Introduction

As was highlighted previously, Indonesia is seemingly experiencing a surplus of nurses. Such surpluses should be a blessing for the country with the fourth largest population in the world, especially considering the global shortage of nurses. Unfortunately, the surplus of nurses is due to the limited absorption capacity of the domestic labour market. Consequently, many nurses have yet to be employed in Indonesia with the population estimated to be 250,000 in 2018. To address such high unemployment rate, the Indonesian government devised a programme to encourage nurses to work overseas since 1996. In its initial year, this programme saw only 11 Indonesian nurses out of 120 candidates (< 10% passing rate) plying their trade in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Only in the last decade, a larger number of Indonesian nurses have successfully migrated overseas. Despite such a large population of unemployed nurses, what is preventing Indonesia from being a major exporter of nurses?

Large Excess of Nurses, Low Export Rate

Since 1996, the number of nurses successfully sent abroad has steadily increased, albeit slowly. This increase coincided with the increasing number of destination countries in the Middle East such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and even into Europe such as England and Netherlands. Soon after, Indonesia initiated similar programmes for its nurses to East Asian countries. Since 2008, Indonesia and Japan have agreed on a bilateral cooperation, the Indonesia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (IJEPA). Part of this cooperation is the provision of Indonesian nurses and caregivers to Japan. Indonesia also routinely sends its nurses to Taiwan, thus becoming the largest exporter of nurses for this state. However, between 2013 and 2018, Indonesia only sent 3,438 nurses to numerous countries, mostly to Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Japan and the UAE.

A reason for the increasing rate of migration stems from a global shortage of nurse. This global shortage has led to Indonesia receiving new requests from countries such as Australia and the United States. According to Indonesia’s Ministry of Health, the demand for both nurses and caregivers raised to 80,000 between the period of 2010 and 2020. Despite such high requests, only 5% has been fulfilled.

Despite its large excess nurses, it does not automatically equate to high export rate of Indonesian nurses. Hampering export includes the lack of desire and motivation of Indonesian nurses to do so and also their difficulties in passing the selection tests. Confounding matters is the COVID-19 pandemic which restricts overseas travel. For example, Taiwan has deferred the arrival of new Indonesian nurses because of the current situation in Indonesia. This is notable as the pandemic has further increased the global need for nurses.

Higher Income and Overseas Experiences not a Priority for Indonesian Nurses

There are several push and pull factors for nurses to work abroad. The push factors for nurses wanting to work abroad generally centres on employment issues in the donor countries. For example, the lack of job opportunities, limited career advancement, low salary and incentives, lack of job safety, and poor workplace conditions. Meanwhile, the pull factors to destination countries would address the aforementioned employment issues.

Unlike other donor countries, Indonesian nurses seem to be unaffected by such push and pull factors. There could be three reasons for this phenomenon: 1) The perception that working abroad did not commensurate with their sacrifices (this will be elaborated in the next paragraph). 2) Turning down overseas stints as they may either be employed in civil service or their families disapproved of such opportunities. Notably, in Indonesia, employment in the civil service is still regarded as an iron rice bowl. Additionally, families continue to play an important role in decision making, particularly for female family members. 3) There is still some apprehension even for nurses who desire to work overseas. Of the approximately 90% of nursing students who wished to work abroad, only about 50% had concrete plans to do so. Shedding light on this apprehension is the finding that those who were younger, lived outside of Java, spoke a foreign language, and had prior overseas experiences were more likely to have concrete plans.

For nurses and nursing students in Indonesia, salary is not the main consideration in selecting a workplace. Instead, they were found to prioritize work experiences and career development. Additionally, many are more comfortable working domestically to be close with their families. Working domestically is perceived to be less risky and challenging than working abroad. This is evident from the low passing rates of Indonesian nurses seeking overseas employment. Many failed to satisfy the requirements, particularly foreign language competencies such as English and proficiency standards such as Prometric Testing, Commission on Graduates of Foreign Nursing School (CGFNS), National Council Licensure Examination for Registered Nurses (NCLEX-RN). Despite the need for foreign nurses, destination countries will not compromise on the quality of nurses they sought.

Attempting to work in Japan and the United States aptly demonstrate the challenges Indonesian nurses faced. To gain employment in Japan, Indonesian nurses are required to sit for competency tests that are conducted in Japanese and in varying writing styles (hiragana, katakana and kanji). However, those who fail such tests can still work in Japan by taking on a lower appointment of nursing assistant. To work in the United States, candidates must pass CGFNS and NCLEX-RN. Test centres for CGFNS are available in Indonesia since 2018 but there are no test centres for NCLEX-RN. The closest NCLEX-RN test centre is in Manila, Philippines, thus, entailing additional costs. This explains why the United States is not yet a major destination country for Indonesian nurses despite repeated requests by the United States government.

Drawing Parallels to the Philippines, the Largest Global Exporter of Nurses

The current surplus of nurses in Indonesia has been experienced by the Philippines in the mid-1970s during President Ferdinand Marcos era. During that era, labour including nurses were sent abroad as a strategy to reduce socio-economic problems and domestic unemployment. This strategy continues to be implemented today. Within the three decades of its inception, more than 193,000 Filipino nurses had worked abroad while only around 30,000 worked domestically. Currently, the number of migrant Filipino nurses is estimated to be higher considering that an average of 13,000 nurses are sent overseas annually, nearly four times the total number of migrant Indonesian nurses in five years from 2013 – 2018.

Such a high migration rate has made the Philippines the largest exporter of nurses in the world. In the United States and UK, the number of Filipino nurses are estimated at 150,000 and 20,000, respectively. Currently, the Philippine government has restricted its nurses from migrating as their services are crucial to the country’s COVID-19 effort. However, Filipino nurses who have secured overseas contracts are exempted from this restriction. Notably, any attempts by the government to reduce the quota for sending its health workers abroad will also face strong resistance.

Unlike Indonesians, Filipinos are not apprehensive about working overseas. Instead, many enrol in nursing schools due to the prospect of working overseas and earning higher salaries. In fact, many Filipino doctors have pursued nursing degrees with similar motivations. In 2017, the author interviewed the senior management of the Philippine Nurses Association (PNA) in Manila, Philippines to obtain insights on their level of success in encouraging their nurses to pursue careers abroad. The PNA did not provide any encouragement but instead the nurses themselves desired to work overseas. This was unexpected as there was a high demand for them to work domestically especially in the current pandemic. Moreover, with its higher education system being oriented to export its graduates, the Philippines will face difficulties in stemming the migration of its health workers, especially nurses.

Nurse migration can be beneficial for its donor countries. Not only will it spell foreign funds entering the country, employment in destination countries is likely to be more secure. Additionally, migration to developed countries enables a brain gain for donor countries as nurses can facilitate the transfer of skills, knowledge and even technology to their home countries upon their return. The caveat is that the donor country’s government must have a strategy to facilitate such brain gain. Unfortunately, Indonesia has yet to have such a strategy. Indonesian nurses who returned from Japan experienced a loss of their learned skills and also found it difficult to re-enter the domestic market as there is no system to bridge their expertise from abroad to the domestic market needs.

The main downside of nurse migration to donor countries is the loss of skilled workers i.e. brain drain. Though sending nurses abroad entails financial gains, donor countries may themselves be in need of nurses, especially in developing countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines. This has led to the World Health Organization (WHO) to issue a Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel in 2010. This code of practice discourages the active recruitment of health workers from countries experiencing personnel shortages. Although not enforced, this code of practice sets the ethical discourse for its member countries when developing their health system.

Will Indonesia Become the Second Philippines?

The Indonesian government has chosen to adopt a policy of sending its nurses abroad in response to its perceived surplus of nurses in the country. Therefore, will the scale of Indonesian nurse migration in the near future mirror that of the Philippines?

Based on the perceived surplus of 250,000 Indonesian nurses, there seems to be a potential for Indonesia to equal or even surpass the Philippines in sending its nurses overseas. However, it is unlikely for this to occur due to two reasons:

1) Based on Indonesian legislation, there must be a balance of three factors; domestic needs, overseas opportunities, and the interest of Indonesian nurses to work abroad. This balance is ascertained from analysing the nursing labour markets and their related policies, globally. Additionally, the Human Resources for Health Information System (SISDMK) maintained by Indonesia’s Ministry of Health is expected to provide accurate, reliable, and current information for policymaking vis-à-vis the demand and supply of nurses domestically and abroad.

2) The higher education system in Indonesia is not, or not yet, export-oriented as in the Philippines. Although the curriculum in nursing courses in Indonesia bear semblance to numerous international curricula such as the ASEAN Nursing Common Core Competencies and international accreditation standards such as AUN-QA and ASIIN, interest to working abroad is still limited, as aforementioned. Additionally, Filipino nursing students have an added advantage over their Indonesian counterparts. The Filipino students generally have a higher language competency as their courses are conducted in English.

