Introduction

After years of debate, Indonesia’s military law, which was first enacted back in 2004, is officially revised. This process, however, seems rushed and lacks clarity.

The legislative discussion, which was not even a prioritised item in the national legislative programme, was conducted behind closed doors without adequate meaningful public participation, contrary to the prevailing norms in a democratic system.

The rushed deliberation process, coupled with the fact that it took place in a luxurious five-star hotel, raised suspicions about the government’s motives. This is compounded with the fact that officers of Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) and Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia (Polri) were deployed to guard the House of Representatives compound, complete with dozens of tactical vehicles, a day before the plenary session.

Rushed Revision

Even more problematic is that the revision process was held in the midst of President Prabowo Subianto’s budget cuts to finance his ambitious programmes and promises.

The points included in the revised law are not entirely negative. For example, the addition of the phrase “military diplomacy” should be appreciated, as it justifies an increase in TNI’s international cooperation with its regional and international counterparts. This is especially important at a time when global security dynamics are highly uncertain, as signified by President Donald Trump’s mercurial policies and the response from the rest of the world.

Additionally, expanding TNI’s primary task to include operations other than war – such as cybersecurity operations and protection of overseas citizens – demonstrates TNI’s ability to adapt to the evolving nature of threats.

Concerns abound nonetheless. The expansion of TNI’s duties, such as in the field of counternarcotics, could easily overlap with the jurisdictions of Polri and Badan Narkotika Nasional (the National Narcotics Agency – BNN). Although counter-narcotics was finally excluded from the list of military operations other than war, BNN is still cited as one of the bodies that can be occupied by active TNI personnel. This is clearly contradictory and has opened the potential for multiple interpretations in the future.

There are also missed opportunities. The government, for instance, could have pushed for the establishment of a cyber force to complement the works of the army, navy and air force – an imperative in the wake of the hacking scandal targeting TNI’s Strategic Intelligence Agency. Additionally, the establishment of a space unit within the air force could improve TNI’s ability to safeguard Indonesia’s national airspace.

Controversies

Unfortunately, the focus of the law’s revision was not on the technical areas that would improve TNI’s professionalism and combat readiness.

One of the most controversial aspects of the revision is Article 47, which significantly expands TNI’s authority to place active personnel in civilian positions. The number of ministries and institutions that can be occupied by active TNI personnel has now increased from 10 to 14.

The government justified this by pointing out that several ministries and institutions, such as Badan Keamanan Laut (the Maritime Security Agency – Bakamla), Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (the National Counter Terrorism Agency – BNPT) and others, have long been occupied by active TNI personnel.

Even though various government representatives have expressed assurances that the placement of active TNI personnel in civilian positions would be strictly regulated, the public needs to remain cautious, given that Prabowo ordered a management and business course for active duty soldiers to prepare them for roles in both state-owned and regional-owned enterprises.

Furthermore, the government’s one-sided claim that assigning active TNI personnel to civilian positions could alleviate human resource shortages is also questionable. This argument appears weak and suggests the government lacks a real solution to the surplus of TNI personnel.

Previous administrations explored various avenues to address this particular issue, such as the establishment of the Defence University and the expansion of TNI’s organisation. Prabowo has also pursued another option – increasing the number of TNI figures in his cabinet.

However, these solutions have often resulted in policies that contradict the principles of reform, such as placing high-ranking officers in non-military positions without removing their military status.

Furthermore, the government’s insistence on extending the age for active service is counterproductive. For one, this is pursued without instituting a moratorium on recruitment. Worse, it could afford Prabowo an undue influence, particularly over four-star generals. This appears to be politically motivated and could seriously hinder TNI’s meritocracy principle.

Challenges to Military Administration

In fact, even without the law revision, TNI personnel have been holding civilian positions for quite some time. As many as 2,569 active personnel are already serving in civilian roles, with 29 of them holding positions in ministries or institutions not stipulated under the old TNI law.

It is unfair that job opportunities available for civilians must shrink to accommodate TNI personnel who are stuck in their careers due to a surplus of military personnel. Evidently, this would also disrupt the career paths of civilian employees in the institutions they are serving.

