Introduction

In late October 2024, rumours circulated in Bangkok’s diplomatic circle that Thailand would hand over the remaining 48 Uyghurs in a Thai prison and Immigration Detention Centers to China in February 2025. Despite strong objections from the international community and human rights groups, this was seen as a “gift” from Thailand to China to commemorate the 50^th anniversary of diplomatic relations.

Former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra was the brain behind this idea. As the father of the current prime minister and the nominal head of a powerful political machine dominating Thailand’s political scene for more than two decades, nobody stood in his way. Reasons as to why the previous government led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha did not deport the Uyghurs did not seem to matter.

If anything, Prayuth was in a better position to do so. Being the chief of the junta behind the 2014 coup that ousted Thaksin’s sister – Yingluck – from power, his government was at first isolated by the West, particularly the United States. The isolation pushed Thailand closer to China, leading to, among others, an important submarine deal.

What Happened to the Detainees?

The Prayut administration did not know what they were waiting for, but they played that waiting game and kept the Uyghurs in Thai detention centres. They knew that a deportation would invite the wrath of the international community, potentially isolating Thailand further.

Adding to the drama was a jailbreak (some said it was assisted by officials) at the Songkhla detention centre in November 2017, where 25 Uyghurs escaped from to make their way to Malaysia. The Malaysian government later resettled them in Turkey. Beijing raised a stink, but bilateral ties normalised quickly because China needed Malaysia’s support for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Besides, no Malaysian leader was about to compromise his standing in the Muslim world.

Thailand, on the other hand, was not exactly a champion of anything.

The 40 Uyghur who were sent back to China on 27 February 2024 by the Thai government were part of some 220 men, women and children who were caught on the Thailand-Malaysia border in March 2014 as they were about to cross into Malaysia (scores of others were arrested in separate occasions around the same time period).

Shortly afterwards, about 170 women and children were resettled in Turkey, but around 100 men were transferred to the Chinese authorities a week later.

Worse, the following month (17 August 2015) saw suspected Uyghur terrorists bomb the Erawan Shrine in the heart of Bangkok, killing 20 and injuring 125. The shrine is popular among Chinese visitors, who made up the majority of the dead and wounded.

The remaining 50 or so Uyghurs were charged with illegal entry and served their jail time; afterward, they remained in Thailand’s detention centres under no clear justification other than the lack of political will to take decisive actions on the leaders’ part. Some had passed away due to illness, while five were serving prison time for attacking security guards as they were escaping detention.

Between the United States and China

China never let up with their demand for Thailand to deport the rest. To avoid further headaches, Thai law enforcement was told not to detain any Uyghur coming through the country. They were told to direct any incoming Uyghurs to Malaysia.

Thaksin came afterwards with his quirky ambition to be some sort of a statesman and perhaps the first among equals – in the eye of China. He and his long-time associate, Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa, were tone-deaf to the international community from the start to the last minute, even as US Senator Marco Rubio was going through a Senate hearing to confirm his appointment as the US Secretary of State.

“Thailand is a very strong US partner, a strong historical ally,” Rubio said during his Senate hearing on 15 January 2025. “That is an area where I think diplomacy could really achieve results because of how important that relationship is and how close it is.” Or so he thought.

Rubio, a leading critic of Beijing, co-sponsored the 2021 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which bans imports from Xinjiang unless free of forced labour. His stance on human rights in China has subjected him to Chinese sanctions since 2020.

It appeared that the Thailand government did not care about what Rubio had to say. Even if they did, it probably would not matter, as Thaksin was already set on his effort to please the Chinese.

On 14 March 2025, Rubio hit back and announced “visa restrictions on current and former officials from the Government of Thailand responsible for, or complicit in, the forced return of 40 Uyghurs from Thailand on February 27.”

One day before the US order on visa restrictions, the European Parliament condemned the deportation and “urges Thailand to halt any further forced returns to countries where people’s lives are at risk.”

The resolution also urged Thailand to reform its lèse majesté law (Article 112) and called on the European Commission to “leverage free trade agreement negotiations to press Thailand to reform the country’s lese-majesty law, release political prisoners, halt the deportation of Uyghur refugees, and to ratify all core International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions.”

China was quick to hit back but directed its comment to Washington. “On the one hand, the US engages in indiscriminate deportations of illegal immigrants, yet, on the other, it points fingers at and smears other countries’ legitimate law enforcement cooperation, imposes sanctions, and pressures others,” said China’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Mao Ning, describing the United States’ actions as “typical bullying”.

While the fear among human rights activists that the remaining Uyghurs would be deported to China did not subside, it was not until January 2025 that everybody sensed something was not right; a group of Thai government officials visited the Uyghur detainees and politely asked them if they would like to return to China voluntarily. They were asked to sign the deportation paper, which they rejected outright.

Words of the meeting got out and the activists as well as opposition parties responded in full force, demanding an explanation from the government. Some of the detainees staged a hunger strike to protest what they saw as a ploy to get them to agree on the deportation.

The situation had gone quiet and the Uyghurs ended their hunger strike. Then, on 27 February 2025, it was rumoured that the Immigration Police were preparing to deport the Uyghur detainees. Reporters and activists went to the detention centre in Bangkok where they were held, but as the vehicles pulled out of the station, reporters were blocked. The rest was history.

Dumbstruck by Rubio’s harsh responses, Thailand insisted that the deportation was voluntary despite evidence to the contrary.

Raised Questions

A trip was organised for a group of journalists to tag along with Thai ministers to Xinjiang to visit the returnees. Observers said it was a sham, but the government insisted that it was not.

According to photos released by the government, the deportees were united with their relatives – but their immediate family members were sent to Turkey by Thai authorities over a decade ago.

Critics and activists came out in full force, particularly the Malay Muslims in the southernmost provinces who had looked up to Justice Minister Thawee Sodsong and considered him to be one of their own, especially as one of the leaders of a political party from the region. They had hoped that he would stand up against the deportation of the Uyghur detainees.

Asmadee Bueheng, a writer from Pattani, said that for Thai and Malay activists, deportation was about human rights. However, for local Islamic leaders, it was about Muslims being mistreated.

Moreover, many Thais wrongly assumed that the government, being democratically elected, would be more sympathetic to the voices of human rights activists. They felt let down, especially those who had given the government the benefit of the doubt for changing their words on military and constitutional reforms.

