Introduction

The recent child exploitation scandal involving local conglomerate Global Ikhwan Services and Business Holdings (GISBH) has brought to the forefront the issue of children’s rights and protection in Malaysia.

Children are frequently thought to be passive “social actors”, but this does not mean that they do not have rights.

Malaysia, children’s rights are safeguarded and secured under the framework outlined in the UN Convention on the Rights of Child (CRC), which encompasses four key aspects: child protection, child development, child participation and child survival.

This means that children’s access to food, housing, education and health are among the primary indicators for measuring children’s rights. A child is considered to be deprived of their rights if these basic needs are unmet.

In Malaysia, the ratification of CRC in 1989 led to many positive policy developments for the realization of children’s rights. Within this framework, children’s rights to grow, develop and pursue the opportunities granted by life are secured and protected through many significantly impactful legal measures.

These include the Child Act of 2001, the Sexual Offences against Children Act of 2017 and the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act of 2007.

However, this recent scandal has stirred a public outrage and questioned the viability of these legal measures in promoting children’s constitutional rights.

It must serve as a “wake-up” call to several parties and stakeholders about how readily children can become targets of exploitation.  

Child Labor and Poverty in Malaysia

The GISBH scandal shows the harsh reality of child abuse through sexual exploitation and forced labor. Such experience of maltreatment brings potential harm to their health and survival.

Marginalized children are especially more vulnerable to these tragic situations. In this regard, there must be heightened attention paid to the underlying societal conditions that contribute to violations of children’s rights in Malaysia.

Malaysia has a specific provision in the Children and Young Person Act (Employment) of 1966 that establishes 15 years as the minimum age of employment. This is consistent with the framework outlined by the International Labour Organization (ILO) on child labor.

These restrictions protect more than nine million children in Malaysia. However, current regulations still fail to protect children from exploitation. The 2018 Employment Survey estimated that 33,600 children were involved in child labor across the country, with Sabah and Sarawak having the highest proportions.

Tackling child labor is a challenge due to the complexity of policy issue and this has been compounded by the lack of up-to-date data that delays the progress of policymaking. As a result, not only have the children paid a heavy price for our shortsighted policies, but the country also itself would lose a potential source of future growth.

The connection between poverty and child exploitation is strong, but recent cases show that it can in part be caused by an interplay of various factors, including religion, which nonetheless has left children in disadvantaged situations.

Most of the time, children are forced to work, abused or neglected because of poor parental behavior. Their conditions are further exacerbated by ongoing family financial hardship, including unemployment, job loss and persistent poverty. These causative factors would hamper the normal development of children.

Recent child exploitation cases unveiled such a factor as parents’ deviant religious beliefs as the chief contributor. Whichever the reason, their inability to provide adequate care and support has further hampered children’s well-being and development. As a result, children are forced to work at a young age and have limited access to basic needs.

Furthermore, a complex web of circumstances, including the Covid-19 pandemic, a weak institutional framework for children, weak regulations and enforcement by authorities, poor parental characteristics, and poverty have exacerbated ongoing risks for children.

Many argue that poverty is the primary cause, as children living in low-income households are exposed to various forms of deprivation and are at heightened risk of experiencing violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation. Indeed, the impacts of poverty are more pronounced for children than adults.

Widening socio-economic inequalities have eventually led to their involvement in a variety of risky situations that would further restrict their rights.

Children living in low-income households are faced with many “disadvantaged conditions” that would profoundly affect their long-term development and well-being.

They were forced to carry out adult responsibilities even though they were not prepared to do so. As a result, their intellectual achievements, development and well-being would be hampered, and they would be disadvantaged for generations.

Many studies have also shown that children who live in poverty are more likely to be involved in forced labor and juvenile delinquency. They also experience physical and emotional ill-treatment, suffer from malnutrition and illiteracy, drop out of school, and have poor learning outcomes.

