Introduction

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has entered its third year with no end in sight. As hope for a just and swift resolution to the conflict slowly fades, Russia instead intensifies its disinformation efforts to garner sympathy from both domestic and international audiences.

One of the most disturbing elements of the Kremlin’s propaganda is deeply intertwined with anti-Semitism, that is, the justification of the military attack as the “denazification” of Ukraine. This narrative stems from Russia’s efforts to falsely align the invasion with Soviet Union’s past war against Germany, a powerful memory that President Vladimir Putin has manipulated to create domestic pro-war sentiment and popular legitimacy.

To amplify these narratives, Russian officials, including Putin himself, have made several notoriously anti-Semitic remarks, such as denigrating Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Jewish background and labelling his government as neo-Nazis. In doing so, the Russian government is attempting to undermine the reputation of the Ukrainian government and leaders in the eyes of the people in Russia and abroad.

Yet, interestingly, such anti-Semitic elements of pro-Russian narratives are packaged quite differently in other parts of the world. Indonesia, where anti-Semitic sentiment is rampant despite the lack of local Jewish communities, serves as an example to highlight the role of anti-Semitism in reinforcing the reach of pro-Russian propaganda.

Weaponizing Anti-Semitism

While Russia’s image in Indonesia was extremely negative during the early days of its military involvement in Syria, this time it appears to be entirely different. Public perception of Russia over its invasion of Ukraine has been strangely positive in Indonesia.

Russia’s public diplomacy effort to rehabilitate its image post-Syrian war might partly explain this shift. Indeed, evidence points to the fact that this positive sentiment emerges due to the attempts to mislead the Indonesian public. A major theme of pro-Russian narratives is religion-related disinformation, such as deceptively presenting Russia’s public image as a defender of Islamic values, while undermining Ukraine and the “West” as the enemy of Muslims.

Interestingly, some of these narratives are not coming directly from official channels representing Russian government, but organically from local news outlets (e.g., Tribun Timur) and content creators. However, a thorough open-source intelligence (OSINT) investigation reveals that the Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA), a company once operated by the Wagner group to perform influence operation, amplifies emotionally charged pro-Russian content to maximize reach and engagement. The investigation also found individuals recruiting Russian expats residing in Bali as “social media strategists”, which are likely tasked to amplify pro-Russian narratives.

Damaging Zelenskyy’s reputation has always been at the heart of Russia’s disinformation tactics. Pro-Russian actors highlight his Jewish background and past as a former entertainer to discredit his competence and character as a leader.

Some of these narratives are popular on TikTok (7.3 million views) and YouTube (>300,000 views), deliberately highlighting Zelenskyy’s Jewish heritage. Not surprisingly, the comment sections of these videos are flooded with anti-Semitic tropes. Additionally, some anti-Semitic comments appear to be driven by perceptions of Western countries’ alignment with Israel in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Because Russian propaganda is notorious for tailoring sensitive topics to vulnerable audiences, it is crucial to identify who the main audiences of these false narratives are.

To this end, I conducted two surveys (Survey 1: June 2022; Survey 2: March 2024) to take a closer look at those most likely to subscribe to pro-Russian narratives. My first survey invited 1,044 people to participate, while the second survey collected data from 373 participants.

Both surveys lead to similar conclusions: the propensity to believe anti-Semitic conspiracy theories is strongly associated with the endorsement of pro-Russian narratives, over and above participants’ personality and cognitive profiles.

While experts suggest that anti-Western attitudes and the desire for strong leadership may explain the popularity of pro-Russian narratives in Indonesia, my surveys show that both aspects contribute much less than anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs. Since religion-related disinformation is popular, one might expect that Muslims with a stronger emphasis on Islamic values in their identity might be susceptible to these narratives, but the centrality of Islamic values to one’s identity does not seem to correlate with the propensity to support pro-Russian narratives.

This leads to the conclusion that there are no clear personality or cognitive features that characterize the main audiences, yet pro-Russian propaganda seems to resonate well with those who are predisposed to hold extreme, conspiratorial anti-Semitic attitudes.

In the absence of visible Jewish communities, how is it possible that some Indonesians harbor such derogatory, if not conspiratorial, anti-Semitic views? Besides, how does it play an important role in shaping Indonesians’ perceptions of global conflicts, such as the Ukraine invasion?

