Introduction

In the quiet hours of night, millions of young Indonesians scroll through their phones. Between comedy clips and music videos, disturbing images flash by, from Palestinian children pulled from rubble in Gaza to rockets exchanged between Israel and Iran.

These appear without warning, delivered not by choice, but by the algorithmic feed.

The intent of such content may be to inform and raise awareness, but its sheer volume could easily overwhelm anyone, leaving them wit

This is how – in the context of radicalism/extremism – brain rot begins, not from apathy but from emotional overload. It is the state where extremist content no longer needs to shout; it blends easily into one’s home feed, just one click or scroll away.

Multiple essays have already looked at brain rot from different angles, including cultural and legal aspects. This one, however, explores the political dynamics of brain rot; in particular, how digital fatigue and emotional vulnerability can facilitate extremist narratives to thrive on youth’s political discourse.

Brain Rot and Youth Vulnerability

A UNICEF baseline study found that nearly 90% of Indonesian youth are online every day, averaging 5.4 hours of screen time. Most young people watch short videos on platforms like TikTok, YouTube Shorts and Instagram Reels on their smartphones. This level of exposure on social media creates a growing risk of radicalisation.

These social media may have started out as communication tools, but they have somehow evolved into platforms where entertainment, aspiration, despair, anger and conviction mix and match, thus giving rise to the brain rot phenomenon. This term, once a meme, now represents a real concern: the slow loss of mental and emotional clarity from constant exposure to shallow or numbing content.

Brain rot is increasingly seen not only as a mental health issue but also as a possible pathway to extremist influence. It weakens cognitive function and mental strength, creating an ideal environment for extremist messages.

In this state, critical thinking declines and political disillusionment rises. Radical ideas start to appear reasonable, especially when they resonate with deep frustrations about politics, economy and general wellbeing.

This concern mirrors another condition called “pandemic brain”, a state of forgetfulness and cognitive fatigue caused by prolonged stress and overstimulation during the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Such a comparison is not without basis, given that the risk of radicalism in Indonesia grew during the pandemic. With increased screen time, less face-to-face interaction and higher dependency on online platforms, young people felt more isolated, creating fertile ground for online radicalisation.

Rising frustration and perceived political unfairness during the pandemic made room for politicised narratives by extremists to develop. For many disillusioned youths, radical messages that frame violence as justice felt emotionally compelling.

Today, Indonesian youth use the term “brain rot” casually to describe their digital fatigue. Students who consume a steady diet of quick, entertaining content often lose interest in tasks requiring deep focus and struggle with complex material. Too much digital input adds to mental fatigue, making it harder for youth to concentrate, plan, stay motivated or understand what truly matters.

The effects reach far beyond the classroom. Brain rot impacts how young people process information, form opinions and engage with the world. In overstimulated environments, truth becomes less significant than emotional appeal; what feels urgent, relatable or compelling captures more attention. When it comes to political discourses like anti-state narratives, it becomes much easier.

Affective Publics

In Indonesia, young people are politically active, socially vocal and emotionally engaged. They follow news online, share critiques and take part in protests.

Many young people have grown disappointed in the government for its perceived inability to address or involvement in creating problems that they are passionate about, such as the environmental destruction in Raja Ampat, unresolved gender-based violence, and the performative – rather than participatory – political system.

The idea of “affective publics” helps to understand how youth get involved in politics today. In online spaces, people connect not through facts but through shared emotions such as anger, grief, pride or betrayal.

These publics are organised around “affect”, described as “thought as felt and feeling as thought”. In these spaces, political engagement comes more from what resonates emotionally than from careful discussion.

This means political discourse today is increasingly influenced by emotional climates instead of rational debate. When someone experiences digital fatigue, their ability to process detailed arguments weakens, making emotional content more convincing.

Issues that resonate with young people today, such as environment and gender, are also highly emotive. But when emotional content overwhelms the youth without giving them a chance to process the information, it stops being a source of empowerment and renders them exhausted.

This is where vulnerability increases, as politics becomes not just a means for civic expression but merely a tool for emotional manipulation.

Extremist

When young people are already emotionally drained and politically disillusioned, it does not take much to push them further.

Jemaah Islamiyah recognised this opportunity. Before its formal disbandment in mid-2024, the group expanded its focus from violence to a political strategy called tamkin siyasi (political consolidation),

Some of its members infiltrated Indonesia’s political and religious institutions. One launched the Partai Dakwah Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People’s Da’wah Party –  PDRI), a party aimed at contesting national and regional elections, while another became part of the fatwa commission at the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI).

These do not mean a shift away from their goals; they were a recalibration, designed to harness public support and political momentum.

Politics, thus, becomes more than a background; it becomes a battlefield for influence. Young people are trying to reclaim their future, while extremist groups aim to capture their attention. In affective publics, where emotional stories spread faster than facts, the risk of ignoring this shift is significant.

As brain fatigue weakens the mental sharpness needed to resist emotional manipulation, this risk only increases.

Emotional Propaganda

Today, extremist propaganda no longer appears only in traditional sermons or manifestos. Instead, it mixes with everyday content like anti-government posts, emotional videos from Gaza or Syria, and viral stories about global injustice. The youth are susceptible to such manipulation, as their constant

Many clips on social media start as genuine journalism, but over time and with repetition, they become emotional triggers that can be distorted. Extremist groups take these visuals and add narratives meant to provoke anger, using public emotions to serve their agendas.

In one interview, a former far-right propagandist explained, “Radicalising people was easy; I just had to tell a better story than The Establishment.” It was not about facts or ideology; it was about creating a story that felt more engaging and personal.

He added, “The one with the better story wins the war… the battle does not take place on a physical level but in our minds.”

These extremist narratives do not seem threatening. They blend into the home feed like a wolf in sheep’s clothing, wrapped with emotive messaging that arouses anger or vengeance. For overstimulated and mentally exhausted youth, this content is easy to accept and hard to question.

In 2023, a teenager in Batu Malang was arrested for engaging with extremist content online, having joined a Telegram group that frequently shared anti-state propaganda. Such propaganda included claims that democracy is shirk (idolatry) and calls for war against the state for not applying sharia.

In Malaysia, the Ulu Tiram incident suggests that the young offender may have been influenced by the ongoing conflict in Palestine, which he frequently consumed online, as well as by a family background connected to a terrorist organisation.

While the details differ, both cases show a clear pattern: those young people are affected by constant exposure to digital content.

If youth can be influenced by online narratives when they are not emotionally fatigued, the risk increases when their emotional defences are low. In such cases, emotionally charged content does more than sway opinions. It influences how young people understand politics, identity and the world around them.

Beyond the Scroll

Brain rot is often seen as a meme, but it might be the canary in the coal mine, a warning sign of a bigger issue among Indonesia’s youth: the decline of clear thinking and emotional strength in a world where many engage in endless scrolling.

For Indonesian youth, this emotional exhaustion affects attention span. It weakens the ability to think critically, fosters political disillusionment and blurs the line between civic participation and emotional manipulation.

When exposed to narratives that provoke rather than inform, extreme ideas do not seem radical; they seem right, especially when they reflect long-standing anger about injustice, inequality or failed leadership.

What starts as mindless scrolling evolves into a tool for shaping political views. Social media feeds, once designed for entertainment or awareness, now serve as emotional channels, boosting complaints, skipping over rational thinking and promoting narratives that resonate more than they inform.

This issue extends beyond mental health. It poses a political and security threat. While extremist groups have quickly adjusted to this environment, democratic forces tend to react rather than act. In a country where the youth are the political majority but trust in institutions is declining, even the most dangerous ideas can seem like common sense.

This article is not about offering blueprints, but it aims to raise awareness. Before fatigue turns into apathy, before emotion transforms into ideology and before the scroll dictates the narrative.

