The Intersection between Terrorism and Politics

Terrorist narrative and propaganda, particularly that of jihadi groups, are not just tools for spreading ideology. They are sophisticated political disinformation machineries designed to distort reality, manipulate perceptions and incite violence.

These extremist messages have found fertile ground in Indonesia, where latest major events, such as the 2019 presidential elections and the Covid-19 pandemic, have facilitated the surge of fake news, national polarization and an increasing distrust in the government.

Generally, disinformation is understood as false information deliberately and often covertly spread (such as by planting rumors) to influence public opinion or obscure facts.  

However, Thomas Rid argued in his book Active Measures that disinformation is not necessarily all lies; it can be accurate information presented in a harmful way. Typically, it mixes about 80% of facts and 20% of falsehood to deceive the audience. Think about messages that aim to misrepresent the truth by planting hoaxes in them.

In the political context, examples include the false claim about the origins of AIDS, the Pizzagate conspiracy during the 2016 US election and the allegations of Jokowi’s Chinese heritage during Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election. All these cases share the trait of blending truth and lies.

Interestingly, these traits are also present in jihadi terrorist narratives. Per Rid’s definition, these narratives blend authentic references from the holy texts with twisted interpretations to support their agenda.

Findings from my personal conversations with reformed terrorists align with this. The extremists combine the holy scriptures and the perceived global oppression of Muslims to attract followers.

Terrorist groups like Daesh are masters of this art. They can quickly spread their disinformation globally using social media platforms’ wide reach and anonymity, which algorithms study user preferences and amplify these messages by providing similar content. This digital shift has increased the impact of their propaganda, making it harder to control.

For instance, it was found that YouTube’s algorithms do recommend extremist content to users who actively search for it. This is occurring on other video-sharing platforms as well, such as what happened to migrant worker Ika Puspitasari who was hooked on extremist content after seeing it on Facebook.

The employment of bots and buzzers in disinformation campaigns has only complicated the matter, as these things foster confusion, erode trust in government and media, and contribute to societal polarization in the long run. This trend was very popular during the US and Indonesian elections, signifying the close association between methods of disinformation campaign and politics.

Terrorist groups such as Daesh, Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) or the recently disbanded Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) fit the same mold. Their ultimate goal is to establish a caliphate in Iraq, Syria or Indonesia, overturning the status quo and replacing existing governments with their own rule, thus revealing their political ambitions despite their proclaimed religious objectives. Interestingly, they have also employed bots to magnify their disinformation campaign.

Having considered these points, the similarities in the processes of both terrorist groups and political actors cannot be overlooked. Through their pursuit of power and ability to govern, terrorist groups’ agendas are political in nature. Besides, they also use disinformation tactics similar to those employed by legitimate political players, such as the use of bots and blurring the lines between facts and lies in their messages.

It is easier to detect hoaxes, fake news and the likes when several factors are present, such as high literacy, strong education, solid trust in government, high social capital as well as fair and just political process. In such conditions, terrorist narratives and disinformation may not take root in the society.

But what happens if these conditions are not met?

Is Indonesia Vulnerable?

The unfortunate news is that the political landscape of the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, especially since the contentious 2019 presidential election and the Covid-19 pandemic, has become more vulnerable to disinformation.

This has created perfect opportunities for jihadi groups to exploit tensions and erode trust in the government.

High internet penetration and social media usage in Indonesia are not matched by high media literacy and education, making the majority of the population sitting ducks for disinformation campaigns.

Low trust in the government and its institutions, coupled with polarization and identity politics, has made it harder for the government to combat disinformation, as the government does not enjoy high trust from the governed.

This condition is suitable for terrorist groups to spread their hate-filled disinformation against the government as part of their radicalization efforts. Once radicalized, individuals find it difficult to change their minds, even when presented with facts and logic by the government.

Lee McIntyre, in his book On Disinformation, argues that many disinformation believers or deniers – those who deny facts even when shown clear evidence – are driven by values and identity, not just facts. Their beliefs are part of who they are, so presenting them with counterfactuals may be perceived as an attack on their identity.

Worse, disinformation facilitates an “us vs. them” mentality and pushes individuals to view those who disagree with them as enemies. This mentality is written all over the takfiri ideology, which views the government and its institutions as enemies. As a result, many members of JI and JAD who were arrested refused to participate in the authority’s deradicalization program, thus undermining its effectiveness.

This is reflected in the government’s struggle to earn public trust. Key government institutions – including the House of Representatives (DPR), the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and the National Police (Polri) – were among the least trusted institutions last year.

High profile cases of corruption and power abuse in the past two years alone have damaged Polri’s reputation, which will need some time to be rehabilitated.  Furthermore, recent wrong turns by the government also play a factor. For example, the cybersecurity disaster affecting the country’s Temporary National Data Center casts doubt over the government’s competency to protect the nation’s interests.  

If similar misfires persist, public trust in the government will likely decline further. This could render people more vulnerable to terrorist groups, which propagate the beliefs that the government has transgressed (taghut) and that no positive outcome can emerge from a government led by infidels.

This is clear from both past and recent arrests made by Densus 88. The 2022 Astana Anyar suicide bomber, a terrorist recidivist, harbored hatred towards the police and the government. More recently, a 19-year-old in Malang was arrested for planning to bomb religious houses after being influenced by similar Daesh propaganda.

Thus, anti-government campaigns may easily find an audience in a society that has growing discontent with the government. This is a major risk that the authorities must attend to.

Way Forward

The World Economic Forum has ranked disinformation as the most significant global risk for the next two years and the fifth greatest over the next decade. Therefore, addressing this issue is crucial, especially in the context of Indonesia, where political instability might enable terrorist groups to spread their wing.

Will McAvoy of The Newsroom: “The first step in solving the problem is admitting that there is one.”

The Indonesian government should not turn a blind eye or be in denial about the disinformation issue, as terrorist groups can easily exploit it. Furthermore, it is imperative for the authorities to acknowledge and immediately ameliorate the mistakes that they have committed, as ignorance and dismissiveness would only hamper the government’s effort to rebuild public trust. 

There is no silver bullet for this. Due to the political nature of the disinformation used by terrorist groups, continuous efforts to educate the public and raise awareness about its dangers and the political elements within their propaganda are necessary.

Other steps, such as fact-checking initiatives, are important, but public campaigns and face-to-face conversations with those who sympathize with radical ideology can also be effective, especially when involving “credible voices” like reformed terrorists and Daesh returnees.

Moreover, coordinated efforts between governmental and non-governmental entities must also be improved. This is especially true for agencies like the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) and Densus 88 of Polri, as they are the primary authorities the public relies on for matters related to counterterrorism and counter violent extremism. Displaying competence and reliability would help boost public trust.

Furthermore, improving media and digital literacy, along with education, are essential for long-term solutions. This is especially important given the rise of AI, deep fakes and generative AI, which make it even more difficult to differentiate between fake and real information. As a final thought, tackling this issue requires a comprehensive strategic communication approach involving all stakeholders, including the government, media, religious organizations, civil society groups, youth organizations and technology companies.

Introduction

“… Women’s and girls’ active participation in society, as educated and empowered individuals, as teachers, mentors, role models, journalists, faith leaders, healers, and community leaders [,] builds resilience to the influence and spread of violent extremism.”

Kenya-based women’s rights activist Sureya Roble made the above remark in 2015 during the first ever open briefing on the role of women in countering terrorism and violent extremism, held by the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee.

The significance of women in Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) has indeed been increasingly recognized worldwide, in parallel with the rising number of women as actors in terrorist plots.

Nonetheless, discourses pertaining to women in P/CVE tend to emphasize one particular role of women: mothers. Due to their arguably fundamental roles in keeping family members away from the influence of violent extremism, labels like “emotional leaders” and “early detection system” are often attributed to mothers, which is often entwined with their marital status as wives.

This ultimately drives many countries to put mothers at the centre of conversations about women and P/CVE, despite the multiple roles women and mothers play in daily life.

Indonesia is no exception to the rule. More attention has been drawn towards women’s role in P/CVE, especially following high-profile terrorist plots by female perpetrators. The urgency to enforce P/CVE measures has put mothers under the spotlight.

Indonesia’s National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) has reaffirmed such importance, echoing the notion of mothers as “frontliners” and “central bastions” in protecting their children and husbands from being radicalized.