The stark reality of child poverty is deeply concerning and given its severe consequences, more effective policies are urgently needed to combat this problem.

In Malaysia, the Ministry of Women, Family and Community Development (MWFCD) and its agencies play an important role in advocating for the rights of children.

The MWFCD, through the Welfare Service Department, is the body responsible for monitoring and providing services related to the protection of children. The MWFCD has always been active and vocal in their role as children’s representatives within the social care framework.

Accordingly, the number of children in need under their protection is increasing from 8,041 persons in 2023 compared to 6,770 in 2022. With this figure in mind, it is concerning how many children have had their rights violated and denied.

It could be argued that poverty has compounded pre-existing inequalities that would deny children’s rights to an adequate standard of living.

In consolidating its efforts, the Ministry has established the Department of Child Development in September 2023 to specifically tackle issues related to children. Such a policy response by MWFCD indicates the importance of children as potential sources of future growth since children are seen as future national assets.

Problems in the Policy Realm

The GISBH case highlights deficiency in policy implementation due to poor enforcement. The absence of a proper oversight function – facilitated by poor policy coordination – has largely been attributed to the increasing number of unregistered welfare homes.

Accordingly, there are 538 unregistered childcare centers in 2024. In Malaysia, the registration of home care falls under the purview of different agencies. Predictably, various rules would be implemented throughout the process.

Lack of uniformity in this regard has led to poor monitoring and enforcement among agencies involved. Such impediment could be properly addressed through uniform policy, with MWFCD serving as the coordinating body to ensure fundamental conditions for children’s development, care and protection are fully complied.

Addressing children’s rights is a tough challenge due to the interdependency between public policies. The policy complexity warrants strategic inter-sectoral collaboration, particularly in policy implementation.

Policy interdependence would necessitate collaboration between the MWFCD and other ministries and agencies, as it would be impractical for one ministry to handle matters related to child education, child health, and child protection all together.

The relative, subjective and material dimensions of children’s wellbeing could be effectively addressed through strategic collaboration and uniform-child focused policy.

It is strongly advised to improve policy networking among government agencies through the implementation of standard policy strategies, in order to prevent them from working in silos. This would ensure that the various needs of affected children were met. Through such collaboration, more preventive and effective policy measures could be developed.

How does child poverty relate to the broader context? Addressing children’s rights through the framework of child poverty would lead to a comprehensive policy plan. Malaysia has a remarkable record of poverty alleviation strategies, but little attention has been paid to addressing child poverty.

Many successful policy measures in addressing child protection have emerged over the years, but a standard policy in combating child poverty is slow and piecemeal. As the chief contributor to many child-related problems, child poverty is not receiving much attention.

Household poverty seems to be the main objective in poverty eradication programs using an income-targeted approach. Given the impact of poverty on children, it is necessary to develop a specific policy targeting children living in poverty.

The complexities in addressing child poverty are recognized due to the interdependency of policies, yet a number of issues related to child poverty could be handled more effectively by adopting a whole-of-government approach.

Conclusion

There have been significantly differing views on the need to develop a specific nation action plan to fight child poverty. The GISBH scandal only reinforces the need for one such instrument to protect children in Malaysia.

The increased focus on inter-sectoral collaboration and coordination between bodies and institutions working on children’s rights at all levels must be strengthened to ensure uniform implementation in minimizing the impact of child poverty.

The lack of policy development in the context of child poverty and other issues related to children needs to be addressed. Centralized policy commitment is particularly important for giving every child the best start in life. These early provisions would bring significant potential returns to the country in the long term.

Introduction

The Global Organized Crime Index (OCIndex) stands as a vital instrument that aids in our comprehension and evaluation of the prevalence and impact of organized crime on a global scale. It provides an extensive overview of diverse transnational criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime. Furthermore, it assesses the strengths and vulnerabilities of 193 UN member states concerning these criminal activities while also evaluating the level of criminality within countries’ markets.