Rather than revising the TNI law, it seems more urgent to revise the military court law in order to uphold equality before the law and ensure fair trials.

An ongoing problem is when active TNI personnel who hold civilian positions are involved in criminal offences—they are still processed in military courts, not public courts. This hampers the legal process because of the different characteristics between military and public courts, particularly in terms of independence, transparency and accountability.

The polemic between the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and TNI regarding the arrest of the former head of Badan Nasional Pencarian dan Pertolongan (the National Search and Rescue Agency – Basarnas) offers a chaotic picture surrounding law enforcement on TNI personnel.

Meanwhile, military courts trying corruption cases involving TNI personnel do not apply as strict legal processes and pass more lenient sentences compared to those in the corruption courts.

The military criminal procedure law mentioned above is not the only problem; the military administrative procedure law is equally problematic. The main issue is the lack of procedural laws governing military administration and institutional structures to examine, address and settle disputes in this area.

Although the military court law mandates that such procedural laws be established through a government regulation within three years of the law’s enactment (the military court law was enacted in 1997), there has been a 25-year legal vacuum in this regard. This gap reveals a troubling reality: all TNI legal products cannot be challenged, leading to a system of impunity.

Conclusion

Despite the controversy, TNI remains the most trusted and popular in Indonesia. Many Indonesians view TNI as a versatile problem solver. This high public trust is due to the fact that TNI is considered capable or sufficiently distanced from political or civil affairs. For those who grew up under Suharto’s authoritarian regime, TNI’s involvement in socio-political affairs is also seen as necessary and natural.

However, if its role continues to expand, there is a fear that it would alienate this public trust, which could backfire on TNI itself.

This recent, heated public debate could have been avoided if the government had been more transparent about the revision process. The government’s response to civil society’s strong rejection, claiming that the draft being circulated was not the one under discussions, highlights its poor public communication and a lack of transparency—both of which go against the principles of meaningful public participation.

If the government is serious about enhancing TNI’s professionalism, there are more effective steps it could undertake. The proposed revision, which focuses on extending the service period of active TNI personnel and granting them access to civilian positions, is both a shortcut and a lazy solution.

Instead, the government should focus on the welfare of TNI soldiers and modernise its weaponry system. TNI’s performance allowance currently accounts for only 70% of salary, which is lower compared to other institutions like Polri (80%) or the Ministry of Finance (100%).

More pressing is the task to modernise TNI’s weaponry system, considering Indonesia’s failure to meet its Minimum Essential Forces target by the end of 2024.

As for the surplus of personnel, rather than expanding their authority to fill civilian roles, the government should implement a moratorium on TNI recruitment or at least review its current practices. Another option is to increase TNI participation in peacekeeping missions and send more personnel abroad for educational purposes.

Introduction

Indonesia’s political landscape is experiencing a significant shift that subtly leans towards increased military engagement in civilian affairs.

Following Prabowo Subianto’s election as president, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) has become a more visible and constant presence in a multitude of areas, including economic development and political process.

TNI’s role under the current government has expanded beyond traditional defence duties and into civilian matters, as will be explored below.

Although such may also be interpreted as TNI’s support for the government’s affairs, its consequences are significant. This is because such activity transcends TNI’s conventional role as the security provider and affords it an opportunity to participate in the state’s governing process.

This is not new. The military was a primary force in Indonesia’s politics during former president Suharto’s New Order regime, during which it incorporated the concept of dwifungsi (dual role)in security and governance. Reformasi, however, facilitated the segregation of the military from civilian government, a process that is often colloquially referred to as “going back to the barracks”.

However, developments in recent years suggest that the military is returning to political centre stage.

TNI’s Growing Prominence: From Jokowi to Prabowo

Prabowo’s military background and connection profoundly define his identity as a political actor. It plays a big role in how Prabowo’s administration is using his military background to strengthen TNI’s role in Indonesia’s political and social landscapes. Following former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s co-optation of Prabowo as defence minister in 2019, this became even clearer.