The same notion has also permeated academic discussion. A study regarding mothers in families affiliated with the East Indonesia Mujahideen (MIT) finds that women’s agency in the cycle of violent extremism, particularly through their maternal roles, could manifest through their roles as cycle endorsers or as cycle breakers. Another paper corroborates this, emphasizing the “dual roles” that women – particularly stay-at-home mothers – play in preventing radicalism domestically and socially.

However, it is pertinent that such views be properly scrutinized.

The Risks of Over-Emphasizing Mothers’ Roles

In the realm of P/CVE, mothers stand on the thin line between the private and the public domains – between their own domestic life and the national, “hard” security concerns. 

The common argument is that, as mothers and wives, women possess a strategic role to prevent violent extremism or break the cycle of violent extremism among family members. In a bigger context, their role in this is considered an integral part of ensuring national security.

While this argument cannot be completely refuted, Indonesia should be careful not to put too much emphasis on mothers as the agents of P/CVE to avoid the “instrumentalization” of mothers.

When the notion of motherhood is instrumentalized by the state for its own political objectives, grave consequences are likely to be inflicted on the concerned mothers when they fail to successfully accomplish their duties.

Over-emphasizing the roles of mothers in P/CVE generates the simplistic logic that “good mothers do not produce radicals”, therefore stigmatizing women whose family members are radicalized. Unfair labels such as “bad mothers” could thus emerged, exposing such individuals to even more social alienation and exclusion. Worse, they may also be branded as “radicals” despite their non-involvement in any radical activities.

Indonesia has also seen cases where family members of radicalized individuals are being exiled by their surrounding communities due to the stigma imposed on them.

For example, the wife of Fazri Pahlawan (also known as Abu Zee Ghuroba) – the terrorist who stabbed Minister Wiranto in 2019 – has opened up about how her husband’s radical activities have led to the marginalization and expulsion of her family. This has resulted in a variety of consequences, such as difficulty for her children to get accepted into schools.

Such impacts might be exacerbated if mothers and wives are further instrumentalized by the state, for instance, through official policy frameworks. In that scenario, the radicalization of their husbands or children can be interpreted as their “failure” in being the frontline “agents” of P/CVE measure.

Consequently, women from lower socio-economic statuses and cultural backgrounds, who are typically vulnerable to such stigma, face an elevated risk due to an inadequate safety net to back them up when they are forcibly evicted from their community. On top of that, they are also disregarded by the state for not being a “beneficial instrument”.  

Furthermore, drawing upon the concern that the centrality of motherhood in P/CVE could potentially transfer the responsibility of the state to mothers, this shift of responsibility is a problematic notion in itself.

Most mothers are already grappling with domestic labour in their own homes. Such activity tends to be devalued because women are essentialized as “natural carers” who perform “a labour of love”. Expecting them to carry out P/CVE duties means putting additional burden on top of their underappreciated conventional domestic labour.

This is crucial in the context of Indonesia, where the idea of women and their presumed strategic position in P/CVE (as mothers and wives) is often assumed to be something “natural”. Such a notion puts an unfair emphasis on mothers’ maternal instincts and strong emotional faculty as crucial elements in preventing violent extremism within the institution of family.

This essentialist view overlooks the complexities of mothers – and women in general – in P/CVE. Consequently, it could shift Indonesia’s collective responsibility of P/CVE under its “whole-of-government” and “whole-of-society” approaches to the sole responsibility of mothers at the forefront.

It is wrong to assume that all mothers are well-equipped with the skills and resources to implement P/CVE measures. Besides, it is equally wrong to expect that all women and mothers conform to their essentialized characteristics to begin with. Just because the patriarchal society they are part of expects them to be loving wives and mothers does not mean all women want to and can embrace such roles.

The lines between “empowering” and “burdening” women are thus obscure in this issue, similar to those between “embracing” and “instrumentalizing”. Overstating the strategic roles of mothers as P/CVE agents without an in-depth scrutiny of such expectations and holistic support will only lead to the latter – burdening and instrumentalizing women.

Navigating Women’s Roles in Indonesia’s P/CVE Strategy

There is an imperative to embrace and empower mothers instead of merely perceiving women as P/CVE agents or “frontliners”. The state needs to reaffirm that mothers are a part of its “whole-of-society” approach who team up with other components of society and synergize with the “whole-of-government” strategy in implementing P/CVE measures.

Mothers also need sufficient support to undertake their responsibilities as P/CVE agents.

Initiatives such as MotherSchools have been enacted by Women without Borders, in collaboration with local community leaders and the women’s wings of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, in regions prone to radicalization.

The program aims to educate and train mothers to “translate their unique potential into action” by protecting their children from violent extremism. In MotherSchools, mothers are taught about the signs that their children might have been radicalized and how to approach their children in such a situation.

Besides, pengajian or study circles that invite women, especially mothers, and incorporate P/CVE elements have also become more frequent across Indonesia, as exemplified by the Yogyakarta-based Assyuhada religious group.

Such initiatives are important to be supported by the government, which has run its own P/CVE programs via BNPT’s regional Counter-Terrorism Communication Forum (FKPT).

The provision of social and/or economic protection and assistance for women should also be carried out. This should target not only those already affected (such as the innocent wives of convicted terrorists), but also be applied in preventive contexts – which might concern larger structural issues such as education, employment and women empowerment.

Nevertheless, the Indonesian government must also amplify its P/CVE engagement with women beyond their specific roles as mothers and wives. The government should seek to maintain productive collaboration with women-led civil society organizations and their pertinent networks including, but not limited to, Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN) Indonesia and the Working Group on Women and P/CVE (WGWC). Simultaneously, it is also important to enforce gender mainstreaming measures in strategic security sectors such as BNPT itself.

Conclusion

By pursuing women’s active and substantive participation in the “public” domain of P/CVE, Indonesia would benefit from more strategic approaches in addressing female extremists. This ranges from comprehending their motives to managing gender-sensitive deradicalization programs.

On top of that, the efforts to support women’s contribution towards P/CVE in the “private” domain, or through their “traditional” roles as mothers and wives, could also be improved as previously discussed. To decouple women’s contribution in P/CVE and their traditional roles altogether risks dismissing their distinctive potentials. However, overstating those potentials without adequate support also risks putting women in susceptible positions. Hence, the Indonesian government needs to find a good balance to navigate women’s involvement in its P/CVE strategy.

Introduction

In a significant stride towards bolstering regional security, government representatives from both China and Indonesia convened in Beijing to chart a path of cooperation in combating terrorism.

The meeting, held in March 2024, saw Wang Xiaohong, China’s Minister of Public Security, engage Mohammed Rycko Amelza Dahniel, the Head of Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (Indonesia’s National Counter Terrorism Agency – BNPT).

The primary agenda of the gathering was to fortify collaborative mechanisms and capabilities in counterterrorism efforts. Both sides expressed a mutual commitment to intensify coordination and communication on international counterterrorism issues, while also enhancing practical cooperation in law enforcement. Wang Xiaohong reiterated China’s readiness to align with Indonesia in implementing crucial agreements reached by their leaders, underscoring the robust momentum in their bilateral relations.

Not the First Time

This recent engagement builds on a history of cooperative endeavors. In 2014, the inauguration of counterterrorism cooperation was marked by the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between BNPT and China’s Ministry of Public Security in Beijing.

Several initiatives were undertaken to enhance collaboration in the following years. Two crucial meetings must be taken into account: the International Meeting on Counter-Terrorism in Bali in 2016 and the Sub-Regional Meeting on Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Cross Border Terrorism in Manado in 2017. These meetings aimed at addressing regional terrorism threats, including those in Marawi, South Philippines, which shook the region during this period.

In these meetings, Indonesia had also proposed strengthening cooperation with China in exchanging information and data on terrorism, deradicalization efforts, and combating terrorist financing through cyber-technology.

In 2017, the Workshop on Counter-Terrorism between China and Its Neighboring Countries further provided a platform for exchanging information. Indonesia was represented by officials from the Ministries of Law and Human Rights as well as Foreign Affairs.

Additionally, in the same year, the 6^th Meeting of the Bilateral Dialogue Between the State Councilor of China and the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs of Indonesia also discussed cooperation plans on counterterrorism under the auspices of the Indonesia-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Action.