Concluding Thoughts

For the time being, officials in Bangkok are putting on a brave face, playing down Washington’s sanctions on government officials. However, it was nothing less than a major embarrassment, considering the fact that the two countries are treaty allies. This is not to mention the fact that Washington was quick to point out to Bangkok the repeated offers to resettle the Uyghur.

The United States has in the past imposed sanctions on Thailand, suspending military aid after coups. This marked the first time that the sanction targeted government officials, although the United States has not identified these individuals. How this will affect the bilateral ties between these so-called longstanding allies, on the other hand, remains to be seen. However, there is no indication that the sanction will slow down Thaksin and his quest to steer Thailand in the direction that serves his personal and political ambitions.

Partnered Content

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Introduction

On 23 January 2025, the Pathumwan District Office in Bangkok organised a marriage registration event at Siam Paragon, a large shopping mall in the heart of Bangkok, where over 300 couples sought to wed. On the same day across the country, 1,754 couples of diverse genders registered their marriages at district administration offices.

The recent passage of the Equal Marriage Act in Thailand, which allowed the LGBTQ+ community the right to marry, made Thailand the first country in Southeast Asia to legally recognise the right of sexual minorities to form a family. It is also the first in Asia to grant this right through an amendment to the Civil and Commercial Code, which was approved by Parliament late last year.

Signs of changing attitude are evident across the region, where there have been recent legal changes regarding the LGBTQ+ communities.

In 2022, Vietnam’s Health Ministry declared that homosexuality is “not an illness.” Singapore repealed a colonial-era ban on gay sex but amended its constitution to define marriage strictly as a union between a man and a woman. Meanwhile, Malaysia’s Federal Court ruled in February 2024 that Kelantan’s Sharia law on “unnatural sex” was unconstitutional.

Despite this, Indonesia remains vehement in its opposition against the LGBTQ+ community. Aceh, where Sharia-based laws are enforced, is an example. Last month, two university students were flogged for engaging in consensual same-sex relations.

This law is an important step for Thai society, particularly in terms of inheritance rights, tax reductions for spouses and decision-making in critical situations, such as emergency surgeries.

However, while the passage of the Equal Marriage Act represents a significant legal and social shift in Thailand, the impact of such changes is not uniform across the country.

In the southern border provinces – Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat – where the insurgency has persisted for more than two decades, Islamic traditions strongly influence community values and practices.

Thailand’s Push for Marriage Equality

This was not the first proposal to recognise same-sex marriages within Thailand’s legal system, though previous attempts always ended in failure.

The idea of marriage equality originated from a proposal by the Move Forward Party and was later carried by the Pheu Thai Party, alongside NGOs, activists and other stakeholders aiming to recognise the right of sexual minorities to form families. They view LGBTQ+ rights as a global norm that needs to be adapted to domestic political, organisational, cultural and societal conditions.

On 16 June 2022, there was a push for consideration of the draft Marriage Equality Act in the House of Representatives, which includes the draft amendments to the Civil and Commercial Code and the Civil Partnership Act. Ultimately, the House of Representatives approved the principle of these bills. Key provisions include issues relating marriage, dissolution of marriage, property management and inheritance. For example, the term “spouse” is used instead of “husband and wife” to encompass family formation between individuals of the same sex, with a minimum age requirement of 18 years old.

Challenges at the National Level

After the overwhelming approval of the bills (369 in favor and 10 against), concerns were raised by Muslim representatives from the southern border provinces on 21 December 2022. They argued that the proposed bills conflicted with Islamic principles, as Islam is followed by around four million people in Thailand.

Among the 10 who opposed, seven were from the Prachachat Party (which received over 500,000 votes in the last national election, mostly from Muslims in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat), two were from the Bhumjaithai Party, and one was from the Democrat Party. Nine out of the 10 opponents were from the southern border provinces.

A representative from the Prachachat Party stated that “We are not campaigning [for marriage equality] …. These are facts that will appear in the three southern border provinces and will be evident to the general Muslim community because it impacts their way of life.”

This opposition is significant. Section 66 of the draft Equality Marriage Bill, which was considered by the committee, states that “The provisions of the Civil and Commercial Code, as amended by this Act, shall not apply in cases where specific laws concerning family or inheritance are provided.”

It should be noted that the application of Islamic law is an exception to the general law. In Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, it has long been used to handle cases related to family matters or inheritance, with a separate court system based on Islamic principles.

Although it is evident that the opposition of Muslim MPs has been relatively minor, it shows a dialectic that continues to exist among political actors regarding the subject of same-sex marriage.

Challenges in Southern Thailand

Thus far, there has been no strong opposition or protest against the Equal Marriage Act by Thailand’s Muslim communities. In Bangkok, there have only been symbolic acts, such as some mosques displaying signs of “No Same-Sex Marriage” to encourage the Islamic community to follow religious principles. Meanwhile, Tok Imam in the southern provinces typically express their opposition by delivering a khutbah during Friday prayer.

Interviews conducted in the southern provinces offer some nuances.

According to a local, “The reason people in this area fervently oppose it is because our religious beliefs are relatively strong.”

Meanwhile, a Muslim transgender who was born and raised in the area explained that “Society forces us to hide our identity. Even though the “Equal Marriage” law has been passed, religious and cultural influence do not allow us to come out, express ourselves or make decisions for our own lives. Meanwhile, transgender people and those with diverse sexual orientations in the area are citizens who deserve the same rights and welfare as everyone else in the country.”

Both of interviewees agree that in southern Thailand, local traditions and community norms still hold significant influence.

Additionally, the adoption of this law may not have a major impact on the Muslim population in these provinces, as Muslims in the region place greater importance on “nikah”, a religious marriage ceremony in Islam guided by Islamic law, rather than civil marriage registration, which follows the state law.

After performing nikah, Muslim couples are not required to register their marriage at the government office. As a result, at this early stage, there is no urgency for Muslim individuals or groups to openly support or endorse marriage equality.

However, the consequence is it remains near impossible for Muslims with diverse sexual orientations to enter same-sex marriage (under religious law) and live openly. The religious principles of the local population act as a filter through which the acceptance of the LGBTQ+ rights is interpreted domestically.

As a result, rather than accepting or rejecting the norm outright, the community exhibits neither strong resistance nor full acceptance. The fact that Islamic law is considered separate from the state law also helps, as it creates a perception that Islamic customs and practices are “protected” against the influence of such global norms as the LGBTQ+ rights.