During Jokowi’s administration, military personnel were assigned to various civilian administrative roles and non-traditional activities, including disaster relief, infrastructure development, and social programmes. Jokowi highlighted that, notwithstanding the expanded responsibilities, the military’s primary role remained on counter-terrorism, maritime security and national development.

Concurrently, Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia (Polri) emerged as the main security entity, capitalising on robust political affiliations. During this period, Polri frequently aligned itself with political figures and entities, at times becoming embroiled in political disputes to suppress opposition or dissent.

For instance, even after leaving office, Jokowi allegedly instructed Polri’s inspector general to lobby the senior officials of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan to keep him and his family within the party. Compared to Polri, TNI exhibited a notably restrained presence in the political sphere, keeping itself mostly in the background, though occasionally emerging above the surface.

This arrangement is shifting under Prabowo’s leadership. TNI appears to have a more prominent role in certain areas, including food security and regional elections.

The establishment of agricultural battalions exemplifies this, with 100 new military units being formed to manage national food security initiatives.

This activity, which was spearheaded by Prabowo during his tenure as Minister of Defence, assigns the military with the responsibility to develop agricultural initiatives, such as the food estate scheme in Central Kalimantan that became contentious.

Regardless, this indicates a considerable expansion of TNI’s role in the areas of economics and development.

Another example is TNI’s participation in the logistics of the recent regional head elections. All three of TNI’s forces deployed their personnel and assets – such as aircraft carriers, helicopters and warships – to distribute election materials like ballots and boxes.

The initiative to integrate troops into regional government activities demonstrates the growing relationship between military forces and civilian governance. These measures indicate TNI’s expanded role in state-building efforts, wherein the armed forces participate in the nation’s economic and political processes while simultaneously safeguarding the state.

Public Perception: Indifference, Confidence or Acceptance?

A significant part of TNI’s seeming resurgence is the lack of considerable popular opposition. In contrast to the events during reformasi, where the people united to oust Suharto and consequently pushed the military away from the political scene, the present shift appears to have largely escaped significant examination or scrutiny.

Despite some instances of dissent, the general populace seems largely indifferent or, in certain instances, are endorsing the military’s expanding influence.

A variety of factors contribute to this societal attitude. Firstly, Indonesia’s historical backdrop influences the people’s perception of TNI, often laced with a romanticised sense of respect and yearning for them to be put in charge.

In contrast, the police have not played a significant role in the national heroic narratives and are oftentimes embroiled in cases of corruption or power abuse. Clashes between the police and the public are also quite frequent.

A portion of the population, including those residing in the regions, continue to view TNI as a crucial, stabilising entity that provides security and order in a nation troubled by regional disparities, economic inequalities and unceasing political turmoil.

Secondly, Prabowo’s portrayal of himself as a decisive and dynamic leader may have distracted the public from the fact that TNI is slowly returning to the centre stage. There is also a potential that the public will dismiss this concern as long as Prabowo remains in the driving seat, becoming a somewhat balancing force against TNI’s expanded role.

Unlike Jokowi’s bureaucratic and technocratic approach, Prabowo projects a straightforward, assertive yet populist image, appealing to a population that heretofore felt disconnected from the political process. His approach resonates with those who see him as a leader, someone who acknowledges their challenges and is actively addressing them.

However, it would be erroneous to think that the people’s lack of rejection towards TNI’s return indicates a complete endorsement of the military’s expanding authority.

Some quarters of the population might not grasp the direct and indirect consequences of TNI’s increasing presence. Besides, they may also consider it as an unavoidable compromise in a country grappling with economic and security issues.

Regardless, the absence of strong public debate and critical discourse surrounding these developments is concerning, indicating that the nation is slowly becoming desensitised to the military’s participation in governance.

A New Dwifungsi?

This shift necessitates a review of the status of democracy in Indonesia. Local NGOs and international human rights organisations alike have consistently warned of the danger of diminishing democratic space in the country.

To be fair, this shift does not directly signify a decline in democracy in Indonesia. Nonetheless, it indicates a transition to an era where coercive power may feature more prominently in day-to-day business, owing to the military’s presence being interwoven with the governance structure.