In late 2023, the two countries further reinforced their counterterrorism collaboration through the signing of an MoU on strategic partnership aimed at promoting regional peace and security. It was emphasized that China sees Indonesia as a country with a  positive track record in counterterrorism that has also been recognized by several countries as well as the United Nations.

Challenges

Amid the strides in cooperative counter-terrorism efforts between China and Indonesia, several significant challenges loom large.

While the cooperative efforts between the two nations have progressed, a potential mismatch arises between China’s and Indonesia’s respective definitions of terrorism. The definition and parameters of terrorism on China’s side are further complicated by its treatment of the Uyghurs.

The primary challenge stems from counterterrorism being utilized as a narrative to obscure China’s harsh policies towards the Uyghur minority in Xinjiang.

Despite its commitment in counterterrorism efforts, China’s approach to handling the Uyghurs presents a multifaceted narrative. Reports have surfaced suggesting that China’s efforts may serve as a veneer to obscure its controversial policies towards these minority groups.

Beijing has faced substantial criticism for its treatment of Uyghur Muslims, including allegations of extensive human rights violations such as mass detentions, surveillance and forced labor. While China portrays these actions as counterterrorism measures aimed at combating extremism, international observers interpret them predominantly as human rights abuses.

Of particular concern are reports indicating that China orchestrates meticulously curated subsidized tours for Indonesian scholars, religious leaders, journalists and other influential figures. These tours purportedly offer a carefully tailored glimpse into specific facets of China’s management of ethnic and religious minorities, presenting a narrative that aligns closely with the Chinese government’s agenda. Participants of these tours reportedly receive remuneration for their time and involvement, raising questions about the authenticity and impartiality of their observations.

The alleged aim of these tours appears to be twofold: to showcase a favorable image of China’s approach to handling its minority populations and to cultivate support and positive perceptions among influential individuals in Indonesia. By carefully controlling the narrative and selectively presenting aspects of its policies and practices, China seeks to shape external perceptions and garner support for its actions, particularly in regions where concerns over human rights and religious freedoms resonate deeply.

However, the existence of these paid tours adds a layer of complexity to the cooperative efforts between China and Indonesia in combating terrorism. While both nations share common interests in addressing security threats and promoting stability, the divergent perspectives on the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities highlight the challenges inherent in navigating diplomatic relations.

For Indonesia, a predominantly Muslim nation, navigating cooperation with China in counterterrorism while concurrently addressing concerns over human rights and religious freedoms poses a nuanced diplomatic challenge. The juxtaposition of these divergent perspectives underscores the complexity of defining terrorism within the context of China’s policies and actions, complicating such collaborative efforts.

Secondly, the South China Sea dispute stands as a significant obstacle to a more effective cooperation between China and Indonesia. The contentious territorial disputes in the South China Sea have long been a source of tension between China and various Southeast Asian nations, including Indonesia, which asserts its sovereignty over parts of the region. China’s expansive claims and assertive actions, such as maritime patrols and the construction of artificial islands, have exacerbated these tensions, fueling concerns over regional stability and maritime security.

The escalating tensions in the South China Sea create a complex backdrop of geopolitical mistrust that could potentially impede bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism initiatives. As both nations strive to address shared security challenges and combat terrorism effectively, the mistrust and suspicion engendered by the South China Sea dispute may hinder the exchange of crucial intelligence, coordination on security measures and the implementation of joint initiatives aimed at countering terrorist threats in the region.

The fear of intelligence data being exploited for ulterior motives adds another layer of complexity to the cooperation between China and Indonesia in counterterrorism efforts. Indonesia may be apprehensive about sharing sensitive intelligence with China, fearing that it could be utilized to further China’s strategic interests, including its aggressive actions in the South China Sea.

Recent incidents, such as the reported cyber-theft of strategic data from ASEAN and its member states, underscore these concerns. Chinese government-linked hackers were purported to have stolen gigabytes of data, including email correspondence, from the ASEAN Secretariat and contacts in member states in 2022. While the exact nature of the stolen information remains undisclosed, it has been suggested that it may have included strategic data related to the South China Sea disputes.

This revelation raises legitimate concerns about the potential misuse of intelligence-sharing mechanisms for geopolitical purposes. For Indonesia, the prospect of sharing any sensitive information with China, including counterterrorism purposes, becomes fraught with uncertainty and risk. There is a justified fear that intelligence data provided to China could be exploited to advance its maritime ambitions and assertive actions in the South China Sea, rather than solely focusing on combating terrorism.

The concerns regarding intelligence sharing with China extend beyond the South China Sea. China’s state-sponsored hackers are known to be highly active in the Southeast Asian region, targeting government and military entities in pursuit of strategic objectives.

Government and military units in Southeast Asian countries have become common targets for China’s hackers in recent years. In the second half of 2022 alone, there was a 20% increase in China-linked cyberattacks against Southeast Asian countries compared to the same period in 2021. These cyber intrusion campaigns are believed to serve the strategic interests of the Chinese government, including gathering intelligence on projects related to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Conclusion

Amid the complex challenges in China-Indonesia counterterrorism cooperation, proactive steps are crucial. Firstly, prioritizing transparency and mutual trust in intelligence-sharing mechanisms is essential, with clear protocols needed to address Indonesia’s concerns about potential misuse of shared intelligence.

Additionally, to enhance cooperation, China and Indonesia must address complexities surrounding the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities, particularly the Uyghur population in Xinjiang. Transparent dialogue is key to resolving disparities in their definitions of terrorism and minority treatment, with China urged to acknowledge and address international concerns regarding its policies in Xinjiang.

Refraining from using counterterrorism to justify harsh measures against the Uyghurs, prioritizing respect for fundamental rights and exploring alternative approaches, are imperative. Indonesia, while embarking on counterterrorism efforts with China, must still uphold its commitment to human rights, advocating for minority rights domestically and internationally.

Second, resolving underlying tensions, especially the South China Sea dispute, is vital for seamless cooperation. Diplomatic dialogue and confidence-building measures can mitigate mistrust, reaffirming commitments to international law and regional stability.

Bolstering cybersecurity cooperation to counter state-sponsored cyber activities is also imperative, collectively addressing cyber threats to safeguard critical infrastructure and information.

In conclusion, concerted efforts in transparency, trust-building and cybersecurity cooperation are crucial for effective counter-terrorism collaboration, advancing peace and security in the region.

Introduction

Women have been involved in the rehabilitation of terrorist inmates for years in Indonesia. This piece will zoom in on the profile of four such women, whose missions are to the break the chains of extremism and guide ex-inmates back into a normal life.

Nurani Ruhendi

In the heart of Nusakambangan Island’s Super Maximum Security Prison, Nurani Ruhendi, a 31 year old deradicalization activist, recently completed a challenging assignment.

Tasked with the responsibility of guiding inmates through an intricate process of rehabilitation, Nurani, fondly known as Rani, does not complain about her challenging duty. On the contrary, she expresses satisfaction and joy when recounting her experiences.

The term “inmates” in this piece refers specifically to those jailed for terrorism acts.

For Rani, interacting with inmates is not merely a routine task, but a mood booster. Rani is entrusted with the unique responsibility of visiting and mentoring these inmates within the prison walls.

When Rani first assumed this role at the age of 26, she realized that this was not ordinary mentoring. She actively engages in the deradicalization process inside the prison, beginning as early as the inmates’ arrival to the Nusakambangan facility after sentencing.

Rani oversees and mentors around 50 terrorism inmates across 11 correctional facilities in Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Central Java, out of a total of 104 facilities in 25 Provinces. Despite the challenges, Rani embraces her responsibilities with enthusiasm, easily overcoming any fatigue.

Terrorism inmates are often reserved initially, resisting engagement with prison staff, including Rani and her team. To these inmates, the staff is perceived as the extension of the Indonesian government, which is considered as thaghut in radical Islamist worldview.

Deradicalization is indeed a lengthy process. Rejection from inmates must be handled delicately, processed with a heart-to-heart approach, in an attempt to convince them that they do need help.

“When there is a former inmate who was once resistant, and we guide them slowly until they firmly pledge allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia, commit and express gratitude for the facilitated mindset shift, it feels incredibly rewarding as if all of our hard work has paid off,” said Rani.