Such might not be the case in Thailand’s urban centres, however, including Muslim-dominated areas in central regions. Owing to their heavier exposure to global norms and more secular social environments, acceptance towards same-sex marriage might be higher.

Conclusion

Compared to the rest of Southeast Asia, Thailand has been more progressive with regards to the LGBTQ+ rights, but we need to acknowledge the nuances. At the national level, the Equal Marriage Act, as a manifestation of the rising global norm, seems to be well accepted. However, opposition has been expressed by the Muslim population of southern Thailand. This is because this new norm cannot be fully adapted into the region’s strong religious values (i.e. Islamic principles), which shapes the community’s beliefs and practices regarding marriage.

Consequently, it remains almost impossible for the people in the southern region to fully accept or open up to this issue. Their deeply rooted cultural and religious beliefs pose a barrier that hamper a full reconciliation with the concept of same-sex marriage. As a result, sexual minorities in the region continue to live on the margins, under the shadow of societal rejection.

Introduction

On the 78^th day of his presidency, President Prabowo Subianto launched his populist, flagship programme that featured as a key promise in his campaign: Makan Bergizi Gratis (Free Nutritious Meal – MBG). This programme has received strong support from a significant majority of the population (with more than 80% of approval rate), placing it as a promising political asset for Prabowo.

However, there are growing concerns aboutits lack of transparency and inadequate preparation.

If the president aims to capitalise this programme to maintain his popularity – and potentially extend his presidency to a second administration – he needs to adopt a paradigm shift in designing the programme. Prabowo must prioritise transparency, primarily by ensuring that every document, guideline and policy related to the MBG are prepared properly and made accessible to the public.

Equally important is how he manages the preparation of this programme in detail. As the saying goes, “the devil is in the details”.

Without adhering to these two principles, MBG is at risk of failing to achieve its ambitious goal of catering to 81 million beneficiaries, thus undermining Prabowo’s credibility and political stature going forward.

Massive Budget, Minimal Clarity

Some Rp100 million saved from the recent budget cut was channeled instead towards MBG, raising the total budget to Rp171 trillion rupiah. It is more than the budget allocated for the Ministry of Defense.

Given its budget size, it has thus become everyone’s interest to monitor its implemention and ensure that the massive fund is not misappropriated. Unfortunately, the current MBG modus operandi relies heavily on verbal instructions and lacks clear written guidelines, detailed work plans, visions, or other technical instructions.

Such situation leaves the public in the dark and renders the program vulnerable to mismanagement and potential corruption. This has contributed to problems such as spoiled or even uncooked food served to students.

This is why transparency is paramount. Undang-Undang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik Nomor 14 Tahun 2008 (Law on Public Information Disclosure) mandates that government agencies must provide information to the public as long as it does not involve threats to national security, defence, state secrets or matters of personal privacy.

None of these exceptions relate to MBG. That being said, when important documents or guidelines are seemingly hidden (if any), the programme has not only violated the aforementioned law but also eroded public trust at a time when their support for the programme’s implementation is high.

Although the MBG programme was initiated by Prabowo, its position as a public good ultimately makes it belong to all Indonesian people. Allowing the public access to guidelines and action plans would enable them to provide constructive input, contribute creative ideas and enhance the programme’s implementation.

It is thus strange why the government is not transparent about this programme.

The Risks of Poor Planning

Indeed, the MBG programme is projected to yield economic benefits. It is estimated to boost GDP growth by 0.06%, increase jobs by 0.19% and grow income for MSMEs by 33.68%,

However, rushing the implementation of any government programme without adequate planning can lead to serious setbacks. Effective risk management, detailed impact analysis and a clear, step-by-step strategic plan – including technical instructions and contingency measures – are all critical components in programme as big as this.

Unfortunately, the programme’s obscurity makes it difficult to monitor these processes, which could lead to some serious problems. These are not mere hypothetical risks – evidence from other parts of the world suggests that negative outcomes may very well occur.

In Brazil, a free meal programme has been troubled by bureaucracy, weak accountability and unclear spending. This has led to financial waste on one hand and substandard food quality on the other. In India, corruption and mismanagement have manifested in disturbing ways. Teachers and meal workers manipulated attendance records to divert food supplies; a school principal in Firozabad embezzled some of the funds and; a tragic incident in Bihar in 2013 resulted in the deaths of 23 children due to contaminated food in 2013.

Latest report in Indonesia underscores these risks. While the programme is designed to provide meals that meet 35% of the daily nutritional requirements (Angka Kecukupan Gizi – AKG), only 15% of options in the menu (five out of 29) have met this standard.

Furthermore, protein analysis reveals that 48% of the sampled meals contain excessive protein, 34% fall below the target and only 17% meet the recommended range of 33-36.4% of daily protein intake. These alarming findings demonstrate that even the most well-intentioned social welfare programmes can deviate significantly from their goals the preparation phase is not conducted well.

Strengthening this suspicion is the perception that MBG was “designed by running”, which implies that its concept was not thoroughly developed before its launch. Such mismanagement threatens MBG to meet its original goals while also adding further stress to the country’s coffers. The programme, as it stands, could end up being a huge waste of money with unclear outcomes.

In light of those potential threats, the establishment of Badan Gizi Nasional (National Nutrition Agency – BGN) in 2024 was actually intended to regulate the entire implementation and supervision of MBG.

However, BGN has not demonstrated its capability to address the problems. It is very concerning that there is still minimal information available to the public regarding BGN’s governance, work plan, vision, mission, master document, guidelines and technical instructions. Its website fails to provide meaningful detailed information, leaving citizens uncertain about its true direction.

In other words, an institution created to address MBG’s problems is also suffering from the same problems. Even after more than a month of operation, the public remains uninformed about the agency’s processes and progress. At the very least, the creation of an online dashboard could facilitate easier monitoring and help bridge some existing information gaps.

This situation is particularly frustrating due to the strong public support for MBG. The public cannot be content with just snippets of the programme’s information provided through verbal testimonies or short articles. Furthermore, the programme’s abnormal budget raises a red flag since the programme is vulnerable to corrupt practices, especially in the procurement process.

It is crucial to remember that government procurement in Indonesia is historically one of the most corruption-prone sectors. Data from Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah (LKPP) and KPK reveals that between 2004 and 2023, there are 339 documented cases of corruption related to procurement activities. The findings of Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) indicate that of the 2,227 corruption cases handled by the law enforcement, 49.1% of them were cases related to the procurement of goods and services. These have incurred losses reahed up to Rp 5.3 trillion.