Some experts suggest that anti-Semitic conspiracy theories were first introduced in the 1950s by clerics who had received their religious training in the Middle East, where such beliefs are known to be politically potent, hence the popularity among the far-right Islamists.

In the 1980s and 2000s, several Islamic magazines (e.g., Hidayatullah, Media Dakwah and Sabili) gave mass appeal to these conspiracy theories. Much of the content of these conspiracy theories was shaped in the context of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan during the “War on Terror”, as well as the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These conspiracy theories are perhaps a readily accessible source of information for those who are predisposed to interpret major world events through the lens of religious ideology.

The content of conspiracy theories disseminated in such media is almost similar, with strong but unsubstantiated accusations that the Jews are the primary cause of all moral ills that threaten Islamic values, as well as the main actor orchestrating many important world events.  

The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a forged document once disseminated by KGB agents in the Middle East as a part of their anti-West disinformation campaign during the Cold War era, is repeatedly cited as the primary source of these unsubstantiated beliefs. Interestingly, however, the anti-Semitic rhetoric may actually have been around for a while in Southeast Asia, with the oldest historical record dating back to a manuscript written in the 17^th century.

Two-Face Anti-Semitism in Pro-Russian Narratives

Russian actors are notorious for spreading conflicting messages to appeal to the sympathies of different audiences. Unsurprisingly, the anti-Semitic elements of pro-Russian narratives in Indonesia, with a predominantly Muslim audience, assume a largely distinct face from the use of anti-Semitic rhetoric to promote pro-Russian narratives targeting audiences in the West.

Putin has made conflicting statements about Zelensky’s background, depending on the situation and the audience he is trying to reach. In front of Western audiences, for example, Putin questions and undermines Zelenskyy’s Jewish identity.

By contrast, pro-Russian narratives formulated by pro-Russian outlets and content creators targeting Muslim communities are much simpler: the messages embrace and emphasize Zelenskyy’s Jewish identity and the Western world’s alignment with Israel.

While these two narratives may be contradictory, this disturbing strategy maximizes the weaponization of anti-Semitism to spread disinformation about the invasion of Ukraine to various audiences.

As tensions rise over the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, pro-Russian narratives are dangerously finding fertile ground. Drawing a parallel with another Muslim community in the North Caucasus, organic anti-Semitic sentiments stemming from the Israeli-Palestinian crisis provoked a riot in Makhachkala. The Russian government then deceptively blamed Ukraine for inciting the incident.

Historical examples such as Soeharto who allegedly blamed the global Jewish conspiracy for the crisis that ended his dictatorship, or George Soros, a Jewish businessman accused of orchestrating the Asian financial crisis of 1998-1999, demonstrate how anti-Semitic conspiracy beliefs can be repurposed as a tool of political manipulation.

In the digital era, these old conspiracies are finding new life, skewing public perceptions of distant conflicts, such as the Ukraine invasion. The collision of disinformation campaigns and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories in Muslim communities is, apparently, an old wine in a new bottle.

Reflecting on this issue, the task ahead is clear but challenging. Before the invasion, I doubt that many Indonesians knew or were aware of the existence of Ukraine. Therefore, more Indonesians need to be exposed to counternarratives that emphasize solidarity, shared values and identity that can help build trust and solidarity between the people of the two nations. The Ukrainian government has made tremendous diplomatic efforts to achieve this, but more work is needed.

Note: The author does not include the links to the TikTok and YouTube videos to avoid amplifying harmful content. Interested readers are welcome to contact the author for data sharing.

Introduction

In mid-November 2020, word of a possible revival of Malaysia’s Anti-fake News Act floated during parliament sittings. Justifying these discussions were the unhindered, wide-spread dissemination of voluminous content deemed as ‘fake news’ as authorities were preoccupied with COVID-19 measures. As of October 11, 270 investigation papers were opened with 388 denials and clarifications made with 35 charged in court. While such info-demic could be responded with existing Malaysian laws and other government campaigns, an examination of Malaysia’s information environment is worth exploring, particularly in the search to refine or innovate approaches to address ‘fake news’ for the present and immediate future.