What we are witnessing now is no longer just a meme. It is a warning.

Introduction

Indonesia successfully curbed terrorist attacks throughout 2023 and 2024, as evidenced by zero recorded attacks.

Enhanced counterterrorism (CT) capabilities and legal frameworks led to this remarkable achievement. Following a series of terrorist attacks in East Java in 2018, the revised Law No 5/2018 on terrorism has empowered security apparatuses to conduct pre-emptive arrests against terrorist suspects.

Nevertheless, the absence of any incident has created a “false assumption” that Indonesia has completely curtailed terrorist threats. Such a perception affects the available funding for CT and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) efforts in the country.

“Zero attack” does not mean that terrorist threats have been eliminated in the country. The police arrested 147 and 55 terrorist suspects in 2023 and 2024, respectively. These figures alone show that extremist beliefs still exist among certain quarters in the country, inspiring some individuals to commit violence.

This article will delve into the enduring threat of terrorism despite the reduction of funding for CT and P/CVE efforts in Indonesia due to shifting priorities at the domestic and international levels.

Unfading Threats

The case studies below demonstrate why Indonesia is yet to be free from the terrorism threat.

In July 2024, HOK, a 19-year-old man, was arrested by the police for his alleged terror plot against two religious sites in Malang, East Java. He was allegedly linked to the Daulah Islamiyah network.

HOK was first exposed to radical ideologies through Telegram in November 2023. In the span of six to seven months since his first exposure, he had plotted an attack that he financed using allowance from his parents without their knowledge.

Two other Daulah Islamiyah supporters were arrested in West Jakarta just days after HOK’s arrest, although they seem to have no connection to HOK himself. Just like HOK, however, they were also exposed to radical ideologies through social media and the Internet, and they have also assembled explosives to launch their own attack.

These examples show that social media remains a critical radicalisation tool in Indonesia. In the first 10 months of 2024 alone, the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) recorded 2,264 social media accounts spreading terrorist propaganda. Facebook recorded the highest number with 1,013 accounts, followed by WhatsApp with 571 accounts.

The police’s special counterterrorism unit, Detachment 88, has also continued detecting social media propaganda encouraging aspiring jihadis to emigrate to Syria following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In a similar vein, BNPT has observed narratives asserting that the victory of Hayyat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) in Syria was the victory of the caliphate against Western capitalism and that people should go to Syria for the struggle of Muslims.

Evidently, the dynamics of Syria and Daesh continue to influence online radicalisation narratives in Indonesia.

Apart from this, offline radicalisation also continues.

In September 2024, the police arrested two suspects in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, who are affiliated with Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), the umbrella organisation of IS-affiliated individuals. According to the police’s claim, one has delivered radical religious sermons while the other conducted paramilitary training for aspiring jihadists.

Meanwhile, in June 2025, the police arrested another suspect in Bima affiliated with Jamaah Ansharu Syariah (JAS); the individual has posted terrorist activities on his social media.

Bima is infamous as a hotbed of terrorist networks, which means that the radicalisation process there occurs in a social environment where many people support radical ideologies. Breaking the chain of extremism in this area will remain a challenge.

The above cases prove why terrorism has not faded as a security concern in Indonesia, even if the intensity of the threat may have decreased in the past few years.

Daesh-affiliated groups may have been weakened, while Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has disbanded. However, the future remains uncertain. The changing domestic and global political situations would determine the way terrorism manif

Prabowo and His Shifting Priorities

Despite this, CT does not seem to be a priority security issue for President Prabowo Subianto. It is not mentioned at all in Prabowo’s manifesto, Asta Cita, which is in all fairness unsurprising considering his focus on the traditional defence procurement agenda during his previous stint as defence minister.

However, Prabowo’s lack of interest could also be partly explained by the already declining trend of terrorist attacks while he was serving as minister thanks to the revised terrorism law.

Meanwhile, as Indonesia failed to meet its Minimum Essential Force (MEF) agenda by 2024, Prabowo is compelled to carry forward his ambitious procurement agenda as president, thereby focusing on traditional security. Additionally, Prabowo also prioritises the establishment of 100 Territorial Development Battalions, which are expected to assist the government in the food estate programme, a central policy in Prabowo’s dream of food security.

Prabowo’s budget cuts affect the CT landscape too, even if they were only aimed at minimising business trips and procurement of office supplies. BNPT is severely affected by this, having suffered roughly a 24.49% cut to its budget. As many of its deradicalisation and counter-radicalisation programmes require Jakarta-based officers to travel to the regions, the effectiveness of its programmes would be notably impacted.

Despite this, the Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK) has flagged a few problems with BNPT’s budget absorption. According to BPK, in 2024, BNPT only utilised roughly 55% of the amount allocated by the government. This is due to the presence of foreign funding, which BNPT has also received over the years due to the international nature of its CT efforts. On the flip side, BNPT’s failure to absorb its budget from the government became a justification for the latter to cut out a portion of its budget.

The Fall of USAID

When the security of the world was rocked by such threats as those imposed by Daesh and its affiliates, many countries witnessed the so-called P/CVE-sation wave whereby a huge flow of foreign funding was dispensed to civil society organisations (CSOs) that focus on P/CVE. In fact, the rapid growth of P/CVE CSOs in Indonesia could be attributed to the availability of support from foreign funders.

But can Indonesia rely on foreign funding?

We are now living in a different time. As the number of terrorist attacks decline and terrorist networks are enfeebled, P/CVE may no longer be a priority for international funders. Consequently, existing projects may be affected, and it would be difficult to ensure the sustainability of P/CVE programmes.

Heavy reliance on foreign funding is unsustainable, as its continuity is dependent on the domestic politics of the country from where the funding comes. No example is more accurate than the United States, which provides the prime example as to why Indonesia should not rely on foreign funding.

Following Trump’s executive order to freeze the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the future of USAID-funded programmes in Indonesia is bleak.

USAID has been one of the main funders of Indonesia’s CT and P/CVE programmes. Agencies such as BNPT have been working closely with USAID in engaging CSOs and deploying programmes, while USAID eventually became a main source of funding for a number of P/CVE-oriented CSOs in the country.

For example, from 2018 to 2024, the USAID-Harmoni project channelled funds to various CSOs to conduct trainings and programmes aimed at enhancing Indonesia’s resilience to intolerance and violent extremism. Despite the importance of such engagements, the project was not renewed after Trump dropped the axe on USAID.

Developments such as these compel Indonesia to find alternative funding that can support its CT and P/CVE programmes. Some available options outside USAID include the Australia Indonesia Partnership for Justice (AIPJ) and the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF). However, options such as these are fairly limited.

Worse, CSOs are forced to look for alternative projects outside the domain of P/CVE to ensure survival. While limitation to foreign funding is an issue, the improved terrorism landscape in Indonesia could also pose existential questions regarding the continued utility of such CSOs.

Despite this narrowing space, CSOs may explore alternative funding from private companies and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) scheme.

Companies disbursing funds for P/CVE-related projects is nothing new; BNPT and Detachment 88 have been working closely with various companies to support former terrorists and the survivors of terrorist attacks. For instance, Detachment 88 has worked closely with PT Sang Hyang Seri – an SOE in the agricultural sector – in providing agricultural training to former terrorist inmates.

CSOs could take an inspiration from this, developing programmes that could benefit both the funder and target audience alike.

Conclusion

The terrorism threat may be declining in Indonesia, but it is fallacious to assume that terrorism has been fully eradicated from the country. Radicalisation continues to occur in the digital space. At the same time, extremists carry on with recruitment and propaganda dissemination in their

Introduction

The digital era has become a challenging period for children, with the presence of child sexual abuse material (CSAM) emerging as a pervasive and increasin

This disturbing content, now referred to as CSAM instead of “child pornography” – following the amendment of the Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017 in Malaysia – is a record of child abuse, signifying that it is not a consensual activity. CSAM is often distributed by anonymous individuals on the Internet, posing a greater challenge to law enforcement worldwide.

