Introduction

In the early morning of February 16, 2022, John Sondang Saito alias Tarzan, hurled two Molotov cocktails at a police post in Jatiwarna, Bekasi, West Java. His act of anarchy was an attempt to spread fear among police officers. His actions had limited impacts as not only were there no casualties but also the post was minimally damaged. During his apprehension by public witnesses, indications of his motives were uncovered. He possessed pamphlets protesting environmental exploitation in Indonesia and the excessive use of force by Indonesian security forces. This article discusses how John, currently detained under the Anti-Terrorism Act, became radicalizedand the security impact of anarchist terrorism in Indonesia.

Music as an Initiator for Self-radicalization

John’s journey to anarchism began in 2006 when he was in the third year of junior high school. He listened to anarchist punk bands such as The Exploited and The Casualties, whose lyrics contained anarchist themes. With his interest piqued, he depended on the internet to translate their lyrics and to seek more information on the bands. As the the term “anarchy” was commonly available on the band’s former MySpace pages, he expanded to learning about global anarchist movements. Inspired by the bands’ social and political protests, he also searched for information on social and political issues on MySpace, Friendster, and Facebook. This was when he learned that the Indonesian security forces violated human rights through unlawful killings such as the 1983-1985 Petrus killings, 1984 Tanjung Priok massacre, the 1989 Talangsari incident, and the 1998 Tri Sakti shootings. Aiding his online searches was his employment at an internet café where he he had unlimited internet access.

After three years of extensive research, he yearned to defend Indonesians whom he felt were oppressed by the government. This yearning led him to to share anarchist posts with his friends on his Friendster and Facebook pages. In 2010, he left his Catholic religion, became agnostic and further committed himself to anarchism. This was demonstrated via his numerous anarchy-related tattoos on his arms, fingers, and chest.             

In 2018, he visited his village in North Tapanuli, North Sumatra, and found that private companies had seized customary land belonging to his community. He was frustrated at the government’s failure to protect indigenous people’s land and favouring capitalists. His frustration saw him participate in numerous protests including the violent May Day protest of 2018 in Jakarta. As an active participant, he sought to harm police officers by pelting them with rocks. Additionally, with new social media platforms, he reached out to other Indonesian anarchists through Instagram. These new connections further immersed him with perceived injustice in Indonesia and kept him abreast with protest schedules.

Perceived Injustice a Trigger for Action

His decision to escalate his actions stemmed from learning about two perceived injustice, namely the arrest of farmers protesting against mining operations in Wadas Village, Purworejo, Central Java and the killing of a villager protesting a gold mining project in Kasimbar, Parigi Moutong, Central Sulawesi. These incidents in February 2022 made John wanting to avenge the arrests and killing. Set on attacking the police, he learnt to make Molotov cocktails online. Using his own savings, he made two Molotov cocktails and printed two hundred copies of protest pamphlets.

National and Regional Security Concerns

It is troubling that John is not the only anarchist in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. These individuals pose a security concern for several reasons:

1) While most Indonesian anarchists reject violence, anarchist cells across Indonesia are committed to building their capabilities to to attack their enemies, for example mining companies, banks, anti-anarchist politicians, and multinational companies. Based on the author’s data, there have been at least 31 anarchist-related attacks since 2011 excluding John Sondang’s attack.

2) Although these attacks have not harmed or killed anyone because the perpetrators only wanted to damage properties, anarchists may change the modus operandi and targets. Noteworthily, Indonesian anarchists remain connected to and inspired by global anarchist communities, such as the Informal Anarchist Federation (FAI), the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), and the Anarchist Union of Afghanistan and Iran. These connections facilitate imitation of attack tactics in Indonesia. Additionally, Indonesian anarchists would likely adhere to any calls by these overseas groups to employ more fatal tactics. Indonesian anarchists, particularly those affiliated with the ELF, also seek international attention from their fellow anarchists overseas. Such attention could be garnered by conducting “spectacular” attacks. Such attacks will probably conducted on international events, high rank government and state owned or private company officers.     