Responding Without Anti-fake News Act in Malaysia

Seen as part and parcel of communication, such forms of information disorder can be found in Malaysia’s information environment prior to the birth of Twitter, Facebook and YouTube. An example would be the conflicting accounts for the root causes of the 1974 Baling demonstrations where students and farmers protested the decline in the price of rubber and rising poverty levels. Mal-information, the deliberate distribution of truthful information with the intention of inflicting harm on an individual or country, too is no stranger to the Malaysian information environment. High-profile exposes involving the personal lives of politicians aim to smear character or distract from existing issues. Most prominent of which is the former deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s sodomy trials in 1998.

Even without the repealed Anti-fake News act, the Malaysian authorities could respond to such incidents with existing laws and institutions. Section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA 1998) punishes those who produces or transmits content or misuses an application service with the intention of annoying, abusing, threatening or harassing another person. The Baling Demonstrations, among other factors, resulted in the Printing Presses and Publications Act 1984 to improve response to virulent misinformation that could result in violence. Moreover, mal-information could be addressed by the Sedition Act 1948, if it was in the interest of the government. The Penal Code too addresses defamation with imprisonment of up to two years.

However, the question on the efficacy of existing laws to address information disorder is relevant, particularly given the nuances of content today. While thresholds of existing laws would vary from the CMA 1998’s intent to ‘annoy, abuse, threaten or harass’ to ‘the incitement of violence’, usage of misinformation, disinformation or mal-information are intended to produce strategic outcomes. In the case of misinformation for instance, where the disseminator believes the information to be true, participation for its transmission may be accidental and would require education and awareness as panaceas as opposed to stringent laws. Fact-checking, from institutions to culture should be cultivated.

In addition, false amplification of messages can target intangible outcomes such as the political congruence of society or social cohesion for political gains. Thus, in a system where divisive political communication may seem a part of the norm, additional laws would be considered unnecessary whether it is to have high quality of fact-checking, to ensure greater transparency in systems or to address content intended to segregate.

But herein lies three problems. The first is trust in institutions, particularly those providing the clarifications and running the fact-checking schemes. And noteworthily, how ‘fake news’ is defined. The second is the idiosyncrasies in Malaysia’s information environment which encourages the manipulation of public sentiment. The third problem is the need to hold open conversations on political communication, organized public manipulation and harm on nation building.

Three Challenges of Existing Laws and Institutions

Malaysia holds a few fact-checking organisations which are either government-run, media-affiliated or interest-based. Prior to COVID-19, the most prominent would be Sebenarnya.my (launched in 2017) and Medical Mythbusters Malaysia (launched in 2016). The modus operandi of such organisations generally involves verifying information directly from official sources. For instance, fraudulent claims about a certain fast-moving consumer goods was not halal, Sebenarnya.my would address such claims with official documentations as proof. Unfortunately, such modus operandi cannot adequately clarify or debunk all claims. This is because such modus operandi relies on the trustworthiness of official sources. Sources whose trust is perceived as compromised challenges the verification process, consequently leading to he-said-she-said situations. Such trust issues dig deeper into systemic problems and the chosen belief-systems of the audience. For instance, if the reputation of the body issuing halal certificates is compromised – truthfully or otherwise – any debunk or clarification made by a fact-checking body would not be effective.

Furthermore, Malaysia has a broad definition of ‘fake news’, even under the repealed Anti-fake News act. In this act, fake news is referred to “any news, information data and reports, which is or are wholly or partly false” with disproportionately high punishments for creators, disseminators and publishers of such content. Confounding this issue is the unfair practice of penalizing the dissemination of false information without discriminating its motivations.

For instance, content analysis of government-attached fact-checking outfit, Sebenarnya.my, during the COVID-19 health crisis (data stops in June 2020) revealed a majority of ‘fake news’ is related to authority’s actions. The categorization, made by Harris Zainul inferred that a majority of motivations behind the claims are to “troll or provoke with no discernible political motive”. An example is the highest viewed fact-check in the data set, a debunk of a voice note stating that Malaysia’s National Security Council will declare an emergency. Motivations for the dissemination of such information could stem from sentiments of concerns or panic rather than a deliberate intention to mislead. To complicate matters, the claims of those charged in court during this period were not revealed to the public. Thus, the exact premises for items regarded as ‘fake news’ was not transparent to the general public.

