Tit for Tat
The previous Moon administration showed a cautious navigation between South Korea’s relations with China and the United States, placing Seoul in a blurry allegiance with both of them. Differently, the current Yoon administration has officially sided with the United States, with its own version of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, leaving South Korea’s strategic ambiguity behind.
Following this closer alignment, the United States is now able to maintain its strong foothold in Northeast Asia and, most importantly, protect Seoul from Pyeongyang’s aggression. This is essential as last year North Korea had nearly 40 missile tests while also firing a ballistic missile that flew over Japan and has the capability of hitting Guam, a US island in the Pacific Ocean.
A security cooperation with the United States is a vital to South Korea to ensure its safety against further aggressions such as these.
For the time being, the United States remains an important actor that can defend South Korea in the Pacific, especially in the Korean Peninsula. However, as the relationship took on a more and more military tinge – as evidenced with frequent military exercises and military cooperation – North Korea naturally grew threatened which encourages the hermit kingdom to turn to its only bargaining chip – its missile arsenal. The missile tests by North Korea prompted its southern neighbour to align its military closer with the United States, creating a continuous loop of security dilemma in the Korean Peninsula.
An example of this loop can be seen after North Korea fired a short-range ballistic missile in the New Year of 2023. South Korea retaliated by passing a resolution calling for a stronger alliance with the United States and to conduct more military exercises in March 2023. In response, Pyeongyang fired another Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and threatened to turn the Pacific into its shooting ground. Such a display of tit for tat has already appeared countless times in the past and will likely remain a fixture in the near future.
The Beijing Question
With the US containment policy and the trilateral security relations between Japan, South Korea and the United States, Beijing is alerted for its security and felt contained in the Pacific.
China has a point to be concerned about Seoul’s shift in its foreign policy. Currently, the relations between China and the United States is not in good condition. The visit of the US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan inflamed the already tense US-China relations.
Moreover, the rogue balloon incident that flew over the United States airspace – resulted in the initial cancelation of the US Secretary of States Anthony Blinken’s visit to Beijing – sparked another spat between the two global powers as well.
Furthermore, the downward spiral in the relationship was fueled when President Joe Biden made a comment on President Xi Jinping that essentially regards the latter as a dictator, leading the Chinese foreign ministry to label the remark as a violation to China’s dignity.
This has not made it easier for Seoul. The shift in South Korea’s strategic maneuverability, with the United States as the major partner, can make China easily perceive this approach as a containment effort in which Seoul is perceived to have joined the United States in deterring Beijing.
However, in South Korea’s 2022 Defense White Paper, China was not mentioned as an issue to peace though the document emphasized on North Korea being an enemy for the first time in six years. The meeting between South Korea’s Foreign Minister Park Jin and the former Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in August 2022 saw the latter encouraging Seoul not to be influenced by external obstacles. Meanwhile, South Korea’s message focused on promoting the relations between the two while also expressing concerns about North Korea’s provocation – an attempt to dilute the misperception Beijing is having on South Korea.
President Yoon also steered Seoul away from diving into the Taiwan conflict by refusing to have a physical meeting with Nancy Pelosi when she visited Taiwan, signaling to China that South Korea, at the end of the day, does not support the Taiwan Independence movement. This hints that despite Seoul’s shift in its strategic position, the relationship between South Korea and China remains vital – it is not in the best interest of both to headbutt each other.
This is understandable as China is an important trading partner for South Korea, trading over US$162 billion in 2021. China is also a major player in North Korea’s nuclear missile issue as Beijing could provide essential support for South Korea through dialogue with North Korea’s regime. Hence, provoking China is not in Seoul’s best interest as Beijing has the capacity to abandon or even further complicate the peace process in the Korean Peninsula.
Conclusion
The strategic clarity, under President Yoon Suk Yeol, has led South Korea and China into a new phase of relations. Beijing naturally becomes cautious as Seoul tilts towards the United States and labels North Korea as its enemy. China’s undoubted constraint could easily sour Seoul and Beijing relations.
South Korea needs a more concrete way of convincing China that its decision to join the US-led mechanism is not aiming to weaken China while Beijing should also enable high-level communication with Seoul to ensure continuous communication and avoid misconception. However, if the US-China strategic competition continues, North Korea would remain important to China, as it is an important buffer zone from one of the US’ closest allies in the region. This is especially pertinent as minor flare up between South Korea and China will continue to emerge from time to time. But with understanding and dialogue, it will become visible that South Korea is seeking to be China’s good neighbor, despite differences, while Seoul is pursuing to diversify its military cooperation to maintain its security that is currently threatened by North Korea.