Against this backdrop, it is pertinent to explore Malaysia’s efforts in combating this horrendous digital crime, as well as hurdles it has faced in doing so.

Developments in Malaysia

Malaysia is actively addressing this issue by establishing a

Disturbingly, UNICEF reported in 2022 that one in four children in Malaysia who use the Internet have experienced online sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment. In 2024 alone, as many as 16,000 reports of CSAM were recorded in Malaysia, tragically involving children as young as seven years old. Such a high number of reported CSAM cases indicates that existing effort is not sufficient to fully stop its proliferation.

As cautioned by the authorities, offenders typically use online platforms under fake identities, grooming children through social media, dating apps and online games.

The Royal Malaysian Police (PDRM) is actively curbing this crime, notably through “Ops Pedo” in December 2024, a joint operation with the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) that seized 40,000 CSAM items. This operation led to 13 arrests nationwide, with perpetrators reportedly purchasing pornographic content from platforms such as X and Telegram.

Issues and Concerns

However, perpetrators often only get lenient penalties from the court, usually in the form of low fines. Such leniency for a crime involving children reduces its deterrent capability and sends out a signal that such a heinous act is of insignificant consequence.

Furthermore, the D11 division of the PDRM – which deals with sexual-related offences – faces resource and technological limitations, encumbering its effort to combat high-tech crimes that involve encryption or AI.

Despite a recent increase in staffing and assistance from CyberTips, for example, the volume and technical complexity of online investigations often overwhel

Aside from the technical challenges, deep-seated social and cultural issues also make intervention difficult.

Stigma also plays into the equation, as the society is still uncomfortable discussing sexual abuse and the toll on victims. This is discouraging people from making reports for suspicious activities or limiting their awareness about available reporting mechanisms.

Meanwhile, deep-seated social and cultural hurdles stop victims and their families from coming forward, thus potentially causing the underreporting of CSAM-related activities and, at the same time, preventing victims from finding support services.

The protection system also suffers from a lack of trust. When children disclose abuse, weak responses, long waits for support or lack of understanding from adults could severely damage their confidence. This would prolong the cycle of silence.

Ways To Tackle

Curbing CSAM requires a comprehensive strategy involving various stakeholders, including parents, schools, the community and government agencies.

Empowering children through digital literacy and online safety education is fundamental in creating a safe environment for children. With the support of parents and the Ministry of Education, schools are encouraged to introduce a consistent and age-appropriate programme to help children recognise grooming tactics and understand the concepts of consent as well as personal boundaries. It is also important for them to be familiar with online content settings, which are instrumental in building their resilience.

Parents play a crucial role—it is their responsibility to take the time to understand the apps and the websites that their children frequent, and thus setting up parental controls is essential.

Furthermore, parents must be encouraged to practice open conversations and learn to listen without judgement so as to allow their children to share their online experiences. It is also helpful to teach parents about the potential dangers of “sha

Increasing public awareness and reducing stigma in reporting is critical. NGOs and government agencies could collaborate on campaigns to combat CSAM. Their combined initiative should emphasise that CSAM is child abuse, not pornography. Both should also widely promote accessible reporting lines (for example, Talian Kasih 15999 in Malaysia) and online portals such as CyberTip Report and Take It Down to encourage reporting or access to support services.

Vigilance and community involvement are essential, as informing parents and children about common grooming tactics empowers early detection. Encouraging neighbourhood watch groups to widen their focus online, as well as involving community and religious leaders in promoting online safety, helps build a collective protection network.

The community should also promote access to child-friendly services. These include One Stop Crisis Centres (OSCC), trauma-informed counselling, “legal companion” services and child protection NGOs for children and guardians.

Finally, citizens must demand stronger laws, more consistent convictions and increased resources for law enforcement. Pressuring online platforms for stronger safety measures, proactive CSAM detection and swift collaboration ensures that technology providers become partners in child protection.

Conclusion

Malaysia is moving towards the right direction in preventing the production and distribution of CSAM, as evidenced by the enactment of the Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017 and enforcement efforts like “Ops Pedo”.

However, the number of cases remains high (not accounting for the unreported ones). The usage of high-tech by online predators and the widespread impact of CSAM indicate that this struggle is far from over.

The analysis shows some critical gaps, as the perceived leniency in the court sentencing undermines deterrence and the authorities struggle against rapidly growing cybercrime and resource constraints. Malaysia needs to consider harsher penalties to increase the deterrent effect and demonstrate zero tolerance towards CSAM.

At the same time, there is a need for PDRM to acquire advanced tech and training so as to enable its effort in combating more sophisticated CSAM-related activities.

Meanwhile, societal stigma, along with a lack of awareness

Therefore, it is crucial to address the cultural taboos surrounding sexual abuse through widespread public awareness campaigns and age-appropriate digital literacy education. When children are provided with the right knowledge, parents receive proper guidance and the community is empowered to report issues, the entire nation is equipped to break this cycle of exploitation. This is the vision for Malaysia, where every child is not only protected by laws but also supported by a caring, alert and understanding community.

Introduction

In recent weeks, Indonesia has seen the emergence of a narrative on the rise of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) after its legal entity was revoked by the government in 2017. This began when a solidarity action against Palestine was held in various Indonesian cities on 2 February 2025.

Although the group that staged this action did not carry HTI’s name, the group’s employment of HTI’s characteristic black and white flag, as well as espousal of such jargons as caliphate and jihad, clearly show HTI’s remnant being the driving force behind this action.

Consequently, mainstream media highlighted the issue of HTI again, focusing on its ideological threats, political motives and transnational character.

Since shortly before its disbandment in 2017, the government has generally portrayed HTI as a threat to the state and nation, one that carries a subversive ideology.

This is a shift from the government’s stance when HTI came about in early 2000s. Some HTI figures even also became board members of the Indonesian Ulema Council. Clearly, resistance was in short supply back then, if any at all.

So, what happened in 2017, the year HTI was banned?

To recap, various academics have explained this harsh policy against HTI as a form of revenge for the group’s involvement in the anti-Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) movement during his blasphemy case. Such a fate befell not only HTI, but also Front Pembela Islam (Islam Defenders Front), which former leader has shown signs of stirring as well.

Narrative of Hostility

Despite the regime change, there remains the narrative that portrays HTI as a radical, anti-Pancasila and pro-caliphate group, including in the mainstream media.

This is more or less the same as the narrative used to describe the movement in various countries such as those in Europe, the Middle East, the United States and Australia. This narrative has been utilised as a legitimising factor to dissolve or ban this movement around the world.

However, such narrative also ignores the movement’s resilience, evidenced by its enduring remnants and covert activities to advance its agenda of caliphate and oppose the existing system, albeit without using its official name.

Several factors explain this resilience against authoritarian and repressive political environment.

The first is internal factors. HTI is able to build its cadres by inculcating robust ideological roots juxtaposed against the problems o

HTI’s resilience is even more remarkable considering its relatively small number of members, compared to mass organisations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The members’ militancy has enabled this movement to influence the public narrative at the national level. Various mobilisations have been carried out to respo

The second is structural factor. This includes global and national political conditions in Indonesia.

In the global context, Hizbut Tahrir and other Islamic movements have advocated various issues affecting the glob

In the local context, HTI occupies a comfortable seat in the middle of the Indonesian public by highlighting public concerns such as corruption or abuse of power, economic disparities, and various government policies that are not pro-people.