The 2023 cohort of the OCIndex illuminated a global scenario in which nations and their populations have grown increasingly vulnerable to organized crimes. This heightened vulnerability can be attributed to the effects of poverty, inequality and the rapid advancement of technology.

Moreover, the Covid-19 pandemic has exacerbated long-standing issues, including inequality, the well-being of individuals and the fragility of government measures aimed at countering illicit economies.

In addition to the existing 10 criminal market indicators in 2021, the OCIndex 2023 underwent refinement by incorporating five new measurement indicators. Furthermore, it considered the involvement of private sector actors, such as intermediaries and businesses, in their newfound roles as contributors to criminal activities.

Figure 1: Criminal markets, global averages 2021 vs 2023

Figure 2: Criminal actors, global averages 2021 vs 2023

The South Asian Context

The OCIndex has revealed that South Asian countries have experienced an increase in criminality levels, with scores rising by 5.82 and 5.46, respectively, compared to the Asia region’s average score of 5.47. Notably, trafficking in persons and human smuggling remains the most prevalent among the 15 illicit economies in the region.

Figure 3: Index Scores, Asia

Figure 4: Criminal Market Scores, Asia

Based on the profiles of Nepal and Malaysia within the index, a substantial portion of Nepali migrant workers find themselves trapped in situations of forced labor when they migrate to countries like Malaysia, the Gulf states and India.

Reflecting this, research conducted by MIDEQ Malaysia has revealed that whilst migration and inequality may not directly lead to organized crime, they establish circumstances that expose migrants and communities to exploitation and criminal activities.

For instance, the significant economic disparities both within and between Nepal and Malaysia compel Nepali migrant workers to seek improved livelihood and break the poverty cycle through overseas employment. These workers frequently originate from economically-disadvantaged backgrounds, heightening their vulnerability. This vulnerability can be capitalized upon by organized criminal private sector actors, such as brokers and sub-agents, who make deceptive employment promises.

As a result, Nepali migrant workers frequently find themselves ensnared in heavy debt due to the cost of migration, unclear about their employment status (forced labor) and other forms of exploitation.

Figure 5: Comparison of Criminality Scores between Nepal and Malaysia

Reflections

• Awareness and Advocacy

The index serves as a powerful tool in raising awareness about the pervasive nature of organized crime and its far-reaching consequences. It urges governments and international organizations to take decisive action against these criminal activities.

It also underscores the importance of multi-stakeholder cooperation in combating transnational organized crimes and advocates for comparative analysis and information sharing among nations.

Moreover, integrating labor intermediaries from Nepal and Malaysia into policymaking is pivotal in bolstering efforts against human trafficking and migrant smuggling. By engaging these facilitators of job placements, policymakers gain an in-depth understanding of on-the-ground challenges and potential loopholes from the start of the recruitment process. This collaboration aids in crafting practical regulations and enforcement strategies that specifically target vulnerabilities within the recruitment process.

• Policy Focus

By offering insights into the extent of organized crime, the OCIndex can guide policymakers in prioritizing efforts to combat these criminal activities. This, in turn, aids in the allocation of resources and expertise to where they are most needed, resulting in more effective policy implementation and enhanced resilience for countries.

Additionally, involving labor intermediaries and Malaysian businesses provides policymakers with invaluable insights. These insights aid in devising proactive strategies, enhancing monitoring mechanisms and enforcing penalties at the right place.

This inclusive approach ensures a comprehensive system to combat human trafficking and migrant smuggling, safeguarding the rights and dignity of vulnerable workers while reinforcing the enforcement framework.

However, it is essential to note the following caveats to the report:

• Focus on Symptoms, Not Causes

While the index highlights the extent of organized crime, it does not explore deeply the root causes that enable these criminal activities to thrive, such as social and economic inequality, poverty and political instability.

In the post-pandemic recovery process, unemployment and job opportunities remain the most prominent global challenges on top of digital technologies and online platforms where criminals have seized new opportunities to exploit vulnerabilities.

