in such areas, it also enables optimization of resources. For instance, shelters can be set up in these areas to offer assistance to victims seeking refuge. Additionally, by establishing a network of such shelters in Indonesia, victims who are not from these areas can be directed to the nearest shelter.

This centralized platform should also assist the community not only by providing information that can be easily understood, but also by getting them to talk about domestic violence. One way to facilitate this is through outreach on relevant mediums such as social media campaigns. This could culminate into developing a protective safety net for victims that is also not intimidating. Other essential information includes assisting the community to develop these shelters themselves and enabling trusted individuals to provide short-term care for victims who have decided to seek refuge at shelters, if required. The benefits of such organically-developed shelters are the sense of community ownership, increases accessibility for victims and reduced bureaucracy. Moreover, providing short-term care serves as humble, yet powerful motivators for victims to take a strong stance against such violence.

One key consideration of this platform is to confer anonymity to victims and the network of shelters. While it may help victims make the first move in seeking assistance, ensuring that shelters are kept anonymous provides an additional sense of security to victims. Such anonymity will safeguard these premises from unwanted visits by perpetrators of domestic violence and minimise negative perceptions while community awareness campaigns on victim-blaming are on-going.

Introduction

In mid-November 2020, word of a possible revival of Malaysia’s Anti-fake News Act floated during parliament sittings. Justifying these discussions were the unhindered, wide-spread dissemination of voluminous content deemed as ‘fake news’ as authorities were preoccupied with COVID-19 measures. As of October 11, 270 investigation papers were opened with 388 denials and clarifications made with 35 charged in court. While such info-demic could be responded with existing Malaysian laws and other government campaigns, an examination of Malaysia’s information environment is worth exploring, particularly in the search to refine or innovate approaches to address ‘fake news’ for the present and immediate future.

Responding Without Anti-fake News Act in Malaysia

Seen as part and parcel of communication, such forms of information disorder can be found in Malaysia’s information environment prior to the birth of Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. An example would be the conflicting accounts for the root causes of the 1974 Baling demonstrations where students and farmers protested the decline in the price of rubber and rising poverty levels. Mal-information, the deliberate distribution of truthful information with the intention of inflicting harm on an individual or country, too is no stranger to the Malaysian information environment. High-profile exposes involving the personal lives of politicians aim to smear character or distract from existing issues. Most prominent of which is the former deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s sodomy trials in 1998.

Even without the repealed Anti-fake News act, the Malaysian authorities could respond to such incidents with existing laws and institutions. Section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA 1998) punishes those who produces or transmits content or misuses an application service with the intention of annoying, abusing, threatening or harassing another person. The Baling Demonstrations, among other factors, resulted in the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 to improve response to virulent misinformation that could result in violence. Moreover, mal-information could be addressed by the Sedition Act 1948, if it was in the interest of the government. The Penal Code too addresses defamation with imprisonment of up to two years.

However, the question on the efficacy of existing laws to address information disorder is relevant, particularly given the nuances of content today. While thresholds of existing laws would vary from the CMA 1998’s intent to ‘annoy, abuse, threaten or harass’ to ‘the incitement of violence’, usage of misinformation, disinformation or mal-information are intended to produce strategic outcomes. In the case of misinformation for instance, where the disseminator believes the information to be true, participation for its transmission may be accidental and would require education and awareness as panaceas as opposed to stringent laws. Fact-checking, from institutions to culture should be cultivated.

In addition, false amplification of messages can target intangible outcomes such as the political congruence of society or social cohesion for political gains. Thus, in a system where divisive political communication may seem a part of the norm, additional laws would be considered unnecessary whether it is to have high quality of fact-checking, to ensure greater transparency in systems or to address content intended to segregate.

But herein lies three problems. The first is trust in institutions, particularly those providing the clarifications and running the fact-checking schemes. And noteworthily, how ‘fake news’ is defined. The second is the idiosyncrasies in Malaysia’s information environment which encourages the manipulation of public sentiment. The third problem is the need to hold open conversations on political communication, organized public manipulation and harm on nation building.

