Part of an ongoing article series on the impact of the Middle East conflict on Southeast Asia.
Introduction
Switching on the hourly news in Malaysia, whether in Malay, English, Tamil or Chinese, a viewer might be a little surprised to see the broadcasters wearing a Palestine solidarity scarf around their neck.
Since the eruption of the recent Israel-Gaza war on 7 October 2023, Malaysia, under the leadership of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, has placed itself strongly in the Palestine camp.
In international forums, he has called for Western leaders to halt arms sales to Israel and has publicly sided with Hamas leaders—offering support and pledging solidarity.
The ever-escalating situation in the Middle East has invariably caused disruptions, increased global tensions and sustained the Palestine solidarity movement in new ways.
Frequent large-scale demonstrations all over the world have changed the narrative of the Palestine solidarity movement, bringing new awareness and supporters to the cause.
The involvement of new countries such as Iran also shifted the narrative to view the Islamic Republic as proactive and able to stand up to Israel.
Malaysia’s Stance
For Malaysia, these developments have solidified the country’s traditional foreign policy stance as well as its societal behaviors and discourse. The governmental rhetoric on Palestinian solidarity brings home Malaysia’s unique foreign policy alignment in the ongoing Israel-Gaza war. On one hand, it can show outward support for Palestine without jeopardizing its relations with the West.
Malaysia has often regarded itself as a “small country” but possesses the self-awareness and confidence to be able to punch above its weight and shift foreign policy stances when necessary. With its upcoming chairmanship of ASEAN, Malaysia will be playing an even bigger symbolic regional role to ensure stability and economic advancements for its members.
During the Cold War, for instance, despite a history of fighting a communist insurgency, Malaysia refrained from joining the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and instead opted for non-alignment.
Driven by its desire to be friends with all, Malaysia has historically opted for neutrality as well as being morally balanced in its international approach. However, this does not mean that it refrains from being active in its support for certain causes.
Despite keeping cordial relations with the West, Anwar has maintained pressure for a ceasefire and, when possible, has shown Malaysia to be aligned with Palestine.
In April 2024, Anwar made an official trip to Germany to discuss trade relations and bilateral ties. He openly criticized Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s pro-Israel alignment, which drew international attention.
The situation appears a little more complex when examining Malaysia’s relations with the United States in the last year.
Washington has expressed concerns over Malaysia’s support for Hamas, especially after Anwar met with Ismail Haniyeh before the latter’s assassination in July 2024. Furthermore, it is the US government and businesses that have become the target of Malaysian anti-Israeli sentiment.
For years, Malaysian leaders have kept alignment with Washington deliberately opaque so as not to draw the ire of the country’s Muslim majority population, who oppose US support for Israel.
Since the war, any major deals between the two countries have come under scrutiny. When it was revealed that US company BlackRock was going to buy a 30% stake in managing Malaysia Airpots Holdings Berhad (MAHB), Anwar was accused of duplicity.
The war has revealed the difficulty Malaysia has always faced between support for Palestine and its desire to be close to the West.
In many ways, the rhetoric Malaysia has built around support for Palestine helps to mitigate this. From regulated demonstrations with Anwar in attendance to newscasters with Palestine scarves, there is a performative aspect of Malaysia’s support.
When Others Joined the Fray
Since its start, the Israel-Gaza war has come to include other countries and organizations, such as the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran. Malaysia has expressed support for all of them, venturing into new kinds of rhetoric and public support.
Despite not having any ties with Hezbollah, in comparison to Hamas, Malaysia condemned Israel’s assassination of Hasan Nasrallah. Similarly, Malaysia has openly supported Iran’s sending of missiles to Israel.
Such statements reflect an emerging shift in Malaysia’s foreign policy that is open to alignment with Iran.
Malaysian-Iranian relations have not always been straightforward, with Malaysia outwardly partaking in sanctions but also breaking sanction regulations when it comes to shipping and economic exchanges.
Furthermore, anti-Shi’i sentiments exist in Malaysia, with strong religious laws that discourage Malaysians from practicing Shi’ism.
Despite this, Malaysia has always made a distinction between Iran and Shi’ism, allowing for cordial bilateral relations but ensuring the practice of Shi’ism by non-Malaysians is discreet.