Instead of imposing one-size-fits-all solutions, international organisations should focus on offering valuable resources, sharing best practices and facilitating the exchange of experiences to Asian countries that face higher vulnerability to organised crimes.

For instance, the Malaysian Employers Federation (MEF) proposed a solution to redeploy jobless migrant workers to sectors facing labour shortages. This strategy aims to match available workers with employers in need, addressing unemployment while fulfilling demand in sectors requiring additional workforce, benefitting both parties in the labour market.

• Response and Adaptation

The index might unconsciously promote a reactive approach, where countries focus on improving their rankings without addressing underlying issues or developing long-term strategies. It is crucial to ensure that efforts are not ad-hoc but sustained and comprehensive.

In cases where victims of trafficking or smuggling are identified, for instance, businesses and recruitment agencies can play a pivotal role in ensuring their safety and providing access to support services. This includes facilitating connections with legal assistance, counselling and safe repatriation services.

For instance, private recruitment agencies (APS) in Malaysia recommend mandating employers to engage only with certified recruiters under the Ministry of Human Resources. This proposal seeks to ensure standardized hiring practices, enhancing worker protection and curbing exploitation by eradicating the freedom to bypass certified agencies in recruitment processes.

Conclusion

In summary, the OCIndex serves as a valuable tool for shedding light on the global challenge of organized crime. However, it is essential to view the index as a starting point for informed discussions, policy considerations and collaborative efforts aimed at addressing the complicated and evolving nature of organised criminal activities.

To harness the full potential of the index, it should be supplemented with evidence-based data and studies, facilitating a stronger connection between the root causes of issues like migration and inequality and the resulting consequences, such as human trafficking and people smuggling.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect the view of the university or any organisation. The original version of this article was published on 13^th October 2023 by MIDEQ.

Introduction: Pseudo Progress

Human trafficking is still a dire problem in Indonesia. The number of victims of this crime generally remained high in the past two decades, while the numbers of successfully resolved cases and convictions of perpetrators remained low. Based on the “Trafficking in Persons 2020” report by the United States Department of State, the number of trafficked persons is estimated to be in the thousands in 2020, as with previous years. In contrast to this estimate, the number of victims reported by the Indonesian government was 761 in 2019. This meant an increase in cases than in 2018 (480 cases) and a decrease when compared to 2017 (1,271 cases). Similarly, the number of cases investigated by the National Police in 2019 was 102, an increase from 2018 (95 cases) and a decrease from 2017 (123 cases). The fluctuations in the number of cases in these three years demonstrate the persistence of this crime in Indonesia with little progress in efforts to eradicate it.

In fact, when viewed institutionally, there are enough policies that have been drafted and implemented by the Indonesian government to address human trafficking. Fairly early on, Indonesia has enacted the Law on the Eradication of the Crime of Trafficking in Persons (Law No. 21/2007) and established a Task Force for the Prevention and Management of Human Trafficking in 2008 (Presidential Regulation No. 69/2008). The task force was formed with the inclusion of various institutions ranging from the police, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection; spanning from central to district / city levels. Additionally, there is substantial budget prepared by the government to implement these policies. For the Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK), the government provided IDR 54 billion (~USD 385,000) in 2019. Additionally, since 2018, the government made it mandatory for local governments to include anti-trafficking policies at their regional levels. These advancements have culminated Indonesia to be categorized as Tier-2 in the “Trafficking in Persons 2020” report.

Indonesia’s categorization as Tier-2 means that despite its progress in anti-trafficking policies, there are still numerous anti-trafficking agendas that have not been implemented by the Indonesian government. Practically, the implementation of current policies is also still not optimally implemented. In terms of institutional development, for example, the National Police has only developed task forces in 13 provinces. The task force at the regional level has also complained about the lack of funds to coordinate and implement policies at their level.