Even though its messages carry the same DNA as those espoused by other social movements criticising the government, HTI packages all of its criticism of the government under an Islamic framework to make its discourse more accessible to the Indonesian Muslims.

The third is communication acumen. HTI is also able to attract the public because of its expertise in utilising social media through various platforms. It increases its appeal with attractive packaging that suits the needs of the public today, including the youth.

This is what mainstream Islamic groups in Indonesia do not have, which largely still dwell on traditional ways of undertaking da’wah. In addition, these groups mainly focus on social issues such as education, health or religion. Rarely do they incorporate national political issues in their campaigns.

The same applies to both nationalist and religious political parties, whose political functions are not optimised to represent the voice of the Indonesian public. In fact, these parties appear usually only engage the voters in political contestations, during which they churn out promises that would eventually disappoint their own voters.

This is a niche that HTI – a banned organisation – is able to exploit, a void that mass organisations and political parties fail to close or even help to create.

All of these factors explain the movement’s resilience despite all the negative narratives that circulate about it.

In addition, efforts to stigmatise HTI – as carried out by the state of Nahdlatul Ulama activists – seem to bear little impact. Narratives attacking the idea of caliphate may not be effective especially when there is a recent shift to acknowledge that caliphate is a legitimate political system in a Muslim society. This idea gained traction when the Indonesian Ulema Council issued a fatwa in 2021 stating that the caliphate is part of Islamic teachings that should not be negatively stigmatised.

The Need for a New Approach

In the global Islamic politics, a state’s response to Islamic political movements commonly uses two approaches: confrontation and accommodation.

The first approach views Islamic political movements as an enemy – consequently, the only way to deal with them is to eradicate them.

The second approach tries to embrace these Islamic groups and invite them formally into the state apparatus. However, this second approach is criticised as merely a tool to tame Islamic political movements, forcing them to compromise with secular-liberal ideology and ultimately aiming to eradicate their ideology, not unlike the first strategy.

There is, however, an alternative option labeled the new convergence approach that acknowledges the existence of various Islamic political movements with all of their different ideologies. The new convergence approach argues that instead of seeing the political Islam as a

There are examples for this: Some welfare states in Europe have incorporated aspects of leftist ideology in an attempt to manage groups affiliated with this.

In the context of HTI, the government adopted the accommodative approach from 2001 to 2017, though this was later reversed as the government pursues a policy of dissolution and stigmatisation.

To be fair, it is understandable that HTI’s call for caliphate could be detrimental to Indonesia’s democratic system and the nationalism of its people. Thus, when triggered by HTI’s involvement in the anti-Ahok movement, the government opted for the confrontational approach in its handling of the movement.

This, however, has not stopped HTI’s activities. Its da’wah and political engagements has continued to grow and spread in various levels of the society even as Indonesia’s political and economic conditions deteriorate. Worse, the repressive policy contributed to the decline of the quality of Indonesian democracy, which of course is mo

As an alternative, the government may consider the new convergence approach in managing HTI, perceiving its messages as both a challenge and an opportunity to address the current condition in Indonesia. The process of acceptance and rejection of HTI’s ideas depends on the dialectic that occurs in society and the gov

Such an approach has a precedent in Indonesia’s political history, such as the of the formation of the Indonesian state and the adoption of Pancasila as the basis of the state. These two were the outcome of a cross-ideological compromise and negotiation between the Islamic and nationalist groups. Furthermore, various policies and regulations in Indonesia have also adopted aspects of the Islamic economy including Islamic banking, waqf and sharia pawnshop.  

Therefore, there is nothing inherently wrong with accepting parts of demands by groups such as HTI. Equally, there is also nothing wrong with including ex-HTI figures in policy discussion as well, especially if the aim is to vanquish deep-seated problems such as corruption.

Conclusion

In managing HTI, the government needs to reconsider continuing its repressive policy by focusing on solving the structural problems that occur in Indonesia to increase the public trust. On the other hand, HTI’s ideological narratives need to be responded to with counter-narratives that aim to resolve Indonesia’s problem realistically.

If the government continues its approach in securitising HTI, more people will only flock to this movement. Therefore, the government needs to reconsider the approach taken to face the ideological challenges of HTI more carefully for the benefit of the Indonesian political future.

A Book Review of Dr. Murni Wan Mohd Nor’s “From Hate to Hope: A Holistic Approach to Address Hate Speech” and an Analysis of Related Developments in ASEAN

Introduction

While reading the latest book by Dr. Murni Wan Mohd Nor, an Expert Researcher at the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR), titled From Hate to Hope: A Holistic Approach to Address Hate Speech, one question arises: How should ASEAN play its role in combatting hate speech in the Southeast Asian region?

Before delving into that question, we should explore what this book discusses. Published by IDFR, the book primarily explores Malaysia’s experience with hate speech, focusing on the complex intersections of race, religion, and nationalism. One of the key takeaways from this book that should be highlighted and discussed is the politics of language.

Dr. Murni explained that hate speech has been used as a tool to achieve power and dominance by influencing public perception. Hate speech – whether rooted in ethnic, religious, or national divisions – poses a significant threat to social harmony and peace, particularly in a region as diverse as Southeast Asia. It undermines the fabric of trust and mutual respect amongst diverse communities, which threatens peaceful coexistence in the region.

This year, Malaysia holds the ASEAN Chair and has introduced the theme of inclusivity and sustainability. This theme carries significant depth and can be applied to address a variety of issues, including hate speech. As hate speech becomes more widespread in Southeast Asia and beyond, it directly impacts inclusiv

Thus, the problem of hate speech – alongside regional issues such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea, geopolitical rivalry between major powers, cyber-security threats, internal political instability, human rights issues, and climate change – all pose a security risk which may disrupt regional stability.

From Animalisation to Dehumanisation and Genocide

Animalisation is a tactic used by political figures to make people believe that the colonisation or elimination of a certain social group is justified because they are seen as having a lower status due to their supposed “animalistic” nature. This concept of animalisation serves as a powerful tool to justify violence, a notion supported by John Locke, who argued that such individuals could b

The Israeli Defence Minister, Yoav Gallant made it abundantly clear without any disguise, “We are fighting against animals, not people.” His statement was directed at Hamas to justify Israel’s actions of bombing and killing Palestinian civilians, resulting in the loss of tens of thousands of lives. The animalisation process leads to dehumanisation, where people lose their sense of morality and empathy, viewing those who are “animalised” as not human, but as wild animals that need to be controlled or destroyed to stop them from causing harm.

In the book, Dr. Murni explained that high-ranking Israeli officials went well beyond employing dehumanising statements by referring to Palestinians in general as “human animals,” and “monsters” who deserve it when Israelis “break their backbone” because “an entire nation out there…is responsible.…” She also referenced other human rights lawyers, activists and scholars who highlighted that such vitriol was indicative of Israel’s intent to commit genocide.

What is occurring in Palestine mirrors the situation faced by the Rohingyas in Myanmar; both groups are suffering from similar animalisation. Amnesty International reports an incident where a Rohingya Muslim human rights defender was labelled a “national traitor” in a post shared over 1,000 times, with social media comments that included threatening and racist messages such as, “He is a Muslim. Muslims are dogs and need to be shot,”, specifically referring to the Rohingya community.

Given the situations in Palestine and Myanmar, it is clear how language can be used as a tool for hate through animalisation by removing their humanity. Such rhetoric encourages violence and may even result in genocide.

Depower the Language of Hate; Empower the Language of Hope

As much as language can become a convenient weapon of dehumanisation which often can lead to human rights abuses, war crimes, and crimes against humanity – language can equally be used as a crucial tool of reconciliation and peacebuilding.