Natalia Aga

Natalia Aga, a 32-year-old with a background in psychology, shares a similar commitment with Rani. Her role involves providing guidance to inmates while they are still inside prisons. Understanding their needs is key to Natalia’s mission to win their hearts and minds.

Inmates often harbor certain unfavorable views towards women, a challenge that Natalia acknowledges. Establishing personal connections is vital and it means giving extra effort due to communication limitations posed by different point of views.

Despite the demanding workload and the negative energy pervasive within the prison, Natalia and her colleagues strive to overcome these hurdles, viewing them as challenges to fulfilling their mission of providing guidance.

“Work rhythms are quite intense, we must be ready to go and meet with inmates at any moment. This prison cannot be described as having positive vibes—on the contrary, it exudes significant negative energy that affects our mood. But this becomes a challenge for us to overcome so that we can carry out our mission of providing guidance,” explains Natalia.

Aysha

In the heart of the prison system, where many work tirelessly to rehabilitate inmates within prison walls, Aysha stands apart. Her mission extends beyond confinement, as she is tasked to guide former inmates as they transition back into society. Aysha’s journey begins after these individuals pledge allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia, securing their parole.

Her responsibilities involve coordinating with various governmental bodies to ensure an inmate’s administrative and documentation requirements are in order, including proofs of their citizenship and identity. These are pre-requisite before an inmate could apply for parole.

She is also in charge of the reintegration process of former inmates. This includes reaching out to their families. This is a crucial step in the post-prison life as their successful reintegration into society hinges on the support they receive.

Aysha firmly believes that these individuals are victims of manipulation by terrorist group, succumbing to indoctrination that exploits religion as a tool. Many fell into the trap, willing to sacrifice themselves in acts of bombing, stabbing, shooting and other forms of violence. However, Aysha remains dedicated to helping them realize that the state is extending a helping hand to empower them once more.

Her altruistic intentions, however, face hurdles. Some parolees shut their doors, refusing assistance for various reasons. Others choose not to opt for parole, maintaining their radical stance. Even in the face of rejection, the government remains vigilant, keeping a watchful eye on these individuals.

Despite encountering resistance, Aysha is motivated to win over those shrouded in the fog of extremism. She views them not as irredeemable, but as human beings who have fallen victim to the indoctrination of extremist ideologies propagated by terrorist networks.

A touching incident in Central Java serves as a testament to Aysha’s determination. Initially resistant, an individual eventually opened up to dialogue and engagement.

In Aysha’s words, “There were several cases in Central Java, they initially resisted because they were still radicalized. That is okay, we should not force them. But we continued to approach them until they finally opened the door and talked to us, eventually participating in our activities.”

Aysha’s commitment sheds light on the complexity of post-terrorism inmates’ reintegration, demonstrating that compassion and persistence can gradually dismantle the walls built by extremist ideologies.

Dyah Ayu Kartika

Dyah Ayu Kartika, a terrorism researcher, underscores the pivotal role women play in the deradicalization process. Kartika emphasizes that, “Especially for female terrorist inmates, an initial approach by female officers proves instrumental. This strategy lays the groundwork before subsequent sessions where they engage with male facilitators.”

By prioritizing female engagement early in the deradicalization journey, it not only fosters a more empathetic connection but also sets the stage for more comprehensive sessions with diverse speakers. These subsequent sessions cover a spectrum of subjects, including religion, personality development and skills enhancement, many of which are conducted by male facilitators.

Kartika also emphasizes that there are currently no specific programs dedicated to female inmates. Consequently, they often resort to improvisation in various aspects, particularly in terms of support following their pledge of loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia.

“The declaration of loyalty to the state thus needs to be followed up by sustained and carefully planned programs,” Kartika adds in a paper, because resources to help female inmates are even scarcer than those available to men.

This approach not only recognizes the unique needs of female inmates, but also highlights the importance of a holistic and gender-sensitive methodology in the ongoing fight against terrorism. In their quiet battles, they redefine narratives, proving that within echoes of despair, the symphony of redemption prevails. National Counterterrorism Agency spokesperson, Prof. Dr. Irfan Idris, emphasizes crucial aspects relating to women’s role in counter-terrorism efforts. “Efforts by women to prevent radicalism are often overlooked, despite their visible and discreet contributions, particularly in areas susceptible to terrorism.”

Introduction:

Malaysia recorded roughly 500 terrorism-related arrests between 2013 and 2022, with the highest number between 2015 and 2018. The high number of arrests during those seven years was a consequential outcome of the Daesh global uprising. The Malaysian authorities’ focus back then was to circumvent the threat of terrorism permeating Malaysia. Many arrests were made to prevent various planned attacks, attempts to leave for Syria and dissemination of Daesh ideology. In recent years, especially since 2020, Malaysia has observed a decline in the number of arrests for terrorist-related charges in Malaysia possibly due to effectiveness of mass arrest in intimidating them and movement restrictions due to Covid-19. In 2023, a majority of the detainees have been released, and they are currently facing a new challenge of returning to society as “ex-terrorists” (to prevent unnecessary stigma, the term ex-detainee is used from here onwards) as they have completed their prison sentencing which typically lasts at least two years for rehabilitation purpose . Some served longer prison sentences due to the severity of the involvement and ideology. Therefore, the focus has now shifted towards assisting these individuals to reintegrate into society.

This article highlights the challenges faced by several ex-detainees charged with terrorism-related acts in Malaysia and their coping mechanisms to mitigate these challenges. The content presented here is retrieved from an ongoing research project funded by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (DFAT) Office of the Ambassador for Counter-Terrorism (OCT).

Challenges faced by Ex-Detainees

Trauma of Arrest

Selected ex-detainees expressed shock at the moment of arrest as they believed they did not commit a crime that was outrageously harmful such as theft or murder, but ideology related offence. This consequently leads to a risk of trauma as they perceived they had been mistreated by the authority. From the author’s interviews, ex-detainees’ belief can be aligned during the prison rehabilitation program which aimed to correct their understandings of Islam. Such efforts contribute to alleviating negative thoughts regarding their arrests. Unfortunately, there were still instances of ex-detainees who remain adamant on their violent ideology despite undergoing this program which has also been recorded in another research. Ostensibly, intervention to prevent prolonged trauma is not an immediate and linear process for selected ex-detainees. Instead, they may require a more intensive and long-term assistance to overcome such trauma. This, thus, emphasizes the need for psychological intervention to be taken into greater consideration in the rehabilitation program.

Prison Trauma

Prison’s ominous environment, proprietary to its structure and system which is meant to punish criminal offenders, may have affected the ex-detainees severely causing a deteriorating mental state long after release. In the author’s interview, the ex-detainees recounted many grim stories, including witnessing attempted suicide, sharing space with other notorious criminals, and being aggravated and subjected to constant dehumanisation by the guards in prison. This is merely a reflection of the prison structure and system in Malaysia. To overcome this issue, active measures need to be taken to improve the prison facilities and amenities to prevent long-term traumas among detainees.

Financial Struggle and Social Stigma Post-Release

Ex-detainees interviewed in this study cited financial struggles as a prevailing problem because they may come from lower socio-economic backgrounds which restricted their economic opportunities. To overcome this issue, the current rehabilitation module includes skills-based trainings for detainees. Additionally, most of the ex-detainees and their family members reported that they suffered from social stigma, caused by uncensored media reports of their arrests, placing them at further risk of isolation from society and returning to normalcy. One ex-detainee expressed her frustration with the local news for publicising her image in a handcuff which she found to be denigrating. Exacerbating this is when stigma is expressed by their own family members. Some ex-detainees’ relatives hesitated to contact or assist them due to fear of arrest and fear that their relationships be publicly known. 

Coping Mechanisms

Two common coping mechanisms reported by the ex-detainees that benefited them during imprisonment and post-release are religion/faith and familial/social support. From interviews in this study, strong faith in God equipped ex-detainees to develop resilience when facing difficulties. Learning the Quran and Hadiths enabled ex-detainees to perceive their hardships as tests from God. This is akin to what is felt by detainees in Indonesia. Their belief that their fate is destined by God facilitates them in construing that they are in servitude of a greater purpose, and their miseries are ephemeral. This instilled an optimistic outlook towards self and built their resilience.