From this brief description, it is evident that there are contradictions in anti-trafficking policies in Indonesia, namely the gap between the vision and its misaligned strategy. Consequently, various polices and progress tended to be ineffective, while human trafficking is still rife based on the figures of victims and cases as presented by the government, foreign organizations and non-governmental organizations.

These contradictions are also reflected in the confusion by government agencies to interpret and operationalize anti-trafficking policies. In various areas with high trafficking cases such as West Kalimantan, East Nusa Tenggara and West Java, the police and immigration face difficulties in identifying perpetrators and stopping these acts of crime while they are being carried out. In most cases, the police and local governments only knew about the occurrence of such crime when victims self-reported the crimes, violence and losses they have experienced. Generally, the policy that is implemented in such cases is facilitating the return and rehabilitation of victims albeit on a small scale.

The government and police at the central and regional levels do not seem to have a clear and directed vision and strategy to reduce human trafficking in Indonesia. Confusion in the interpretation and operationalization of anti-trafficking policies must be resolved by understanding the problems that exist in practice that enables the continued occurrence of human trafficking and rendering policies to be ineffective.

Human Trafficking Operations Embedded in Social Structures and Exploits Social Networking Bias

The root problem in developing and implementing anti-trafficking policies in Indonesia stems from the characteristics of this crime itself, namely 1) being embedded in the social structure till it is difficult to identify and address the crime, and 2) the bias of social networks which sees labour migration as vertical mobility despite violating administrative procedures and protective measures, and disregarding the risks that labour migration could be a ploy for human trafficking when such violations are committed.

In Indonesia, human trafficking is operated by embedding itself into social structures. This makes it difficult to ascertain if a crime has been committed as human trafficking has integrated the people’s daily activities. Generally, perpetrators arrested for this crime were part of the social networks of their victims or the victims’ families. In many cases, the perpetrators who were reported to be involved in the recruitment process were even the victims’ family members, relatives or close friends. Many of the recruiters were themselves Indonesian migrants in the destination countries that the victims would be sent to and were socially connected with the victims. Their modus operandi for recruitment could be on the pretext of facilitating requests from their places of employment or their own initiatives whenever there is a job opening. Offering a job opportunity is often seen as a benevolent act and the potential for vertical mobility for family, relatives and members of the village.

The process of transporting and sheltering the victims is also embedded into the daily activities of the community. The transportation that was used in such crimes were generally not specifically set up to solely serve such organized crime networks. Instead, public transportation has been exploited for such heinous purposes. In some cases, victims get a lift in the private vehicles belonging to migrant workers commuting to the same destination countries.

In their villages, the victims’ families and communities generally encourage their children to become migrant works, including via illegal means, regardless of the possibility of becoming victims of human trafficking. Economic pressures and limited work and business opportunities in their hometowns are structural factors that encourage migration that bypasses procedures and protection. Collectively, by being embedded into the social structures and processes, on the one hand facilitates opportunities for human trafficking to occur while confounding efforts to identify and prevent it.

Social networking bias also plays an important role in facilitating human trafficking operations. Victims readily accept work offers due to their social connections with recruiters. By exploiting such trust, victims and victims’ families deem such migrations as opportunities, until they return home as human trafficking victims.

Behind Ineffective Policies: Lack of Basis on Knowledge and Institutionalization

Ineffective government policies are a result of weak basis on knowledge for policy formulation and implementation, as well as weak institutional development to lead and coordinate the prevention and managing human trafficking. The Law on the Eradication of the Crime of Trafficking in Persons is widely used to crack down on illegal migration – apart from cases of illegal local prostitution, however, there is no clear distinction between illegal migration and human trafficking. The report from the US DOS also reveals that data in Indonesia was not uniformed between the National Police, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Law and Human Rights. The confusion generated from this lack of uniformity reduces the reliability of such data. This is confounded by the lack of basis on knowledge about the structures and processes involved in human trafficking operations in Indonesia. This affects the policy agendas to eradicate human trafficking consequently leading to ineffective measures.