Underscoring this critical point, Dr. Murni advocates for a whole-of-nation approach to address hate speech. She believes this multi-stakeholder approach may promise a more effective execution of ideas and yield better results, as it would bring together the government, private sector, NGOs, and grass-roots leaders toward a common goal.

In addition, Dr. Murni advocates for a culture of genuine dialogue by outlining a guideline when responding to hate speech that emphasises patience and rational language. She also encourages the principle of being gentle yet firm when addressing a wrong. This is followed by the need to restrain ourselves from reciprocating hate with even more hate. Instead, she encourages the values of being proportionate and moderate in our recourse.

Dr. Murni also emphasises the importance of responding to hate with what is better, acting with wisdom, and avoiding the need to exaggerate which demonstrates our magnanimity. This guideline is hoped to help achieve the justice needed in combatting hate speech.                                                                                                                                                  

ASEAN and the Fight Against Hateful Narratives

As part of its mandate to promote regional stability, and indeed, due to its diverse ethnic and religious makeup, ASEAN has always been at the forefront in addressing human rights issues, including hate speech.

Following the intercommunal conflicts in Myanmar, ASEAN spearheaded the establishment of a five-point consensus (5PC) peace commitment in 2021. The 5PC, which was signed by Myanmar’s military leader and nine other ASEAN heads of states, remains ASEAN’s most notable collective resolve with respect to the deteriorating humanitarian situation caused by ethnic and religious conflict in Myanmar.

To enhance ASEAN’s influence on the global stage and actively address the challenge of hate speech, ASEAN could explore strengthening the role of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) to make it more impactful beyond its capacity as a consultative body. If the AICHR is given the mandate to create a complaint and monitoring mechanism for ASEAN member states, the human rights situation in the region would likely improve, especially in tackling hate speech to preserve social harmony, both domestically and regionally.

Malaysia has been prominent in the assertive leadership within the Global South for decades. Coupled with its globally commended vocal stance on global humanitarian issues under the Madani government, Malaysia can thus capitalise on its growing soft power to advocate for the promotion of human rights and mitigation of hate speech in the region and beyond as the chair of ASEAN.

Indeed, hate speech has become more pervasive than ever in our globalised, highly connected world. The proliferation of social media connectivity has meant that the dehumanisation of a people can be carried out at our fingertips, through a simple click of a button. Recognising the problems at hand, Dr. Murni’s new book, From Hate to Hope: A Holistic Approach to Address Hate Speech aims to address this problem bypresenting a practical and holistic approach requiring the whole-of-nation collaboration.

The book offers a glimmer of hope in a hate-fuelled environment by emphasising the importance of diplomacy, effective communication strategies, and most importantly, the power of counterspeech initiatives

The free PDF copy of From Hate to Hope: A Holistic Approach to Address Hate Speech is now available and can be accessed via https://www.idfr.gov.my/ or https://www.idfr.gov.my/publication/other-publications/2025-publications

Spons

stratsea was honoured to be invited to review Dr. Murni Wan Mohd Nor’s latest publication entitled, “From Hate to H

Below is a short review provided by stratsea’s Chief Editor:

“We currently live in a time when internet shutdowns, blocking of websites, and taking down of online contents are possible. Unfortunately, this is only sufficient at attempting to treat the symptoms of hate speech. Confounding this is the possibility of governments being complicit in these heinous actions. Aptly named From Hate to Hope – A Holistic Approach to Address Hate Speech, Dr. Murni provides readers a contemporary understanding of the issue with a focus on Malaysia and tools to go beyond simply tolerance but also acceptance of each other.

Sham Ismail

Chief Editor, stratsea

Co-Author, Digital Authoritarianism and its Religious Legitimization – The Cases of Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and India (palgrave macmillan)”

Click here for more information on IDFR Malaysia’s programmes and publications.

The Intersection between Terrorism and Politics

Terrorist narrative and propaganda, particularly that of jihadi groups, are not just tools for spreading ideology. They are sophisticated political disinformation machineries designed to distort reality, manipulate perceptions and incite violence.

These extremist messages have found fertile ground in Indonesia, where latest major events, such as the 2019 presidential elections and the Covid-19 pandemic, have facilitated the surge of fake news, national polarization and an increasing distrust in the government.

Generally, disinformation is understood as false information deliberately and often covertly spread (such as by planting rumors) to influence public opinion or obscure facts.  

However, Thomas Rid argued in his book Active Measures that disinformation is not necessarily all lies; it can be accurate information presented in a harmful way. Typically, it mixes about 80% of facts and 20% of falsehood to deceive the audience. Think about messages that aim to misrepresent the truth by planting hoaxes in them.

In the political context, examples include the false claim about the origins of AIDS, the Pizzagate conspiracy during the 2016 US electi

Interestingly, these traits are also present in jihadi terrorist narratives. Per Rid’s definition, these narratives blend authentic references from the holy texts with twisted interpretations to support their agenda.

Findings from my personal conversations with reformed terrorists align with this. The extremists combine the holy scriptures and the perceived global oppression of Muslims to attract followers.

Terrorist groups like Daesh are masters of this art. They can quickly spread their disinformation globally using social media platforms’ wide reach and anonymity, which algorithms study user preferences and amplify these messages by providing similar content. This digital shift has increased the impact of their propaganda, making it harder to control.

For instance, it was found that YouTube’s algorithms do recommend extremist content to users who actively search for it. This is occurring on other video-sharing platforms as well, such as what happened to migrant worker Ika Puspitasari who was hooked on extremist content after seeing it on Facebook.

The employment of bots and buzzers in disinformation campaigns has only complicated the matter, as these things foster confusion, erode trust in government and media, and contribute to societal polarization in the long run. This trend was very popular during the US and Indonesian elections, signifying the close association between methods of disinformation campaign and politics.

Terrorist groups such as Daesh, Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) or the recently disbanded Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) fit the same mold. Their ultimate goal is to establish a caliphate in Iraq, Syria or Indonesia, overturning the status quo and replacing existing governments with their own rule, thus revealing their political ambitions despite their proclaimed religious objectives. Interestingly, they have also employed bots to magnify their disinformation campaign.

Having considered these points, the similarities in the processes of both terrorist groups and political actors cannot be overlooked. Through their pursuit of power and ability to govern, terrorist groups’ agendas are political in nature. Besides, they also use disinformation tactics similar to those employed by legitimate political players, such as the use of bots and blurring the lines between facts and lies in their messages.

It is easi

But what happens if these conditions are not met?

Is Indonesia Vulnerable?

The unfortunate news is that the political landscape of the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, especially since the contentious 2019 presidential election and the Covid-19 pandemic, has become more vulnerable to disinformation.

This has created perfect opportunities for jihadi groups to exploit tensions and erode trust in the government.

High internet penetration and social media usage in Indonesia are not matched by high media literacy and education, making the majority of the population sitting ducks for disinformation campaigns.

Low trust in the government and its institutions, coupled with polarization and identity politics, has made it harder for the government to combat disinformation, as the government does not enjoy high trust from the governed.

This condition is suitable for terrorist groups to spread their hate-filled disinformation against the government as part of their radicalization efforts. On

Lee McIntyre, in his book On Disinformation, argues that many disinformation believers or deniers – those who deny facts even when shown clear evidence – are driven by values and identity, not just facts. Their beliefs are part of who they are, so presenting them with counterfactuals may be perceived as an attack on their identity.

Worse, disinformation facilitates an “us vs. them” mentality and pushes individuals to view those who disagree with them as enemies. This mentality is written all over the takfiri ideology, which views the government and its institutions as enemies. As a result, many members of JI and JAD who were arrested refused to participate in the authority’s deradicalization program, thus undermining its effectiveness.

This is reflected in the government’s struggle to earn public trust. Key government institutions – including the House of Representatives (DPR), the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and the National Police (Polri) – were among the least trusted institutions last year.

