Introduction

The intent to employ chemical agents in Indonesia has yet to dissipate. Like the Singapore’s Statutes, here, biological agents are any microorganisms and its components excluding toxins while chemical agents are toxic chemicals and its precursors. This intent is evidenced from the successful assembly of an explosive device that was to disperse the stored abrin. Other prior notable incidents include police intelligence of a plot to deliver cyanide-tainted food to police officers, a failed detonation of a “chlorine bomb” in a shopping mall, and smearing straws with self-extracted ricin at a food stall frequented by police officers. There were also concerns where coronavirus-infected extremists deliberately infecting targets such as the police. However, such opinion is conjecture vis-à-vis extremists in Indonesia.

What It Means?

These incidents demonstrate the perceived attractiveness of chemical agents over biological agents. Additionally, the choice of targets of this type of attacks are largely consistent with previous gun-and-bomb attacks in Indonesia, namely the police. In their rejection of Indonesian democracy, Indonesian extremist ideologues have labelled those maintaining such governance as legitimate targets. Additionally, the Indonesian police have consistently foiled extremist attacks, thus securing them as high value targets for Indonesian extremists. Nevertheless, the public may occasionally be targeted.

Among the types of chemical agents, abrin and ricin (both plant-based toxins), and chlorine gas (a choking agent) will continue to pose a low but lingering threat. Abrin and ricin have estimated oral LD50 values (median dose that is lethal to 50% of a population) of 0.1-1mg/kg and 1-20 mg/kg, respectively. Based on the Gosselin, Smith and Hodge scale, they are also deemed to be super toxic and extremely toxic, respectively. Despite their toxicity, one key limitation, as with other chemical and biological agents, is dissemination. Though they possess lower LD50 values (thus, more lethal) if aerosolized, their efficacy would be dependent on the efficiency of the dissemination method and environmental conditions.

Therefore, dissemination via oral consumption will still be the preferred mode for extremists. Similarly, such modes of dissemination hold several challenges. This includes the purity of these toxins, their susceptibility to high temperature and the lack of control in hitting the intended targets. Unlike a suicide bomb attack in which the attacker acts like a homing device, oral dissemination is dependent on the target consuming the toxin. Therefore, due to its indiscriminate nature, these toxins pose a grave security concern if large enough quantities are acquired to inflict mass casualty incidents.

Though toxins can also be extracted from animals and microorganisms, they pose a lower risk than plant-based toxins. This is due to the difficulty in acquiring these sources of toxins and their subsequent extraction, particularly those from microorganisms such as botulinum toxin. Additionally, these toxins face the same issues as plant-based toxins as the most likely form of dissemination is via oral consumption.

Chlorine gas will remain as a potential weapon for extremists, largely due to its relative ease of production. Like plant-based toxins, manufacturing of this gas does not require a laboratory, could be manufactured without the involvement of laboratory-trained individuals, low manufacturing cost, and relative ease in obtaining raw materials. Additionally, toxic gases have the potential to cause harm to both primary (those exposed upon initial dissemination) and secondary casualties (first responders).

There are, however, key issues with the use of chlorine gas. These issues include inducing death at high levels of exposure (e.g. exposure to 400 ppm to around 1000 ppm is generally fatal only after 30 minutes)  and noticeable traits such as odour, yellowish hue and tending to be close to the floor as it is heavier than air. Additionally, first responders could easily detect toxic gases and its concentrations with portable gas detectors. Its inflammable property, however, is a double-edged sword. Though it may not pose a fire risk to first responders, chlorine gas may survive the initial explosion if incorporated into an explosive device. However, the impact of such a release on victims would be low. Despite its relative low lethality, a key security concern is if the incident is over-sensationalized in the media. Notably, imperative to terrorism is to cause terror amongst the public, hoping to create turmoil.

There are three potential candidates that extremists may attempt to acquire to expand their chemical agent repertoire. The first is potassium cyanide which was thought to be used in the murder of an Indonesian civilian with no links to terrorism. This case, however, demonstrates how disseminating via oral means can successfully reach the intended target, is lethal and how even civilians can procure it. The second is hydrogen cyanide. Though it may be produced crudely with relative ease and the ease to procure the raw materials, its LC50 (like LD50) for inhalation is 524 ppm for 10 minutes and observable traits such as almond-like odour. Lastly, hydrogen sulphide gas could be chosen due to its relative ease to obtain raw materials as demonstrated its use in numerous suicide attempts globally. Like chlorine gas, its efficacy is dependent on its environment.

Limitations of Biological Agents

There are many challenges that will prevent the use of biological agents by extremists. These can be categorized into acquiring a virulent strain of microorganism, the successful manufacture of viable and pure samples, and dissemination. Collectively, these require time, large finances, a well-equipped laboratory that prevents accidental infections such as a BSL-4 laboratory, and recruitment of trained and knowledgeable individuals. The case of Aum Shinrikyo demonstrates the difficulty of non-state actors acquiring this weapon.

Concerns of infected extremists deliberately infecting victims has yet to be justified. Reasons for this includes the potential to infect their own members and loved ones, the long period that the infected extremist must endure before succumbing to his death, and victims requiring time to develop symptoms. This, thus, prevent extremist groups from claiming responsibility for the attack. Additionally, it would be challenging for these groups to produce recruitment videos based on this form of attacks. Typically, a recruitment video showcasing a suicide bomb attack would feature an interview with the bomber to inspire others to follow suit. Interviewing an infected extremist displaying symptoms may not inspire potential recruits to do the same.