Conclusion

While the MBG programme enjoys overwhelming public support and potentially delivers socioeconomic benefits, its current implementation appears flawed by a lack of transparency and inadequate preparation. It thus risks becoming a waste of public funds with unclear results.

The government should establish clear guidelines and transparent information including a detailed work plan and a strong oversight mechanism to ensure the programme’s sustainability. Citizens must also be invited to participate in the monitoring process and hold authorities accountable for errors. With what is currently visible, we can imagine that the MBG program is at risk of being a huge waste of public funds, potentially reaching hundreds of trillions of rupiah,

For Prabowo, this programme should not only be seen as a mainstay political asset but also a test of his commitment to effective, accountable and transparent governance. If he continues to ignore the need for thorough preparation and full transparency, it will certainly endanger the success of MBG, which will also have a negative impact on his administration.

Introduction

As shown in a 2016 Al Jazeera documentary, seven primary school students of Orang Asli descent were reportedly missing while visiting the rainforests of Gua Musang, Kelantan.

After 50 days of searching, five of the children were found dead and the other two injured.

A subsequent interview with some Orang Asli students revealed a shocking fact. Based on one testimony, their teacher – identified as a Malay – frequently treated them in an abusive manner. The teacher had reportedly given them stale food and scolded them with racial pejoratives such as “Asli bodoh!”(dumb Aborigines!).

This revelation further influenced Orang Asli parents’ and students’ cynicism towards Orang Asli education, resulting in students’ reluctance to participate in formal schools.  

The Orang Asli Education

Given the historical context, the term of Orang Asli is a continuation of British colonial policy that was first used as colonial labelling of particular indigenous groups inhabiting the Malay Peninsula.

As found in a note by British bureaucrat, H. D. Noones, the term Orang Asli was derived and translated from “aborigines” and was created to distinguish the non-Muslim natives from the Malay population. This label was not mutually exclusive—it comprises 19 ethnic groups with various cultures, social organisation, livelihood and physical features.

Educational access for Orang Asli was provided by the Malaysian government as part of the implementation of  the Second Malaysia Plan (1961-1965) all the way to the Tenth Malaysia Plan (2011-2015), as Orang Asli were categorised as low-income class groups that require education to improve their quality of life.

Meanwhile, in a broader context, the provision of access to education for Orang Asli is already encapsulated in the United Nations Declaration Rights of Indigenous People. Among others, it calls for the state to provide education free from discrimination and with methods that befit Orang Asli’s cultural background.

Until recently, student attendance in Orang Asli schools was at 88.9%. However, in terms of student achievement in the Primary School Achievement Test, the figure only stood at 29.9%

Furthermore, a downward trend was recorded in the percentage of students who continued their education from the primary school to the secondary school levels. In 2019, 74.3% of students continued, a decrease of 2.4% from the previous year.

According to the report, among the reasons for this decline include the long distance of secondary schools from Orang Asli settlements and the challenge to integrate Orang Asli students with students of other ethnicities.

Furthermore, the provision of education for Orang Asli has also been subject of criticism. Despite having a distinct ethnic identity from the Malays, the Malay language is still the predominant medium of instruction in Orang Asli schools, as found in the case of Sekolah Kebangsaaan Sungai Berua, Terengganu.

Students’ abilities in writing, reading and arithmetic are often considered unaligned with their “age”, which is standardised in the national curriculum. For example, fifth graders Orang Asli students (between 10-11 years old) in Sekolah Kebangsaan Sungai Berua are still unable to read Malay texts and solve arithmetic questions. This is despite those standards being requirements that should have been accomplished by third graders (between 8-9 years old), according to the national curriculum. 

This leads to a critical question: Should indigenous education be implemented?

Attending School: Learning to Become a Malay?

Due to the use of the Malay language as the medium of instruction in Orang Asli schools, a language barrier emerged between Malay teachers and Orang Asli students. This is a significant constraint in the everyday teaching and learning process.

In 2013, the Ministry of Education issued the Dignifying Malays and Strengthening English policy that obliged all national education institutions in Malaysia to use English and Malay as mediums of instruction. There is no exception to Orang Asli schools.

This policy aims to boost student confidence in using standardised Malay and English both in formal and informal settings.

Meanwhile, for most Orang Asli students, Malay is considered to be their second language,  used only in a formal environment—at the school. During lessons, Orang Asli students are thus forced to carry out rapid code switching mentally in order to find appropriate terms in their own language for the concepts being taught to them in Malay.

In one particular case, students are oftentimes unable to fully comprehend the learning materials provided to them in maths class. It has been found that, in comparison to the standard tests in written Malay, Orang Asli students are able to perform better in tests of numeracy and computational skills when they are conducted orally or bilingually (in Malay and their mother tongue).

Teachers’ capacity to adjust their teaching style to the needs of Orang Asli students thus becomes a priority. Challenges faced by students to comprehend learning materials are also exacerbated by teachers’ non-fluency in the Orang Asli language. This is particularly an issue in teaching first grader students with limited Malay proficiency.

Another hindrance is, as indicated above, the geography of Orang Asli settlements. The remoteness of their areas decreases the frequency of contact with Malay-speaking society. This leads to lack of competency in the Malay language, contrary to government aspiration to create a society that is confident in speaking Malay.

Furthermore, religious education could also be a barrier. As denoted in the Aboriginal Peoples Act 1954, Orang Asli students have the right to absences religious classes unless  a notice is given otherwise by their parents or guardian. As written in the Act:

No aboriginal child attending any school shall be obliged to attend any religious instruction unless the prior consent of his father or of his mother if his father is dead, or of his guardian should both parents be dead, is notified to the Director General, and is transmitted by the Director General in writing to the headmaster of the school concerned.

Despite this, Islamic religious preachers facilitated by Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia (JAKIM) and Jabatan Kemajuan Orang Asli (JAKOA) often conduct sermons and religious activities engaging Orang Asli students. They have also provided scholarships for Orang Asli Muslim students who have converted to Islam.

The obligation to use Malay and participate in Islamic activities thus underscores a lack of sensitivity to the distinct cultural identify of Orang Asli, thus impacting their educational system. 

Theoretically speaking, integrating the Orang Asli community into the mainstream national curriculum and educational institution has become a form of hegemonic infrastructure since these two factors, language and religion, have played an important power in constructing the Malaysian national identity.