The second most effective coping mechanism was social support. Social support, inclusive of positive feedback and encouragement from loved ones, are palpable means of sustaining a sense of mastery or competence within individuals going through adversities. These are imperative to building resilience among detainees to endure harrowing prison experiences. Although some ex-detainees had difficulties in reaching out to their relatives for help, others were privileged to have devoted family members who provided ceaseless support to them. Ex-detainees with strong familial support had expressed a more positive attitude towards self-growth and willingness to return to society.

Way Forward

Leveraging on the two coping mechanisms could facilitate successful reintegration of ex-detainees. Programs in prison should, thus, include faith-building and social activities to bolster a sense of identity and resilience among the inmates to ensure well-being during imprisonment and post-release. These programs could be particularly beneficial for inmates who have lost considerable support from their loved ones. Additionally, there is a need to restrict uncensored publications within various media outlets to prevent residual stigmas impacting ex-detainees. Otherwise, an ex-detainee’s successful reintegration into society would be impeded.

Introduction

On the last Pancasila Day (1 June 2023), 76 terror convicts at Gunung Sindur prison in Bogor declared their loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia and relinquished their baiat (pledge of allegiance) to violent extremist leaders. The number of participants in this ceremony was multiple times higher compared to similar events in other prisons. Usman Haidar bin Seff (Ustadz Fahim), a prominent Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)-linked cleric and Farid Okbah, former board member of the government-affiliated council Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulama Council/MUI) were among them.

The well-prepared ceremony was designed with a psychological approach intended to strengthen the commitment of inmates to support Indonesia. This was exemplified via three activities.

First, national songs were played to remind participants of the sacrifices for Indonesia to achieve independence.

Second, During the ceremony, officials also demonstrated their acceptance of the terror inmates as regular members of Indonesia’s society. Notably, R. Andika Dwi Prasetya, a representative of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, hugged each inmate during the event. Such an act functions to instill a sense of acceptance and ostensibly forgiveness for their past acts of terrorism. Andika also spoke to inmates in a manner that could resonate with them. In his remark, he invited participants to give shalawat (greetings) to Prophet Muhammad and prayed for participants using phrases they were familiar with. For example, he prayed for Allah to consider the willingness of inmates to support Indonesia as a basis for them to enter heaven.

Third, the ceremony entailed inmates’ active participation. They were invited to perform Indonesian traditional dances and read poetries, while wearing traditional costumes, signifying their allegiance to Indonesia’s unity in diversity (bhinneka tunggal ika) principle.

What Next?

The ceremony is a culmination of multiagency efforts in conducting in-prison deradicalization programs as well as a point in the inmates’ journey towards deradicalization. Moving forward, what measures and steps must be considered for these 76 inmates, as well as future terrorist prisoners who wish to relinquish their allegiance to the violent cause?

The points below are worth noting.

Regular monitoring during and post imprisonment is crucial as continued psychological and theological assessments are necessary. Relinquishing baiat to a violent extremist cause, while pledging allegiance to Indonesia, does not guarantee that they will not fall back to the old ways.

Furthermore, it is more challenging for those who had played important roles in their groups or had been involved for years to change their worldviews. Of the 76 inmates, Ustadz Fahim is a likely example. Before being nabbed in 2021, he actively preached violent ideologies and supported JI founder Abu Bakar Ba’ashir. His frequent sermons garnered a substantial following that his supporters continued to preach his ideas while he was incarcerated. His experience to be a combatant in Afghanistan also gave him more credit on the view of his followers. These staunch supporters could prove to be a hurdle for Ustadz Fahim to truly abandon his past worldview, as they might assert pressure on him to return to his violent ways.

While incarcerated, monitoring should also be extended to individuals and family members who regularly visit and interact with inmates. This is to ascertain whether they present a negative influence on inmates. Indeed, family members could serve as either a dampener or reinforcer of the inmates’ radical beliefs.

A study conducted from 2016 to 2018, in which I participated as a primary investigator, discovered that several wives supported what their husbands’ violent activities in the past. A wife in Central Java, for example, did not consider the killing a pastor, which her husband committed, a mistake. She has held this view since before and event after her husband’s imprisonment.

Similarly, several wives in Central Sulawesi, supports terror operations carried out by their jailed husbands. These wives from Poso believed that Muslims are being oppressed by the Christians, who make up the majority of local population. In an interview, an inmate’s wife stated, “Over here there is no one who is a brainwashing. We are all victims of slaughter, so this is for defense so we don’t get slaughtered”. The wives espoused such views to justify the terror act the husbands carried out.

Based on this finding, the wives of the 76 inmates in Gunung Sindur should also be the primary subjects of deradicalization and receive relevant intervention from the authorities, in parallel with their husbands.

In terms of monitoring of visitors who wish to see terror inmates, it is true that prison administrations have applied strict visitor restrictions, such as only allowing family members to enter prison. Nevertheless, it is mostly enforced in maximum security prisons like Nusa Kambangan and not in medium- and low-risk prisons. Observation and data collected display the same result, showing that individuals outside family members can visit prisoners.

Gunung Sindur prison has collaborated with the mobile brigade of the police to check visitors; however, their responsibility seems to focus on inspecting what the visitors bring rather than identifying potential affiliations of them. In addition, their task also cover visitors of drug convicts, not specifically terror inmates.

The stake is higher as supporters of violent extremist groups typically continue to give support and try to engage with prisoners. The reason for this varies, including their sense of brotherhood with inmates and their determination to help the latter retain their radical beliefs.

Many give material support as well. In certain events such as Ramadhan, they care packages containing things like dates to prison. Interestingly, such care packages were purchased with money collected from donation which was marketed on social media, the campaign of which also states that the packages would be delivered to prisons.

Lastly, correctional officers and related institutions need to undertake efforts to help inmates prepare for their economic resilience after their release, not only during their imprisonment period. Thus far, prison administrations have offered multiple entrepreneurship training and skill development to each prisoner.

In a Semarang prison, in West Java, for example, prison officers allow terror convicts to sell Turkish kebabs to visitors. Similarly, the prison in East Jakarta facilitates inmates to sell cooked food inside prisons. The food was prepared by the wives and transported to prison while they are visiting their husbands. In a Sidoarjo prison, terror inmates are facilitated to manage fishponds and small farming. Additionally, many inmates across the country also produce Arabic calligraphy for sale.

Nevertheless, many in-prison entrepreneurship programs could not be continued after inmates’ release due to the inability to sell their products or apply their entrepreneurship knowledge in real society. Prison administration can actually offer wider options. Writing activities, for example, is a possible avenue despite it being a rarity currently in prisons. An ex-JI convict Arif Budi Setyawan has proven just that. He wrote articles, including in English, during his imprisonment and published books after his release.

Other initiatives such as cooking and culinary programs, video editing, information and communications technology (ICT), digital marketing, and others should be considered as well. Current programs tend to target basic common skills and largely ignore these potential areas. Kedung Pane prison in Semarang, for instance, upholds programs such as tailoring, welding, carpentry, fishery and farming, printing, soap making, and mat making, but does not provide programs in ICT.

This situation highlights the necessity to enhance the preparedness of post-prison monitoring, which will be necessary to severe the inmates’ dependence on their old circle. The Indonesian government should also be aware of the existence of charity organizations that are ready to regularly support inmates and their family members, which potentially pulls inmates back to their old communities.

Conclusion

In sum, despite their symbolic abandonment of the violent cause, the deradicalization process of the 76 inmates continues. Intensive follow-up monitoring and deradicalization program targeting the inmates and family members must be conducted. Although in many cases husbands take dominant roles in the family, examples above show that wives of extremists can also influence or reinforce their husbands’ radical beliefs. More worrying is the recidivism rate in the country in the past 20 years, which stood at 11.39%. Thus, there is an imperative to rethink options for sustainable initiatives that meet inmates’ needs in post-prison life that goes beyond just entrepreneurship programs, as not everyone has an acumen to run business. Wider options for alternative educational activities should be facilitated so that they can explore new interests.

Introduction

The recidivism rate of Indonesian terrorist ex-convicts between 2002 and 2020 is 11.39% (94 individuals), which is 4-9% higher than in Europe.