However, this may change depending on future developments in employment, education and health policies in Indonesia, and extraordinary circumstances such as the current pandemic. Such extraordinary circumstances present an opportunity for donor countries to either export its excess nurses or stockpile its excess nurses in anticipation of a worst-case scenario.

Introduction: Pseudo Progress

Human trafficking is still a dire problem in Indonesia. The number of victims of this crime generally remained high in the past two decades, while the numbers of successfully resolved cases and convictions of perpetrators remained low. Based on the “Trafficking in Persons 2020” report by the United States Department of State, the number of trafficked persons is estimated to be in the thousands in 2020, as with previous years. In contrast to this estimate, the number of victims reported by the Indonesian government was 761 in 2019. This meant an increase in cases than in 2018 (480 cases) and a decrease when compared to 2017 (1,271 cases). Similarly, the number of cases investigated by the National Police in 2019 was 102, an increase from 2018 (95 cases) and a decrease from 2017 (123 cases). The fluctuations in the number of cases in these three years demonstrate the persistence of this crime in Indonesia with little progress in efforts to eradicate it.

In fact, when viewed institutionally, there are enough policies that have been drafted and implemented by the Indonesian government to address human trafficking. Fairly early on, Indonesia has enacted the Law on the Eradication of the Crime of Trafficking in Persons (Law No. 21/2007) and established a Task Force for the Prevention and Management of Human Trafficking in 2008 (Presidential Regulation No. 69/2008). The task force was formed with the inclusion of various institutions ranging from the police, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection; spanning from central to district / city levels. Additionally, there is substantial budget prepared by the government to implement these policies. For the Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK), the government provided IDR 54 billion (~USD 385,000) in 2019. Additionally, since 2018, the government made it mandatory for local governments to include anti-trafficking policies at their regional levels. These advancements have culminated Indonesia to be categorized as Tier-2 in the “Trafficking in Persons 2020” report.

Indonesia’s categorization as Tier-2 means that despite its progress in anti-trafficking policies, there are still numerous anti-trafficking agendas that have not been implemented by the Indonesian government. Practically, the implementation of current policies is also still not optimally implemented. In terms of institutional development, for example, the National Police has only developed task forces in 13 provinces. The task force at the regional level has also complained about the lack of funds to coordinate and implement policies at their level.

From this brief description, it is evident that there are contradictions in anti-trafficking policies in Indonesia, namely the gap between the vision and its misaligned strategy. Consequently, various polices and progress tended to be ineffective, while human trafficking is still rife based on the figures of victims and cases as presented by the government, foreign organizations and non-governmental organizations.

These contradictions are also reflected in the confusion by government agencies to interpret and operationalize anti-trafficking policies. In various areas with high trafficking cases such as West Kalimantan, East Nusa Tenggara and West Java, the police and immigration face difficulties in identifying perpetrators and stopping these acts of crime while they are being carried out. In most cases, the police and local governments only knew about the occurrence of such crime when victims self-reported the crimes, violence and losses they have experienced. Generally, the policy that is implemented in such cases is facilitating the return and rehabilitation of victims albeit on a small scale.

The government and police at the central and regional levels do not seem to have a clear and directed vision and strategy to reduce human trafficking in Indonesia. Confusion in the interpretation and operationalization of anti-trafficking policies must be resolved by understanding the problems that exist in practice that enables the continued occurrence of human trafficking and rendering policies to be ineffective.

Human Trafficking Operations Embedded in Social Structures and Exploits Social Networking Bias

The root problem in developing and implementing anti-trafficking policies in Indonesia stems from the characteristics of this crime itself, namely 1) being embedded in the social structure till it is difficult to identify and address the crime, and 2) the bias of social networks which sees labour migration as vertical mobility despite violating administrative procedures and protective measures, and disregarding the risks that labour migration could be a ploy for human trafficking when such violations are committed.

In Indonesia, human trafficking is operated by embedding itself into social structures. This makes it difficult to ascertain if a crime has been committed as human trafficking has integrated the people’s daily activities. Generally, perpetrators arrested for this crime were part of the social networks of their victims or the victims’ families. In many cases, the perpetrators who were reported to be involved in the recruitment process were even the victims’ family members, relatives or close friends. Many of the recruiters were themselves Indonesian migrants in the destination countries that the victims would be sent to and were socially connected with the victims. Their modus operandi for recruitment could be on the pretext of facilitating requests from their places of employment or their own initiatives whenever there is a job opening. Offering a job opportunity is often seen as a benevolent act and the potential for vertical mobility for family, relatives and members of the village.

The process of transporting and sheltering the victims is also embedded into the daily activities of the community. The transportation that was used in such crimes were generally not specifically set up to solely serve such organized crime networks. Instead, public transportation has been exploited for such heinous purposes. In some cases, victims get a lift in the private vehicles belonging to migrant workers commuting to the same destination countries.

In their villages, the victims’ families and communities generally encourage their children to become migrant works, including via illegal means, regardless of the possibility of becoming victims of human trafficking. Economic pressures and limited work and business opportunities in their hometowns are structural factors that encourage migration that bypasses procedures and protection. Collectively, by being embedded into the social structures and processes, on the one hand facilitates opportunities for human trafficking to occur while confounding efforts to identify and prevent it.

Social networking bias also plays an important role in facilitating human trafficking operations. Victims readily accept work offers due to their social connections with recruiters. By exploiting such trust, victims and victims’ families deem such migrations as opportunities, until they return home as human trafficking victims.

Behind Ineffective Policies: Lack of Basis on Knowledge and Institutionalization

Ineffective government policies are a result of weak basis on knowledge for policy formulation and implementation, as well as weak institutional development to lead and coordinate the prevention and managing human trafficking. The Law on the Eradication of the Crime of Trafficking in Persons is widely used to crack down on illegal migration – apart from cases of illegal local prostitution, however, there is no clear distinction between illegal migration and human trafficking. The report from the US DOS also reveals that data in Indonesia was not uniformed between the National Police, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. The confusion generated from this lack of uniformity reduces the reliability of such data. This is confounded by the lack of basis on knowledge about the structures and processes involved in human trafficking operations in Indonesia. This affects the policy agendas to eradicate human trafficking consequently leading to ineffective measures.

The legal framework of anti-trafficking policies alone is insufficient in providing an operational definition of human trafficking, its processes and indicators. An understanding of the structures and processes based on ground realities is needed to design policies that are more precise and effective, both to address and mitigate human trafficking. Clear definitions, vision and strategy based on contextual knowledge are needed in this regard.

More detailed analyses of governance in the implementation of anti-trafficking policies also needs to be conducted and used as a basis for policy development. One such analysis discovered that the Task Forces for the Prevention and Management of Human Trafficking in districts do not work effectively throughout the year. The agencies only meet several times annually and are without any operating budget. Repatriating and rehabilitating victims generally leverage on local government funds which in itself is limited. Therefore, there is often a lack of funds to cater to all the victims. Additionally, investigations and trials have to often end abruptly due to the lack of funds to accommodate victims during investigations and trial processes, thus hampering the resolution of their cases.

Conclusion: The Need for Commitment, Policy Revision and Institutional Reforms

The aforementioned descriptions of Indonesia do not present a bright and optimistic forecast for the eradication of human trafficking in Indonesia. On one end, we see a grim outlook based on the ineffectiveness and seemingly flippant nature of government policies leading to an increase in the number of victims experiencing violence and losses in wealth and opportunities. Numerous victims even refused to return to their respective hometowns and chose to stay in transit regions due to the trauma they experienced.

The threes factors that must be emphasized to initiate improvements are 1) strengthening government and institutions’ commitment both nationally and locally, 2) revising policies, and 3) reforming institutions involved in the prevention and management of human trafficking. The government must also strengthen its vision and commitment to eradicate human trafficking to ensure its translation into a more effective strategy and policies. Beyond this, the institutions responsible for implementing these need to be improve their stewardships and inter-institution coordination.

Introduction

Indonesia is experiencing both a shortage and surplus of nurses. A surplus of Indonesian nurses is created when the number of nurses far exceeds the need and demand. Consequently, there is a high rate of unemployment and low bargaining power for nursing graduates. Currently, the average salary of nurses is only slightly above the national minimum wage.

According to the Ministry of Manpower’s (MOM) 2018 report, Indonesia had 695,248 qualified nurses in the sector. However, only 446,428 are employed while the remaining 248,820 are unemployed or looking for employment. Even if the demand for domestic nurses were met, there would still be an excess of 219,257 graduate nurses that year. The demand for domestic nurses was calculated based on the ratio set by the government.