Seeking an Alternative

Taking a lesson from the case of Sokola Rimba—an indigenous school for the Orang Rimbacommunity in Jambi, Indonesia, there are several conditions that ought to be met in the implementation of education for indigenous communities.

Among others, these are: 1) a lesson plan that is tailored to their daily activities; 2) the facilitation of students’ critical thinking abilities to cope with the developmental challenges around them; 3) the assistance to achieve self-realisation and the community’s self-integrity; 4) the organisation of a localised educational system, and; 5) the ability to generate a beneficial impact to the community. Therefore, providing access to education for the indigenous community should be framed as an opportunity to teach diversity and equality instead of a hegemonic exertion of a dominant group over a subordinate one.

Introduction

The Malaysian Standard for Halal Food MS 1500 provides guidance on the preparation and handling of halal food. The standard consists of eight clauses that must be complied by organizations that plan on obtaining halal certification from the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia.

In Malaysia, more businesses are working to get certified halal due to the rising demand for halal products. Currently, 9,520 businesses in Malaysia have been certified as halal. As a Muslim-majority country, this increase is ostensibly due to an increasing preference and accessibility to halal-certified products. This preference, thus, provides impetus for more organizations to seek halal certification. Muslims have also been shown to firmly believe in the importance of halal food ingredients in preserving their health and faith. Globally, this trend is envisaged to similarly increase in light of the expanding Muslim population, and the globalization of halal standards.

In riding this trend, the Malaysian government intends for the country to be a global centre for halal products. To achieve this,  halal service providers must ensure that “halal toyyiban” goods and services are offered. This would mean that both domestic and international businesses in Malaysia and outside are eligible for halal certification. According to the Malaysian Standard on Halal Food MS 1500, the following candidates are qualified to apply for halal certification:

1. Manufacturer or producer

2. Distributor or dealer

3. Sub-contract manufacturers

4. Repackaging

5. Food premises

6. Slaughterhouse

Not only may MS 1500 certification benefit the company, but it can also benefit stakeholders and customers. Examples of benefits include a) penetration to the largest market share in the food sector because Malaysia’s halal logo is highly respected and well received by Muslim countries; b) Malaysia’s halal certification system gives confidence to businesses, customers, suppliers and other stakeholders that a product is halal and Shariah compliant; c) the standard entails specific technical requirements in the preparation of a product that is halal and Shariah compliant, d) the standard holistically looks at other factors such as managing human resources. This may assist in increasing staff morale and commitment; e) providing businesses a competitive advantage, and f) consequently increasing profits.

Ensuring Product Quality via Halal Certification

In addition to being essential for obtaining halal certification, the application of MS 1500 standards aids in the production of high-quality goods through eight requirements.

1) Management Responsibilities

Management must ensure its employees’ competency with relevant training in preparing halal products. This would guarantee that halal products can be prepared by fulfilling the relevant food control and halal criteria. In other words, both management and employees play significant roles in the production of halal products. Additionally, the management must ensure that the records of halal food production and administration are kept up to date. This enables control over production and early error detection.

2) Facility Premises

The development and upkeep of facility premises are necessary for an efficient halal production process. The risk of product contamination can be eliminated with a well-planned and executed production process flow. Additionally, the production of halal products places a high priority on cleanliness. This is to prevent the introduction of contaminants such as dirt and dung to raw materials and halal products produced on the property.

3) Machinery, Processing Equipment, and Utensils

Porcine and porcine-derived materials must not be utilised in any part of the production including the machineries, processing equipment, and utensils. Additionally,  machineries, processing equipment, and utensils must be cleaned and maintained on a regular basis.

4) Cleanliness, Sanitation and Food Safety 

Reinforcing the importance of cleanliness, MS 1500 requires the implementation and thorough upkeep of good personal hygiene, clothes, equipment, premises, food processing, and storage. Furthermore, halal food processing and distribution must adhere to on-site hygiene standards based on several guidelines, including Veterinary Hygiene Practices (VHP), Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP), and Good Hygiene Practices (GHP).

5) Halal Food Processing

For the manufacture of halal food, only halal ingredients are permitted. Ingredients that are deemed halal can be derived from plants, microbes, minerals, chemicals, solutions, and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The use of halal ingredients would, thus, prevent the introduction of harmful contaminants. Additionally, all products must be prepared, distributed, and served in accordance to MS 1500.

6) Storage, Transportation, Exhibition, Sale and Serving of Halal Products 

Every halal product that is sold, served, transported, displayed, or stored must have a halal label. To prevent spoiling, products should also be kept in appropriate locations. For instance, storing products in fridges. It is also important to ensure that these products be delivered to the sales location. Accordingly, the transport vehicle needs to be deemed appropriate for carrying halal food, and meet all hygienic and sanitation requirements.

7) Packaging and Labeling  

In addition to being Shariah compliant, the packaging of products need to conducted in a hygienic environment. Furthermore, halal products cannot be given names that could confuse consumers by using terms such as “ham”, “bak kut teh”, “bacon”, and “beer.” The product name, net content, trademark, manufacturer, importer, and distributor names and addresses, identification code number, manufacturer number, and expiration date must all be included on the packaging.  

8) Legal requirements

Legal standards, including those already in effect in Malaysia and/or other nations, must be adhered to in the production of halal products. These would include those from law enforcement, regulators, and legal institutions.

Challenges of Implementing MS 1500: A Case Study of a Malaysian Halal Food Product Company

Based on the author’s empirical research, challenges in implementing MS 1500 are highlighted in this section. This research was conducted on a leading Malaysian producer of halal food located in Klang Valley.

1) The Need for Employees to be Constantly Highly Motivated

All employees are required to ensure compliance with MS 1500 in its halal food production process. This is particular pertinent at the assembly line where employees must ensure that machinery and equipment are in good working order. Additionally, employees in the assembly line are key in ensuring that the food production process is free of contaminants. This requires employees at this area to competently identify and address contaminated food and spillages. Here lies two issues: a) to keep employees motivated to remain committed and attentive when performing their duties, and b) the need to monitor employees in the assembly line to deal with contamination effectively. One way to keep employees committed and attentive, the management of this company prioritises the provision of adequate downtime to employees.