Adding to this concern is that attacks by recidivists tend to be bigger in scale and deadlier than their previous attempts. Case in point: in December 2022, a recidivist carried out a suicide attack on Astana Anyar police station in Bandung resulting in the death of one police officer and wounding several victims. The perpetrator was released in 2021 after a stint behind bars for terrorism-related financing and making explosives used in a 2017 attack in Bandung.

Numerous factors have been attributed to recidivism. These include increasing resentment towards the government and security officers due to their experiences during imprisonment.

Indonesian counterterrorism agencies such as the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88) and correctional institutions have also been cited as contributing factors due to their overlapping work and lack of inter-institutional coordination in conducting in-prison deradicalization programs. For example, BNPT, Densus 88 and correction officers visit terror inmates separately. Additionally, the intent of these visits are questionable.

Preventing recidivism requires multidimensional analyses. In contributing to addressing recidivism in Indonesia, this article aims to contribute by presenting the narratives and psychological factors that pull terror inmates back to the path of violence.

The Pull Factors

Narratives circulated within violent extremist groups are crucial in compelling members to remain committed to their cause. From the beginning of their engagement with an extremist entity and throughout their journey of violence, recruited individuals are introduced to various risks they would be exposed to. These include being labeled as a “terrorist”, being marginalized and stigmatized against, being separated from parents and family members, being imprisoned, and being killed.

Members of these organizations are also directed to believe that imprisonment is a test from Allah for anyone who defends His religion. Notably, they deem prisons to be “madrasah [school of] Yusuf.” This positive label refers to Prophet Yusuf who attained mental and intellectual maturity during his imprisonment for a false allegation.

Such association resonates with imprisoned members as they believe that their cause is not a crime but a holy war. They perceive their imprisonment as an endeavor by the Indonesian government to extinguish Islam instead of suppressing crime.

And due to the limitations of prisons which enables terror inmates to interact freely with each other, imprisonment is a precious opportunity to learn “true” Islam without distraction from worldly matters.

Unfortunately, such narratives are also effective on the wives and children of these inmates. My earlier study discovers how the wife of a terror inmate believed that her husband would gain merits from Allah every day despite being barred from the action due to his imprisonment. According to her, being imprisoned for “jihad” is part of “jihad” itself.

There is also a belief among this group that wives and children also obtain merits for their patience and loyalty to their husband/father as the latter undergo their sentence. Such narratives have prevented terror inmates from fully embracing deradicalization programs inside prison.

An Exclusive Group

Such pushback from terror inmates are supported by a 2017 assessment conducted by the Division for Applied Social Psychology Research (DASPR) in collaboration with the Department of Correction. Numerous prisoners were discovered to refuse interactions with any outsider, including prison guards and officers of Densus 88. They exclusively performed daily prayers and held religious discussions in their cells with other likeminded inmates.

Despite their exclusive nature, they continued attempts to recruit inmates who committed other types of crimes. These general crime inmates have joined various activities with terror inmates, including learning how to recite and interpret the Qur’an, participating in regular religious sharing sessions, and eventually accessing jihad-related content.

Interestingly, whose who were successfully influenced were labelled by officers and practitioners as “teroris KW” (translated as “counterfeit terrorists), implying that they are not ideologically-inspired and thus not serious in the cause). Consequently, they are also deemed to be less dangerous than terror inmates.

Prison guards and non-governmental organizations have made efforts to prevent the emergence of “teroris KW”. For instance, in a deradicalization program, DASPR invited “teroris KW” to attend discussion sessions with terror inmates.

However, such occasional discussions are not enough to counter the violent ideologies that they are constantly exposed to. Without adequately addressing this issue, both terror inmates and “teroris KW” will continue to pose significant risk.

To increase receptiveness towards deradicalization programs, prison guards also conduct personal (i.e., one-on-one), informal interactions with terror inmates. Like BNPT’s and Densus 88’s visit programs, prison officers discuss with terror inmates about general themes such as family and inmates’ previous activities before they engaged in violent extremism.

By gaining inmates trust, they can be directed to participate in formal programs to discuss themes such as theology and nationalism. Unfortunately, having informal interactions with terror inmates are hindered due to numerous reasons including the risk of being attacked by inmates during these close interactions and lack of manpower.

Network Support

Another pull factor is the support rendered from their network. Those who stay in the network gain various assistance, both mentally and financially. They receive regular visits and material aids such as supplies and cash from others in the same network.

Moreover, their family members, in particular wives and children, receive benefits including accommodation and food, return transportation for those visiting terror inmates, and scholarships for children. Such assistance conveys to terror inmates that their network is the best safety net and growth enabler rather than the government that does not provide such assistance. Rumors of how ex-inmates are abandoned by the government after their release strengthens inmates’ resolve to not participate in deradicalization programs.

Fear of Excommunication

The last factor is related to a psychological dilemma. Walking away from their violent cause is akin to a religious conversion; not just a shift to being less religious. Leaving “jihad qital” (armed war) means being shunned as an apostate, making it permissible for them to be targeted and possibly killed by their former comrades.

This belief is espoused during the recruitment process and continuously reinforced through various methods and media, including sermons, videos, books, articles and excerpts from extremist scholars. Those who have engaged with a radical ideology since their childhood and teenage years potentially face more intense psychological dynamics compared to others who did not get the same experience. Furthermore, members who do not leave their network gain recognition as a “true muwahid” (monotheist/believer) and their status is higher than the opposite group. Similarly, inmates who do not take parole are labeled “real muwahid” because they decline to follow “man-made” correctional rules.

Potential Approaches to Prevent Recidivism

It is crucial for relevant agencies to implement more relevant deradicalization policies by understanding the narratives and psychological factors that pull terror inmates back to their groups. Of significant importance is the need to develop a robust in-prison counternarratives.

For example, a working group with relevant institutions should learn other versions of “madrasah Yusuf” and invite prisoners to revisit their interpretation. This entails discussions on whether the situations faced by Prophet Yusuf were like theirs and encouraging them to critically rethink whether the prophet was imprisoned for terrorizing others. Notably, such rethinking has facilitated Ali Imron, the mastermind of the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings towards non-violence.

Secondly, to ensure total disengagement from extremist organizations, relevant institutions should channel terror inmates who are about to be released to deradicalized communities. Examples of these communities are Yayasan Dekat Bintang dan Langit (Near Stars and Sky Foundation – DeBintal) – a Densus 88-initiated foundation for terror prisoners from any violent extremist groups – Forum Komunikasi Aktifis Akhlakul Karimah Indonesia (Communication Forum of Akhlakul Karimah Activists – FKAAI), which gathers predominantly former Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI)/al-Qaeda combatants.

DeBintal has conducted various activities ranging from regular Islamic fora, to dialogues with stakeholders, to capacity building and to entrepreneurship initiatives. It also runs a quail and chicken farming business, provides training in air conditioning (AC) reparation and baking, and has participated in government events. They have also held dialogues with Kiai Baha’udin Nursalim (aka Gus Baha), a prominent moderate scholar who has proposed re-interpretations of “jihad” based on prophetic teachings and critical thoughts.

FKAAI, which is supervised by the chief of Densus 88 Marthinus Hukom and former JI commander Nasir Abas, has developed business programs such as a car dealership, fruit farming, seafood tents. It has conducted counterradicalism seminars, directed inmates to halfway houses, produced publications and also rendered financial support via donations. They are able to help ex-convicts in at least three matters: convincing them that they have many non-violent activities to participate in, giving mental support to counter enmity from active violent extremists and empowering them financially that enables them to choose a new social circle.

While such communities continue to receive support from government agencies, they still seek collaborations with private entities and civil society for funding and training. This exemplifies the need for a whole-of-society approach in deradicalization efforts. Lastly, in handling the psychological dilemma, relevant institutions are recommended to provide regular monitoring to evaluate terror inmates’ psychological states during and post release. The 76 inmates who recently declared their oath of allegiance to the Indonesian state, for example, will require such assistance because they are transiting from extremism and restarting their lives upon their release.

Promoted Content

Introduction

Terrorism remains a serious problem in Indonesia. In recent years, women have increasingly become part of the execution stage of these acts of terror.

Between 2009 and 2020, at least 39 Indonesian women were involved in terrorism. However, this figure only represents those who have been prosecuted for such activities. Many more, whose degree of involvement varies, remain undetected.