The military’s growing presence in critical dimensions such as food security, regional politics and electoral processes indicates that it is ready to be involved in sectors outside its traditional mandate.

This blurring line between the military and civilian spaces is not necessarily a throwback to Suharto’s dwifungsi in the New Order era, but something that is uniquely Prabowo’s in nature. Besides, we are still only in the beginning of Prabowo’s administration – how this dynamic would change or develop in the future remains to be seen.

Some portents are suggestive of how this would unfurl, however. Firstly, Prabowo’s Red and White cabinet features the largest numbers of TNI and Polri retirees in the nation’s history. Secondly – and this is more symbolic than substantial – Prabowo sent almost all his cabinet members to a three-day boot camp at the military academy in Magelang after the inauguration, where they were draped in military garbs and taught discipline courses.

Unlike the New Order era, which explicitly integrated the military with civilian politics, Prabowo’s strategy thus far indicates a more nuanced approach, wherein TNI plays a crucial role in several pockets of government affairs.

All these suggest TNI’s relative progress back into the centre stage, blurring the line between military and civilian affairs.

Conclusion

This development requires considerable attention. The increasing military engagement in food security and regional elections also indicates the shrinking role of civilian authority in these areas. If this trend continues and expands to other domains, it might jeopardise fundamental democratic principles like accountability, checks and balances, and civilian oversight.

The public’s indifference – or implicit endorsement – of this shift intensifies the problem. As indicated above, a number of Indonesians view the military as a stabilising force. Yet, further studies should be conducted to investigate what this means to their perception of democracy in Indonesia. The nation finds itself at a pivotal moment, necessitating careful examination by both the populace and the global community regarding the possible lasting effects of TNI leaving the barracks. Without careful vigilance, Indonesia could veer toward a path that undermines its democratic ideals, all under the guise of stability and security.

Organization Restructuring: Indonesian National Armed Forces Project to Establish 22 New Military Commands

The Indonesian National Armed Forces Headquarters (Mabes TNI) plans to add 22 new Military Regional Commands (Kodam) across Indonesia. The plan to increase these 22 Kodams was announced by the TNI Commander General Agus Subiyanto during the 2024 TNI-Polri Leadership Meeting at Indonesian National Armed Forces Headquarters (Mabes TNI), Cilangkap, East Jakarta, on Wednesday, February 28, 2024. This statement was also affirmed by the Head of the Indonesian Armed Forces Information Center (Kapuspen), Major General Dr. Nugraha Gumilar at Headquarters of the Indonesian National Defense Information Center in Cilangkap, East Jakarta, on Thursday, February 29, 2024, confirming that the addition will bring the total number of Kodams in the country from the current 15 to 37. 15 of them will be reinforced by military resort commands (Korem), while the other 22 will not be reinforced by Korem.

Moreover, the Chief of Staff of the Army (KSAD), General Maruli Simanjuntak, stated that the establishment of 22 new Kodams is aimed at achieving balance in each province, matching the number of regional police headquarters (polda). Currently, some provinces only have Korems led by TNI officers with the rank of colonel and brigadier general. In contrast, each province has a regional police chief (Kapolda) holding the rank of a two-star general. This maybe intepreted as the military presence in some provinces is less robust when compared to the police.

The TNI Commander emphasized that the plan to add Kodams is part of the TNI’s efforts to enhance its organization to meet the evolving challenges of future tasks, including the development of an integrated defense system in the Nusantara Capital (IKN) area. This includes establishing Air Force bases (Lanud) TNI AU, Marine Corps units (Pasmar) TNI AL, special military regional commands (Kodam), and two new Army battalions. The creation of new TNI headquarters from the three branches is part of the overall organization management of the TNI to align with the relocation of Indonesia’s capital from Jakarta to IKN. General Maruli also disclosed that a total of 2,820 soldiers from Mabes TNI, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, will be stationed in the National Capital Region by 2024. However, the specific timing of the deployment of these soldiers, including whether it will coincide with the construction of special military regional command headquarters, air bases, and Marine Corps headquarters in IKN, was not specified.