High profile cases of corruption and power abuse in the past two years alone have damaged Polri’s reputation, which will need some time to be rehabilitated.  Furthermore, recent wrong turns by the government also play a factor. For example, the cybersecuri

If similar misfires persist, public trust in the government will likely decline further. This could rend

This is clear from both past and recent arrests made by Densus 88. The 2022 Astana Anyar suicide bomber, a terrorist recidivist, harbored hatred towards the police and the government. More recently, a 19-year-old in Malang was arrested for planning to bomb religious houses after being influenced by similar Daesh propaganda.

Thus, anti-government campaigns may easily find an audience in a society that has growing discontent with the government. This is a major risk that the authorities must attend to.

Way Forwa

The World Economic Forum has ranked disinformation as the most significant global risk for the next two years and the fifth greatest over the next decade. Therefore, addressing this issue is crucial, especially in the context of Indonesia, where pol

Will McAvoy of The Newsroom: “The first step in solving the problem is admitting that there is one.”

The Indonesian government should not turn a blind eye or be in denial about the disinformation issue, as terrorist groups can easily exploit it. Furthermore, it is imperative for the authorities to acknowledge and immediately ameliorate the mistakes that they have committed, as ignorance and dismissiveness would only hamper the government’s effort to rebuild public trust. 

There is no silver bullet for this. Due to the political nature of the disinformation used by terrorist groups, continuous efforts to educate the public and raise awareness about its dangers and the political elements within their propaganda are necessary.

Other steps, such as fact-checking initiatives, are important, but public campaigns and face-to-face conversations with those who sympathize with radical ideology can also be effective, especially when involving “credible voices” like reformed terrorists and Daesh returnees.

Moreover, coordinated efforts between governmental and non-governmental entities must also be improved. This is especially true for agencies like the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) and Densus 88 of Polri, as they are the primary authorities the public relies on for matters related to counterterrorism and counter violent extremism. Displaying competence and reliability would help boost public trust.

Furthermore, improving media and digital literacy, along with education, are essential for long-term solutions. This is especially important given the rise of AI, deep fakes and generative AI, which make it even more difficult to differentiate between fake and real information. As a final thought, tackling this issue requires a comprehensive strategic communication approach involving all stakeholders, including the government, media, religious organizations, civil society groups, youth organizations and technology companies.

Introduction

“… Women’s and girls’ active participation in society, as educated and empowered individuals, as teachers, mentors, role models, journalists, faith leaders, healers, and community leaders [,] builds resilience to the influence and spread of violent extremism.”

Kenya-based women’s rights activist Sureya Roble made the above remark in 2015 during the first ever open brie

The significance of women in Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) has indeed been increasingly recognized worldwide, in parallel with the rising number of women as actors in terrorist plots.

Nonetheless, discourses pertaining to women in P/CVE tend to emphasize one particular role of women: mothers. Due to their arguably fundamental roles in keeping family members away from the influence of violent extremism, labels like “emotional leaders” and “early detection system” are often attributed to mothers, which is often entwined with their marital status as wives.

This ultimately drives many countries to put mothers at the centre of conversations about women and P/C

Indonesia is no exception to the rule. More attention has been drawn towards women’s role in P/CVE, especially following high-profile terrorist plots by female perpetrators. The urgency to enforce P/CVE measures has put mothers under the spotlight.

Indonesia’s National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) has reaffirmed such importance, echoing the notion of mothers as “frontliners” and “central bastions” in protecting their children and husbands from being radicalized.

The same notion has also permeated academic discussion. A study regarding mothers in families affiliated with the East Indonesia Mujahideen (MIT) finds that women’s agency in the cycle of violent extremism, particularly through their maternal roles, could manifest through their roles as cycle endorsers or as cycle breakers. Another paper corroborates this, emphasizing the “dual roles” that women – particularly stay-at-home mothers – play in preventing radicalism domestically and socially.

However, it is pertinent that such views be properly scrutinized.

The Risks of Over-Emphasizing Mothers’ Roles

In the realm of P/CVE, mothers stand on the thin line between the private and the public domains – between their own domestic life and the national, “hard” security concerns. 

The common argument is that, as mothers and wives, women possess a strategic role to prevent violent extremism or break the cycle of violent extremism among family members. In a bigger context, their role in this is considered an integral part of ensuring national security.

While this argument canno

When the notion of motherhood is instrumentalized by the state for its own political objectives, grave consequences are likely to be inflicted on the concerned mothers when they fail to successfully accomplish their duties.

Over-emphasizing the roles of mothers in P/CVE generates the simplistic logic that “good mothers do not produce radicals”, therefore stigmatizing women whose family members are radicalized. Unfair labels such as “bad mothers” could thus emerged, exposing such individuals to even more social alienation and exclusion. Worse, they may also be branded as “radicals” despite their non-involvement in any radical activities.

Indonesia has also seen cases where family members of radicalized individuals are being exiled by their surrounding commun

For example, the wife of Fazri Pahlawan (also known as Abu Zee Ghuroba) – the terrorist who stabbed Minister Wiranto in 2019 – has opened up about how her husband’s radical activities have led to the marginalization and expulsion of her family. This has resulted in a variety of consequences, such as difficulty for her children to get accepted into schools.

Such impacts might be exacerbated if mothers and wives are further instrumentalized by the state, for instance, through official policy frameworks. In that scenario, the radicalization of their husbands or children can be interpreted as their “failure” in being the frontline “agents” of P/CVE measure.

Consequently, women from lower socio-economic statuses and cultural backgrounds, who are typically vulnerable to such stigma, face an elevated risk due to an inadequate safety net to back them up when they are forcibly evicted from their community. On top of that, they are also disregarded by the state for not being a “beneficial instrument”.  

Furthermore, drawing upon the concern that the centrality of motherhood in P/CVE could potentially transfer the responsibility of the state to mothers, this shift of responsibility is a problematic notion in itself.

Most mothers are already grappling with domestic labour in their own homes. Such activity tends to be devalued because wom

This is crucial in the context of Indonesia, where the idea of women and their presumed strategic position in P/CVE (as mothers and wives) is often assumed to be something “natural”. Such a notion puts an unfair emphasis on mothers’ maternal instincts and strong emotional faculty as crucial elements in preventing violent extremism within the institution of family.

This essentialist view overlooks the complexities of mothers – and women in general – in P/CVE. Consequently, it could shift Indonesia’s collective responsibility of P/CVE under its “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-society” approaches to the sole responsibility of mothers at the forefront.

It is wrong to assume that all mothers are well-equipped with the skills and resources to implement P/CVE measures. Besides, it is equally wrong to expect that all women and mothers conform to their essentialized characteristics to begin with. Just because the patriarchal society they are part of expects them to be loving wives and mothers does not mean all women want to and can embrace such roles.

The lines between “empowering” and “burdening” women are thus obscure in this issue, similar to those between “embracing” and “instrumentalizing”. Overstating the strategic roles of mothers as P/CVE agents without an in-depth scrutiny of such expectations and holistic support will only lead to the latter – burdening and instrumentalizing women.

Navigating Women’s Roles in Indonesia’s P/CVE Strategy

There is an imperative to embrace and empower mothers instead of merely perceiving women as P/CVE agents or “frontliners”. The state needs to reaffirm that mothers are a part of its “whole-of-society” approach who team up with other components of society and synergize with the “whole-of-government” strategy in implementing P/CVE measures.

Mothers also need sufficient support to undertake their responsibilities as P/CVE agents.

Initiatives such as MotherSchools have been enacted by Women without Borders, in collaboration with local community leaders and the women’s wings of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, in regions prone to radicalization.