Despite the surplus in qualified nurses, Indonesia is experiencing a shortage of employed nurses. Recent data revealed that the number of employed nurses compared to Indonesia’s total population is still below the ideal. This is further confounded by the uneven distribution of nurses in several regions. This raises several questions: 1) How can there be a simultaneous surplus and shortage of nurses? 2) Why is the demand for nurses not automatically met with the surplus of nurses? 3) How is this issue being currently addressed?

The Surplus—Shortage Paradox

There are at least two reasons behind the surplus of qualified nurses. First, the continued perception that Indonesia is experiencing a critical shortage of nurses. Second, the high rate of development of nurses in Indonesia.

In 2006, WHO included Indonesia in their list of 57 countries experiencing a human resources for health (HRH) crisis. A country was deemed to be experiencing a critical shortage if it possessed less than 80% of the nursing population needed to serve the country’s needs (needs-based sufficiency). Till today, this data is often referred to when formulating health HR policies.

WHO determined that the ideal ratio of employed nurses is 1.58 nurses per 1,000 population. This is different from the Indonesian government’s standard which is 1.80 nurses per 1,000 residents. Despite the differences, both targets have yet to be met till today. The latest data from the Ministry of Health’s (MOH) HRH Information System shows that the number of employed nurses in Indonesia is 356,960 or around 1.30 per 1,000 population. Therefore, to achieve the respective ideal ratios, an additional 75,000 to 135,000 nurses have to be absorbed into the labour market. When compared with the 2018 MOM report, it must be noted that there is no decrease in the number of employed nurses. The difference in figures is primarily due to the different parameters employed by each to define nurses. MOM’s definition included nurses who were not affiliated with any healthcare facilities and were working independently (for e.g. independent home care nurses, etc) whereas MOH’s data was tabulated by nurses who were registered in their HRH information system.

Unfortunately, this demand cannot be immediately be met despite the high number of nursing job seekers. The main issue stems from the suboptimal capability of the domestic market to absorb available nurses. According to the MOM, Indonesia needs an additional 584 hospitals to achieve the recruitment of nurses as set by the government’s 2024 target. The number of new hospitals would have to be revised to 1,958 to absorb all available nurses. However, achieving the 2024 target is already hampered by the government’s and private sector’s limited budget. Though the COVID-19 pandemic has forced large-scale recruitment of nurses, it would still not satisfy the ideal ratio set out by the government nor is sufficient to absorb the entire surplus of nurses.

It is common practice to use nurse-per-population ratio to formulate health HR policies, especially in low- and middle-income countries. This needs-based approach can indeed reveal the number of health workers needed for a population. However, this approach cannot provide a comprehensive picture of the dynamic nature of labour markets.

In the past, there was a tendency for any shortage to be perceived as a result of insufficient supply.  It was the result of overreliance towards nurse-per-population which had been widely used in many countries as well as by the WHO. Consequently, in response to the lack of supply, the government increased the production capacity and to train more health workers. In 2008, Indonesia was able to produce 34,000 nurses annually. A decade later, in 2019, the production capacity increased to 138,206 nurses per year (roughly a four-fold increase). However, the increased capacity was unexpectedly unaligned with the absorption capacity of the labour market, resulting in an oversupply, high number of unemployment and loss of competent nurses.

Inadequate Policy Implementation Perpetuates Overproduction

As the policy to train nurses is closely linked to the tertiary education policy, the government implemented several policies to reduce the overproduction. This included closing non-accredited nursing programmes, reducing the quota for new student admissions, and imposing a moratorium on the establishment of new nursing programmes.

In 2019, the government revoked the permits of 130 private universities because of not meeting accreditation standard, ostensibly in an attempt to reducing the number of nursing programmes. Additionally, the moratorium on new nursing programmes has continued since 2011. This moratorium, however, can be waived for regions experiencing a shortage of nurses. Moreover, the establishment of undergraduate and professional nursing programmes is still permitted so long as the applying college has a vocational nursing programme (D3) that is minimally B-accredited.

Unlike these two policies, there has not been any concrete implementation to reduce the quota for new nursing students. Conversely, there has been a tendency to increase this quota annually as the colleges themselves continue to determine it independently. In fact, the Nursing Act regulates the national quota for new admissions of nursing students, as has been implemented for medical and dentistry programmes. However, to this day, the derivative rules regarding this quota have not been promulgated.

Nurse Migration as a Means to Address Surplus

Despite these policies, the production capacity of nurses cannot be drastically reduced immediately. Similarly, the absorption capacity of the labour market cannot be increased in a short period of time. Therefore, to manage the increasing number of nurses graduating annually while the job market remains limited, the Indonesian government has adopted a policy to encourage nurses to migrate. This policy was feasible as there was a global shortage of nurses. In 2014, it was estimated that there was a shortage of 9 million nurses globally.

Between 2013 and 2018, 3.838 Indonesian nurses found employment overseas. The top five destinations were Taiwan (1,446), Saudi Arabia (932), Kuwait (495), Japan (307) and the United Arab Emirates (112). Despite this, migration is still insignificant to impact the existing surplus of nurses. There are several challenges preventing this from being a viable solution. One challenge is that Indonesia is still a “new player” when compared to neighbouring Philippines which has been a top exporter of nurses globally for more than seven decades.

Need for Accurate Data to Drive Policy Changes

The Indonesian government has relied on nurse migration to address the surplus issue. However, there is a need to improve the health HR data management through an integrated information system.

Currently, conflicting data between institutions is a chronic issue in Indonesia. For example, there is a difference of around 50,000 nursing graduates between the data issued by the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Higher Education Database (PD DIKTI) in 2019. Additionally, the data on employed nurses in 2018 from the MOH and the MOM also differed significantly (around 36,000 difference). In fact, the author found inconsistencies in the number of nurses from documents released by the MOH.

Such inconsistencies have led the Minister of Health himself to be reluctant in using his ministry’s data to facilitate the COVID-19 vaccination programme. Currently, there is a Health Human Resources Information System which includes data of nurses entering and leaving the labour market, as well as active nurses at the national, provincial, and district / city levels. However, this system requires vast improvements such as integrating data on nursing graduates with PD DIKTI and data on vacancies available in the job market. By ensuring the accuracy of such data, more effective policies on the development and employment of nurses can be formulated.

Introduction

The proposed revision of the Information and Electronic Transaction Law (UU ITE) No.19/2016 by the government has led to speculations from civil society groups and members of the opposition that the government intends to expand its powers to include other avenues of criminalization under to an already ambiguous clause. The proposed revision will allegedly include a guideline to interpret the existing defamation clause despite calls from the opposition and public to completely remove the clause. These calls arose from perceiving the government being overzealous and having skewed interpretation of what constitutes as defamation. Due to recent rises in government arrests under the defamation clause, an attempt to further specify the clause with minimum community involvement raises concerns with the government’s growing authoritarian nature. Clamping down on government critiques on the internet only adds to further polarize Indonesian society under pro-government and opposition camps. The government as a political entity should instead focus on minimizing polarization by being a moderating force instead of resorting to restraining its citizens right to the freedom of speech.

The Defamation Clause: An Attempt to Maintain Stability in an Increasingly Politically Polarized Society?

The inclusion of the defamation clause was first enforced as law back as UU ITE No.11/2008before its eventual amendment as UU ITE No.19/2016. The government’s rationale for the law was to limit the dissemination of negative content as the number of internet users in Indonesia increases. The ambiguous nature of the defamation clause has resulted in many cases of individuals invoking the law against one another to settle petty disputes. It has also been allegedly abused by the government to criminalize political dissidents. According to an interview with the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KontraS ) Deputy Coordinator Rivanlee Anandar mentioned that in its current implementation, police officers are given jurisdictional mandate to summon alleged suspects to the police station for questioning without prior consideration of the context, speaker, intention and the content of the speech making this a case of “guilty until proven innocent”. During an interview with the Ministry of Communication and Informatics (Menkominfo) Spokesperson Dedy Permadi, he mentioned that the government’s solution to remedy this debacle will be to provide a “guideline” for the interpretation of the defamation clause. However, the revision would ostensibly be favourable to the government, will only further open avenues of criminalization of political dissidents.

It is worth noting that despite its well-intentioned purpose to ensure a healthy internet space for its citizens, the same law has numerously been abused to silence political critiques. It is worth noting that there are indications of the rise in abuse of the defamation clause occurring during the course of President Joko Widodo’s administration. The rise in these numbers was largely attributed to the increasing political polarity of Indonesian citizens as a result of the heated presidential elections back in 2014 and 2019. Rivanlee mentioned that of the reported 31 Indonesians were currently being processed for crimes under the UU ITE Law, a majority of these cases were for alleged defamation against the President, Police, local government institutions and high-ranking political appointees. However, it is imperative to view this data within the context of the existing political dynamics occurring during the contentious presidential elections in the past. During the 2014 and 2019 elections, both pro-Jokowi supporters and opposition actively used political buzzers in social media to sway the public. Some of these allegations towards the government at times took an inciting tone for example accusing Jokowi as a communist, anti-Islam and a Chinese puppet etc. Some of these allegations were outlandish and misleading that the election was no longer a matter of which candidate has a better program for the country, but who is a better Muslim, more anti-communist and anti-foreign interest. Some of the fake news included incitements that provoked acts of treason against a legitimately elected government.