However, the plan to add Kodams is still under further study, considering budget, salary projections, facilities, and personnel numbers. Various structural change plans are being designed in line with the TNI’s PRIMA vision, which stands for Professional, Responsive, Integrative, Modern, and Adaptive for effective organizational management. Additionally, the TNI Commander has revealed plans to change the organizational structure in the three TNI branches. Apart from constructing 22 new Kodams in the Army, there are also plans to modify the organizational structure in the other two TNI branches. This includes elevating the status of the main naval bases (Lantamal) to main operational commands (Kotama) and changing the supervision with the nomenclature of class A maritime regional commands (Kodamar) for eight Lantamal and six Lantamal to class B Kodamar. In the Air Force branch, there are plans to upgrade the status of five type A air bases and two type B air bases, as well as establish a type C air base and new squadrons.

Short History of Kodam: From Independence Guerrilla to Modern Defense

In the structure of the TNI, Kodam is the top military organization in a region within the territorial concept that operates under the territorial command of the Indonesian Army (TNI AD). Kodam has several subordinate units, including the Korem at the provincial level, which oversees specific regions, the Military District Command (Kodim) at the district/city level, and the Military Sub-District Command (Koramil) at the sub-district level, with the Village Development Officer (Babinsa) operating at the village level. The Kodam is led by the Commander of the Kodam (Pangdam) with the rank of Major General (Mayjen).

The concept of Kodam in Indonesia is unique and not commonly found in other countries. Developed nations typically have a centralized defense system with a structured command chain, rather than being divided by regions. Additionally, these countries often have smaller territories compared to Indonesia, which is an archipelagic nation. This allows them to maintain a centralized defense system without the need for territorial command structures like Kodam. In developed countries, the military’s primary focus is usually on external security rather than internal conflicts.

The Kodam concept in Indonesia originated from guerrilla warfare tactics used during the Indonesian National Revolution (1945-1949) against Dutch colonial forces. At that time, there was no centralized military structure, and regional commands were based on guerrilla units. This strategy eventually led to the establishment of the People’s Security and Defense System (sishankamrata) to address both external threats from the Netherlands and internal challenges such as rebellions and regional unrest. This context highlighted the necessity for a more organized defense system.

After gaining independence, the newly established People’s Security Army (TKR) lacked a formal territorial structure. General A.H. Nasution, who was the Chief of Staff of the Army at the time, recognized the need for a more organized military and initiated reforms in the 1950s. The concept of Kodam was introduced to divide Indonesia into military regions with specific commands, enhancing operational efficiency and enabling the swift deployment of troops nationwide. In the early 1950s, regional rebellions and security threats were prevalent, prompting the establishment of the first 7 Kodam, including Kodam Siliwangi (West Java), Kodam Diponegoro (Central Java), Kodam Brawijaya (East Java), Kodam Sriwijaya (South Sumatra), Kodam Bukit Barisan (North Sumatra), Kodam Garuda (South Sulawesi), and Kodam Pattimura (Maluku). This illustrates the effectiveness of the territorial military concept of Kodam, which is utilized during military emergencies or internal unrest. The number of military regions (Kodam) in Indonesia has changed over time to meet the country’s needs. In 1963, there were 17 Kodam, which increased to 20 by 1965. Subsequent reorganizations, such as the one in 1985, reduced the number to 10. Presently, there are 15 Kodam located throughout Indonesia.

Reviewing the Need and Urgency of Adding a Military Command

The expansion of Kodams in every province as a defense strategy is outdated. While it was effective during guerrilla warfare when the risk of physical invasion was high, it is no longer relevant in today’s context. Upon examination, the current number of Kodams in Indonesia (15 Kodams) seems sufficient to cover the entire territory. The addition of Kodams in 22 regions, thus, seems unnecessary for maintaining national security and stability. The relevance and significance of territorial commands have also diminished in the face of contemporary threats. In today’s VUCA (Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity) world, threats have evolved beyond traditional inter-country warfare to include non-conventional forms like cyberwarfare. The establishment of 22 new Kodams lacks urgency and suggests inertia to modernize in addressing global challenges. Enhancing national defense now requires modern, adaptable, and effective strategies that incorporate defense technology and non-military elements, rather than relying solely on traditional methods in the VUCA world.

