Introduction
On 19 November 2022, Malaysia conducted its 15th General Elections (GE15) after a protracted political turmoil since the downfall of the Pakatan Harapan (PH) government in early 2020. Much hope was placed in GE15 to be a way out of the political impasse that has plagued the country.
A brief look at the political developments since the previous election (GE14) is necessary to understand today’s context.
GE14 and Malaysia’s Political Crisis
In GE14, which was conducted in May 2018, Malaysia’s longest ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (BN) was defeated for the first time in post-independence history. The breakthrough was made possible through cooperation between progressive politicians and conservative authoritarian diaspora (i.e., BN’s defectors) within PH, which was also supported by Partai Warisan (the Heritage Party), an ally in Sabah.
Following BN’s defeat, its leading party, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), regrouped with Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) and established Muafakat Nasional (National Concord – MN) in 2019. MN was supposed to function as an umbrella under which both parties operationalize their political cooperation.
Throughout 2019, MN espoused an ethno-religious populist appeal and won a series of by-elections in Peninsular Malaysia to the extent that the conservative party in PH, Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu), was forced to rethink its position in the new government.
The growing popularity of MN successfully back-peddled a number of PH’s progressive policies, including the state declarations on International Conventional of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and Rome Statute, thus signifying authoritarian innovation amidst Malaysia’s democratic reform.
Subsequently, Bersatu orchestrated an autocoup dubbed “Sheraton Move”, which was supported by MN and allies in Sabah and Sarawak. This coalition is known as Perikatan Nasional (PN). Its government was subsequently formed on 1 March 2020 through the presentation of its support at the National Palace.
Although mid-term governmental change is not new in Malaysia, it was the first at the national level with its impact immediate. Bursa Malaysia (Malaysia’s stock exchange) tanked with billions of ringgit in losses and consolidated a period of political uncertainties, which has continued years after.
PH’s Anwar Ibrahim attempted to topple the then premier Muhyiddin Yassin using similar tactics in late 2020, with the support from BN’s leaders. Muhyiddin retaliated by advising the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (King) to declare a state of emergency in January 2021, which suspended parliamentary sittings indefinitely and thus saved his administration.
It should be noted that Muhyiddin, since his ascension in March 2020, had always avoided parliamentary sittings and the tabling of vote of no confidence against his premiership.
In late June 2021, Muhyiddin lost his royal backings, largely due to his administration’s poor management of the Covid-19 pandemic and its implications. Several additional issues, particularly the re-convening of the parliament and the revocation of Emergency Ordinances, also strained the relationship between his government and the National Palace.
Muhyiddin was forced to relinquish his post in August 2021 after UMNO President Zahid Hamidi publicly withdrew the party’s support for the former. About a week later, UMNO Vice President Ismail Sabri was appointed by the Agong as Malaysia’s 9th prime minister, though the PN still formed part of administration with BN at the tip of the spear, in keeping Harapan at bay.
It can be argued that Zahid’s endeavor to topple both governments in 2021 and 2022 as well as to force an election is generally due to his pending court cases. Arguably, this is why Zahid continued to pressure Ismail to call for a fresh election, despite UMNO’s reigning position under the latter. The accidental prime minister only managed to withstand the pressure from Zahid for about a year, before buckling under the weight and dissolved the parliament in October 2022. GE15 was thus afoot.
GE15 and the Subsequent Developments
The Agong seemed to have agreed (albeit cautiously) with Ismail’s advice, which originated from Zahid, that the election is the way out for the current political turmoil. However, Zahid had strong political motive to call the election. The state elections in Melaka and Johor, held in late 2021 and March 2022 respectively, showed that a low voter turnout could successfully usher BN back to power with two-third majority in state legislative assembly. The low turnout was due to outstation voters not returning to the states to cast their ballot, largely because the fear of Covid-19 remained in place. Zahid was confident that BN would be able to repeat the results in GE15 to the extent that he did not want the coalition to work with other parties.
Zahid’s vision proved wrong. As projected by many experts, there is no clear winner in GE15. PH emerged as the largest bloc in parliament with 82 seats, but fell short by 30 seats to have simple majority (50% plus one) to form a government, as required by the Malaysian constitution.
Nevertheless, Anwar announced that he held a simple majority with “111-112 seats” and wished to see the Agong to prove his claim. Strangely, Muhyiddin, whose PN coalition won 73 seats, also claimed that he commanded a majority. This situation of “claiming majority” is reminiscent and a continuation of what happened during regime changes in March 2020 and August 2021.