The legal framework of anti-trafficking policies alone is insufficient in providing an operational definition of human trafficking, its processes and indicators. An understanding of the structures and processes based on ground realities is needed to design policies that are more precise and effective, both to address and mitigate human trafficking. Clear definitions, vision and strategy based on contextual knowledge are needed in this regard.

More detailed analyses of governance in the implementation of anti-trafficking policies also needs to be conducted and used as a basis for policy development. One such analysis discovered that the Task Forces for the Prevention and Management of Human Trafficking in districts do not work effectively throughout the year. The agencies only meet several times annually and are without any operating budget. Repatriating and rehabilitating victims generally leverage on local government funds which in itself is limited. Therefore, there is often a lack of funds to cater to all the victims. Additionally, investigations and trials have to often end abruptly due to the lack of funds to accommodate victims during investigations and trial processes, thus hampering the resolution of their cases.

Conclusion: The Need for Commitment, Policy Revision and Institutional Reforms

The aforementioned descriptions of Indonesia do not present a bright and optimistic forecast for the eradication of human trafficking in Indonesia. On one end, we see a grim outlook based on the ineffectiveness and seemingly flippant nature of government policies leading to an increase in the number of victims experiencing violence and losses in wealth and opportunities. Numerous victims even refused to return to their respective hometowns and chose to stay in transit regions due to the trauma they experienced.

The threes factors that must be emphasized to initiate improvements are 1) strengthening government and institutions’ commitment both nationally and locally, 2) revising policies, and 3) reforming institutions involved in the prevention and management of human trafficking. The government must also strengthen its vision and commitment to eradicate human trafficking to ensure its translation into a more effective strategy and policies. Beyond this, the institutions responsible for implementing these need to be improve their stewardships and inter-institution coordination.

Introduction

Amidst COVID-19, there is a disturbing increase in the number domestic violence globally. In Indonesia, findings from a 2020 survey by the National Commission on the Elimination of Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan) indicates a similar trend. As governments prioritized stemming viral spread, such trends suggest an emerging crisis as states transit into a ‘new normal’. Though this emerging crisis was avoidable, it is never too late for states to address it now. To do so, specifically in Indonesia, would require an understanding of how COVID-19 have heightened the occurrences of domestic violence and how there needs to be further emphasis on victims of domestic violence and the community.

Stresses of COVID-19 in Indonesia

A major impact of COVID-19 is that longer hours are now spent at homes. This is attributed to social restrictions such as lockdowns and loss of employment. Unfortunately for some Indonesians, this also places them at risk of losing their homes. Wading further into the unfamiliar, Indonesians are left to figure out how to maintain a sense of normalcy, for example, by working from home while ensuring their children continue with their education, albeit online. Additionally, COVID-19 increases physical isolation of nuclear families. This becomes an added issue as Indonesia is a collectivist society and where religion is important in daily lives. Therefore, not only would Indonesians lose support and care from their extended families but also their religious support network. Collectively, these factors can increase the level of anxiety than pre-COVID conditions.

During this pandemic, Indonesian females tended to experience higher levels of anxiety than their male counterparts. Though there have yet to be detailed studies, the 2020 survey by Komnas Perempuan may provide insights into this phenomenon.

Briefly, respondents of this study claimed to have experienced higher household workloads and were more prone to domestic violence. The study reported numerous forms of violence experienced, with physical and sexual violence being the most frequently experienced followed by psychological violence and economic abuse. Women who were particularly vulnerable to such violence were those from households earning less than IDR 5 million monthly and working in the informal sector, aged between 31-40, caring for more than three children, and living in any of the top 10 provinces with the highest number of COVID-19 infections. Particularly troubling is that less than 10% of the female respondents reported their cases to the authority or sought help during the pandemic. A majority of those who chose to remain quiet were women who minimally possessed a tertiary level qualification. Additionally, 69% of the respondents claimed to not know how to access legal or other forms of assistance.