2) Stringent MS 1500

The eight requirements of MS 1500 are highly detailed, technical and intricate. Management and employees must fully comprehend each of the eight requirements in order to execute MS 1500 competently. Acting as a conduit between management and line employees, the company is supported by middle managers and executives. They are provided training to perform tasks associated with managing halal operations. These middle managers and executives would have regular meetings with management and stakeholders to address issues raised in the production process.

3) The Need for High Standard of Hygiene

As part of ensuring halal products in adherence to MS 1500, the upkeep of high standards of hygiene must be ensured in operational areas. A key part of instilling this would be employees deployed in these areas as they would be a primary source of potential contamination. Therefore, processes must be established to ensure that employees’ hygiene is maintained before entering these areas and during the production process. The company in this research has to ensure the provision of adequate facilities and equipment to facilitate employees maintenance of hygiene such as proper wash areas and areas for employees to don their appropriate clothing and equipment.

4) Unwarranted Doubts over Halal Production Process

Though the company in this research is the top manufacturer of halal food in Malaysia, it is still subjected to slander. This would arise from allegations such as raw materials used are not halal or that its halal status is questionable. Unfortunately, defamation is easy to propagate among consumers and the general public particularly with social media. This would thus impact sales of the company’s products. To address such slanders, the company has resorted to publicly display the halal certificate of raw materials used in its production. Additionally, the company provides refutations of all slanders on its website and on both online and offline platforms.

5) Managing a Rising Demand

Conversely, a rising demand for the company’s products, ironically, also present an issue. There is currently a growing demand for the company’s products to changes in lifestyle in Malaysia. To deal with the increasing demands at work, Malaysian youths are becoming more dependent on fully or partially prepared meals. Additionally, the company has to deal with a different level of complexity as it provides a wide range of halal food products. Therefore, the company had to increase its manufacturing facilities and to adopt new technologies to satisfy the rising demand. Management of this company would, thus, have to ensure that the new infrastructure and new technologies adhere to the rigorous MS 1500.

Conclusion

Quality halal products that satisfy the demands of today’s consumers can be produced through the implementation of the rigorous Malaysian Standard on Halal Food MS 1500. In addition to ensuring quality, effective implementation of MS 1500 provides other benefits such as increasing Muslim consumer’s confidence of halal product. Despite these benefits, implementing MS 1500 is not without its challenges. These challenges include the difficulty in complying to the requirements of MS 1500 and managing consumers perception to the authenticity of the halal products offered. Nevertheless, these challenges can be addressed as highlighted in the aforementioned case study.

While there are definitive benefits for companies to implement MS 1500, it is not without challenges. Halal certification can boost consumer confidence in the calibre of the product produced in addition to confirming that it is halal. Therefore, in order to survive in the difficult economic climate of today, entrepreneurs should work to achieve halal certification, as it can significantly add value to the organization.

Introduction

Education is a gateway to discover the world, going far beyond merely acing exams. It is about understanding the complex realities that shape our existence. In Malaysia, education is an evolving landscape, constantly adapting in pursuit of better outcomes. A variety of roadmaps and blueprints have been laid out to prepare Malaysians for the challenges of the world. One pressing challenge today is the role of religion in society.

In Malaysia, where Islam is the official religion, its influence pervades many aspects of life. The government actively supports Islamic institutions, mosques, and religious education, weaving Islamic teachings into the national curriculum. The relationship between Islam and education often reflects the priorities of the government of the day, influencing how Islam is communicated to the public. This dynamic serves as a reminder of the powerful role education plays in shaping not just intellectual capabilities, but also cultural and spiritual awareness of future generations.

History of Islam in Malaysia’s Educational System

The history of Islam in the Malay Peninsula dates to around the 12th century. Early Islamic education centred in mosques and later evolved into pondok schools. These institutions prioritized religious studies, Quranic teachings, and the Arabic language, laying a foundation for Islamic scholarly traditions in the region. As Malaysia advanced, the government aimed to modernize the education system while preserving Islamic values. During Mahathir Mohamad’s first administration, he emphasized the integration of Islamic values to cultivate a national identity rooted in Islamic teachings. This vision led to the expansion and establishment of Islamic schools and institutions.

Anwar Ibrahim, serving as the education minister from 1986 to 1991, was instrumental in implementing this transformative agenda. His efforts focused on curriculum reform, ensuring that Islamic studies became a core component of education. Through these transformative steps, Malaysia continues to honour its Islamic roots while striving for a progressive, inclusive future in education.

The establishment of Islamic universities in Malaysia represents a significant step toward integrating modern academia with Islamic teachings. Among these institutions, the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), founded in 1983 with Anwar as the second president (1988-1999), stands out. IIUM’s mission is to merge Islamic wisdom with contemporary knowledge, crafting an educational framework that embodies both Malaysia’s Islamic identity and its commitment to global relevance. The university offers diverse programs in fields such as law, engineering, and medicine, each infused with an Islamic perspective to ensure a well-rounded educational experience.

In 1998, the political landscape took a significant turn when Anwar Ibrahim was dismissed from his roles in Umno and as deputy prime minister. Despite this political upheaval, the Islamization agenda continued unabated. Abdullah Badawi, who served as prime minister from 2003 to 2009, made substantial changes to the education system by introducing J-QAF. This curriculum aimed to enhance Islamic education in public schools by focusing on Jawi script, Quranic studies, Arabic language, and Fardhu Ain. Najib Razak, Badawi’s successor, continued to prioritize Islamic education by increasing budget allocations, ensuring that the Islamization agenda remained at the forefront of national education policy.

When Pakatan Harapan emerged victorious in the 2018 general elections, it marked another shift, particularly with the introduction of Jawi in Bahasa Malaysia textbooks for Standard Four students. This move caused a major debate over so-called Islamic elements in the national curriculum, despite Jawi as a script being more about Malay culture. The return of Anwar Ibrahim to power in 2022 has brought about new educational initiatives, such as the introduction of a module on “Imam al-Nawawi 40 Hadith.” This module is now part of the curriculum for Muslim students at various levels, emphasizing moral and ethical teachings derived from the Hadiths—sayings or deeds of the Prophet. These shifts indicate an enduring focus on integrating Islamic values within the educational system, mirroring broader societal trends and political necessities.

In Malaysia, different political parties vie for influence by portraying their commitment to Islam in various ways. Historically, two dominant parties, Umno and PAS, have been leading players in the country’s Malay-Islamic political landscape. However, since around 2015, new parties like Amanah and Bersatu have joined the fray, broadening the competition to appeal to the same voter base. Each of these parties, and their respective coalitions, strives to demonstrate their dedication to Islamic principles, including by shaping national education policies.