Secondly, there are idiosyncrasies of Malaysia’s information environment which could create susceptibility to info-demic. An environment unfolding since the 1970s, the terrain consists of the media, government agencies, private sector and civil society to an audience divided linguistically, culturally and politically. With the introduction of Web 2.0, sources of information that are no longer only government-affiliated individuals and bodies. In other words, the Internet has lowered barriers of access to information and barriers to discourse. This enabled greater representation of minority voices through new media, quicker feedback it offered political parties and individuals,  traditional media being more open to non-establishment views due to competition with new media, and an increase in accountability as politicians are forced to interact with individuals online.

Yet, the interactive environment would not change a population that is divided in vernacular, cultural or political media consumption. Despite proffered democratic values offered by Web2.0, the public sphere can still be rife with manipulation, particularly due to Malaysia’s contested political space. Both sides of the political divide would deploy half-truths and disinformation tactics to discredit each other, which could detract conversations from policies and issues. The success of such tactics would be dependent on their effectiveness of building echo chambers that aim to segregate and divide. It is also not helpful that with the anonymity of the Web, the distinction between representing the views of the masses and misrepresenting the views of a few as that of the masses is blurred.

Such misrepresentations are evident from the presence of bots utilised by Malaysian actors and permanent cyber troopers in Malaysia’s digital spaces. An open secret, Malaysia’s cyber troopers consist of paid support as well as loyal amplifiers who could be paid in kind,  engaged by numerous political parties. The saturation of cyber troopers was deemed important when in 2017 Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, who was then the Deputy Prime Minister, depicted that 93.4% of cyber-troopers were pro-opposition with the remaining 6.6% supporting the Barisan Nasional government. The decision to saturate the Internet with such forms of support appear similar to the acquisition or increased affiliation of media houses in the 1970-1980s.

There are aspects of the process that can be organic, for instance harnessing the energy of supporters to build favourable environments online and offline. However, suggestions to amplify messages by utilizing social media and employing micro-targeting methods may segment the online population further. This could utilize narratives inclusive of fanning racial rhetoric, encourage cyber-bullying of alternative-voices and the creation of fake accounts to falsely bolster a message. The role of such actors in public opinion would eventually feed to traditional and new media sources, which could impact direction of nation-building and policies. Therefore, in addition to verification and fact-checking, conversations on civil interaction, the development of societal preference for issue-based policy conversations and digital attempts to pierce echo chambers need to be held to advance democratic maturity.

It would be easy to think that addressing info-demicis only concerned with truth and truth-seeking. However, the end goal is the development of matured discourses on issues. As complex information environments complicate truth formation, safeguarding society from inauthentic representation, particularly those with socio-political consequences would have to be acted upon. Legislative action and any reprisal of the Anti-fake News Act – or future legislation – would have to consider these as the nation battles COVID-19 and info-demic.

Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic does not simply entail deadly waves of infections, but also a rising wave of hate and misinformation towards specific groups and identities in Indonesia. Unfortunately, this rising wave will continue to be a heightened challenge during this pandemic. The difficulties in mitigating such contents depend on how extensive COVID-19 impacts the resumption of daily lives. Unfortunately, the rate of Indonesians affected by COVID-19 is still increasing with little indications of slowing down as seen with the implementation of another round of PSBB in Jakarta on 14 September 2020.

As per the Greater Jakarta Metropolitan Regional Police’s data, 443 cases of hoax and hate speech were reported in Jabodetabek (Greater Jakarta Metropolitan). These cases occurred in April-May 2020 just as Jakarta implemented its first partial lockdown; locally known as PSBB. This meant a large increase in numbers when compared to the same period last year.

Diverse Contents of Hate Speech and Misinformation

The contents of these hoaxes and hate speech during COVID-19 are diverse. Not only limited to pouring scorn on the Indonesian government, hoaxes include there being concerted efforts against Islam. This include government efforts to manage COVID-19 being perceived as a guise for communists, Jews and Christians to eradicate Islam. Disturbingly, such hoaxes have tangible outcomes. This was evident from the reactions of a social media posting on the government’s restrictions of public worship at Muslim houses of worship such as mosques and suraus. The widely circulated posting painted the restrictions as a means to break the bonds or silaturrahim between Muslims. In March 2020, numerous cities such as Bandung experienced several protests against these restrictions.