The Problem with Exploiting Political Polarization

One underlying theme seems to highlight the root problem of the ongoing plan to revise the UU ITE Law: growing polarity. This has manifested into a war of words between both pro-government supporters and the opposition on the internet with one crying foul against the other over the abuse of the defamation clause. This growing political polarization is well illustrated by a survey released by Indikator Politik Indonesia (IPI) in 2020 which showed that from a total of 1200 respondents 36% believed that Indonesia’s democracy was deteriorating while the same survey also found 57.7%  believed that the government had used excessive force towards people with diverging views. This data shows a growing perception of the government’s willingness to criminalize its citizens for expressing their political opinion as a quick fix to issues that stemmed from political polarization of its people. Ironically, there are also instances the government has also indirectly endorsed its supporters to use the same tactics used by his opposition against them in the internet which only fuels the growing mistrust towards the government in terms of allowing constructive critique crucial for the functioning of a democratic society. The growing mistrust with each other has led to a political deadlock over what the government views as an attempt to sabotage a democratically elected government and the opposition’s claim of the government growing increasingly authoritarian.

This phenomenon underlines a flaw in the Indonesian democratic system where instead of finding ways to reduce polarization, both parties seek to use it to achieve political ends. Both the opposition and the government as major players with a large political following should serve as a moderator instead of actively instigating attacks against the other. The government should also leverage on its influence on its supporters to be open to constructive criticism especially towards its programs instead to resorting to buzzers to silence critiques and evoking the defamation clause. The opposition as a legitimate representative of the political interests of the society should also leverage its influence especially in the areas in encouraging proper conduct of expressing their dissatisfaction to the government instead of resorting to personal slander and spreading false news. In a well-functioning democratic society, the first response to such polarity would not be to suspend the freedoms of its citizens, instead address the underlining cause of political polarity. It is worth noting that the existing UU ITE has clauses against the discriminatory use of race, ethnicity, religion and ethnic groups (SARA). The government should instead strengthen such laws in its government institutions and political parties should play a role in promoting a self-regulating normative body that prevents the use SARA issues towards its followers and members. Culminating from this, the government could consider removing the defamation clause altogether.

Finding a Middle Ground

There is no denying the government’s right to protect its interest to carry out its development agenda. In doing so, however, the government could do better than evoke authoritarianist ideals to subdue critiques from civil society and the opposition. A middle way around the ongoing debacle should be one of bridging differences, reconciliation and commitment. One being the involvement of civil society groups and members of the opposition with the ongoing government task force’s revision of the UU ITE via feedbacks and recommendations. Public involvement with the project will ensure that plans to provide guidelines to the defamation clause does not infringe the right of Indonesians to voice their political opinion and more importantly come up with agreeable standards on how to determine an act as defamation. Secondly, the government should leverage its position as a role model to educate and promulgate proper ways to voice political opinion that is respectable and fair towards its political institutions, political parties and voter base instead of resorting to arrests made under the defamation clause. This advice should also be extended to opposition parties as legitimate representatives of Indonesia’s democratic institutions. Political parties should be self-regulating and put clear guidelines on how proper politics are conducted and should not deviate from properly addressing the shortcomings of the incumbent government’s programmes.

It is also advisable that the government applies an internationally acknowledged standard of determining the difference between free speech and hate speech under the Rabat Plan of Action in which Indonesia is a signatory to. In this aspect, the government or the police must pass a rigid threshold test for expression that are considered criminal offences mainly through the context of the critique, the speakers position in society, the speakers intent, content or form (whether it contains incitement, extent of the free speech and likelihood to incite crime.

Introduction

The signing of the RCEP on 15 November 2020 signified the establishment of the largest free trade agreement (FTA) in the world. The agreement comprises ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan and South Korea. Even after the exit of India, the RCEP constitutes no less than 30 percent of world’s gross domestic product (GDP). The deal also covers 27.4 percent of world’s trade, only a little smaller than the European Union (EU) that makes 29.8 percent.

An interesting element of the RCEP is the vaunted “ASEAN centrality” principle. RCEP’s 2012 Guiding Principles and Objectives document states that “negotiation for the RCEP will recognize ASEAN centrality in the emerging regional economic architecture”. Likewise, the FTA’s Joint Leaders’ Statement, launched in November 2020, also explicitly mentions that “the RCEP agreement is the most ambitious FTA initiated by ASEAN, which contributes to enhancing ASEAN centrality in regional frameworks and strengthening ASEAN cooperation with regional partners”.

How is ASEAN centrality defined? What is the position of RCEP’s ASEAN centrality amidst economic and political dynamics of Asia-Pacific region? What are the challenges for ASEAN leaders to maintain centrality in trade sector? While RCEP is an economic agreement, the involvement of regional major and secondary powers makes it imperative to analyse the deal from a (geo)political perspective.

Defining ASEAN Centrality

There are at least two definitions on ASEAN centrality. First, centrality means ASEAN as a forum provider. RCEP is a part of ASEAN “Plus X” forums that gather and arrange cooperation with external powers. In the security arena, ASEAN’s most high-profile forums are the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). EAS’ membership includes powerful countries such as the United States (US), China, Russia and India, whereas the ARF even includes the EU and North Korea. Meanwhile, in trade sector, in addition to the RCEP that convenes five ASEAN’s dialogue partners, the Association has developed six separate ASEAN “Plus One” FTAs. Second, centrality means the driver of substance. ASEAN should develop substantial cooperation within its various forums. For example, there have been expectations for the RCEP to negotiate a truly substantial (rather than a mere rhetoric) “high-quality agreement”, meaning to comprehensively liberalise trade barriers in substantially all sectors, so that it would maximize economic gains and domestic reforms. Among these two definitions, many academics evaluate that ASEAN has only shown a modest progress in achieving centrality, by preferring forum membership to substance.

Why has ASEAN centrality emerged? In a region where rivalry has persisted between China and Japan, China and the US, China and India, and South Korea and Japan, any regional initiatives from one will be treated suspiciously by another power. ASEAN has met this challenge by projecting open, inclusive and non-confrontational images to its “Plus X” frameworks, therefore making these external powers convenient to accept ASEAN’s initiatives. Southeast Asian countries have benefited from this situation since, as a collection of small and medium powers, they have had the opportunity to voice their concerns among these external giants.

The Three Challenges

After the RCEP, ASEAN confronts three challenges to maintain centrality in trade regionalism: the first relates to being a forum provider and the next two pertains to centrality of substance.

Apart from the homework to lure India back to the RCEP (and perhaps, in the long run, to entice the US and Russia to join the FTA), ASEAN should be watchful of any possible forum alternatives. ASEAN’s forums will remain attractive in so far as rivalry and distrust among external powers continue to exist. Should external powers achieve some degree of understanding and develop a common platform to cooperate, there will no longer be a need for ASEAN to be an honest broker. A case in point is the possible conclusion of the long-stalled China-Japan-Korea (CJK) FTA. After the finalisation of RCEP, both Japan and China have expressed their optimism regarding the prospect of CJK-FTA. The trilateral FTA is difficult since it involves the long-standing Japan-China and Japan-Korea rivalries. ASEAN’s proponents may exultantly declare that the RCEP has become the first FTA between these politico-economic rivals. Yet, a successful negotiation of CJK-FTA may potentially reduce the tension among the three countries, and even evolve into a distinct Northeast Asian institution that is independent from ASEAN forums. Another case in point is the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The FTA was once named Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and was politically strategic to serve US’ engagement policy in the Asia-Pacific under President Barrack Obama. President Donald Trump pulled the country out of the deal in 2017, however, the new President-elect Joe Biden had indicated US’ return. Interestingly, soon after RCEP’s signing, Chinese President Xi Jinping has also expressed his country’s interest in joining the deal. If this scenario comes true, then the CPTPP will economically far outweigh the RCEP. Geopolitically, the CPTPP may serve as a platform to negotiate cooperations and future relations among the two most powerful countries, and these prospects will likely make the ASEAN centrality run out of stream. At the time being, it is definitely too early to tell the likely occurrence of these dim scenarios (from ASEAN’s view) of CJK-FTA and CPTPP. However, in the long run, ASEAN needs to cautiously observe these regional developments.