Three Challenges of Existing Laws and Institutions

Malaysia holds a few fact-checking organisations which are either government-run, media-affiliated or interest-based. Prior to COVID-19, the most prominent would be Sebenarnya.my (launched in 2017) and Medical Mythbusters Malaysia (launched in 2016). The modus operandi of such organisations generally involves verifying information directly from official sources. For instance, fraudulent claims about a certain fast-moving consumer goods was not halal, Sebenarnya.my would address such claims with official documentations as proof. Unfortunately, such modus operandi cannot adequately clarify or debunk all claims. This is because such modus operandi relies on the trustworthiness of official sources. Sources whose trust is perceived as compromised challenges the verification process, consequently leading to he-said-she-said situations. Such trust issues dig deeper into systemic problems and the chosen belief-systems of the audience. For instance, if the reputation of the body issuing halal certificates is compromised – truthfully or otherwise – any debunk or clarification made by a fact-checking body would not be effective.

Furthermore, Malaysia has a broad definition of ‘fake news’, even under the repealed Anti-fake News act. In this act, fake news is referred to “any news, information data and reports, which is or are wholly or partly false” with disproportionately high punishments for creators, disseminators and publishers of such content. Confounding this issue is the unfair practice of penalizing the dissemination of false information without discriminating its motivations.

For instance, content analysis of government-attached fact-checking outfit, Sebenarnya.my, during the COVID-19 health crisis (data stops in June 2020) revealed a majority of ‘fake news’ is related to authority’s actions. The categorization, made by Harris Zainul inferred that a majority of motivations behind the claims are to “troll or provoke with no discernible political motive”. An example is the highest viewed fact-check in the data set, a debunk of a voice note stating that Malaysia’s National Security Council will declare an emergency. Motivations for the dissemination of such information could stem from sentiments of concerns or panic rather than a deliberate intention to mislead. To complicate matters, the claims of those charged in court during this period were not revealed to the public. Thus, the exact premises for items regarded as ‘fake news’ was not transparent to the general public.

Secondly, there are idiosyncrasies of Malaysia’s information environment which could create susceptibility to info-demic. An environment unfolding since the 1970s, the terrain consists of the media, government agencies, private sector and civil society to an audience divided linguistically, culturally and politically. With the introduction of Web 2.0, sources of information that are no longer only government-affiliated individuals and bodies. In other words, the Internet has lowered barriers of access to information and barriers to discourse. This enabled greater representation of minority voices through new media, quicker feedback it offered political parties and individuals,  traditional media being more open to non-establishment views due to competition with new media, and an increase in accountability as politicians are forced to interact with individuals online.

Yet, the interactive environment would not change a population that is divided in vernacular, cultural or political media consumption. Despite proffered democratic values offered by Web2.0, the public sphere can still be rife with manipulation, particularly due to Malaysia’s contested political space. Both sides of the political divide would deploy half-truths and disinformation tactics to discredit each other, which could detract conversations from policies and issues. The success of such tactics would be dependent on their effectiveness of building echo chambers that aim to segregate and divide. It is also not helpful that with the anonymity of the Web, the distinction between representing the views of the masses and misrepresenting the views of a few as that of the masses is blurred.

Such misrepresentations are evident from the presence of bots utilised by Malaysian actors and permanent cyber troopers in Malaysia’s digital spaces. An open secret, Malaysia’s cyber troopers consist of paid support as well as loyal amplifiers who could be paid in kind,  engaged by numerous political parties. The saturation of cyber troopers was deemed important when in 2017 Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, who was then the Deputy Prime Minister, depicted that 93.4% of cyber-troopers were pro-opposition with the remaining 6.6% supporting the Barisan Nasional government. The decision to saturate the Internet with such forms of support appear similar to the acquisition or increased affiliation of media houses in the 1970-1980s.

There are aspects of the process that can be organic, for instance harnessing the energy of supporters to build favourable environments online and offline. However, suggestions to amplify messages by utilizing social media and employing micro-targeting methods may segment the online population further. This could utilize narratives inclusive of fanning racial rhetoric, encourage cyber-bullying of alternative-voices and the creation of fake accounts to falsely bolster a message. The role of such actors in public opinion would eventually feed to traditional and new media sources, which could impact direction of nation-building and policies. Therefore, in addition to verification and fact-checking, conversations on civil interaction, the development of societal preference for issue-based policy conversations and digital attempts to pierce echo chambers need to be held to advance democratic maturity.