This time, however, the Agong seemed more careful. Here, our attention must shift to the election result in the state of Perak.
A political deadlock was simultaneously happening in Perak. PN won most seats (26), but failed to achieve a simple majority. PH and BN, however, decided to ally and were thus able to form the Perak state government. This coalition highlighted the formation of a post-electoral pact (in this case between the two) for the first time in Perak and Malaysia in general.
Amidst this backdrop, the Agong granted audience to both Anwar and Muhyiddin on 22 November 2022 and encouraged both to cooperate with each other to form a unity government. This was due to the fact that none controlled a majority in the parliament. A unity government could also serve as a form of national consensus to bring about political stability – which was the primary objective of GE15. Muhyiddin declined the advice and was arguably unyielding, as he contended that he had the majority.
Behind the scenes, it was widely believed that Muhyiddin had secured the support from individual BN Members of Parliament (MPs) and from Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS). However, this would have contradicted the recently gazetted Anti-Hopping Law (AHL) and constitutional amendments which required en bloc party support for one side. Individual MPs’ shifting of alliances in 2020 and in 2021 was widely recognized as the main factor for political instability in the country. The AHL is specifically designed to curb such practices in the future. Thus, the Agong’s refusal to appoint Muhyiddin through the support of individual MPs, rather than through collective decision of respective parties, is highly commendable.
To prevent further impasse, the Agong advised BN and GPS, the third and the fourth largest blocs in parliament, to choose a side – either PH or PN. The matter was of high importance as it became the primary issue discussed within the Council of Rulers held in the same week.
Finally, with the support from BN and GPS, and the endorsement from the Agong through consensus achieved in the Council, Anwar was appointed to lead the unity government and thus became the 10th prime minister of Malaysia.
Will the Anwar Administration Survive?
Will the current machinations (e.g., Anti-Hopping Law, constitutional amendments, etc.) and innovations (i.e., post-electoral coalitional government, unity government, etc.) bring back political stability to Malaysia?
Less than two weeks after the appointment of Anwar, ex-BN member Shahidan Kassim, which is now PN’s MP representing Arau, claimed that plans are being designed to topple unity government. After all, there is a loophole in the AHL – MPs can still change their allegiances, but it must be done collectively (en bloc), involving the whole party.
Other PN MPs have also continued to aggressively discredit the unity government on grounds of integrity (particularly with the appointment of Zahid as one of Deputy Prime Ministers) and on ethno-religious appeals.
Whether the newly minted government would survive depends on two factors. First, it depends on the government’s performance to respond to economic challenges. As with other developing countries, the mandate to govern and continue to govern does not necessarily come from electoral results, but also from economic performances and symbolic representation. The economic performance of Mahathir Mohamad’s second government (2018 – 2020) was acceptable, but his administration was too calculative in providing subsidies to the poor, which had been well patronized under Najib’s administration (2009 – 2018).
“The people did not feel the favours of having governmental change,” according to PKR’s leader Shamsul Iskandar Md. Akin. He added that “democracy did not deliver” in reflecting the failure of PH’s first stint in Putrajaya. Thus, when MN leaders drummed up ethno-religious issue, it went well to the hearts and minds of the people particularly among the poor and the Malays – the biggest supporters for PN in GE15.
Therefore, if Anwar administration can properly respond to socioeconomics challenges and addressing hate speech, while introducing effective policies and achieving impactful results, he would be able to maintain support at all levels (from the Palace to the poor) to continue to govern for a full electoral term.
Secondly, it depends on the extent that the due process of law is upheld, particularly in the appointment and the change of the head of government. In a parliamentary system that maintains the position of traditional rulers, a rule is established to separate the constitutional monarchy and the parliamentary democracy. The powers of the constitutional monarch are limited and largely symbolic though the monarch still have some rights. As per Walter Bagehot, they are “to be consulted, to encourage and to warn.” Thus, as long as the due process of the law is respected in upholding the sanctity of constitutional monarchy, supremacy of the constitution and the sovereignty of the parliamentary democracy, then any transition of power and leadership change can be conducted properly as well as transparently. Such will be much more acceptable to the people and horizontally to the parliament and the court. That is the reason why the tabling for a vote of confidence on Anwar’s administration is a must.