Notably, there are at least five factors that explain women’s involvement in terrorist activities. These are marriage, the search for redemption, revenge, the pursuit of religious knowledge and the opportunity for gender equality (especially for roles that are traditionally assumed by men).

While women are assuming bigger roles in terrorism, they are also crucial in preventing and countering terrorism. Fortunately, such roles of preventing and countering terrorism are not limited to specific women such as mothers. Any women can play a part including those who were previously involved in terrorism.

This is demonstrated through a case study of how Ibu Kartini Panggabean who was associated with terrorism in Indonesia. She eventually realized the error of possessing such violent belief and now runs a school to counter such belief.

Ibu Kartini’s journey can be broken down to three stages: 1) introduction to extremist beliefs and marriage; 2) involvement in terrorism and her turning point, and; 3) deradicalization and re-engagement with society.

Stage One: Introduction to Extremist Beliefs and Marriage

Ibu Kartini hails from Tebing Tinggi, North Sumatera and has been married for several decades. Since the initial stages of marriage, she knew that her husband harboured radical belief.

Her husband, Khairul Ghazali, is a former terrorist inmate. He was known as an ideologue who also actively participated in high profile terrorist cases, including the heist at the CIMB Niaga bank in Medan and the attack on the Hamparan Perak police station.

But her marriage to Pak Ghazali was not her first exposure to such ideology. Ibu Kartini learned about Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia – NII) during her time in junior high school via exposure from various discussion fora that she participated in. At her public school, she even became known as the girl who refused to salute the Indonesian flag during the flag raising ceremony. This stemmed from her indoctrination that saluting the flag is forbidden in Islam (haram) and could compromise her faith. A scolding from her sociology teacher did little to shake her position on this.

Stage Two: Involvement in Terrorism and Turning Point

During her marriage, Ibu Kartini and her husband migrated to Malaysia for 10 years. Their stay abroad did nothing to their hardened belief. Upon their return, they opened a place for children to recite the Al-Qur’an in Tanjung Balai, Riau. Kartini’s husband was also installed as the Imam of a mosque. Leveraging on these platforms, they began to spread their violent belief.

This came to an abrupt end with the arrest of Ibu Kartini’s husband along with his five other friends. During these arrests, two were shot dead by the police. Her husband was subsequently brought to Jakarta for processsing.

Ibu Kartini was not spared herself. She was detained for a week at the Tanjung Balai police station. Upon her release, she immediately sought to reunite with her husband in Jakarta whom she later found was still in detention.

Seeing her husband behind bars challenged her belief. She was especially troubled by the impact of their detainment on their children and their extended family. She realized how her actions impacted her loved ones and prevented her from meaningful engagements such as fostering children’s education. She was particularly moved when she discovered several of her friends’ children did not attend school, for various reasons. This inspired her to open a school for children in her surrounding areas to receive formal schooling. It was this strong belief in children’s education that convinced her to let go of her radical belief and contact with her previous terrorist network.

Stage Three: Deradicalization and Re-engagement with Society

While Ibu Kartini is determined on this new cause, fortune was also on her side. With little savings, she was gifted a plot of land from her brother-in-law for agricultural use. This was out of concern that her husband might return to the terrorist network if he did not have economic avenues to sustain him and his family.

It was also during this time that she discovered a lack of prayer facility in that plot of land. With the little money she had, she decided to build a musholla, a prayer hall. Eventually, this hut expanded into a pesantren (boarding school) named Al-Hidayah Islamic Boarding School run by both Ibu Kartini and Pak Ghazali, following his release.

The pesantren was inaugurated in 2016 and initially aimed at only providing education to children of terrorist inmates and former terrorist inmates. Gradually, the pesantren accepted students living close by. This demonstrates how their community had grown to accept and trust the couple. 

This trust is also recognized when the local education authority granted an operational permit for the school. To assist with its operations, Al-Hidayah Islamic Boarding School has received support from the police, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (National Counter Terrorism Agency – BNPT), local government as well as the society.

Ibu Kartini: An Agent of Peace

Ibu Kartini and Pak Ghazali’s journey is remarkable albeit arduous and long. Initially spreading radical beliefs to being school administrators teaching children to prevent and counter radical belief.

Ibu Kartini opined that radical belief is difficult to abandon. Once an individual embraces such belief, it would take a gradual yet consistent effort to facilitate a change in worldview. Such effort includes participation in therapy, socializing with the community, attending religious classes and being open to pursue other knowledge for one to see the error of his/her way.

Ibu Kartini’s strive for children’s education rightfully earned her the title of “agent of peace.” Her experience was lauded by Siti Rofi’ah, an Islamic scholar, who explained that Ibu Kartini critically reassessed her earlier position and had the courage to explore the values of peace in Islam, as opposed to being trapped in her own narrow-mindedness. She also states that the country needs more people like Ibu Kartini to be agents of peace.

Srikandi Lintas Iman (SRILI), a partner of stratsea.com, is a women interfaith community in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The organization strive to empower women and children in various issues including terrorism. To prevent and counter terrorism, SRILI documented Ibu Kartini’s journey which can be assessed on their YouTube channel. This video is a collaboration between SRILI and the Center for Security Studies and Peace, Gadjah Mada University.

Introduction

It is arduous to understand the topology and the commitment of those previously convicted of terrorism to abandon violence. Numerous theories have been developed to explain either deradicalization or disengagement. This article proposes a new tool based on Desifter Theory to facilitate a comprehensive assessment of the individual. Via this theory, individuals would be assessed based on six channels of influences, namely, “Heaven”, “Head”, “Heart”, “Home”, “Habit”, and “Hand” (Figure 1). Such assessments would subsequently determine the type of interventions to be appropriated to the individual (i.e. customized intervention) for their desistance from terrorism.

A Glimpse of the 6H

“Heaven” entails how the individual not only perceives heaven but what they believe must be done to gain acceptance there. Generally, heaven is deemed as an exclusive reward that is difficult to attain. While attaining heaven is based on personal “performance”, daily lives would also be affected their environments, specifically how their country is governed. Therefore, in this channel of influence, individuals’ perceptions of the government and its legitimacy will be assessed.

“Head” refers to how introspective an individual is in finding alternative narratives. Often, terrorists deem their narratives as absolute truths. Through introspection, former terrorists may break away from such absolutism while replacing it with non-violent beliefs.  

“Heart” looks at the level of maturity and the deterrent effect of the criminal justice system. An individual’s level of maturity can change internally or externally. For former terrorists, this would include getting married, having children, continuing education, and even disappointment with their old groups. Meanwhile, the criminal justice system may also deter former terrorists from re-offending. Usually, the length of time an individual serves in prison influences the level of deterrence.

The author’s interpretation of “Home” is family as it is the smallest unit of interaction for former terrorists. Family can be on both sides of the coin; a family can be a supporter of terrorism or can be a pull factor in encouraging former terrorists to abandon violence.

“Habit” consists of networks, social relations, and integration. Addressing this channel is key to enabling former terrorists to abandon their old groups and to join new ones. This is done by understanding how former terrorists change their habits or environment.

Lastly, “Hand” includes factors that support a former terrorist care for themselves and their families upon their release. Special attention should be placed on their economic well-being. The more they can care for themselves, the higher the likelihood of them staying away from their previous group. This also means smoother reintegration with society.

Method

To demonstrate the effectiveness of this assessment tool, the author began by conducting a survey with 124 former terrorists in Indonesia. These former terrorists resided in 12 provinces throughout Indonesia. The impetus of the survey was to understand: 1) their condition and whether they have cut off communication with their terrorist groups, and 2) if they were willing to publicly share their experiences of abandoning terrorism in a bid to prevent others from following their footsteps and to encourage other terrorists to do the same. Of the 124 former terrorists, only 36 were willing to become involved in such efforts within a one-year frame.

To understand how they abandon terrorism, the 36 individuals were next invited to a semi-structured interview and were assessed via a behaviour checklist. Assessment from the checklists include inputs from the individual and those around him such as his wife, neighbors, and companions from the regional police. Questions for the interview and the checklist were developed based on the 6H.

To develop a typology, the author employed a software, atlas.TI, to compile the results of the semi-structured interviews and checklists. This facilitates the development of a gradation of desistance from terrorism of these 36 individuals.