It would be easy to think that addressing info-demicis only concerned with truth and truth-seeking. However, the end goal is the development of matured discourses on issues. As complex information environments complicate truth formation, safeguarding society from inauthentic representation, particularly those with socio-political consequences would have to be acted upon. Legislative action and any reprisal of the Anti-fake News Act – or future legislation – would have to consider these as the nation battles COVID-19 and info-demic.

Abstract

Indonesian children face an increased risk of online radicalization during COVID-19. This commentary discusses the challenges to prevent such radicalization while proposing how the involvements of social influencers may be a step forward.

Introduction

The involvement of children in terrorism is no longer a foreign concept. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has brought unique challenges vis-à-vis the potential for their online radicalization. Throughout the pandemic, many including educational institutions have heavily relied on technology to maintain a sense of normalcy. Extra care and vigilance are required particularly for children as they no longer benefit from the amount and type of supervision that comes with conventional classes.

This is due to three factors: 1) Children are susceptible to radicalization as they are highly impressionable; 2) Children are strategic tools for terrorist groups as they go against social norms and, thus, become more newsworthy; and 3) early intervention at their formative years maximizes the chances of successful rehabilitation.

Alarmingly, COVID-19 could worsen this issue as Indonesian children were already at risk of being exposed to extremist contents online prior to the pandemic. And this risk substantially increases when the child’s parent(s) become involved in terrorism. Based on personal interviews of such families in Jakarta prior to the pandemic, parents admitted exposing their children to violent propaganda videos online to cultivate their children’s yearning for “jihad.” Moreover, these videos become effective visual evidence to reinforce the ideologies espoused by their parents.

Challenges of Online Radicalization of Children in Indonesia during COVID-19

The pandemic presents several new challenges to the radicalization of children. The first is that children may spend more time with their families as part of lockdown measures. This becomes problematic for families whose parents subscribe to violent ideologies. The intensity of passing down their ideologies to their children will substantially increase. Unfortunately, such means of radicalization is difficult as it could compromise personal privacy. It is noteworthy that such radicalization have led to physical actions in Indonesia where entire families including their underaged children were involved in suicide bombings.

Secondly, parents may become distant from their families including their children as they reel from increased stress during this pandemic. In June 2020, 6.4 million Indonesians have lost their jobs due to the impact of the pandemic. This is concerning as children will be left unattended for extended periods. Additionally, as physical interactions among peers are limited, children become heavily reliant on the internet. Prolonged, unsupervised internet usage may expose the child to adult contents including emotionally-charged terrorist recruitment videos and extremist discussion forums.

Not surprisingly, extremists have started to exploit popular online communication platforms such as Zoom and Google Meet. These encrypted platforms allow them to customize their discussions to their needs; either discussions that are open for all or restricted to the invited few. Such platforms may thus become a surrogate parent for children seeking attention and care during this troubled time.

Third, efforts to prevent online radicalization may get compromised as the Indonesian government are focused on mitigating the spread of COVID-19. Such shift in attention has enabled intolerant or radical group to ramp up their anti-government influence. In August 2020, the Indonesian Ministry of Communication and Information Technology uncovered 1,928 online hoaxes related to COVID-19. These hoaxes range from perpetuating the conspiracy that COVID-19 is a hoax to highlighting the government’s failure to effectively respond to the pandemic.

Such hoaxes become attractive fodder for the disillusioned seeking an outlet for their current predicament. Not only has COVID-19 increased unemployment rate, but also resulted in restrictions on entry of places of worships; removing a source of solace for many. Children will face a tougher time than adults as they try to make sense of this new normal. Unfortunately, disillusioned parents may either propagate hatred for the government to their children or leave them to make sense of their bleak situation on their own. Both are unfavourable for children as the former encourages societal disengagement while the latter presents a cognitive opening for radicalization. Societal disengagement has also been found to be a factor for radicalization to occur.

Preventing Radicalization during COVID-19 is More Important than Before

The restrictions on direct social interactions and the heavy reliance on the internet during COVID-19 makes it more challenging to prevent online radicalization of children. Children are now at a higher risk of self-radicalization. We may, thus, encounter a repeat with that experienced with the radicalization of Indonesian women. As with women, Indonesian authorities may face difficulties in monitoring children who are self-radicalized and are not part of terrorist groups that are monitored. It is also worth emphasizing that in this digital era, wars are no longer fought solely on land but also in cyberspace. As seen with the recent radicalization of Indonesian domestic helpers working overseas, terror groups continue to employ the internet to wage their war of influence.