Furthermore, the decision to increase the number of Kodams requires a nuanced approach that considers various factors. A comprehensive analysis of current and future threats, along with a cost-benefit analysis, is crucial. Moreover, expanding the number of Kodam would entail a substantial budget for infrastructure development, including command headquarters, barracks, weapon storage facilities, equipment procurement, operational vehicles, communication devices, and personnel expenses such as salaries, allowances, and pensions. These aspects must align with the TNI’s strategic plans and force posture to prevent straining the state budget and diverting funds from critical sectors like education, health, and public infrastructure.

To simply equate the structure of Kodam with the Regional Police (Polda) within the Indonesian National Police is a flawed mindset. The formation of Polda in each region is based on legal jurisdictions following autonomous regions, while defense functions are the responsibility of the central government and are organized based on a strategic assessment of potential threats from outside. Decisions on adding Kodam should not be influenced by accommodation politics but should be based on mature strategic analysis. Adding Kodams without careful consideration further strengthens the impression of accommodation politics by President Joko Widodo, who changed the retirement age of the military from 55 to 58 years in the TNI Law, resulting in an excess of over 500 mid-level officers equivalent to colonels without positions. This appears to turn Kodam into a means of accommodating these officers.

The introduction of Kodams in various regions may also introduce layers of bureaucracy that could slow down the chain of command and hinder the effectiveness of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI). Many countries have actually eliminated territorial command systems to enhance efficiency, as seen in the Bundeswehr (German armed forces) to improve military operations, the Armée de Terre (French army) to bolster central control and readiness, and the Jieitai in Japan, which has also abolished territorial command structures to enhance flexibility and adaptability to evolving threats.

The government should reconsider its plan to add Kodams in every province in Indonesia, especially if there is no urgent need. Territorial commands with rigid structures may struggle to adapt to evolving threats. Furthermore, it would be more effective if the placement of Kodam is focused on border and outermost areas to ensure national defense and sovereignty. This should be in line with Article 11 (2) of the TNI Law, especially the explanation of paragraph (2) stating that the development and deployment of TNI forces must consider and prioritize security-prone areas, border areas, conflict-prone areas, and remote islands according to geographical conditions and defense strategies. Instead of focusing on adding Kodams, it would be more beneficial to address key priorities for improvement within the TNI. This includes ensuring the fulfillment of defense and security equipment (alpalhankam) and providing adequate supporting facilities. These factors are crucial for the operational readiness of the TNI and for the training and empowerment of soldiers.

Interestingly, the existence of Kodam has even been debated. The structure of Kodam has been argued to represent a non-democratic legacy that persists to this day. Lieutenant General TNI (Ret.) Agus Wirahadikusumah, as cited in Marcus Mietzner’s book “The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” sharply criticized the territorial concept during a parliamentary session in December 1999. He argued that the lower-level command structure is a relic of the authoritarian past and serves no practical purpose: “Why do we need a territorial unit in Wonosobo? Will the enemy attack us there? No, we have those units because lazy, inflexible officers have become complacent playing politics, making money, and retiring to cushy civilian positions. That has nothing to do with defense.”

Militarization and Echoes of the New Order in Indonesia

The expansion of Kodams in Indonesia is raising concerns about a potential return to the New Order era, where the military had significant influences on political and civil life. This move could undermine the 1998 TNI reform and have negative implications for democracy. The focus on strengthening TNI posture through the addition of Kodams suggests a more inward-looking approach, with an emphasis on internal threats rather than external ones. Integrating Kodams into the government’s administrative structure at the regional level could blur the line between military and civilian roles, contradicting the TNI’s primary function of addressing external security threats.