Second, ASEAN leaders need to emphasize the substantive contribution of ASEAN centrality. RCEP is oft-repeatedly described as of a lower quality than the CPTPP for its less ambitious agendas in regulating investment and intellectual property rights, as well as the absence of labour and environmental chapters. However, the RCEP has actually provided different substantial contributions. Rather than simply an economic agreement that promises economic benefits, RCEP is essentially a part of ASEAN’s geopolitical instrument to entangle conflicting external powers in a joint platform of cooperation. To be clear, RCEP may not extirpate the gamut of profound politico-military conflicts in the Asia-Pacific. Yet, providing a platform for communication and collaboration is a necessary stepping stone to conflict reduction. Therefore, RCEP is an instrument of peace. Another area of contribution is the representation of developing countries’ interests in the RCEP. Substantively, RCEP incorporates special and differential treatment (SDT), economic and technical cooperation, and trade facilitation mechanism. These points are easily overlooked, or even underestimated, given the massive “high-quality FTA” narratives from developed countries and large businesses. Not all developing countries are comfortable with such a demand since it potentially brings massive distributional costs and structural adjustments. While it is indeed true that the RCEP also aims to be a “high-quality” FTA, the incorporation of the above-mentioned elements mean that the developing members still retain some room for policy and pace of adjustments. Politically, joining a regional agreement is a typical strategy of weak developing countries as it allows them to build a common bargaining position against the more powerful developed countries. Therefore, ASEAN has indeed provided some substantial contribution to ASEAN centrality, and the challenge here is to elevate these frequently neglected achievements more widely.

Third, substantively, the principle of ASEAN centrality should be directed to engage civil society organizations (CSOs). Despite the people-centred rhetoric, many ASEAN meetings, especially FTA negotiations, are held secretively without sufficient public deliberations. During RCEP’s negotiations, it was only when the hosts (as Indonesia did) initiated a separate forum for CSOs that the latter could directly express their concerns, yet as testified by a Jakarta-based CSO activist, the forum was brief and its content was too general. Such a top-down process is a typical ASEAN’s reach-out strategy to the CSOs, in which the former limits the latter’s participation in “ASEAN-created spaces” only. ASEAN should consult the CSOs more meaningfully. It is indeed true that ASEAN centrality processes are of high-level security nature, nevertheless, trade is different. FTAs, including the RCEP, will affect the livelihood of small farmers, labours, and other ordinary citizens, hence the opportunity to create a more inclusive ASEAN centrality.

Conclusion

The completion of the RCEP is a milestone for ASEAN centrality. However, the road ahead is still a hard slog. ASEAN leaders should rivet to address the above-mentioned challenges to maintain future relevance in the Asia-Pacific.

Introduction

The Job Creation law (or generally knowns as UU Cipta Kerja) and all its components have been legitimized since October 2020. However, the enforcement of this law has not been successful thus far. Some have attributed this to the need for other implementing laws, such as Government Regulations and Presidential Decrees, to be part of the implementation process. The inclusion of such laws also enables the public to continue to track and ensure that the laws are enforced in compliance with the public interest.

Moreover, it remains unclear whether the law can potentially improve the Indonesian economic position, both regionally and internationally. One indication of how this could be achieved is outlined in a section in the Republic of Indonesia Law Number 11 of 2020 on job creation. The section entails how the Job Creation Law should absorb as much of the Indonesian workforce as possible in the midst of highly competitive global economic demands This, thus, demonstrates how the law is vital in preparing the national economy to compete regionally and globally.

Economic, Technological and Human Resource Considerations for the Job Creation Law

There are several considerations for the Indonesian government pertaining to the Job Creation law. Indonesia should first focus on enhancing its productivity as the largest economy among ASEAN countries. More specifically, Indonesia should avoid becoming a consumer state as it eases access of imported goods into the country.  By doing so, Indonesia can avoid becoming a victim of the global economy as it facilitates both domestic and foreign investments through the law. It is also noteworthy that the law is implemented in the digital economy of industrial revolution 4.0 which encourages a larger reliance on technology through online sales and transactions.

This law is also expected to facilitate technology-based transfer into Indonesia and improve the informational skills of its citizens. To sustain long-term impact, the quality of Indonesian human resources should be significantly improved and the utilization of its natural resources optimized. Such optimization is crucial to support Indonesia’s exporting process. Additionally, this should entail a significant reduction of raw material exports that can be achieved by transforming the paradigm behind Indonesian exports. Through economic policies, Indonesia could instead focus on increasing their exported products which have been processed both partially and fully in Indonesia. By doing so, it will not only further increase the job creation in Indonesia, but also inspire new local innovations that can compete with global competitors.

Improving Human Resources through Education

To facilitate a successful transfer of information, skills, and technology, improving the quality of Indonesian human resources is mandatory. The lack of such improvements will limit the goals of the law and endanger its existence. Generally, Indonesia’s human resources are impeded by several factors, including (1) low qualifications of manpower which predominantly possess high school qualifications or lower; (2) low productivity rates; and (3) a lowly skilled labour. Addressing these human resource challenges enable a proper matching with the expectation of the Job Creation Law.

As a developing country, Indonesian human resources require substantial improvements. This is evident as Indonesia is ranked 111^th out of 189 countries or sixth among ASEAN countries in the Human Development Index Ranking. This is unfortunate when human development is key to increasing economic growth and vice versa. The “two-way relationships between Economic Growth (EG) and Human Development (HD)” also demonstrates that human development is not only a product of economic growth but also an important indicator and input for economic growth. Therefore, human development should be prioritized further to drive higher economic growth.

This, thus, supports the need to synergize the law with other regulations including the Law on the National Educational System. Currently, educational regulations have been incorporated into the Job Creation Law to facilitate the improvement of Indonesian human resources. While the law aims to ease investments and creating jobs, the incorporated educational reforms would improve the quality of Indonesian human resources intended to fill these newly created jobs. This symbiotic relationship exemplifies the importance of a strong economic system sustained by an equally good education system; within the ambit of national development.

The current Law on the National Educational System has yet to successfully developed a comprehensive education system throughout Indonesia. This is due to numerous compartmentalized developments of other educational regulations covering: 1) Law No. 14/2005 on teachers and lecturers; 2) Law No. 12/2012 on higher education; and 3) Law No. 18/2019 on Islamic boarding schools (pesantren).

These developments have caused the Law on the National Education System to seem fragmented and reduced to several specific regulations, thus impeding the formation of an integrated education system. Akin to the Job Creation Bill, by merging these separate education laws, it is hoped that there would no longer be any regulations pertaining to education beyond the Law on the National Education System.

Towards a Good Education System in Indonesia

A good education system is one that develops Indonesians to possess values such as diligence, independence, resilient, entrepreneurial while possessing a prestigious mindset. Simultaneously, an education system that also instils citizenship values is essential to develop a preference for locally-made products over foreign products. Such education system would not only improve Indonesia’s human resources but also innovate Indonesians to better compete in this global economy.

Numerous of these values are being nurtured into students under the current education system. However, some of these values have not yet been implemented due to a lack of grounded educational philosophy. This is further confounded by the current education system which cannot fully accommodate various developments such as industrial revolution 4.0 and society 5.0. Instead, it seems solely focused on formal education.

To address these issues, it is proposed for the Indonesian national education system to return to the philosophy espoused by Ki Hajar Dewantara, Indonesia’s founding father of education. Through such a philosophy, the system is capable of strengthening and synergizing the three hubs of education; formal, non-formal and informal. This would also entail the standardization of national education across Indonesia covering aspects such as competencies, curriculum, processes, and educators. Moreover, with the advent of industrial revolution 4.0, society 5.0 and the COVID-19 pandemic, the digitalization of education must also be considered.

Such massive effort of standardization is still a distant goal as it is fraught with numerous challenges:

1. Indonesia does not have a grounded national education philosophy;
2. The lack of an educational roadmap or blueprint for the next 50 or 100 years to serve as a main reference for administering the National Education System;
3. The presence of inconsistent education policies such as the zoning policy;
4. The contested autonomy of education between the central and local governments;
5. The lack of proportional and efficient allocation of Indonesia’s education budget;
6. The compulsory education programme of nine years is not completely administered as evident from the number of school dropouts;
7. The low national mean years of schooling (Rata-rata Lama Sekolah, RLS) that has yet to complete high school and the low estimated participation rate (Angka Partisipasi Kasar, APK) of those moving on to tertiary education upon completing pre-tertiary education;
8. The lack of standardization of educators as aforementioned;
9. The disparity of education between regions due to factors such as restricted access; and
10. There is yet to be a link and match between education and industry.

Key to overcoming these challenges is the formulation of an educational roadmap or blueprint as aforementioned. A long-term educational roadmap lays the foundation for the development of comprehensive, complementary policies that are relevant to the needs of time.

To further inspire educational reforms, the government should escape from the paradigmatic trap of focusing solely on Indonesia’s economic growth rate. Instead, the government needs to recalibrate qualitatively and comprehensively in initiating a balanced development of other sectors. Economic growth without such a balanced development perpetuates social imbalance.

