Should China Adopt the Indo-Pacific Terminology?

Various countries and regional organizations including ASEAN have adopted the concept of “Indo-Pacific.” However, China continues to be wary of such terms. CREDIT: ASEAN.ORG

Introduction

The “Indo-Pacific” concept and strategy have been tabled by various countries and regional organisations in the world, including the United States, Japan, Australia, India, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, France and Germany. The last few years also saw an uptick in the use of the term “Indo-Pacific” by world leaders, usually to denote the new strategic geographical landscape where the Indian and Pacific oceans intersect.

It can be argued that two notable leaders were responsible for the gaining traction of the term in recent memory, though the term itself has been articulated earlier. In 2007, Japan’s late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe introduced the “Indo-Pacific” concept to the Indian Parliament in a speech entitled the “Confluence of the Two Seas”. This marks the beginning of countries co-opting and developing the concept constructively and inclusively.

Former Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa of Indonesia also contributed to the discourse, suggesting the idea of an Indo-Pacific Treaty in which he emphasized the importance of the dynamic equilibrium principle in managing regional power politics. Although the idea failed to launch, this is evidence that Indonesia has also actively contributed to the construction of the concept.

China Containment?

The debate on “Indo-Pacific” was limited to foreign policy establishment for a while and it did not receive much attention until President Trump assumed office in 2017. Since then, unfortunately, the discourse on the “Indo-Pacific” concept has been implicitly placing China as the target of policy objective thanks to a series of policies introduced by the administration.

Let us cast our sight on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) to exemplify this point. The Quad consist of the United States, Japan, Australia and India, functioning as a minilateral arrangement formed in 2007 by the initiative of Japan. These four countries have placed Indo-Pacific as their framework of cooperation.

The Quad has been a source of global tension lately due to its ostensible posturing towards China. Former US State Secretary Mike Pompeo’s speech in the Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting in Tokyo 2020 openly mentioned China as the objective and raison d’être of Quad. This confirmed Beijing’ suspicion that the “Indo-Pacific” construct was devised as a geopolitical strategy to contain China.

To make matters worse, there are indications that Beijing tends to view the “Indo-Pacific” concept as a product of the West and assume the latter has an exclusive ownership to its parameters. Such view and assumption are arguably erroneous. Truth be told, nobody can claim exclusive ownership to the definition, crux and parameters of any term, be it the Western countries or others. Instead, countries should approach the “Indo-Pacific” concept as a public good and not limited as a strategy to contain certain powers. This is especially important if the world were to establish a more inclusive and collaborative process to tackle global challenges, which require a prosperous, modern, developed, stable and peaceful Indo-Pacific region.

We should remember that “Indo-Pacific” is still a developing concept and thus no country can exclusively own the terminology. As a concept, it is open to all interpretation, which means any country, including China, can contribute to its construction.

China itself still firmly upholds the concept of “Asia Pacific” in its geopolitical and geoeconomic engagements. This is not a surprise. The “Asia-Pacific” concept was developed and driven by economic cooperation which is aligned with China’s foreign policy interest. China, thus, has played a pro-active role in its construction and promotion.

Deteriorating Global Landscape

The idea of why China should adopt the concept is because there is a need to shift the paradigm of the “Indo-Pacific” concept from one that is contentious to a collaborative platform. The deterioration of today’s geopolitical context demands this.

The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war is a game-changing event in today’s multipolar world. The war has permanently changed the European security outlook and architecture. Additionally, the Russian invasion of Ukraine sparks regional concern in the direction of China-Taiwan dynamics, bearing in mind that Beijing and Moscow just signed the “no limits” strategic partnership weeks before the invasion. Therefore, it has given rise to more debates and concerns about regional security as well as power politics in the Indo-Pacific region. Adding to that is Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s imprudent visit to Taiwan which was followed by other US lawmaker delegations to the island republic, which has pushed the US-China relations to its lowest point.

Another important observation is the worrying trend of shrinking room for dialogue between the West and Russia as well as China respectively. This is evident in many international forums held this year. For instance, by the end of 2022 alone Southeast Asia would have hosted three global meetings including the Group of 20 (G20), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and ASEAN-related summits. Meetings that have been conducted by the time of writing saw the pressure to disinvite Russia. Diplomats who attended these meetings have recounted to the author whereby they witnessed American and Russian ministers avoiding walking past each other on conference sidelines. These small yet significant gestures definitely minimize the value of dialogues and could work counter-productively for the Southeast Asia’s stability.