Despite being well-educated and the ease of access to information, the continued occurrence of domestic violence in Indonesia is ostensibly due to an imbalance of power and control in relationships. Adherence to patriarchy, which is still prevalent in Indonesia, is an important predictor of such violence. Even if Indonesian women were to seek assistance from those close to them, many are reluctant to intervene for fear of intruding into a private matter or their belief that it is still within men’s right to do so. The situation is worsening as victims are forced to spend more time with their perpetrators during COVID-19 thus further limiting their escape strategies.

Indonesia’s response to domestic violence against women is also still far from ideal. Though in need of a comprehensive legislation, the Eradication of Sexual Violence Bill is once again delayed. Proposed in 2016, this bill not only sought to prevent sexual violence but also accords more rights to victims. Without this bill, current investigations on such violence are centred solely on punitive measures for the perpetrator. Though these measures may bring some relieve to victims, whatever relieve could come undone as female victims may have to contend with the victim-blaming culture in Indonesia.

Empowering Victims and the Community

Indonesia cannot simply wait for the Eradication of Sexual Violence Bill to be passed. While waiting for the passing of this bill, the government must work closely with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) on two factors. The first is to adopt an educational approach to empower both victims and the community. Particularly during COVID-19, female victims must be empowered to speak up. This could either be via reporting their abusers to the authorities or seeking assistance to stop the violence. Through time, victims should eventually realise the need to avoid justifying the abuse meted at them.

Education is also pertinent in addressing victim-blaming culture in Indonesia. Victims should not have to endure such biased judgements while coming to terms with their trauma. One method involves including the notion of consent, at the very latest, in university curriculum. Doing so may culminate in reducing unwarranted comments, online and in real life. Additionally, the community should also be taught to recognize signs of domestic violence. Fortunately, these signs include verbal cues which are pertinent especially during times of increased physical isolation such as during COVID-19. And rather than the community reporting on behalf of the victim, it would be ideal for them to assist victims find the courage to do so themselves.

Akin to frontliners, the community should be shown resources for them to direct victims to. It would, thus, be beneficial to have a single, central platform that is accessible via numerous means including on newer mediums such as social media. This is crucial as more time is spent online, particularly during times such as COVID-19. Collectively by doing so, not only does it shift some responsibility to the community, the community are not overburdened by it.

Towards a Centralized Assistance Platform

To initiate the development of such assistance platform, it is crucial to identify “hotspots” of domestic violence in Indonesia. This not only enables a more targeted awareness campaign in such areas, it also enables optimization of resources. For instance, shelters can be set up in these areas to offer assistance to victims seeking refuge. Additionally, by establishing a network of such shelters in Indonesia, victims who are not from these areas can be directed to the nearest shelter.

This centralized platform should also assist the community not only by providing information that can be easily understood, but also by getting them to talk about domestic violence. One way to facilitate this is through outreach on relevant mediums such as social media campaigns. This could culminate into developing a protective safety net for victims that is also not intimidating. Other essential information includes assisting the community to develop these shelters themselves and enabling trusted individuals to provide short-term care for victims who have decided to seek refuge at shelters, if required. The benefits of such organically-developed shelters are the sense of community ownership, increases accessibility for victims and reduced bureaucracy. Moreover, providing short-term care serves as humble, yet powerful motivators for victims to take a strong stance against such violence.

One key consideration of this platform is to confer anonymity to victims and the network of shelters. While it may help victims make the first move in seeking assistance, ensuring that shelters are kept anonymous provides an additional sense of security to victims. Such anonymity will safeguard these premises from unwanted visits by perpetrators of domestic violence and minimise negative perceptions while community awareness campaigns on victim-blaming are on-going.