Introduction

Indonesia’s adoption of the Omnibus Law back in late October of this year despite strong concerns and rejection from communities highlights growing concerns that the Indonesian government seems to be out of touch with ongoing negative public sentiment caused by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The government’s preoccupation on long-term post COVID-19 economic recovery signified by the justification of signing the Omnibus Law could potentially have dire consequences to the country’s stability and could potentially undo years of economic progress.

Omnibus Law: A Misguided Post Pandemic Economic Recovery Strategy

The Omnibus bill, also referred to as the job creation bill, was signed into law by the House of Representatives (DPR) in late October with the hopes of providing a much-needed re-haul to the country’s labour system and natural resources management. The first mention of the law was made by President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) back during his presidential inauguration on October 2019 with the first draft of the bill circulated to the public on February 2020. The then 905-page law has included the amendment of 79 prevailing laws concerning labour, spatial planning and environment management to improve bureaucratic efficiency and address existing red tapes during the process of application for a business permit. President Jokowi during the Presentation of the Government Statement on the Bill of the State Budget for 2021 fiscal year stated that the adoption of the Omnibus law will serve to support Indonesia’s post COVID-19 pandemic recovery.

However, the signing of the bill has been met with strong opposition which later escalated into mass protests in the streets of Jakarta by labour unions, university students and civil society groups after it was signed into law. Protesters has decried the government for its lack of transparency and protested the lack of prior consultation with relevant stakeholders within the community. There has also been public sentiment that the signing of the bill was rushed and that the government had been prioritizing non-pressing issues amidst Indonesia’s worsening COVID-19 infection rate. The signing of the Omnibus Law suggests that the government of Indonesia is underestimating the prolonged impact of COVID-19 to the economy and the mass unrest the pandemic has on the population.

By signing into law a bill that affects the livelihoods of many workers mostly impacted by the COVID-19 such as labours effected by mass layoffs, the government only seems to be playing with fire. With overemphasis on long-term recovery instead of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the government has effectively sidelined the need for stricter health protocols and adequate testing regime to mitigate larger economic losses incurred by the country. This indicates that there seems to be a mismatch between the government long-term economic ambitions and realities on the ground.

With recent data indicating that Indonesia has reported a total of 450 thousand COVID-19 cases as of October, The Institute for Economics and Finance (INDEF) has projected that Indonesia could suffer IDR 127 trillion (USD 8.7 billon) due to the ongoing pandemic, and with infective policies currently in place, and the lack of consistency in enforcement of appropriate health protocols, there is valid reason to worry that Indonesia economy will take a much longer time to recover.

Urgency of the Omnibus Law: A Less than Lukewarm Reception?

There are a few clauses within the Omnibus Law which affects the most vulnerable communities during the COVID-19 pandemic, firstly, under the new law, factory workers will be hired on contract basis instead of being provided with permanent contracts upon employment. Labour unions has pointed out that under the new clause, labour will be hired through third party outsourcing entities which will render them powerless against their employers due to the lack of clarity on whom would pay the severance packages (employer or the outsourcing entities). Secondly, the government will reassign minimum pay which was previously set to district levels to now provincial levels. Complaints about this clause centred on the argument that minimum pay based on district levels are larger of that based on the provincial level. Lastly, if speculations are true, the elimination of work period contract and opting for contract for life will render workers without adequate healthcare and retirement package.

The implementation of the Omnibus Law will undoubtedly have an impact on workers, especially due to the potential loss of income and social safety nets. This is also compounded by existing fears caused by COVID-19 which causes large amount of worker lay-offs. The Ministry of Manpower on April of this year mentioned that nearly 1.2 million workers from 74,439 companies have been laid-off or have been told to stay home indefinitely.  It is likely the number of people that will be further impacted by job loss will increase until the government prioritizes keeping the spikes of COVID-19 infections down. Despite the bleak economic outlook, the concerns from workers towards the Omnibus Law mostly stems from speculations due to the lack of government transparency. However, it is worth noting that the government’s attempt to re-organize Indonesia’s manpower to increase productivity are well justified. A survey from Japan External Trade Organization of 20 countries in Asia and Oceania shows that Indonesia’s manufacturing sector has the lowest productivity rate in comparison to its other Southeast Asian neighbours.

Another point of contention within the new Omnibus Law is that the simplification of granting land rights, opening land concessions for palm oil and regulatory compliance under the law will be directly under the central government instead of regional authorities. This include the government’s power to implement a national policy on environmental management, without excerpts mentioning the need for prior consultation with related communities owning community and tribal lands. The law has been seen by both environment groups and businesses alike as having the potential to further weaken environmental safeguards already in place since it provides a leeway for local business oligarchs to expand their business with impunity. Foreign businesses alike have also expressed their concerns regarding the new land rights and environmental law with 35 foreign enterprises reportedly sending a letter of concern to the Indonesian government. These foreign enterprises fear that the new law can negatively impact their business reputation, operations, regulations and environmental management.

Both cases concerning changes in the labour law and spatial planning suggest that the regulation lacks both a receptive response from Indonesians and positive sentiment from international businesses which the Indonesian government intends to attract. One key theme of the two arguments highlights two pressing concerns regarding the Omnibus Law: 1) it is untimely given existing economic concerns by those hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic and 2) highlights the need for further consultation with relevant stakeholders before it is enacted into law. Amnesty Indonesia further mentioned that the signing of the Omnibus Law undermined Indonesian workers need for political participation.

Health Security vs. Economic Growth

The COVID-19 pandemic also highlights Indonesia’s current inadequacy in providing adequate health care towards a large portion of its citizens. Current shortfalls in enforcing adequate testing regime’s, adequate communication, increasing hospital capacities and ensuring universal access will impede Indonesia’s ability to recover economically. The government needs to realize that as part of a broader economic recovery strategy, ensuring that consistent centralized policies need to be enforced to reduce reported COVID-19 cases. In terms of giving a much-needed boost towards Indonesia’s attractiveness to foreign investors, mismanagement of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic will cast doubts for  would-be investors of Indonesia’s ability to govern.

One key theme that emerges during the passing of the Omnibus Law is that the government needs to balance the need to keep the rate of COVID-19 infections down and the need for economic growth. The debacle of passing the Omnibus Law seems to indicate that the current administration seems to view aspects of health security as being unrelated to future economic growth. While there is no denying the need for the government to also invest their time and resources to think of strategies for post COVID-19 economic recovery, ensuring the health of the population cannot be separated with the need for economic growth. For Indonesia’s economy which relies heavily on domestic spending, services and hospitality sector it is crucial that the population have adequate assurance that the government has the pandemic under control. Many Indonesians are undoubtedly effected by the ongoing pandemic with lay-offs and economic uncertainty greatly diminishing the spending power of Indonesians which in turn further weakens the Indonesian economy. While focusing on economic reforms that focus on economic recovery may seem like a desirable option for the government to partake, such reforms cannot be pushed during times of mass unrest caused the ongoing pandemic especially without prior consultation with those mostly effected by the Omnibus Law. It is increasingly clear that such reforms need to wait, and instead the government needs to invest more time and attention in protecting the safety of what is runing the Indonesian economy: its citizens. Indonesia’s economy would not function while its people constantly fear the loss of their livelihoods caused by the pandemic.

Introduction

For over a decade, religion continues to be integral to Indonesians. Since 2008, at least 90% of Indonesian respondents believed that religion is “very important” in their lives. In 2020, 98% of Indonesian respondents believed this to be true with the remaining 2% believing that this is “somewhat” true. This, thus, ranks Indonesia as one of the most religious countries in the world.

“Supply” from the Indonesian Government

There are two takeaways from this trend. The first is the state’s continued success in the religionization of public affairs. Here “religionization” is defined as the process of framing public issues such as government regulations as religious issues. Religionization is not a new phenomenon for Indonesia. This can be seen from its formulation of the Pancasila, the state ideology. Recently, 96% of Indonesian respondents stated that “belief in God is necessary in order to be moral and have good values.” This is aligned with the first principle of Pancasila, namely “the belief in the one true God”, which was ostensibly aimed at cultivating good citizens.

It can be argued that religionization intensified during Era Reformasi (Reformation Era). Unlike the Soeharto’s authoritarian New Order which was generally secular, the government administrations of the Reformation Era were accommodative towards religious symbolism. Building such an atmosphere was the numerous years of Soeharto’s suppression of political Islam while only co-opting Islamic political leaders in the last decade of his rule. Additionally, during the Reformation Era, political elites regarded religion as a mobilizer for their political careers. Religion would award them public support at all levels of society.

