Introduction
With the recent presidential victories of Gabriel Boric in Chile and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil, there seems to be a renewed hope in electoral process to check the spread of far-right populist governments and their neoliberal policies that accelerate environmental destruction and other socio-economic woes.
Indonesia, a country deemed to be experiencing a democratic backsliding, has passed some questionable policies that are not in line with its pledge to combat climate crisis. Thus, the upcoming Pemilu 2024 poses an interesting question: will the election result bring a significant change to the agenda of environmental protection?
Regrettably, the short answer is probably no. Considering how the Indonesian electoral system and political funding scheme are established, only those with significant economic capital or strong networks with wealthy donors could have any hope to participate in politics and reverse the derided status quo.
This article will explore those systemic challenges and the potential formation of oligarchs surrounding the potential presidential candidates in Pemilu 2024.
Rigged by the Rich, for the Rich
Ideally, in a democracy, everybody has an equal opportunity to have an equal say in how the nation’s laws are made, regardless of their socio-economic background. Representatives are charged with collecting, communicating and acting on the public’s many but conflicting interest, and thus the policies enacted ought to reflect the interests of the many without harming the rights of the few.
But this is not the case. In Indonesia, oligarchs either have a firm grip on representative politics or are businesspersons aiming for wealth accumulation.
In 2019, 262 (45.5%) out of 575 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives – DPR) members are affiliated with 1,016 corporations. This number increased in 2020 with up to 318 parliament members are categorized as businesspersons.
Furthermore, at least 20 legislative members and five officials from the executive branch were found to be affiliated with the coal industry. This affiliation could impede a smooth transition towards renewable energy.
The prevalence of oligarchs dominating Indonesian politics is not an anomaly but a logical consequence of the legal frameworks surrounding political party finance and campaign donations that enable parties’ transactional dependency on big donors.
This has a consequence on the price of entering politics. It was found that a single political party in Indonesia must spend up to Rp51.2 billion in a non-political year to cover their expenses, such as for political education, operational needs and organization consolidation.
This already exorbitant sum does not include money parties need to pour toward their campaign during the election cycles. For example, one party participating in Pemilihan Umum Legislatif 2019 (the 2019 Legislative Election – Pileg) reported spending Rp232 billion for their campaign fund.
One estimation calculated that the amount of expenditure of an individual legislative candidate in Pileg 2014 varies between Rp1.18 – 4.6 billion. This does not take into account the costs that must be incurred if each candidate wants to illegally “buy” votes. A study found that most candidates running for seats at DPR spent between Rp1.4 – 7.8 billion in total for bribing potential voters to vote in their favour.
Since Indonesian laws prohibit political parties from acting as a for-profit business, parties could only rely on several legal sources of funding to satisfy those high demands. These include: 1) mandatory party member contributions; 2) donations from party and non-party members; 3) corporate donations, and; 4) financial assistance from state funds (commonly referred to as political assistance).
With some slight differences, the regulation regarding campaign funding stipulates that the source could come from the candidates’ own resources, their political parties and other outside contributions as long as it does not come from foreign sources, anonymous contributors, illegal activities, or from the government.
In a nutshell, political parties become overly reliant on a transactional relationship with their benefactors due to a combination of three factors. These are: 1) a high cap for third-party donation; 2) limitless personal donation from party members or the candidates themselves and; 3) the domination of a few big donors as a source of donation (as opposed to the public through the state). It should be noted that the significant funds disbursed by third-party donors to parties – as well as the capital used by each candidate to win elections – are not “gifts”, let alone driven by altruistic motivations. There could be reciprocal demands to recoup their “investments” or even multiply the amount when their candidates are sitting in the office. The contributors hope they will benefit from political parties through policymaking or access resources available to their backed candidates who occupy strategic positions.
One indicator for this is the selling off permits that sacrifice environmental sustainability and the rights of indigenous peoples for the sake of extractive industries as well as the preservation of the oligarchs’ power.
Through the practice commonly referred to as regulatory capture, the interests of oligarchs – especially those affiliated with coal industry – are also accommodated through various legislations. This is exemplified by the Omnibus Law on Job Creation and the revision of the Coal and Mineral Mining Law. For instance, coal companies can qualify for an exemption from paying royalties as well as being absolved of criminal and financial sanctions for mining in forest areas. Ignoring the massive public rejection, the two legal products were unconstitutionally deliberated and passed in a closed manner.
Looking at the recent draft bill on New and Renewable Energy Law, coal oligarchs have also hijacked the effort of transitioning towards cleaner energy by classifying coal-based energy such as coal bed methane, coal liquefaction and coal gasification as part of a “new” renewable energy, which is misleading to say the least.
New President, Same Old Elites
One of the key characteristics of oligarchs is that they tend to operate through the logic of wealth defense. Oligarchs will use their significant concentrations of material resources to defend or increase their wealth and exclusive standing in a society through effective control (directly or indirectly) of government or other strategic sectors.
Through this lens, the oligarchs see that the Indonesian political system (especially during the administration of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo) is to their benefit, mainly through various deregulation policies. Therefore, they try to maintain the current political system arrangement that favours their interests. One of the ways is by limiting the potential for independent presidential candidates outside the support of major parties and alternative candidates other than the incumbent in power to advance to the general election.
Article 222 of the Election Law states that a party or a coalition of parties must secure a minimum of 20% of parliamentary seats or 25% of the popular vote to nominate a candidate in the presidential election. Until now, the Constitutional Court have rejected at least 14 petitions by the public demanding the annulment the provisions regarding the presidential threshold. The Court kept maintaining that the issue of presidential threshold falls into what is called “open legal policy” category. It means that it is up to the legislators to determine the threshold percentage. The Court decided they would not interfere with lawmakers’ prerogative in making legal policies.
Consequently, such limitation means that only parties with a sizeable presence in DPR or are members of a grand coalition can field a presidential candidate. The implication of this is the loss of an effective opposition in DPR, potentially further marginalizes the public interest in favour of the elite few. This loss of opposition is caused by parties wishing to gain access to resources and patronage by joining the grand coalition during Jokowi’s time.
Currently, only Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle – PDI-P), with total control of 22.9% of seats, can nominate a presidential candidate without the help of a coalition.
Looking at several figures who have declared themselves intending to run for president, the result of the Pemilu 2024 is shaping up to be another win for the oligarchs. Some of them have long been affiliated with the coal business or are affiliated with the share owners in one of Indonesia’s largest coal companies, while others rely on the support of a well-known party led by a media tycoon.
Beyond Elections
Things might seem dire for those who expect the ushering of meaningful change in the regime through the ballots post-2024, especially with the civil society having no apparent official recourse to make their demands considered by those in power. However, looking at the situation differently, maybe it is time for us to reconsider what can be defined as public participation beyond the thin procedural conceptualization of electoral voting. Suppose we could not depend on the elected officials to give us adequate formal means to exercise our constitutional rights to participate in the decision-making process. In such case, we must expand the scope of public participation so it can create organic, inclusive and emancipatory enclaves of resistance. Through intersectional community organizing, we can increase the bargaining power of civil society so that at least it can disrupt the smooth running of what seems to be an increasingly oligarchic and authoritarian style of governance.