Throughout the pandemic, the issue of the labour market being flooded by Chinese foreign workers have again gained momentum. The rise of this issue was not only a symptom of hatred towards foreigners but also strengthened anti-ethnic Chinese sentiments that has been simmering beforehand. An example is the arrest of an Indonesian from South Konawe, Sulawesi for disseminating a video alleging the import of Chinese foreign workers into Indonesia. In reality, these Chinese nationals flew to South Konawe from Jakarta, and not from China, to extend their visa. Though the individual may either be naïve or malicious when disseminating the video, it demonstrates the deep suspicions towards Chinese foreign workers. And by proxy, ethnic Indonesian Chinese. This issue has also been leveraged by violent extremists in Indonesia to garner support. In IPAC’s April 2020 report, ISIS networks in Indonesia were exploiting this resentment towards Chinese foreign workers particularly in Southeast Sulawesi and Banten.

By providing a clear target, the disenfranchised are presented with several narratives. The first is that they have, in addition to the Indonesian government, another outlet to vent their frustrations due to the loss of opportunities arising from the pandemic. The second is that the current system of administration is failing and thus the need to embrace an alternative. Such alternatives can drive these disenfranchised towards conservatism, intolerance and discrimination, and violent extremism.

Hatred towards Specific Communities Developed Throughout Indonesia’s History

Hateful contents as experienced throughout this pandemic is not a novel issue to Indonesia. These deep-seated sentiments against the Chinese, Jews, and Christians have long developed throughout Indonesia’s history. Dissemination of such contents have a propensity to intensify at specific moments, particularly times of crisis such as COVID-19 and political contestation.

Throughout such crises in Indonesia, three common sentiments are expressed: 1) anxiety, 2) frustration, and 3) anger. This consequently motivates one to identify those who are guilty and responsible for their predicament. Till today, the Indonesian President and ethnic and religious minorities continue to be held accountable for any crisis in Indonesia without much rational basis. However, unlike the past, the situation now is confounded by social media platforms and massaging apps that enables indiscriminate access, increases the speed of circulation, significantly expand the reach of such contents. No longer are such contents limited to text but have now included images and videos. Nevertheless, history has shown how uncontrolled dissemination of such contents have led to violence.

Key Roles of Businesses to Address Hateful Contents

Particularly during crisis, like government institutions, businesses must focus on systematic efforts to reduce the spread of such contents in the community and towards themselves. By contributing to reduce the spread in the community, businesses promote a conducive and healthy environment for their businesses to thrive. Businesses can also prevent themselves from being a target via careful policy considerations. During crisis, discriminative termination of employment, restrictions on places of worships within their business premises, the contents of their advertisements, and even regulations on office attire potentially serve as fuel for hate speech and misinformation towards these businesses.

Businesses should also adopt anticipative measures by analysing social issues that are related to their industry or their brands during a crisis. This includes understanding hate speech and intolerant contents that are circulating not only in their communities but also amongst their staff. Benefits of doing so includes addressing potential issues while they are still in infancy, possessing more time to develop a comprehensive counterstrategy, and instilling trust and allaying any concerns from their staff. Not only would it promote staff retention, staff would be confident to act as informal brand ambassadors to address any misinformation and hate speech targeted at their employers.

Anticipative measures should also consist of guidelines to prevent the spread of such contents from within their businesses. It is essential for staff to know how to respond when they encounter such contents targeting their companies. Having a consistent response prevents fanning the issue further while conveying seriousness at addressing the issue. It is also essential to outline appropriate company behaviour. This enables staff to have a clear understanding of what behaviours are permitted and the consequences for failure to comply.

A notable case study was an incident involving a bakery franchise in Jakarta on November 2019, a month after President Joko Widodo was officially sworn in after a divisive election. A franchise outlet had controversially refused customer requests for Christmas greetings to be decorated on their cakes. One silver lining of this incident is the voices supporting the outlet’s decision was met with equally loud voices opposing it. This ostensibly signal a deviation of simply being seen as a “silent majority” while also demonstrating heightened tensions within the community. Despite such silver lining, businesses should still avoid such controversies altogether.

Though it may seem daunting, businesses in Indonesia can work with government institutions, civil society organizations (CSOs) and subject matter experts. Businesses, for instance, can collaborate with CSOs to strengthen tolerance and to prevent hate speech and hoaxes in the business sector. Businesses can similarly work with relevant ministries such as the Ministry of Communication and Information, National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) and Ministry of Labour to establish guidelines that are specific for each industry.