Anwar Ibrahim’s ascent to prime minister marked a pivotal moment. His political journey is deeply rooted in his time as a Muslim activist, dating back to his university days. Notably, he led the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement, known as ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia). Anwar’s decision to join Umno in 1981 initially disappointed some ABIM members and leaders. Despite this, his eventual rise to prime minister under Pakatan Harapan has rekindled hopes. His current position signals a potential shift in the political rewards and strategies of his supporters, particularly those who remained active within Islamic movements.

ABIM’s Significance in Shaping Malaysia’s Educational Landscape

ABIM has been a driving force in shaping Malaysia’s educational landscape by integrating Islamic principles into teachings. Founded in the 1970s, ABIM focuses on promoting Islamic education while fostering a comprehensive understanding of these teachings among Malaysian youth. It blends religious teachings with contemporary educational practices to create well-rounded individuals. The alignment between politics and education under Anwar’s administration strengthened the impact of ABIM’s initiatives.

Concurrently, IIUM has been experiencing notable leadership changes reflecting its commitment to Islamic educational values. With the end of the previous rector’s tenure, Prof. Emeritus Datuk Dr. Osman Bakar took on the role as of September 23, 2024. The position of rector is a political appointment, as that of vice-chancellors in other public universities in Malaysia. Prof. Osman Bakar brings a wealth of experience as a renowned scholar in Islamic philosophy and shares a long-standing personal connection with Anwar, stemming from their school days at the Malay College Kuala Kangsar. Osman Bakar’s alignment with Anwar Ibrahim through ABIM further reflects their shared vision for a holistic Islamic education, aiming to integrate Islamic principles deeply into the academic fabric of IIUM. Under Prof. Osman Bakar’s leadership, IIUM is also witnessing the inclusion of other ABIM-affiliated scholars in deputy rector positions, further ensuring the institution’s adherence to its educational ethos.

Moreover, Zulkifli Hassan, another key figure from ABIM, was appointed as the Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department (Religious Affairs) in December 2023. His prior experience as IIUM’s Deputy Rector for Student Development and Community Engagement underscored his commitment to the university’s Islamic educational goals as well. Malaysia’s current Minister of Education, Fadhlina Sidek, is also the daughter of Siddiq Fadzil, the third president of ABIM right after Anwar. These strategic appointments having ties with ABIM reflect broader efforts to embed progressive Islamic ethics within Malaysia’s educational framework.

The spotlight on IIUM arises from its role as both an academic institution and a symbolic battleground for different interpretations of Islamic values in Malaysia. IIUM was also infamous in the early 2000s for alleged links to terrorism during the so-called Global War on Terror. Founded in the 1980s with the vision of integrating religious and modern sciences, IIUM has long been a centre of ideological diversity. Historically, some student movements within IIUM, such as We Unite for Islam (Wufi), have had affiliations with PAS, a major Islamic political party in Malaysia. This has led to conversations about the university’s role in shaping political tendencies, as seen in the presidency of its Student Union (IIUMSU), which has frequently been led by Wufi-affiliated leaders. The election in 2022 of a president from outside Wufi, albeit narrowly, highlights the changing dynamics within the student body.

The emergence of leaders from ABIM, particularly in IIUM’s higher management, introduces a new dimension to the university’s cultural and educational atmosphere. Students’ support for PAS may not necessarily clash with the leadership’s ABIM affiliations, as both groups place importance on Islamic values, though with different emphases. Interviews with Wufi members have shown a commitment to upholding Islamic principles while also recognizing the evolving influence and relevance of their movement. A member’s remark underscores the complexity: “As a Muslim, for me any agenda or behaviour that leads to goodness and to empowering the understanding of Islam must be supported even if they are in opposite circles in the political stage. However, if the agenda brought is an agenda due to political interests, then it must be rejected because this institution is for all regardless of political ideological differences.”

IIUM encapsulates the interplay among Malaysian Islamists, serving as a reflection of the broader societal quest for direction and identity. As the university’s new management shoulders the responsibility of steering IIUM towards fulfilling its founding mission—integrating knowledge with a modern, progressive outlook—it holds the potential to shape a generation of Muslims pivotal to Malaysia’s future. The 2022 general election results underscore a clear demand among Malay voters on Islam’s role as a cornerstone of their identity.  The ongoing debate centres on the vision that should underpin this enigma: should it align with Anwar’s vision of Islam within the Madani framework, or should it lean towards a more traditional and conservative interpretation championed by his political rivals? The educational landscape in Malaysia has become a battleground for these ideological contests, often caught in the crossfire of political agendas. While political socialization within schools and universities is inevitable, given their role in shaping young minds, it’s imperative to maintain educational neutrality. Students should be equipped with values like compassion, respect, and tolerance, which are at the heart of Anwar’s Madani framework, without being subjected to the sway of partisan indoctrination. By nurturing an environment where these universal values thrive, IIUM can contribute significantly to cultivating informed and balanced individuals who can navigate modern-day Malaysia while honouring their cultural and religious heritage.

Introduction

When my husband and I decided to get married, we knew what we were getting ourselves into. For all its wonder, our interracial marriage is about doing it on our own terms while somewhat adapting to Indonesia’s religiously conservative culture.

Regarded as multiculturalism in its fullest expression, interracial marriages are still fraught with challenges in Indonesia. While each marriage – with its own set of unique dynamics – is not free from problems, navigating an interracial one can be especially tricky as couples must steer through a complex maze of cultural and legal hurdles.

Interracial marriage is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia: it dates back to the Dutch colonial era. Back then, this practice highlighted the existing racial inequality, with Indo-Europeans – the offspring of Dutch men and Indonesian women – not enjoying the same social status as their full Dutch counterparts. The famous novel Bumi Manusia (This Earth of Mankind) captures some of these dynamics.

Today, as the world becomes even more connected, we can safely assume that mixed marriage is on the rise in Indonesia—although, unfortunately, I cannot find a comprehensive dataset to confirm this. Even more elusive is the data that shows whether these marriages are successful or not.

Cultural Aspects

For any marriage to succeed, whether interracial or not, the three Cs are crucial: communication, compatibility and compromise.

“Communication” is arguably the most critical aspect in an interracial marriage, where language barriers can pose significant challenges. While one might argue that today’s relationships can rely on tools like Google Translate, it is unthinkable for this marriage to be as fulfilling as it could be with direct communication. Language is far more nuanced than simple word-by-word translation and misunderstandings might arise from not sharing a common language.

