Introduction
Mere days before 2021, the Indonesian government officially classified FPI as a prohibited organization. This decision was based on the Joint Ministerial Decree (SKB) No. 220-4780/2020. The government’s rationale was that FPI threatened Indonesia’s public order and safety through its activities. Noteworthily, this organization has not been legally registered as a mass organization since 20 June 2019. This prohibition is shocking considering previous administrations had never intervened in the 22 years of its existence.
Against the Constitution?
Despite the many illegal and divisive actions, the disbandment of FPI by the Jokowi administration can be construed to be constitutionally flawed. One argument is that FPI was not awarded any court processes prior to its disbandment unlike in Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’s (HTI) case. However, a counterargument is the presence of a stipulation that provides the government legal prerogative to do so. This stipulation is based on the removal of article 68 of Law No. 17/2003 which regulates the revocation of legal status and disbandment of mass organizations via the courts. In its place, the government can disband a mass organization if it does not comply with a total of three written warnings issued against it.
This begs the question: has the government issued three written warnings to FPI? There were no indications of this due to its lack of mention in the SKB. In the first of six points, the SKB categorically stated that FPI’s legal disbandment was because it was an unregistered social organization. Unfortunately, such reasoning is inept based on Constitutional Court Decision No. 82/PUU-XI/2013 which stipulates that the registration of the Registration Certificate (SKT) for mass organizations is voluntary. This means that the existence of mass organizations is still recognized despite not being officially registered.
A Bad Precedence for Democracy
In the past, FPI has been described to be a political tool with questionable loyalty despite its close ties with political figures affiliated with the New Order. For example, FPI transferred its support to Wiranto from Prabowo after the latter was found to have been involved in the kidnapping of an activist. Since then, its political involvements became increasingly successful, unaffected by the waning prestige of Wiranto following his defeat in the 2004 Presidential election. The height of which was on 4 November 2016 when FPI successfully mobilized thousands to participate in demonstrations against then-Governor Basuki Tjahja Purnama for allegations of blasphemy. These demonstrations were described as FPI’s largest political action since its establishment.
Currently, its status as a political tool is declining as its “support” can be bought by those in need of large masses. And during the Jokowi administration, FPI have constantly attempted to challenge the government’s stability.
This constant harassment could have triggered the Jokowi administration’s decision to disband FPI with Jokowi reportedly personally requested for FPI to be disbanded. Such actions would, thus, reinforce the decision to be politically-motivated rather than legally.
However, the government’s decision could be argued to be rational considering FPI’s potential for sectarian violence may present a graver threat to Indonesia’s political stability than the terrorist organization, Jemaah Islamiyah. This is due to its potential to provoke horizontal religious conflicts between communities. Indicators for this include the presence of at least 2,400 cases of religious freedom violations in the past 12 years. Regardless of the actual figure being higher, FPI largely contributed to these numbers.
Nevertheless, the unilateral decision to prohibit FPI as an organization and without prior warnings, sets a bad precedent for the freedom of association and assembly in Indonesia in accordance with Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution. Such action serves as an implicit warning to other groups and organizations to not only tow the line but also that their existence is at the hands of the government. Those that do not share the same view and even those that have fallen out of favour with the government could share the same fate as FPI. How would this be different from what transpired during the New Order?
Sparking Islamic Populism
Despite being rife with controversies, it cannot be denied that FPI has a significant influence on Indonesia’s Muslim community, especially at the grassroots. More so, after the blasphemy-related demonstrations that triggered the rise of Islamic populism. In addition to the unilateral disbandment of FPI, the government had blocked 88 organizational and personal accounts belonging to FPI and its affiliates on the pretext of ascertaining any involvement in terrorism financing. The government has also yet to conclusive prove the nexus between FPI and terrorism. The mere existence of 35 former FPI members in terrorism is insufficient to prove this nexus. Confounding matters is the recent unclear killing of six FPI paramilitary members by the authorities. Collectively, these will only make Islamic populism in Indonesia becoming more widespread, an issue that is anticipated by the current Minister of Religious Affair.
Additionally, such government actions may be construed as excessive which will increase antipathy and diminish public trust, especially within the Muslim community, of Jokowi’s administration. Such loss of trust now is particularly problematic for the Jokowi administration as it attempts to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in Indonesia. Not only would the administration face a tougher challenge tackling misinformation pertaining to COVID-19 but its political stability is also compromised.
Furthermore, disbandment would not solve the issue of intolerance that is often perpetrated by FPI. Not within a week after the government’s prohibition, FPI adopted a name with the same abbreviation, Islamic Brotherhood Front. With the same figures and members, what is the likelihood that their ideologies have changed? There is also no guarantee that under a different name, the violence and persecutions will disappear.
Currently, FPI can still seek legal redress of its disbandment through the State Administrative Court (PTUN). As aforementioned, FPI’s legal challenge would be based on Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution regarding the freedom of association and assembly which is the basis for the formation of mass organizations in Indonesia. FPI had in fact considered this option through its lawyer, Aziz Yanuar. With the rise in Islamic populism, media coverage of this legal challenge will increase sympathy and support for FPI from the Muslim community. Semblance of this can already be observed as focus is continuously diverted to the killing of the six FPI paramilitary members.
However, based on the HTI case, FPI’s waning interest for legal recourse is understandable. After its disbandment in 2017, HTI had unsuccessfully applied for a judicial review of the decision; rejected by the Supreme Court in 2019. Thus, it would be easier for FPI to rename rather than facing the possibility of enduring years of court processes without definite, favourable results.
Therefore, a more effective strategy for the government to control FPI is to criminally prosecute all FPI leaders and members involved in such cases. Not only will it improve perceptions of the Jokowi administration’s transparency, but the arrest of FPI leaders and members can limit the organization’s ability to operate. There are, however, at least two caveats for this to be effective. First, there must be continued political will to go after FPI and its leaders. The government must remain steadfast despite public pressures. Second, in criminally prosecuting FPI, the government must itself abide by laws and to not overreact so as to reduce negative sentiments from the Muslim community and Islamic populism.
Nevertheless, FPI has been disbanded and the political elites that had been defended by it are nowhere to be found to lend their support to FPI. Instead, they have swung over to the Jokowi administration. Is this necessarily a good thing for Indonesia’s democracy?