The program aims to educate and train mothers to “translate their unique potential into action” by protecting their children from violent extremism. In MotherSchools, mothers are taught about the signs that their children might have been radicalized and how to approach thei

Besides, pengajian or study circles that invite women, especially mothers, and incorporate P/CVE elements have also become more frequent across Indonesia, as exemplified by the Yogyakarta-based Assyuhada religious group.

Such initiatives are important to be supported by the government, which has run its own P/CVE programs via BNPT’s regional Counter-Terrorism Communication Forum (FKPT).

The provision of social and/or economic protection and assistance for women should also be carried out. This should target not only those already affected (such as the innocent wives of convicted terrorists), but also be applied in preventive contexts – which might concern larger structural issues such as education, employment and women empowerment.

Nevertheless, the Indonesian government must also amplify its P/CVE engagement with women beyond their specific roles as mothers and wives. The government should seek to maintain productive collaboration with women-led civil society organizations and their pertinent networks including, but not limited to, Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN) Indonesia and the Working Group on Women and P/CVE (WGWC). Simultaneously, it is also important to enforce gender mainstreaming measures in strategic security sectors such as BNPT itself.

Conclusion

By pursuing women’s active and substantive participation in the “public” domain of P/CVE, Indonesia would benefit from more strategic approaches in addressing female extremists. This ranges from comprehending their motives to managing gender-sensitive deradicalization programs.

On top of that, the efforts to support women’s contribution towards P/CVE in the “private” domain, or through their “traditional” roles as mothers and wives, could also be improved as previously discussed. To decouple women’s contribution in P/CVE and their traditional roles altogether risks dismissing their distinctive potentials. However, overstating those potentials without adequate support also risks putting women in susceptible positions. Hence, the Indonesian government needs to find a good balance to navigate women’s involvement in its P/CVE strategy.

Introduction

In a significant stride towards bolstering regional security, government representatives from both China and Indonesia convened in Beijing to chart a path of cooperation in combating terrorism.

The meeting, held in March 2024, saw Wang Xiaohong, China’s Minister of Public Security, engage Mohammed Rycko Amelza Dahniel, the Head of Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (Indonesia’s National Counter Terrorism Agency – BNPT).

The primary agenda of the gathering was to fortify collaborative mechanisms and capabilities in counterterrorism efforts. Both sides expressed a mutual commitment to intensify coordination and communication on international counterterrorism issues, while also enhancing practical cooperation in law enforcement. Wang Xiaohong reiterated China’s readiness to align with Indonesia in implementing crucial agreements reached by their leaders, underscoring the robust momentum in their bilateral relations.

Not the First Time

This recent engagement builds on a history of cooperative endeavors. In 2014, the inauguration of counterterrorism cooperation was marked by the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between BNPT and China’s Ministry of Public Security in Beijing.

Several initiatives were undertaken to enhance collaboration in the following years. Two crucial meetings must be taken into account: the International Meeting on Counter-Terrorism in Bali in 2016 and the Sub-Regional Meeting on Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Cross Border Terrorism in Manado in 2017. These meetings aimed at addressing regional terrorism threats, including those in Marawi, South Philippines, which shook the region during this period.

In these meetings, Indonesia had also pr

In 2017, the Workshop on Counter-Terrorism between China and Its Neighboring Countries further provided a platform for exchanging information. Indonesia was represented by officials from the Ministries of Law and Human Rights as well as Foreign Affairs.

Additionally, in the same year, the 6^th Meeting of the Bilateral Dialogue Between the State Councilor of China and the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs of Indonesia also discussed cooperation plans on counterterrorism under the auspices of the Indonesia-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Action.

In late 2023, the two countries further reinforced their counterterrorism collaboration through the signing of an MoU on strategic partnership aimed at promoting regional peace and security. It was emphasized that China sees Indonesia as a country with a  positive track record in counterterrorism that has also been recognized by several countries as well as the United Nations.

Challenges

Amid the strides in cooperative counter-terrorism efforts between China and Indonesia, several significant challenges loom large.

While the cooperative efforts between the two nations have progressed, a potential mismatch arises between China’s and Indonesia’s respective definitions of terrorism. The definition and parameters of terrorism on China’s side are further complicated by its treatment of the Uyghurs.

The primary challenge stems from counterterrorism being utilized as a narrative to obscure China’s harsh policies towards the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang.

Despite its commitment in counterterrorism efforts, China’s approach to handling the Uyghurs presents a multifaceted narrative. Reports have surfaced suggesting that China’s efforts may serve as a veneer to obscure its controversial policies towards these minority groups.

Beijing has faced substantial criticism for its treatment of Uyghur Muslims, including allegations of extensive human rights violations such as mass detentions, surveillance and forced labor. While China portrays these actions as counterterrorism measures aimed at combating extremism, international observers interpret them predominantly as human rights abuses.

Of particular concern are reports indicating that China orchestrates meticulously curated subsidized tours for Indonesian scholars, religious leaders, journalists and other influential figures. These tours purportedly offer a carefully tailored glimpse into specific facets of China’s management of ethnic and religious minorities, presenting a narrative that aligns closely with the Chinese government’s agenda. Participants of these tours reportedly receive remuneration for their time and involvement, raising questions about the authenticity and impartiality of their observations.

The alleged aim of these tours appears to be twofold: to showcase a favorable image of China’s approach to handling its minority populations and to cultivate support and positive perceptions among influential individuals in Indonesia. By carefully controlling the narrative and selectively presenting aspects of its policies and practices, China seeks to shape external perceptions and garner support for its actions, particularly in regions where concerns over hu

However, the existence of these paid tours adds a layer of complexity to the cooperative efforts between China and Indonesia in combating terrorism. While both nations share common interests in addressing security threats and promoting stability, the divergent perspectives on the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities highlight the challenges inherent in navigating diplomatic relations.

For Indonesia, a predominantly Muslim nation, navigating cooperation with China in counterterrorism while concurrently addressing concerns over human rights and religious freedoms poses a nuanced diplomatic challenge. The juxtaposition of these divergent perspectives underscores the complexity of defining terrorism within the context of China’s policies and actions, complicating such collaborative efforts.

Secondly, the South China Sea dispute stands as a significant obstacle to a more effective cooperation between China and Indonesia. The contentious territorial disputes in the South China Sea have long been a source of tension between China and various Southeast Asian nations, including Indonesia, which asserts its sovereignty over parts of the region. China’s expansive claims and assertive actions, such as maritime patrols and the construction of artificial islands, have exacerbated these tensions, fueling concerns over regional stability and maritime security.

The escalating tensions in the South China Sea create a complex backdrop of geopolitical mistrust that could potentially impede bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism initiatives. As both nations strive to address shared security challenges and combat terrorism effectively, the mistrust and suspicion engendered by the South China Sea dispute may hinder the exchange of crucial intelligence, coordination on security measures and the implementation of joint initiatives aimed at countering terrorist threats in the region.

The fear of intelligence data being exploited for ulterior motives adds another layer of complexity to the cooperation between China and Indonesia in counterterrorism efforts. Indonesia may be apprehensive about sharing sensitive intelligence with China, fearing that it could be utilized to further China’s strategic interests, including its aggressive actions in the South China Sea.

Recent incidents, such as the reported cyber-theft of strategic data from ASEAN and its member states, underscore these concerns. Chinese government-linked hackers were purported to have stolen gigabytes of data, including email correspondence, from the ASEAN Secretariat and contacts in member states in 2022. While the exact nature of the stolen information remains undisclosed, it has been suggested that it may have included strategic data related to the South China Sea disputes.