The conflict and Malaysia’s support for Iran are political and this distinction remains in place, meaning that there is unlikely to be a relaxing of anti-Shi’i sentiments or regulations.
The escalation of the war in the Middle East and the possible increased involvement of Iran may see Malaysia stepping up its support for Tehran, which may reduce sectarian tensions but place further strain on its relations with the United States.
Malaysians React
The Israel-Gaza war has also impacted the Malaysian society in extraordinary ways. On one hand, it has led to interesting discussions on Malaysia’s role in international solidarity, on immigration and on social consciousness. On the other hand, it has also contributed to societal tensions with the dominance of the Malay-Muslim community in the Palestine issue.
Indeed, since 7 October, Malaysia and Malaysians have shown a strong front against Israel, while actively taking part in the boycott movement against corporations that have shown support for Israel or who have refrained from divesting.
McDonalds and Starbucks became the main targets of boycotts, with both companies reporting losses in the millions of ringgit.
The Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement is regarded as the most significant and effective form of international solidarity for the Palestinians. Since 2005, it has brought awareness to the struggles of the Palestinian people against the Israeli apartheid regime and has brought together people from across the world to be a part of a highly globalized resistance movement.
For the first time, Malaysia has joined this movement in full force, actively supporting BDS. Calls for boycotting, divesting, and sanctioning have come from different corners of Malaysian society, from the government, politicians and social media influencers. Indeed, there is a lot of pressure to use social media as a platform of solidarity.
In Malaysia, the pro-Palestine movement is divided along racial lines, with the Malay-Muslim population leading the narrative of presenting Palestine as a predominantly Muslim cause.
However, this is not to say that other races and religions are not engaged or that all Malays are fully supportive. Palestine, with a Muslim majority, has since the 1980s been seen as a key plight for the Islamic world. The symbol of Al-Aqsa, the third holiest site in Islam after Mecca and Madinah, is palpable and reaches Muslims all over the world at a basic and instinctive level.
This narrative has not changed, with many Muslim charities and organizations from Islamic Relief to Friends of Al-Aqsa, using Palestine as a focus point.
The adoption of Palestine as a Muslim concern is not something novel. After all, Palestine had for a long time become a focal point for the Islamic world, even if the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is seen to have abandoned the Palestinian liberation movement.
This in turn has led to the rise of Muslim youth fundamentalism and the adoption of Palestine as an issue by individual Muslim countries. The prolonged Israel-Gaza war has placed Palestine again at the heart of the debate, with growing frustration at the lack of collective response and reaction from the Muslim world, particularly the Arab countries.
As such, the conflict has seen Malaysia and Malaysians become part of a new global movement for Palestine. This increases Malaysia’s confidence on an international level and within the Islamic world, something that Anwar builds on from previous Prime Ministers, including Najib Razak, who made Malaysia into a guardian of disenfranchised Muslims.
Palestine has certainly provided Malaysians with an avenue for expression and political participation on a wider level. A country that has avoided protests, Malaysia has allowed for controlled public demonstrations for the public to show their solidarity, often with Anwar in attendance.
In addition, participation in BDS has made Malaysia a part of a wider movement, building transnational solidarity links with the establishment of BDS Malaysia. This in turn has become a new platform of scrutiny for Malaysia’s deals with foreign companies.
Conclusion
The tensions in the Middle East do not show any signs of dissipating. A year since the start of the Israel-Gaza war, Malaysian society has also reached a state of sustained solidarity for Palestine and Palestinians, with the boycott continuing against businesses considered unfriendly to the cause.
With the change in the global narrative towards the Palestinian issue, more widespread support from all aspects of Malaysian society may be observed, with growing awareness of Palestine as a human issue rather than a religious one. However, the dominance of the Malay-Muslim in directing the solidarity will most likely stay in place.
Malaysia has opted for a balancing act between support for Palestine and continuing cordial relations with the West. However, if a war were to erupt between Iran and Israel, we might see strong rhetoric in support of Iran, though this may not mean a break in the relationship with the West. Malaysia’s positioning as a neutral “friend to all” should be able to withstand some strain on its relationship to the West while accommodating an orientation in its foreign policy that sees support for Palestine and Iran.