Keeping to this, Wahid Foundation’s One Decade Report on the Monitoring of Freedom of Religion and Beliefs found that religious events such as mass recitation of the Quran were one of the most organized by the two government administrations in the past decade. These were during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s and Joko Widodo’s second and first term in office, respectively. Additionally, during Joko Widodo’s term, there was a new phenomenon of announcing religious instructions for civil servants in several regions. In 2018, a total of 13 instructions were uncovered. These instructions included requiring civil servants to pray together once the call to prayer has been delivered. Such instructions may be a new support-seeking tactic in preparation for the 2019 legislative and 2020 gubernatorial elections. Unfortunately, one drawback of mixing religion with public affairs is the prevalence of discrimination. During the two terms (2009 – 2018), 88 discriminative regulations at the provincial, district and city levels were uncovered.

“Demand” by Society

Secondly, in addition to this “supply” from the government, it is important to consider how the demand by society contributes to this phenomenon. Indicators for this demand is evident from the increasing popularity of Islamic clothing, Muslim-only residential complexes and Syariah-compliant banks.

Driving this demand is the middle-income group whom a majority does not possess religious education backgrounds. Instead, they minimally graduated from public high schools. Insecurity and anxiety have been cited for this increase in religious identity. These sentiments may be due to diverse factors including economic-social insecurity and the politization of numerous issues such as intolerance and inequality. Interestingly, it was shown that there is a negative correlation between a country’s religiosity and GDP. Countries with lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita are more likely to tie belief in God to morality as seen with Indonesia. In these situations, religion becomes an important institution to allay these sentiments.

One concern, however, is the demand’s potential to drive the growth of conservative and hardline groups in Indonesia. The mobilization of conservative and hardline Muslims in Indonesia has been gaining traction since 2016. An explanation for this is that conservative and hardline groups have become more coordinated in simultaneously mobilizing their members and affiliates. Having a higher turnout while organizing such demonstrations to be held after Friday prayers, further empowers sympathizers to participate. This led to large-scale demonstrations as seen since 2016. Additionally, by calling themselves Alumni 212, not only does it serve to create a common shared memory for participants, it also enables the growth of such movement under a single banner. Such growth is further assisted as no formal memberships are required. In other words, any like-minded individuals will be accepted.

Rising Tide of Intolerance in Indonesia

Taken together, moderate Islam is at risk of weakening its position in Indonesia, and thus signalling a rising tide of intolerance. There is preliminary evidence that found higher level of self-declared religiosity to be negatively correlated with a tolerant attitude in Indonesia. Additionally, the same study found that a higher income inequality and extent of poverty are associated with higher level of religious intolerance.

Curbing this rising intolerance, however, cannot be achieved simply by allaying the insecurity and anxiety of Indonesians such as the provision of economic assistance. It should also be through eradicating state-perpetrated discrimination. Allowing and even encouraging discriminative actions by the state provides fodder for intolerance. And there have been studies that indicates how an individual’s behaviour may be an outcome of state policies and society’s corresponding response towards them. By taking a tougher stance on intolerance, it may aid in removing the legitimacy of hardline groups. However, the decentralization of power in Indonesia may prevent this from cascading to the local levels where the influence of Islamic leaders on politicians are still strong.

Despite this emerging trend, the worry that Indonesia may develop into an Islamic state with the imposition of Syariah laws maybe baseless. Though seen in Aceh, it has yet to become a source of inspiration for other localities. Even in Aceh, despite reports of public flogging for unacceptable behaviours, they have not implemented new religious regulations since 2007 while most of the current regulations are centred on the use of Islamic clothing.

Introduction

Up till 2024, the regulation policies for tobacco control is unlikely to experience significant progress. This is despite tobacco consumption being a major risk factor for non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Reasons include strong resistance and protest from the majority of parliamentary factions and the tobacco industry. This issue is further confounded as political attention and national resources are prioritized for the management of the coronavirus pandemic and its direct health, economy and social impacts. Theoretically, tobacco regulation policies and the prevention of diseases caused by cigarette consumption are clear, easy to apply and will have a major impact on improving public health in the long term.

Lethality of Tobacco-associated Non-communicable Diseases

NCDs are the leading cause of death and disabilities worldwide. In 2018, the World Health Organization (WHO) recorded an annual 41 million deaths globally due to NCDs. This constitutes an estimated 70% of the total deaths worldwide. The top three lethal NCDs were cardiovascular diseases (17.9 million), cancer (9 million), and respiratory diseases (3.9 million). Causes of these top three killers include the consumption of highly toxic products such as cigarettes. Additionally, tobacco products are mass produced, thus, not only increasing access to these harmful products but also increasing society’s exposure to its toxins.

Unfortunately, Indonesia is not only one of the biggest producers of tobacco but also one of the biggest consumers in the world. Enabling this is the favourable environment in Indonesia that enables the tobacco industry to flourish. Collectively, these highlight the need for two simultaneous courses of action. Lacking one course of action would compromise efforts to mitigate NCDs. The first course of action would be targeted at the individual level with the promotion of a healthy lifestyle while avoiding the consumption of toxic products. The second is the need for structural changes through stricter tobacco control policies.

Without strong political will from President Joko Widodo, it is almost certain for the status quo to remain. This seems to be the reality as he completes his final tenure as President in 2024. And without stricter tobacco control policies, Indonesians susceptibility to sickness and poverty would increase. In addition to NCDs,  tobacco consumption increases the risk and severity of communicable diseases such as influenza, tuberculosis, and nosocomial infections. Numerous studies have also shown that the majority of tobacco users in developing countries are the poor. Upon their addiction to tobacco products, a larger percentage of their income would likely be used on these products instead of basic essential items. This consequently increases their risk of falling ill and thus, worsening their financial standing.

Two factors that affect political will are the social norms of tobacco consumption and the delayed expression of symptoms. Unlike infectious diseases such as COVID-19 where their symptoms are immediate, ailments from NCDs usually require several decades to develop. Additionally, tobacco consumption, particularly smoking of kreteks (clove-flavoured cigarettes), is deeply entrenched in Indonesia.

To reverse the increasing number of deaths due to tobacco consumption, WHO has approved and encouraged countries to ratify the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) since 2003. FCTC entails a strong and comprehensive legal framework to control tobacco consumption. Currently, this convention has been ratified by 182 countries consisting of more than 90% of the world’s population. However, Indonesia is the only Asian country that has yet to do so but not without trying. In 2004, plans to ratify the convention by the Indonesian government failed and there have been no attempts ever since. Instead, in 2016, Joko Widodo stated that one reason for Indonesia to continue the status quo is to safeguard “national interest” on the basis of protecting tobacco growers and those employed in the tobacco industry. Similarly, the tobacco industry, association and its supporters in Indonesia have constantly lobbied Joko Widodo against the ratification on the pretext that the industry contributes a large amount of taxes to the government while ensuring the livelihoods of many Indonesians.

Due to this stance, Indonesia’s Health Ministry faces a losing battle against tobacco consumption. This is despite Indonesia’s Health Ministry reporting 230,000 tobacco-related deaths annually. The ministry has also uncovered a rising prevalence of teenage smokers, aged 10 – 18. Teenage smokers rose to 9.1% in 2018 from 7.2% in 2013. Ironically, the Indonesian government had targeted the prevalence of teenage smokers to be capped at 5.4% in 2019 despite their stance on tobacco consumption. This is indicative of the government’s failure to control cigarette consumption while highlighting the tobacco industry’s success at targeting teenagers. Targeting teenagers is a significant achievement by the industry as teenage smokers will become their long-serving patrons, replacing older smokers.

Economically, Indonesia’s Health Ministry has shown massive losses of nearly IDR 600 trillion (USD 40 billion) to the macro economy due to tobacco consumption. This amount is four times the amount of cigarette taxes received by the government in the same year. Losses are tabulated from the total number of productive years lost, inpatient and outpatient costs. Unfortunately, the amount of losses is envisaged to increase annually as these costs increase. A more grave concern is that the majority of smokers (60%) comes from low-income families.

These statistics, however, do not hinder 65 million Indonesians from continued tobacco consumption. Tobacco industries in Indonesia are relatively unimpeded in advertising, promoting and distributing their products. This population will continue to increase as children and teenagers are targeted by the tobacco industry as their new generation of consumers. Indicative of this is WHO’s estimation that the population of tobacco consumers in Indonesia to rise to 96 million by 2025. It is, thus, a monumental challenge for Indonesia to drop from its third ranking of countries with the highest number of smokers in the world without stricter tobacco control policies.

Restricting Outreach and Price Control: Easier Said Than Done

Outreach and price control are two effective policies to regulate tobacco consumption that are much needed and still lacking in Indonesia. Restricting outreach entails the total banning of its advertisements, promotions, and sponsorships in mass media and outdoor media. Meanwhile, price control entails increasing prices of tobacco products by setting minimum prices and increasing taxes on tobacco products.