The significant expansion of Kodams would serve political interests and lead to greater military involvement in civilian affairs, contradicting the principles of the TNI Law. The historical context of the dual function doctrine during the New Order regime highlights the risks of military interference in politics, such as the dual function doctrine of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) and the military’s social-political role in governance, which was abolished with the enactment of MPR Decree Number 6 of 2000 on the Separation of TNI/Polri and MPR Decree Number 7 of 2000 on the Role of TNI/Polri. This prompted the need for reforms to separate the military from civilian governance. The expansion violates the spirit of Article 11(2) of the TNI Law, which discourages military structures used for political gain. The explanation of this article emphasizes the need to avoid forms of organization that could serve practical political interests in the deployment of TNI forces. With the upcoming 2024 Pilkada, prioritizing reform becomes even more crucial to prevent the TNI from re-entering the political sphere and to ensure military neutrality in the elections.

Expanding Kodams could potentially violate international human rights principles. These principles promote demilitarization (reducing military influence) and emphasize strong civilian oversight of the military. By empowering regional military commands, there is an increased risk of military interference in political activities. The proliferation of territorial commands under Kodam could deepen military influence in local governance, allowing military leaders to influence local policies and engage in political affairs. This organizational structure may blur the distinction between military and civilian roles, potentially undermining democratic principles of civilian control over the military. The establishment of a Kodam is always accompanied by the creation of territorial structures below it, such as military Korem, Kodim, Koramil and Babinsa. However, the establishment of military area commands in each province may contribute to the prevalence of a militaristic culture. This concern is not unfounded, as recent actions and attitudes of territorial commands have shown signs of militarism. For example, in 2017, Kodam Iskandar Muda initiated a program to expand rice fields and construct roads, which was perceived as a militaristic intervention in civilian affairs. Additionally, in 2020, Kodam Jayakarta deployed around 6,000 TNI soldiers to maintain security during labor and student protests against the Omnibus Law on Job Creation, which was seen as an excessive use of military force in a civilian matter.

This article is published in the memory of Colonel (P) Heri Oktavian, the Commander of KRI 402-Nanggala, an RSIS Strategic Studies Alumnus.

Introduction

Following the KRI Nanggala 402 incident, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo visited East Java to meet families of sunken Indonesian submarine crew. President Jokowi promised that the Indonesian government would provide scholarships for the children of the 53 submariners until they complete their bachelor’s degrees. Jokowi also promised that the government will build houses for the families in their desired locations in East Java. Were these promises ad-hoc policies? What are the official regulations in providing protection and welfare (i.e. social security scheme) for TNI personnel? This article also highlights potential issues of governmental assistance to the families of these fallen submariners.

Revising Current Regulation on Scholarships Better than Ad-hoc Policies

In 2020, Jokowi issued Governmental Regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah/PP) No. 54/2020 on the amendment of Government Regulations No. 102/2015 on compensation for the Indonesian Armed Forces, the Indonesian National Police, and civil servants under the Ministry of Defence (MinDef). With this regulation, compensations for families of deceased soldiers increased. This insurance scheme is managed by state-owned insurance company Asuransi Sosial Angkatan Bersenjata (Asabri) which engages other relevant counterparts for the disbursement of financial compensations. An example of this relationship is Asabri engaging Mandiri Taspen banks to distribute the old age saving funds (Tabungan Hari Tua/THT), Work Accident Benefit (JKK), and scholarships.

However, Jokowi’s promise of providing scholarships for all the fallen submariners’ children seems at odds with regulations PP No. 54/2020. In this regulation, the government will provide scholarships up to two children of deceased soldiers, capped at IDR 30 million (USD $2,100) per child. In a prior regulation, scholarships were granted to only one child capped at IDR 30 million. In other words, under regulations PP No. 54/2020, the government is not obligated to provide such scholarships to beyond the second child.

The regulation also specified that scholarships will be granted via lump sum payments instead of periodic payments. Such lump sum payments have a potential downside. With limited financial acuity, a lump sum payment, specifically meant for education, may be used for both educational and non-educational intents. Consequently, families may face difficulties sustaining long-term education for their two children.