Result

From the semi-structured interviews and checklists, there were 13 factors that were uncovered to influence individuals in desisting from terrorism. Collectively, these 13 factors outline what is manifested in the thoughts and behaviours of the 36 individuals. These 13 factors were subsequently classified into two groups, “Seen” and “Unseen.” This refers to what is visible and not visible in their abandonment of terrorism (Figure 2).

Seen and unseen factors are then manifested into what is still in thought and has become a behavior. A gradation of desistance can then be developed based on the number of factors one possessed.

As outlined in Figure 3, the desifter typology can be classified into four categories: primary desifter, secondary desifter, tertiary desifter, and quarternary desifter. The typology formation is based on the interval between qualifications. For example, primary desifter has n factors between 0-1 (intervals:2). This means that the lesser the n factor, the more likelihood the individual has abandoned terrorism. Therefore, it is desirable for individuals to be in the primary desifter category.

Of the 36 individuals, 21 were classified as secondary desifters (~58.3%) and 11 were classified as tertiary desifters (~30.6%). Notably, there was only one who fell into the Quartinary desifter category (~2.8%).

This highlights two important observations: 1) worryingly, only 3 individuals were in the primary desifter category (~8.3%) and 2) a total of 33.4% of the 36 individuals were in the tertiary and quarternary Desifter categories. This not only highlights a higher risk of them being recidivists but intervention for these individuals are admittedly difficult.

Conclusion

This tool based on Desifter theory provides a means to assess former terrorists and their propensity to recidivism. By assessing former terrorists based on 13 “Seen” and “Unseen” factors, a gradation of desistance from terrorism can be determined. In this study, only about 8.3% of the 36 individuals assessed posed little risk of recidivism. Additionally, extrapolating these results to the entire former terrorist population in Indonesia would, thus, highlight a significant risk of terrorist recidivism and the challenges of deradicalization. However, further research is required to ensure a representative sample size.

Introduction

On 7 December 2022, a former terrorist inmate committed a suicide bombing at a police station in Astana Anyar, Bandung, West Java, killing one police officer and wounding eight people. The perpetrator was later identified as Agus Sujatno or Agus Muslim or Abu Muslim.

The National Police (Polri) Chief General Listyo Sigit Prabowo stated that Agus was imprisoned in Nusakambangan prison for his involvement in the Cicendo Bombing 2017 and finished his sentence in October 2021. Listyo added that Agus was reluctant to join the deradicalization program. This case has raised doubt over the effectiveness of Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) deradicalization program.

Agus and Deradicalization Program

According to fellow former inmate Hendro Fernando, Agus refused to join deradicalization program in prison, earning him the category of “red” or high-risk inmate. After his release, Agus stayed in Sukoharjo, Central Java, with his family. Hendro suggested that Agus re-joined the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) network in Central Java.

Although there are still limited details about Agus’ deradicalization and rehabilitation programs, many people have voiced out their criticism against BNPT, the national body charged with executing deradicalization program. For instance, member of Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) Commission III, Santoso, argued that with regards to its deradicalization program, BNPT tends to focus on spending the allocated budget instead of genuinely trying to foster tolerance. In other words, it focuses on the “output” instead of the “outcome”.

This criticism was echoed by terrorism observer Al Chaidar, who opined that BNPT’s deradicalization program should be re-evaluated. He went further by calling for BNPT’s dissolution if the program is found to be ineffective.

The Mandate of BNPT

Based on the revised law on terrorism, Law No. 5/2018, BNPT has an overarching mandate to implement the country’s counterterrorism (CT) efforts, including formulating and implementing policies; coordinating the policies, and; conducting counter-radicalization and deradicalization programs. 

The public have high expectations toward the agency due to its overarching mandate. BNPT’s deradicalization programs have been heavily criticized because the programs preach to the converted; they mostly engage prisoners who are already disengaged or distancing themselves from violent actions. The programs also tend to focus on instilling the loyalty of the prisoners to the national ideology of Pancasila in a seminar or lecture setting. Nonetheless, BNPT also provides entrepreneurship training for the inmates, hoping that it would be useful for them once they finish their sentences and return to their respective hometowns.

The public may be more familiar with BNPT as an agency that runs deradicalization programs. In fact, however, BNPT is not the only agency which carries out this mandate. Other organizations are tasked with this as well. The Directorate General of Correction has been working closely with various civil society organizations (CSOs) in designing such programs for inmates. For instance, DGC has been partnering with Search for Common Ground (SCFG) Indonesia in creating a conflict management training program for the inmates.

Unfortunately, the coordination between BNPT and DGC tends to be poor. It remains unclear who should bear the responsibility in managing and implementing the in-prison deradicalization program.

The special CT unit in Polri, Detachment 88, also has its own program under Unit Identifikasi dan Sosialisasi (Directorate of Identification and Socialisation – Idensos). Nevertheless, it is unlikely for inmates or former inmates to participate in both Idensos and BNPT’s deradicalization programs.

Interestingly, in 2021, some former terrorist inmates petitioned to dissolve BNPT. Many of the signatories were former terrorist inmates who are under the care of Idensos. The petition claimed that BNPT’s program is ineffective and that Detachment 88’s program is more effective. Although Detachment 88 asserted that they were unaware of the petition, the petition itself indicates that inmates or former inmates do not view deradicalization program as a collaborative initiative between relevant institutions.

The Challenge of Reintegration Program

In the past few years, Polri has arrested hundreds of terrorist suspects. Polri arrested 232 and 370 terrorist suspects in 2020 and 2021 respectively. The revised law on terrorism has also empowered the security apparatus to carry out preventive detention. However, majority of terrorist suspects will only serve their sentence for three to four years as their involvement in terror plots tend to be limited. Upon their release, monitoring the movements of the former inmates and providing a regular reintegration program can be very challenging as these people are scattered across the country.

Both governmental and non-governmental agencies have attempted to provide reintegration programs for the former inmates. These programs try to assist the former inmates to reintegrate into society. For example, BNPT has developed Kawasan Terpadu Nusantara (Archipelago Integrated Area – KTN) that provides an opportunity for former inmates to work as farmers. KTN has been developed in West Java, Central Java, East Java and West Nusa Tenggara thus far.

Meanwhile, a notable initiative from a non-governmental organization (NGO) is DeBintal Foundation which was established in 2020. DeBintal is run by former terrorist inmates and supervised by Detachment 88. The foundation owns a poultry farm in Bekasi, West Java. Despite the good intention, DeBintal Foundation has received severe criticism from the “high risk” individuals. They accused DeBintal Foundation members as murtad (apostates) because they are working with Detachment 88.

Although there have been several initiatives from the government and NGOs, most of these are based in Jakarta and its neighboring cities. Regular visit to monitor the progress and current conditions of ex-inmates in all parts of Indonesia would be very taxing. Hence, the role of the regional government is important.

 In 2021, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo issued Peraturan Presiden tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme Tahun 2020-2024 (Presidential Regulation on the National Action Plan for the Prevention and Countermeasures of Violent-Based Extremism Leading to Terrorism 2020-2024). The regulation acknowledges the importance of engaging regional government in the country’s Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) efforts.

On this front, BNPT has been working with P/CVE CSOs in assisting the regional government to create their own Regional Action Plan (RAP). There are a few regional governments which have issued their own RAP, such as Aceh, Central Java and Central Sulawesi. These Plans enables the identification of necessary activities and partners in assisting the reintegration process of former inmates. However, it is still a long way to go before we can see all regions to issue their own RAP, as the process to produce one depends on the political will of regional leaders and relevant regional bodies.

Enhancing the Coordinating Role of BNPT

Dissolving BNPT may not be an appropriate solution to enhance Indonesia’s deradicalization program. Although BNPT’s programs are found wanting, Indonesia still needs a coordinating body to manage and organize all of its P/CVE initiatives.

BNPT should focus more on its coordinating role as there have been plenty of valuable initiatives in Indonesia done by both governmental and non-governmental agencies. However, sometimes the initiatives overlap with each other which leads to a waste of resources. BNPT should make the best use of its Indonesia Knowledge Hub (IK-HUB) platform to map out the existing initiatives. The platform is a work in progress and needs a lot of improvements. Relevant users should be able to easily access and navigate the site, as well as understanding the available data on the platform.