3) Indonesian anarchists have listed ten state-owned companies and its senior management as targets for their involvement in mining projects and the oppression of farmers. Unless the government provides protection to these companies and its staff, attacks on these companies are probable. Notably, two of these companies were attacked in May 2021.

4) Southeast Asian anarchists have established a strong brotherhood where happenings in one country could trigger an attack in another. For instance, in 2012, the Indonesian government imprisoned two anarchists responsible for burning down an ATM in Sleman, Yogyakarta. To avenge their imprisonment, Filipino anarchists vandalized the wall of the Indonesian Embassy in Manila. 

5) As with religiously-motivated violent extremism, the internet is vital for radicalization, capability building and coordination. While there are many online counternarrative initiatives and efforts to disrupt such communications for religiously violent extremism in Indonesia, there have yet to be similar efforts for anarchism.

Way Forward

To prevent future anarchist attacks in Indonesia, it is imperative for the Indonesian government, academicians, and NGOs to consider the following: 1) The Indonesian government and academicians must map out anarchists operating in Indonesia to understand how the anarchists operate and how to deradicalize them. Greater attention should be focused on anarchists in Aceh, South & North Sumatra, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, and North Sulawesi because they are most active in these provinces.

2) The Indonesian government and NGOs must design deradicalization programs for anarchists while in detention. Noteworthily, it will be ideal to separate such inmates from those detained for religiously-linked terrorism as there have been precedence of general crimes inmates being radicalized. To reinforce deradicalization, there must be outlets to listen to the grievances of these inmates and facilitate peaceful solutions. As most Indonesian anarchists are young and unemployed, aiding these inmates secure employment post-release. This could help them mature and open up new avenues to solving issues without violence.

3)  The government should prioritize peaceful dialogue to solve conflicts mainly triggered by mining-related projects. Peaceful dialogues will prevent providing fodder for anarchists to seek violence.    4) The Indonesian anti-terror police should establish a task force focusing on anarcho-terrorism. This includes the monitoring of anarcho-terrorism movements overseas of the potentiality of Indonesian anarchists imitating overseas attacks.

Introduction

On April 29, 2021, the Indonesian government has labelled the Free Papua Movement (OPM) as a terrorist group. Such labelling is based on this rebel group conducting a series of violent attacks on unarmed, innocent civilians in recent years. The most notable indiscriminate attack by OPM was the brutal mass killing of 31 workers from PT Istaka Karya, who were building the Trans Papua project in Kali Yigi and Kali Aurak in Yigi sub-district, Nduga district on December 2, 2018. This article discusses the consequences of this labelling while proposing solutions for the government to counter this terrorist threat in Papua.

Legal, Political and Security Consequences of Government Labelling

Legal Consequences

This labelling has serious legal consequences for OPM’s leaders, recruiters, members and supporters both in Indonesia and overseas. This means that group members and supporters are punishable by Law Number 5 of 2018 in Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2003 on Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism. Articles 12-16 authorize their arrests by the Indonesian police and prosecutions, potentially facing three to 15 years imprisonment. Such arrests and prosecutions are meted not only to perpetrators of terrorism but also to its members, those providing financial support to the group, and those abetting the group’s members in conducting their attacks. Consequently, activists who carry out OPM’s propaganda under the pretence of human rights are now deemed as terrorists. Similarly, all financial donors to this group have violated Article 4 of the Law Number of 2013 on the Prevention and Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism Financing.

Political Consequences

This labelling will create tensions between Indonesia and OPM’s state backers. The Indonesian government now has a legal basis to seek the repatriation of OPM members and supporters from countries harbouring them. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that these countries will accede to repatriations while erroneously citing security concerns for OPM’s members. Confounding the situation is the domestic repercussions of failing to secure repatriations which may stem from Indonesia’s lack of bargaining power. Domestically, such failure would become fodder for opposition parties to paint the Indonesian government as weak and unable to uphold Indonesia’s pride internationally.