To overcome such limitations, Jokowi’s administration ensured that all the fallen submariners’ children could securely pursue higher education. The Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Navy co-signed an agreement on scholarships for the children of these submariners from elementary school to university. In contrast to the insurance scheme, the agreement stipulates that the government will disburse payment to the families periodically with disbursements potentially till 2044. Scholarships will also cover both tuition fees and living costs.

The co-signed agreement is not the only scholarship avenue for these children. MinDef is also providing scholarships for the children. The Minister of Defence, Prabowo Subianto, stated that the children of submariners will be able to pursue education in MinDef’s affiliated educational institutions, such as Taruna Nusantara High School and University of Defence (Universitas Pertahanan). Additionally, the Mayor of Surabaya is also granting scholarships for the children of submariners residing in Surabaya.

There is, however, one important consideration of having numerous scholarship avenues for these children. Although they could fill loopholes of the current insurance scheme, it might create confusion among the families if there is a lack of coordination between the governmental agencies awarding these scholarships, particularly a centralized contact point for scholarship enquiries.

More importantly, rather than ad-hoc policies, the Indonesian government could have revised the existing regulation. The government should not only increase the monetary amount of scholarships and recipients, but also create specific schemes which ensure that payments to families are utilized solely for their children’s long-term education. One such scheme could entail an annual disbursement of payment at the start of a new school year with the amount that would be disbursed to commensurate with the level of education. Therefore, an initial assessment of educational costs is required to develop a tiered payment that supports a burden-free education for these children and their families. Additionally, this tiered payment should be regularly reviewed to align with any price changes.

Housing Grants for Families: An Abrupt Policy?

Though Jokowi promised to build houses for these families in their desired locations, PP No. 54/2020 does not mention such housing grants. Instead, it mentions a House Ownership Credit (KPR) scheme for soldiers. In facilitating this promise, news about this housing grants were delivered in piecemeals. For example, in early June 2021, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (Kementerian PUPR) stated its responsibility in building the houses for these families  in Sidoarjo and Surabaya, East Java. Later, the Navy Chief of Staff, Yudo Margono, shared that the families can either live in those houses or sell them.

Collectively, these suggest that such housing grants were an abrupt policy without thorough prior assessments. Such assessments are crucial in understanding the exact needs of these families as they move on in their lives. This would also enable sufficient financial assistance is rendered to these grieving families. Unfortunately, it is now too late to conduct such assessments. These public promises must be honoured by the Indonesian government where failure, actual or perceived, will risk public backlash.

Need for Coordination for Psychological Counselling and Employment

Jokowi’s administration is also committed to caring for the families’ mental wellbeing. The Minister of Social Affairs, Tri Rismaharini, stated that the ministry will dispatch psychologists to provide counselling for the families. The ministry has also requested assistance from the Surabaya local government to provide counsellors to support its efforts. Besides psychologists, the Social Affairs Ministry will create job opportunities for the families to work in the ministry. Minister Rismaharini also highlighted that the ministry will assist the families gain employment at relevant governmental institutions, such as the Surabaya local government.

Similarly, these efforts were indicative of being reactionary and ad hoc. Moving forward, policies should be implemented to ensure close coordination between national and local governments to not only enable quick deployment of resources to provide emotional support but also help families gain financial stability. This is essential for a majority of TNI personnel who are the sole bread winners.

Conclusion

Jokowi is known for his impromptu statements. This spontaneity requires his administration to execute new promises rather than solely relying on existing regulations. Although Jokowi’s statements are for the greater good of the submariners’ families, rigorous planning is necessary for the long-term sustainability of policies. Well-designed regulations and effective coordination between relevant agencies are urgently needed. Initiatives to engage local governments, such as with the Surabaya local government, should be a feature in these regulations with relevant mayors playing a key role for smooth coordination between central and local governments. Noteworthily, in this instance, the close coordination between the Surabaya local government and the Ministry of Social affairs could be attributed to close personal ties. Surabaya Mayor, Eri Cahyadi, is the protégé of Minister Tri Rismaharini, formerly the Surabaya Mayor herself. Therefore, future efforts for similar incidents should rely on well-established regulations and effective coordination rather than on personal relationships.