Living through a mixed marriage is also the ultimate test of “Compatibility”, especially if one marries someone else from an entirely different culture.

Those of us who are fortunate enough in our romantic pursuit know all too well that love, however strong, is not enough to sustain a marriage. That initial “butterfly in the stomach” feeling – if it even exists in the first place – does not last.

For a marriage to thrive, there needs to be a shared vision and mutual interests. Coming from different cultures, interracial couples can consider themselves lucky if they align on most issues.

In my marriage, something so common and acceptable in Indonesia can be viewed completely differently by my husband.

Coming from a more “individualistic” Western culture, my husband often struggles to understand why I spend so much effort to please others and leave a good impression on my family as well as society. He struggles to fully comprehend the concept of shared communal responsibility either, shaking his head when I donate money to help someone I barely know.

Issues like this may seem trivial, but they can soon form an exhaustive list and subsequently cause friction, especially if we do not take a step back and talk about them, allowing each to understand the other’s point of view.

How each spouse views the hierarchy in their marriage is also a determinant of compatibility. Traditional Indonesian society tends to be more “patriarchal”, where a wife’s submission to her husband might be seen as non-negotiable (though, hopefully, this is changing), while equality might be more common in Western culture. If one spouse is more traditional than the other, it would be more challenging to find common ground.

Marriage is, after all, a contract, much like politics; it involves power dynamics, albeit with an added element of love. Depending on whom you ask, the balance of love and power in a marriage can vary.

I have personally heard a horror story from a friend who was in an abusive relationship with a foreign husband. She relocated to his country and quickly realized that he was an exceedingly patriarchal figure, controlling everything she could or could not do. She began to question her dependence as her personality gradually shifted from bubbly and independent to frightened and powerless.

This raises questions about protection in interracial marriages. Where can you go if you are in trouble? Could you rely on your country’s embassy? To what extent can they help realistically?

“Compromise” is another crucial factor in any marriage, but it is rarely equal. In a perfect world, we would expect that both partners would compromise equally. However, in reality, it is often the “flexible” partner who ends up making more sacrifices to meet the requirements of the “rigid” one.

Most Indonesians view marriage as not just about two people in love; it is about joining two families. The opposite is true in some Western cultures, where marriage is seen as a decision made by two individuals. This is why compromise is an especially important factor here, seeing as a marriage of two people from opposite cultures may not have the best stable foundation to begin with.

However, the challenge is exponentially higher for interfaith couples. To date, interfaith marriages continue to be frowned upon. The legality of such marriages in Indonesia is not clear-cut. Indonesia’s Marriage Act leaves it to the religious authorities to decide whether an interfaith marriage is permitted. Meanwhile, the Indonesian Ulama Council’s (MUI) Fatwa 4/2005 deems interfaith marriage haram (forbidden).

Of course, one can use legal loopholes to allow interfaith marriages, but even if the couple decides to marry, they may still face disapproval, especially from conservative family members.

This, however, has not stopped interfaith marriages from taking place in the country, as even high-profile individuals practice it. Moreover, it has also been portrayed in popular culture, such as the highly entertaining movie Bu Tejo Sowan Jakarta (Mrs. Tejo Visits Jakarta).

It is not an option for all couples owing to the hardship it might present. What often ends up happening is that the more “flexible” partner converts to Islam to marry an Indonesian Muslim, just as my husband and the husbands of some of my friends did.

I once asked my husband what I would need to do to be accepted by his family, and he could not give any response—this implies I do not need to compromise much! Of course, my story does not represent all interracial marriages, as many Indonesians might have to give up a lot more to feel accepted.

Furthermore, Indonesian women are often subjected to a stereotype—that if they marry a “white” person, they must be a “bule-hunter”, a derogatory term for someone who seeks out relationships with white foreigners mainly for financial gain and social status.

Several of my friends have experienced this form of racism from fellow Indonesians. This stereotype is thus a form of collective punishment for a “crime” that one does not personally commit.

Legal Hurdles

Interracial couples in Indonesia face numerous legal hurdles.

The first is concerning Indonesian laws that regulate land ownership, which restrict ownership to Indonesian citizens with some exceptions.

Without a prenuptial or postnuptial agreement specifying the separation of assets, it is unclear whether the Indonesian spouse can own land in their name after marriage. This is because, without such agreements, any property acquired after the marriage will be considered as joint marital property, on which the foreign spouse is legally not allowed to hold ownership.

In many cases, interracial couples end up having prenuptial agreements, especially if they want to acquire land after marriage. However, it means that the foreign spouse could be left with nothing in case of divorce, as everything would be under the Indonesian spouse’s name. This lack of legal protection for the foreign spouse has been a significant concern for many years.

The second is the gray area over whether and how foreign spouses could earn income under spousal visa. Technically, under a spousal temporary stay permit (KITAS), the foreign spouse can “help” or participate in the Indonesian spouse’s business venture but without officially receiving any salary. However, this opens up possibilities for exploitation, with the risk of deportation over those who are caught exploiting such a loophole.

Dual citizenship is another concern. Indonesia requires individuals to renounce their current citizenship if they wish to obtain Indonesian citizenship and vice versa for Indonesians wishing to obtain foreign citizenship. Adding children to the mix makes the situation even more complicated.

Where is the Data?

As I am writing this piece, I cannot find comprehensive statistics on Indonesian mixed marriages. Marital data is usually very localized, as marriages are conducted and registered at local religious or civil offices. Even the rules and requirements regarding interracial marriages in Indonesia are not standardized; they vary depending on the office where the marriage is registered.

Without good data, developing policies that truly reflect the realities on the ground is almost impossible. The (not-so) low-hanging fruit would be to compile data from all provinces on interracial marriages, including the total number of marriages, who is getting married, how many and reasons for divorces.

Final Thoughts

Despite all these challenges, Indonesians are culturally evolving. The younger generation is more likely to speak English, opening up more possibilities for interracial marriages that are less culturally bound.

Increased awareness of these issues may hopefully incentivize the government to implement fairer and better policies for interracial couples. Each of us desires happiness and a successful marriage might just be one way to achieve it.

As it stands now, for lack of a better word, my husband is stuck in a precarious enigma without sufficient legal protection in Indonesia, despite his long list of compromises. Well, I suppose that is what love is.