Aiding these movements are the vast number of internet users. In May 2020, 62.6% of the Indonesians were reported as internet users. Regardless that this figure is an estimate on a particular point in time, it presents three potential issues: 1) This population would likely include children who are now more reliant on the internet; 2) Although most Indonesians can access the internet, bestowing them with Internet safety principles is still a work-in-progress; and 3) The Indonesian authorities would have to invest in large resources to uncover and monitor online activities of extremist groups. This is, however, not impossible considering how the Indonesian National Police mandated the launch of “cyber patrols” and “counter-narratives” on social media in response to rising tensions against the newly enacted Omnibus Law. Additionally, official government procurement documents revealed a total spending of IDR 90 billion (US$ 6 million) to “influencers” or “key opinion leaders” in the last three years.

Such tactics should similarly be employed to counter extremist propaganda as they imbibe the contemporary principles behind the spread of digital information. Not only does it acknowledge a shift in the balance of influence from broadcasters to individuals, “co-opting” social influencers increases the chances of spreading influence to the many diverse online social clusters. Additionally, such influencers would possess the necessary skills and knowledge to create and package relevant information that is appealing to the masses. These are particularly important when previous counternarrative strategies may lack these characteristics. Therefore, getting social influencers on board will complement current strategies of reducing the digital space extremist groups can operate in.

Such preventive strategies are now more important in Indonesia for two additional reasons. Despite this pandemic, Indonesia is set on conducting regional elections. In such states of political flux, mitigating misinformation will be confounded by smear campaigns that will be rife as politicians attempt to gain an advantage over their competitors. There is, thus, a higher risk of children being exposed to misinformation via their parents. Secondly, deradicalization of individuals including children is extremely challenging. Such programmes are time-consuming, costly and is not guaranteed. It is not uncommon to find former terrorist in Indonesia who have yet to recognize Indonesia as a state even after their release from prison. Moreover, during COVID-19, deradicalization programmes in Indonesian prisons are affected as authorities attempt to prevent its spread amongst inmates.

Collectively, they emphasize the need for political will to ensure that new and relevant counternarrative strategies are adopted by the Indonesian government. They also emphasize how it is now timely to include media-savvy individuals with vast outreach in such efforts.

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic does not simply entail deadly waves of infections, but also a rising wave of hate and misinformation towards specific groups and identities in Indonesia. Unfortunately, this rising wave will continue to be a heightened challenge during this pandemic. The difficulties in mitigating such contents depend on how extensive COVID-19 impacts the resumption of daily lives. Unfortunately, the rate of Indonesians affected by COVID-19 is still increasing with little indications of slowing down as seen with the implementation of another round of PSBB in Jakarta on 14 September 2020.

As per the Greater Jakarta Metropolitan Regional Police’s data, 443 cases of hoax and hate speech were reported in Jabodetabek (Greater Jakarta Metropolitan). These cases occurred in April-May 2020 just as Jakarta implemented its first partial lockdown; locally known as PSBB. This meant a large increase in numbers when compared to the same period last year.

Diverse Contents of Hate Speech and Misinformation

The contents of these hoaxes and hate speech during COVID-19 are diverse. Not only limited to pouring scorn on the Indonesian government, hoaxes include there being concerted efforts against Islam. This include government efforts to manage COVID-19 being perceived as a guise for communists, Jews and Christians to eradicate Islam. Disturbingly, such hoaxes have tangible outcomes. This was evident from the reactions of a social media posting on the government’s restrictions of public worship at Muslim houses of worship such as mosques and suraus. The widely circulated posting painted the restrictions as a means to break the bonds or silaturrahim between Muslims. In March 2020, numerous cities such as Bandung experienced several protests against these restrictions.