Current outreach restrictions are still suboptimal. Tobacco product commercials continue to be broadcasted on television albeit restricted to airtimes of 09.30pm to 05.00am daily. Similarly, advertisements on print media are still allowed with certain restrictions such as no full-page advertisements. The Indonesian government, at the urging of the health ministry, must be recognized for its attempt at curbing online outreach. A total of 114 websites were shut down in 2019 for violations prohibiting the publication of tobacco product images in their advertisements. However, such regulations can be bypassed simply by removing such images. Additionally, there have yet to be regulations on advertisements on social media platforms. Another regulation that is lacking is the restriction on internet sales.

The affordable prices and taxes on tobacco products do not impede their purchase by the poor and children. Despite a revision in cigarette prices this year, one can still obtain a pack of 12 at IDR 12,300 (USD0.84). It must be noted that one of the lowest regional minimum wage (UMR) in Indonesia is around IDR 1.7 million. Setting a minimum price of IDR 50,000 could motivate consumers to stop their habit. It is also concerning that the sales of loose cigarettes are still permitted in Indonesia. According to a 2018 survey, the market price per stick of loose cigarette is approximately IDR 1,000 – IDR 2,000. Its cheap prices and lack of enforcement on age restrictions enable their purchase by children. Additionally, tobacco industries have yet to incur the maximum amount of tax that can be legally enforced on their products, set at 57% of the retail price. Currently, the highest tax bracket is capped at 43%. This was only after an increase this year as there was no revision of tax for tobacco products in 2019.

Should the stance of the next government administration on tobacco control policies change, ratification of the FCTC could still be a tall order. Nevertheless, continued lobbying could lead to tougher restrictions and increasing public awareness on the dangers of tobacco consumption. Such incremental toughening and increased awareness could one day culminate to Indonesia ratifying the FCTC.

Introduction

The concern that Indonesia’s 2020 simultaneous regional elections (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah 2020, hereafter Pilkada) will breed new COVID-19 clusters have become an increasingly regular topic as the government pushes on with its 9 December 2020 schedule. Originally slated on 23 September 2020, calls to its further delay have not been entertained despite the pandemic spreading with little signs of respite. Consequently, this might not bode well to Indonesia’s image.

Elections during a Flat Curve – Does Indonesia Qualify?

To be fair, Indonesia is not the only country facing political pressures in this pandemic. Countries such as Japan, Singapore, Mongolia and Malaysia (Pahang by-election) have had to organise elections despite the trepidation over potential election clusters. Apart from Malaysia, these examples serve as indications that elections can indeed be conducted without severe consequences.

Adhy Aman pointed out that such success is largely due to these elections taking place when the infection curve was flat in these countries. If elections were held during a steep rise in the curve, the outcome would likely be undesirable. Case in point: Malaysia’s most recent election in Sabah was held while local cases were stacking up – it is now considered as the inception point of the current infection wave in the country.

Yet, this warning may likely be unheeded as Indonesia appears unfazed by the development in Negeri Jiran (neighbouring country). Unlike the examples above, Indonesia has been unable to flatten its curve with 365,240confirmed COVID-19 cases and 12,617 fatalities at the time of writing. Further fuelling this anxiety is the fact that Pilkada 2020 will be held in nine provinces, 224 districts and 37 cities stretching from Sumatera to Papua, thus risking potential new outbreaks all over the country if risks are not minimized.

Indonesia definitely cannot afford new clusters, as hospitals are worryingly reaching maximum capacity and over 200 medical officers have died from the virus.

In spite of that, Pilkada-linked cases have emerged long before voting day. Candidates are reported to have flouted the health protocol as early as the registration period in early September, with the Election Supervisory Body discovering 243 of such violations during this period alone. By mid-October, 67 candidates have contracted the virus while six others have died. Members of the General Elections Commission have also reportedly fallen ill from COVID-19. The risks remain prevalent as campaigning will last until 5 December.

Pushing on – “Resilience” or Other Motives?

In Malaysia, there is an interesting perception that Indonesians are resilient – they are unperturbed by any hardships they faced. Although the perception is unsubstantiated, the standpoint and attitude of lawmakers and politicians seem to reflect a degree of it.

The President’s office, for example, has stated that Pilkada cannot wait until the pandemic subsides and that the constitutional rights of voters must be protected. Ministers Mahfud Md and Tito Karnavian also reinforced this stance. The former warned of a power vacuum if another delay materializes and the latter believing that Pilkada would lead the public to vote for candidates who can manage the crisis. This is akin to the People Action Party’s (PAP) narrative in the lead up to Singapore’s 2020 General Election. The ruling party has requested “the support of every Singaporean, not just to return the PAP to the government, but also give it a strong mandate, to empower it to act decisively on your behalf, and steer the country towards better days ahead.” Furthermore, PDIP and Gerindra representatives had stated that Pilkada should go ahead as the end of the pandemic is uncertain and delaying it further would risk political chaos.

Still, there could be less-altruistic motivations for not delaying Pilkada further. Expert Djohermansyah Djohan laid out five sources of pressures behind this keenness: the contesting incumbents, political parties, decision makers, the business sector and the people themselves. According to him, each of these would benefit, politically or financially, if Pilkada were to proceed. For instance, some have exploited the election momentum to obtain food and financial aids from contesting candidates.

Casting Ballot and Casting an Image

Indonesia’s handling of the situation may likely impact its image abroad. Firstly, it calls into question the commitment that the state has towards ensuring the wellbeing of the people. Despite the palpable risks to voters, election officials and the candidates, the priority to execute a political process seems to prevail. However, it must be noted that the decision makers cannot be fully faulted for not making any effort to manage the situation as Pilkada has indeed been delayed once. Numerous deliberations would have taken place to reach such a decision.

Regardless, the optics of this situation might not look positive as politics and political process are seemingly prioritized above a national crisis. This is evident as political events such as Pilkada are seemingly immune to the restrictions placed on economic, social and cultural events or activities during this health crisis. Preventing a positive optic is Indonesia’s mounting daily infection rates. This is indicative that Indonesia has yet to develop a successful strategy to mitigate COVID-19 infections in normal conditions, let alone during political processes such as Pilkada.

This could amplify angst and criticisms of the state’s capability and accountability if the people are unconvinced with the government’s effort. As seen recently, angst and criticisms in Indonesia can lead to large-scale protests. Additionally, at a time when the country is led by a development-oriented administration, it is not sending an appealing message to potential foreign investors, further casting doubts on the future of its economy and recovery plan.

Secondly, it reinforces the perception that the government’s approach to the pandemic is that of resignation. Indonesia’s COVID-19 strategy thus far has appeared to be sub-optimum, evidenced by unsound movement control regulations, half-hearted enforcements, conflicting messages from authorities and the general shortage of COVID-19 tests performed, among others.

The gestures and tones from the government also suggest that the state is relying on the provision of an effective vaccine that could mitigate the pandemic instead of instilling more stringent measures.

From an Indonesian perspective, this is understandable. At 1,919,443 square kilometres of land area and with over 270 million people, Indonesia requires immense financial and human resources to enforce regulations that could keep the entire country in check.

Nevertheless, the expectation by decision makers and officials that Indonesians would abide by health protocols is also misplaced. To paraphrase Tirto.ID, if health protocols were already flouted during the quasi-lockdown period, how can we ensure that such flouting will not be repeated during Pilkada?

Anxious Wait for Indonesia

This is why the period between now and voting day would be that of suspense, as candidates embark on their campaign trails and explore ways to campaign without breaking the health protocol (or be caught breaking it).

Unfortunately, the protocol has yet to be adhered to in this early stage of campaigning as seen by the gathering of large crowds such as in Jambi. Not only are physical campaigns hard to control, candidates themselves do not serve as positive examples to their constituents on adhering to the parameters of the protocol. Examples include the candidates’ improper wearing of masks and posing with voters without observing social distancing.

The latest survey results on Indonesians’ obedience to the health protocol do not seem encouraging. Despite some positive pointers (92% of respondents claim to wear masks), the survey may not be representative of the situation in campaign trails. The findings that only 75% and 73% of respondents wash hands and observe social distancing respectively also elevate this worry over physical campaigns.

Additionally, voting day would provide insights beyond the outcome of the contest – voter turnout, the readiness of voting stations to observe health protocol and the legitimacy of the results (especially in a low turnout scenario). Bear in mind that previous voting days were especially strenuous to conduct, with 894 voting officers passing away in the Presidential Election last year. Whether Pilkada-linked clusters would emerge or not would be dependent on Indonesia’s infection rates in the lead up to 9 December.

It seems that Pilkada as a political process will serve as a pressure test for the country’s professed new normal paradigm. Indonesia is a big country and a proud democracy, but the awkward situation that the pandemic has plunged it into only reminds us that its nation- and state-building processes are not yet complete.