Simultaneously, this labelling may empower OPM members and supporters at home to attack the government politically by casting it as the “real terrorist” and “violators of human rights.” It is, thus, unsurprising if OPM was to covertly or openly work with opposition activists to disseminate government’s alleged human rights violations in Papua.

Security Consequences

Increasing clashes between OPM and government forces are expected in the coming months. OPM would likely increase attacks on military and civilian targets in Papua to express their anger at their new label. To protect its civilians and military, the government will respond to these attacks with counter terrorism operations.

Multi-Pronged Approaches to Ensure Peace in Papua

OPM terrorism is a complex issue that requires multi-pronged approaches to ensure lasting peace in Papua. These approaches entail addressing the security, legal and human rights, economic and political aspects of this issue.

Security Approach

The government needs to launch a joint and measured counter terrorism operation targeting OPM members and supporters across Indonesia akin to the current Madago Raya Operation. The Madago Raya Operation which targets the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT) members and supporters in Central Sulawesi is a concerted effort involving the police (Polri), the military (TNI) and the state intelligence agency (BIN). The operation against OPM should be also based on solid intelligence to ensure the prevention of unintended casualties. This can be achieved by the police anti-terror unit, Detachment 88, TNI’s anti-terror units and BIN working closely together to conduct pre-emptive arrests of OPM members and supporters. Simultaneously, police attachés in Indonesian embassies overseas need to work with the police in their host countries to apprehend OPM members and supporters.

More importantly, the government needs to iterate and reinforce that this counter terrorism operation is to mitigate the OPM threat and not an attack on Papuans in general. This is to give a sense of security to Papuans residing outside Papua by preventing them from being wrongly stigmatized as terrorists. In other words, not all Papuans are terrorists and have equal rights to thrive in Indonesia.

Legal and Human Rights Approach

To ensure that the counter terrorism operation does not violate human rights, the government needs to remain steadfast in investigating and prosecuting unlawful killings and tortures committed by any Indonesian security personnel and all indiscriminate attacks on innocent civilians committed by OPM. To maintain transparency of the counter terrorism operation and to avoid the excessive use of security forces, the government also needs to allow human rights observers from the National Commission of Human Rights (KOMNAS HAM) to monitor and to advise the government in avoiding human rights violation. Additionally, the government needs to employ police investigators, public prosecutors and judges who understand the human rights aspect of OPM terrorism. This is to ensure a fair and legal prosecution of OPM members that also respects their human rights.

In anticipation of large-scale massive arrests of OPM members and supporters, the government needs to build new detention centres and prisons to house them. To also ensure that senior members do not rebuild their networks and organize attacks from inside the prison, the government needs to place them in maximum-security prisons.

Economic Approach

An unfortunate, unavoidable impact of this counter terrorism operation is on Papuan’s livelihoods despite the government’s efforts to minimize it. For instance, houses and businesses could be damaged due to clashes between OPM members and the security forces. The government needs to financially compensate those affected by OPM terrorism and the government’s counter terrorism efforts. This is particularly important as the government strives to win the people’s hearts and minds.

Political Approach

The government needs to conduct an assertive international diplomacy by persuading OPM state backers to abandon their support for OPM and repatriate OPM members to Indonesia, forcefully if required. Refusal to do so can lead to economic ramifications by the Indonesian government. For instance, embargoing the import of their products to Indonesia and their conduct of businesses in Indonesia. The government should not be concerned with potential backlash of such assertive diplomacy due to its strong and close relationships with major international economic powers such as Singapore, China, Japan and Hongkong. With their understanding and continued support of the government’s decision on OPM through their continued investment in Indonesia, Indonesia’s economy would remain relatively unaffected. However, the Indonesian government should endeavour in its efforts to diplomatically persuade these state backers before resorting to such measures.

Simultaneously, the government needs to consider establishing a new desk within the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs to manage the complexities surrounding OPM terrorism. The desk chief will manage the counter terrorism operation and other law enforcements in Papua under the supervision of the Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal and Security Affairs.