Throughout the pandemic, the issue of the labour market being flooded by Chinese foreign workers have again gained momentum. The rise of this issue was not only a symptom of hatred towards foreigners but also strengthened anti-ethnic Chinese sentiments that has been simmering beforehand. An example is the arrest of an Indonesian from South Konawe, Sulawesi for disseminating a video alleging the import of Chinese foreign workers into Indonesia. In reality, these Chinese nationals flew to South Konawe from Jakarta, and not from China, to extend their visa. Though the individual may either be naïve or malicious when disseminating the video, it demonstrates the deep suspicions towards Chinese foreign workers. And by proxy, ethnic Indonesian Chinese. This issue has also been leveraged by violent extremists in Indonesia to garner support. In IPAC’s April 2020 report, ISIS networks in Indonesia were exploiting this resentment towards Chinese foreign workers particularly in Southeast Sulawesi and Banten.

By providing a clear target, the disenfranchised are presented with several narratives. The first is that they have, in addition to the Indonesian government, another outlet to vent their frustrations due to the loss of opportunities arising from the pandemic. The second is that the current system of administration is failing and thus the need to embrace an alternative. Such alternatives can drive these disenfranchised towards conservatism, intolerance and discrimination, and violent extremism.

Hatred towards Specific Communities Developed Throughout Indonesia’s History

Hateful contents as experienced throughout this pandemic is not a novel issue to Indonesia. These deep-seated sentiments against the Chinese, Jews, and Christians have long developed throughout Indonesia’s history. Dissemination of such contents have a propensity to intensify at specific moments, particularly times of crisis such as COVID-19 and political contestation.

Throughout such crises in Indonesia, three common sentiments are expressed: 1) anxiety, 2) frustration, and 3) anger. This consequently motivates one to identify those who are guilty and responsible for their predicament. Till today, the Indonesian President and ethnic and religious minorities continue to be held accountable for any crisis in Indonesia without much rational basis. However, unlike the past, the situation now is confounded by social media platforms and massaging apps that enables indiscriminate access, increases the speed of circulation, significantly expand the reach of such contents. No longer are such contents limited to text but have now included images and videos. Nevertheless, history has shown how uncontrolled dissemination of such contents have led to violence.

Key Roles of Businesses to Address Hateful Contents

Particularly during crisis, like government institutions, businesses must focus on systematic efforts to reduce the spread of such contents in the community and towards themselves. By contributing to reduce the spread in the community, businesses promote a conducive and healthy environment for their businesses to thrive. Businesses can also prevent themselves from being a target via careful policy considerations. During crisis, discriminative termination of employment, restrictions on places of worships within their business premises, the contents of their advertisements, and even regulations on office attire potentially serve as fuel for hate speech and misinformation towards these businesses.

Businesses should also adopt anticipative measures by analysing social issues that are related to their industry or their brands during a crisis. This includes understanding hate speech and intolerant contents that are circulating not only in their communities but also amongst their staff. Benefits of doing so includes addressing potential issues while they are still in infancy, possessing more time to develop a comprehensive counterstrategy, and instilling trust and allaying any concerns from their staff. Not only would it promote staff retention, staff would be confident to act as informal brand ambassadors to address any misinformation and hate speech targeted at their employers.

Anticipative measures should also consist of guidelines to prevent the spread of such contents from within their businesses. It is essential for staff to know how to respond when they encounter such contents targeting their companies. Having a consistent response prevents fanning the issue further while conveying seriousness at addressing the issue. It is also essential to outline appropriate company behaviour. This enables staff to have a clear understanding of what behaviours are permitted and the consequences for failure to comply.

A notable case study was an incident involving a bakery franchise in Jakarta on November 2019, a month after President Joko Widodo was officially sworn in after a divisive election. A franchise outlet had controversially refused customer requests for Christmas greetings to be decorated on their cakes. One silver lining of this incident is the voices supporting the outlet’s decision was met with equally loud voices opposing it. This ostensibly signal a deviation of simply being seen as a “silent majority” while also demonstrating heightened tensions within the community. Despite such silver lining, businesses should still avoid such controversies altogether.

Though it may seem daunting, businesses in Indonesia can work with government institutions, civil society organizations (CSOs) and subject matter experts. Businesses, for instance, can collaborate with CSOs to strengthen tolerance and to prevent hate speech and hoaxes in the business sector. Businesses can similarly work with relevant ministries such as the Ministry of Communication and Information, National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) and Ministry of Labour to establish guidelines that are specific for each industry.