Introduction

In August 2017, Indonesian authorities uncovered a plot to use chemical and radioactive explosive devices by a pro-IS cell in Bandung, Indonesia. This is the second known attempt by terrorists in three years using unconventional weapons. In 2015, an explosive device containing chlorine was detonated in a shopping mall in Jakarta, Indonesia. The detonation, attributed to IS returnees from Syria, did not cause any casualties. Both incidents highlight the continued interest by Indonesian terrorist groups for unconventional weapons. This could be due to the potency and fear-generating potential of such weapons.

However, could this signal a preference by Indonesian terrorist groups to use unconventional weapons other than biological agents, namely chemical and radioactive agents? Additionally, despite their similarity in employing unconventional weapons, police issued contradictory statements for both cases; one assuring while the other potentially alarmist. What is the potential impact on the Indonesian police’s image due to such contradiction?

Why Chemical and Radiological Weapons?

One reason behind using chemical and radioactive agents could be their slightly easier production process over biological agents. Two cases in point are the botched attempts by the Japanese cult-terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo and the transnational Islamist militant group Al Qaeda to produce biological agents. These were despite their vast finances, employment of scientists and presence of laboratories. Aum Shinrikyo eventually gained notoriety for releasing a chemical agent (sarin gas) in Tokyo subway in 1995, killing 12 people.

Despite their ambitious plot, the recent Indonesian cell did not succeed because it lacked the capabilities to produce such weapons. Firstly, it is likely that the cell did not have any technical knowledge in natural sciences. The reliance of the cell operatives on a manual to produce radiological dispersal device exposes their lack of expertise.  This manual was written by Bahrun Naim, an Indonesian militant based in Syria. Possessing only a degree in Informatics Engineering, his inexperience in unconventional weapons was evident. He mislabelled radiological dispersal devices as nuclear bombs and his guidelines for producing radioactive materials were flawed.

Another possible reason behind using chemical and radioactive agents by the Indonesian terrorist cell could be the fairly localized impact of such weapons. In other words, the spread of these agents is limited; restricted by factors such as wind and susceptibility to heat. This is ideal for Indonesian terrorist groups who have mainly targeted foreigners or foreign-owned businesses and the police, regarded as infidels. This suggests that Indonesian terrorists shy away from being perceived as directly attacking the general Muslim population. One deviation was the 2016 church bombing in East Kalimantan, Indonesia.

As opposed to chemical and radioactive agents, biological agents could be perceived as not only having the potential to target indiscriminately but would also have far reaching effects. In reality, only some biological agents have the potential to cause epidemics. The impact of using such infectious biological agents would be detrimental to these groups. Firstly, due to their inexperience, terrorist groups risk prematurely releasing the biological agent during its manufacture. This would put their members and the communities they seek to influence and recruit from at risk of infection. Secondly, it would be a challenge to convince Indonesians that their targets were the police or foreigners when there is no control over who would be infected. Again, this would affect their recruitment potential due to public backlash. Therefore, any plots involving biological agents have a low possibility of going past the planning phase and was likely considered only for its potential for eliciting fear.

Differing Police Media Statements in Both Incidents

In the 2015-botched chemical attack, the Indonesian police adopted a reassuring stance. The police stated that “there was no need for alarm as the explosion had an extremely low impact.” They even likened the explosion to “the bursting of a balloon.” While in the recent incident, the police took a contrary stance. They described the potential of the dirty bomb to “have more destructive impact” than an explosive called Tri-cyclic Acetone Peroxide (TATP). The police added that such bombs “could burn anything and make it hard for people to breathe.”

There are merits in issuing alarmist statements. Such statements would signal the need for the general population’s involvement in mitigating the threat of terrorism. It would highlight the need for heightened vigilance by citizens. However, such statements should also be calibrated to highlight that the authorities can adequately respond to any threats by terrorist groups. This is where the Indonesian police’s statement in the recent incident could be improved.

Disregarding a reassuring tone could be detrimental to the police’s image. First, people look to the police to ensure their safety. Therefore, the public’s trust in the Indonesian police’s capabilities should not be compromised. By presenting a bleak situation without any assurances could also motivate the public to be vigilant but for the wrong reasons. They would be motivated by fear and the perceived lack of safety provided by the police. Vigilance due to such motivations could breed suspicion and distrust amongst communities.

Another potential negative fallout of such statements will be equipping the police critics with more ammunition for criticism. The police could be falsely accused of attempting to manipulate the population’s opinion for their own benefit such as the need for a higher police budget. In July 2017, the Indonesian National Police chief announced that the annual police budget has doubled since 2014.

Such statements, if issued regularly, would also undo the years of good police work in maintaining security. The lack of assurances of safety would only bolster the argument that the police alone is not sufficient in managing the terrorist threat in Indonesia. Currently, the military has been pushing for a larger role in counter-terrorism in Indonesia. It would be useful to not contribute to this momentum as such initiatives require measured considerations. One consideration is that police and army in Indonesia have different training cultures. For instance, the police inculcate a culture of apprehending suspects for prosecution by the legal system, while the military is geared towards combat.

At the international level, it could lead to two possible outcomes. The first would be the perception of growing sense of insecurity in Indonesia. This in turn could lead to a decline in foreign investments and tourism; potentially affecting resources for national development and security. The other outcome would be for neighbouring countries with vested interest in Indonesia, such as Australia, to increase foreign intervention such as funding. However, such interventions have setbacks. One would be that it could send the message that terrorism could be used as a bargaining chip to gain concessions. Such conduct would not aid in building mutual trust in mitigating terrorism.