Introduction
The intent to employ chemical agents in Indonesia has yet to dissipate. Like the Singapore’s Statutes, here, biological agents are any microorganisms and its components excluding toxins while chemical agents are toxic chemicals and its precursors. This intent is evidenced from the successful assembly of an explosive device that was to disperse the stored abrin. Other prior notable incidents include police intelligence of a plot to deliver cyanide-tainted food to police officers, a failed detonation of a “chlorine bomb” in a shopping mall, and smearing straws with self-extracted ricin at a food stall frequented by police officers. There were also concerns where coronavirus-infected extremists deliberately infecting targets such as the police. However, such opinion is conjecture vis-à-vis extremists in Indonesia.
What It Means?
These incidents demonstrate the perceived attractiveness of chemical agents over biological agents. Additionally, the choice of targets of this type of attacks are largely consistent with previous gun-and-bomb attacks in Indonesia, namely the police. In their rejection of Indonesian democracy, Indonesian extremist ideologues have labelled those maintaining such governance as legitimate targets. Additionally, the Indonesian police have consistently foiled extremist attacks, thus securing them as high value targets for Indonesian extremists. Nevertheless, the public may occasionally be targeted.
Among the types of chemical agents, abrin and ricin (both plant-based toxins), and chlorine gas (a choking agent) will continue to pose a low but lingering threat. Abrin and ricin have estimated oral LD50 values (median dose that is lethal to 50% of a population) of 0.1-1mg/kg and 1-20 mg/kg, respectively. Based on the Gosselin, Smith and Hodge scale, they are also deemed to be super toxic and extremely toxic, respectively. Despite their toxicity, one key limitation, as with other chemical and biological agents, is dissemination. Though they possess lower LD50 values (thus, more lethal) if aerosolized, their efficacy would be dependent on the efficiency of the dissemination method and environmental conditions.
Therefore, dissemination via oral consumption will still be the preferred mode for extremists. Similarly, such modes of dissemination hold several challenges. This includes the purity of these toxins, their susceptibility to high temperature and the lack of control in hitting the intended targets. Unlike a suicide bomb attack in which the attacker acts like a homing device, oral dissemination is dependent on the target consuming the toxin. Therefore, due to its indiscriminate nature, these toxins pose a grave security concern if large enough quantities are acquired to inflict mass casualty incidents.
Though toxins can also be extracted from animals and microorganisms, they pose a lower risk than plant-based toxins. This is due to the difficulty in acquiring these sources of toxins and their subsequent extraction, particularly those from microorganisms such as botulinum toxin. Additionally, these toxins face the same issues as plant-based toxins as the most likely form of dissemination is via oral consumption.
Chlorine gas will remain as a potential weapon for extremists, largely due to its relative ease of production. Like plant-based toxins, manufacturing of this gas does not require a laboratory, could be manufactured without the involvement of laboratory-trained individuals, low manufacturing cost, and relative ease in obtaining raw materials. Additionally, toxic gases have the potential to cause harm to both primary (those exposed upon initial dissemination) and secondary casualties (first responders).
There are, however, key issues with the use of chlorine gas. These issues include inducing death at high levels of exposure (e.g. exposure to 400 ppm to around 1000 ppm is generally fatal only after 30 minutes) and noticeable traits such as odour, yellowish hue and tending to be close to the floor as it is heavier than air. Additionally, first responders could easily detect toxic gases and its concentrations with portable gas detectors. Its inflammable property, however, is a double-edged sword. Though it may not pose a fire risk to first responders, chlorine gas may survive the initial explosion if incorporated into an explosive device. However, the impact of such a release on victims would be low. Despite its relative low lethality, a key security concern is if the incident is over-sensationalized in the media. Notably, imperative to terrorism is to cause terror amongst the public, hoping to create turmoil.
There are three potential candidates that extremists may attempt to acquire to expand their chemical agent repertoire. The first is potassium cyanide which was thought to be used in the murder of an Indonesian civilian with no links to terrorism. This case, however, demonstrates how disseminating via oral means can successfully reach the intended target, is lethal and how even civilians can procure it. The second is hydrogen cyanide. Though it may be produced crudely with relative ease and the ease to procure the raw materials, its LC50 (like LD50) for inhalation is 524 ppm for 10 minutes and observable traits such as almond-like odour. Lastly, hydrogen sulphide gas could be chosen due to its relative ease to obtain raw materials as demonstrated its use in numerous suicide attempts globally. Like chlorine gas, its efficacy is dependent on its environment.
Limitations of Biological Agents
There are many challenges that will prevent the use of biological agents by extremists. These can be categorized into acquiring a virulent strain of microorganism, the successful manufacture of viable and pure samples, and dissemination. Collectively, these require time, large finances, a well-equipped laboratory that prevents accidental infections such as a BSL-4 laboratory, and recruitment of trained and knowledgeable individuals. The case of Aum Shinrikyo demonstrates the difficulty of non-state actors acquiring this weapon.
Concerns of infected extremists deliberately infecting victims has yet to be justified. Reasons for this includes the potential to infect their own members and loved ones, the long period that the infected extremist must endure before succumbing to his death, and victims requiring time to develop symptoms. This, thus, prevent extremist groups from claiming responsibility for the attack. Additionally, it would be challenging for these groups to produce recruitment videos based on this form of attacks. Typically, a recruitment video showcasing a suicide bomb attack would feature an interview with the bomber to inspire others to follow suit. Interviewing an infected extremist displaying symptoms may not inspire potential recruits to do the same.