Therefore, against the backdrop of current geopolitical circumstances, it would be more productive for all powers to instead approach the “Indo-Pacific” concept not as a stage for competition, but as a platform for collaboration.

Why “Indo-Pacific”?

The answer is simple: most powers, both major and middle ones, have adopted it in their foreign policy strategy. China is yet to be part of it, and in history, there has never been a successful geopolitical concept that excluded certain powers. For instance, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was a US initiative, failed due to its exclusive nature and aim to curb communism during the Cold War.

But why should China adopt it at all in their foreign policy outlook? Answering the question is tricky, yet it is worth for China to consider. China’s adoption would contribute to dispel the assumption that the Middle Kingdom is a closed power that does not wish to engage others on international stage. Indeed, all this while, China has been reluctant to debate on or even discuss the concept. Instead, it would indicate that as a country, China is open to collaborate with others to solve global problems. China’s contribution to the discourse would enrich, challenge, test, or even complement existing arguments on the concept.

An example of how China has the capability to do so is at full display during the State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s policy speech at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta a few months ago. He made a reference to the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and stated, “we would like to increase synergy and cooperation with ASEAN on the implementation of the Outlook to produce cooperation outcomes at an early date.

Furthermore, “Indo-Pacific” was also acknowledged during the latest bilateral meeting between President Joko Widodo and President Xi Jinping of China. With that, China has not only acknowledged and supported AOIP but also become a complementary partner to the AOIP.

The acknowledgement of the terminology will also invigorate China’s initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Global Development Initiative (GDI), and Global Security Initiative (GSI). As a comparison, the United States’ push for the Indo-Pacific initiatives is embodied in Build Back Better, the Quad, Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS), and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), all of which have been immensely influential in shaping the region’s geopolitics in recent memory. Japan is doing the same with the Asia-Japan Investing for the Future Initiative.      

Therefore, China’s adoption of the “Indo-Pacific” terminology may work in its favour by pushing forward its initiatives in the region. At the same time, the region would also receive benefit from a multitude of initiatives and programmes competing and complementing each other.

Therefore, the author suggests China should adopt to the term simply because the people in Southeast Asia does not wish to see the concept emerge as a point of contention that could trigger further destabilization in the region. For the interest of Southeast Asians, the concept needs to be accepted by all relevant powers. Learning from the past, we cannot exclude a certain power to make any concept work effectively to ease tension and promote cooperation. Without China in the debate, the discourse will always be dominated by the assumptions that China is being contained and that Southeast Asia will be forced to choose sides. Although ASEAN actively promotes its interpretation of the concept via AOIP, the idea of an inclusive Indo-Pacific that ASEAN is propagating will never realize without China’s buy-in.

This suggestion of China adopting “Indo-Pacific” would never be successful without the openness of the West to see China be in the same circuit. Yet, this is possible and interesting because the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy uses the term of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”. But what does “open” mean exactly here? Could it mean open to all kind of ideas, suggestions and countries to be partake in the process?

China’s adoption of the concept could test the meaning of Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The author once asked this question to a friend in Washington D.C. and the answer is neither supporting nor not supporting China adoption of the concept.

Conclusion

Southeast Asia sits at the intersection of the two strategic oceans and has felt the rising tension between major powers lately. Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto said in the Shangri-La Dialogue 2022 that “we need a benevolent big power.” To have that, we need every country to engage in confidence building measures through dialogue and discussion. A debate on the “Indo-pacific” concept, one which sees the participation of China, is a good point to start with. 


The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of STRAT.O.SPHERE CONSULTING PTE LTD.

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Author

  • Calvin Khoe is Director of Research and Analysis, FPCI, Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI). FPCI is an independent international relations organization and a think tank based in Jakarta. Calvin focuses on Indonesian Foreign policy, ASEAN, ASEAN-China, and Geopolitics of Indo-Pacific. He has also been the program coordinator and analyst of ASEAN-China Survey since 2020.