This revelation raises legitimate concerns about the potential misuse of intelligence-sharing mechanisms for geopolitical purposes. For Indonesia, the prospect of sharing any sensitive information with China, including counterterrorism purposes, becomes fraught with uncertainty and risk. There is a justified fear that intelligence data provided to China could be exploited to advance its maritime ambitions and assertive actions in the South China Sea, rather than solely focusing on combating terrorism.

The concerns regarding intelligence sharing with China extend beyond the South China Sea. China’s state-sponsored hackers are known to be highly active in the Southeast Asian region, targeting government and military entities in pursuit of strategic objectives.

Government and military units in Southeast Asian countries have become common targets for China’s hackers in recent years. In the second half of 2022 alone, there was a 20% increase in China-linked cyberattacks against Southeast Asian countries compared to the same period in 2021. These cyber intrusion campaigns are believed to serve the strategic interests of the

Conclusion

Amid the complex challenges in China-Indonesia counterterrorism cooperation, proactive steps are crucial. Firstly, prioritizing transparency and mutual trust in intelligence-sharing mechanisms is essential, with clear protocols needed to address Indonesia’s concerns about potential misuse of shared intelligence.

Additionally, to enhance cooperation, China and Indonesia must address complexities surrounding the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities, particularly the Uyghur population in Xinjiang. Transparent dialogue is key to resolving disparities in their definitions of terrorism and minority treatment, with China urged to acknowledge and address international concerns regarding its policies in Xinjiang.

Refraining from using counterterrorism to justify harsh measures against the Uyghurs, prioritizing respect for fundamental rights and exploring alternative approaches, are imperative. Indonesia, while embar

Second, resolving underlying tensions, especially the South China Sea dispute, is vital for seamless cooperation. Diplomatic dialogue and confidence-building measures can mitigate mistrust, reaffirming commitments to international law and regional stability.

Bolstering cybersecurity cooperation to counter state-sponsored cyber activities is also imperative, collectively addressing cyber threats to safeguard critical infrastructure and information.

In conclusion, concerted efforts in transparency, trust-building and cybersecurity cooperation are crucial for effective counter-terrorism collaboration, advancing peace and security in the region.

Introduction

Women have been involved in the rehabilitation of terrorist inmates for years in Indonesia. This piece will zoom in on the profile of four such women, whose missions are to the break the chains of extremism and guide ex-inmates back into a normal life.

Nurani Ruhendi

In the heart of Nusakambangan Island’s Super Maximum Security Prison, Nurani Ruhendi, a 31 year old deradicalization activist, recently completed a challenging assignment.

Tasked with the responsibility of guiding inmates through an intricate process of rehabilitation, Nurani, fondly known as Rani, does not complain about her challenging duty. On the contrary, she expresses satisfaction and joy when recounting her experiences.

The term “inmates” in this piece refers specifically to those jailed for terrorism acts.

For Rani, interacting with inmates is not merely a routine task, but a mood booster. Rani is entrusted with the unique responsibility of visiting and mentoring these inmates within the prison walls.

When Rani first assumed this role at the age of 26, she realized that this was no

Rani oversees and mentors around 50 terrorism inmates across 11 correctional facilities in Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Central Java, out of a total of 104 facilities in 25 Provinces. Despite the challenges, Rani embraces her responsibilities with enthusiasm, easily overcoming any fatigue.

Terrorism inmates are often reserved initially, resisting engagement with prison staff, including Rani and her team. To these inmates, the staff is perceived

Deradicalization is indeed a lengthy process. Rejection from inmates must be handled delicately, processed with a heart-to-heart approach, in an attempt to convince them that they do need help.

“When there is a former inmate who was once resistant, and we guide them slowly until they firmly pledge allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia, commit and express gratitude for the facilitated mindset shift, it feels incredibly rewarding as if all of our hard work has paid off,” said Rani.

Natalia Aga

Natalia Aga, a 32-year-old with a background in psychology, shares a similar commitment with Rani. Her role involves providing guidance to inmates while they are still inside prisons. Understanding their needs is key to Natalia’s mission to win their hearts and minds.

Inmates often harbor certain unfavorable views towards women, a challenge that Natalia acknowledges. Establishing personal connections is vital and it means giving extra effort due to communication limitations posed by different point of views.

Despite the demanding workload and the negative energy pervasive within the prison, Natalia and her colleagues strive to overcome these hurdles, viewing them as challenges to fulfilling their mission of providing guidance.

“Work rhythms are quite intense, we must be ready to go and meet with inmates at any moment. This prison cannot be described as having positive vibes—on the contrary, it exudes significant negative energy that affects our mood. But this becomes a challenge for us to overcome so that we can carry out our mission of providing guidance,” explains Natalia.

Aysha

In the heart of the prison system, where many work tirelessly to rehabilitate inmates within prison walls, Aysha stands apart. Her mission extends beyond confinement, as she is tasked to guide former inmates as they transition back into society. Aysha’s journey begins after these individuals pledge allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia, securing their parole.

Her responsibilities involve coordinating with various governmental bodies to ensure an inmate’s administrative and documentation requirements are in order, including proofs of their citizenship and identity. These are pre-requisite before an inmate could apply for parole.

She is also in charge of the reintegration process of former inmates. This includes reaching out to their families. This is a crucial step in the post-prison life as their successful reintegration into society hinges on the support they receive.

Aysha firmly believes that these individuals are victims of manipulation by terrorist group, succumbing to indoctrination that exploits religion as a tool. Many fell into the trap, willing to sacrifice themselves in acts of bombing, stabbing, shooting and other forms of violence. However, Aysha remains dedicated to helping them realize that the state is extending a helping hand to empower them once more.

Her altruistic intentions, however, face hurdles. Some parolees shut their doors, refusing assistance for various reasons. Others choose not to opt for parole, maintaining their radical stance. Even in the face of rejection, the government remains vigilant, keeping a watchful eye on these individuals.

Despite encountering resistance, Aysha is motivated to win over those shrouded in the fog of extremism. She views them not as irredeemable, but as human beings who have fallen victim to the indoctrination of extremist ideologies propagated by terrorist networks.

A touching incident in Central Java serves as a testament to Aysha’s determination. Initially resistant, an individual eventually opened up to dialogue and engagement.

In Aysha’s words, “There were several cases in Central Java, they initially resisted because they were still radicalized. That is okay, we should not force them. But we continued to approach them until they finally opened the door and talked to us, eventually participating in our activities.”

Aysha’s commitment sheds light on the complexity of post-terrorism inmates’ reintegration, demonstrating that compassion and persistence can gradually dismantle the walls built by extremist ideologies.

Dyah Ayu Kartika

Dyah Ayu Kartika, a terrorism researcher, underscores the pivotal role women play in the deradicalization process. Kartika emphasizes that, “Especially for female terrorist inmates, an initial approach by female officers proves instrumental. This strategy lays the groundwork before subsequent sessions where they engage with male facilitators.”

By prioritizing female engagement early in the deradicalization journey, it not only fosters a more empathetic connection but also sets the stage for more comprehensive sessions with diverse speakers. These subsequent sessions cover a spectrum of subjects, including religion, personality development and skills enhancement, many of which are conducted by male facilitators.

Kartika also emphasizes that there are currently no specific programs

“The declaration of loyalty to the state thus needs to be followed up by sustained and carefully

This approach not only recognizes the unique needs of female inmates, but also highlights the importance of a holistic and gender-sensitive methodology in the ongoing fight against terrorism. In their quiet battles, they redefine narratives, proving that within echoes of despair, the symphony of redemption prevails. National Counterterrorism Agency spokesperson, Prof. Dr. Irfan Idris, emphasizes crucial aspects relating to women’s role in counter-terrorism efforts. “Efforts by women to prevent radicalism are often overlooked, despite their visible and discreet contributions, particularly in areas susceptible to terrorism.”