Introduction

For over a decade, religion continues to be integral to Indonesians. Since 2008, at least 90% of Indonesian respondents believed that religion is “very important” in their lives. In 2020, 98% of Indonesian respondents believed this to be true with the remaining 2% believing that this is “somewhat” true. This, thus, ranks Indonesia as one of the most religious countries in the world.

“Supply” from the Indonesian Government

There are two takeaways from this trend. The first is the state’s continued success in the religionization of public affairs. Here “religionization” is defined as the process of framing public issues such as government regulations as religious issues. Religionization is not a new phenomenon for Indonesia. This can be seen from its formulation of the Pancasila, the state ideology. Recently, 96% of Indonesian respondents stated that “belief in God is necessary in order to be moral and have good values.” This is aligned with the first principle of Pancasila, namely “the belief in the one true God”, which was ostensibly aimed at cultivating good citizens.

It can be argued that religionization intensified during Era Reformasi (Reformation Era). Unlike the Soeharto’s authoritarian New Order which was generally secular, the government administrations of the Reformation Era were accommodative towards religious symbolism. Building such an atmosphere was the numerous years of Soeharto’s suppression of political Islam while only co-opting Islamic political leaders in the last decade of his rule. Additionally, during the Reformation Era, political elites regarded religion as a mobilizer for their political careers. Religion would award them public support at all levels of society.

Keeping to this, Wahid Foundation’s One Decade Report on the Monitoring of Freedom of Religion and Beliefs found that religious events such as mass recitation of the Quran were one of the most organized by the two government administrations in the past decade. These were during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s and Joko Widodo’s second and first term in office, respectively. Additionally, during Joko Widodo’s term, there was a new phenomenon of announcing religious instructions for civil servants in several regions. In 2018, a total of 13 instructions were uncovered. These instructions included requiring civil servants to pray together once the call to prayer has been delivered. Such instructions may be a new support-seeking tactic in preparation for the 2019 legislative and 2020 gubernatorial elections. Unfortunately, one drawback of mixing religion with public affairs is the prevalence of discrimination. During the two terms (2009 – 2018), 88 discriminative regulations at the provincial, district and city levels were uncovered.

“Demand” by Society

Secondly, in addition to this “supply” from the government, it is important to consider how the demand by society contributes to this phenomenon. Indicators for this demand is evident from the increasing popularity of Islamic clothing, Muslim-only residential complexes and Syariah-compliant banks.

Driving this demand is the middle-income group whom a majority does not possess religious education backgrounds. Instead, they minimally graduated from public high schools. Insecurity and anxiety have been cited for this increase in religious identity. These sentiments may be due to diverse factors including economic-social insecurity and the politization of numerous issues such as intolerance and inequality. Interestingly, it was shown that there is a negative correlation between a country’s religiosity and GDP. Countries with lower Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita are more likely to tie belief in God to morality as seen with Indonesia. In these situations, religion becomes an important institution to allay these sentiments.

One concern, however, is the demand’s potential to drive the growth of conservative and hardline groups in Indonesia. The mobilization of conservative and hardline Muslims in Indonesia has been gaining traction since 2016. An explanation for this is that conservative and hardline groups have become more coordinated in simultaneously mobilizing their members and affiliates. Having a higher turnout while organizing such demonstrations to be held after Friday prayers, further empowers sympathizers to participate. This led to large-scale demonstrations as seen since 2016. Additionally, by calling themselves Alumni 212, not only does it serve to create a common shared memory for participants, it also enables the growth of such movement under a single banner. Such growth is further assisted as no formal memberships are required. In other words, any like-minded individuals will be accepted.

Rising Tide of Intolerance in Indonesia

Taken together, moderate Islam is at risk of weakening its position in Indonesia, and thus signalling a rising tide of intolerance. There is preliminary evidence that found higher level of self-declared religiosity to be negatively correlated with a tolerant attitude in Indonesia. Additionally, the same study found that a higher income inequality and extent of poverty are associated with higher level of religious intolerance.

Curbing this rising intolerance, however, cannot be achieved simply by allaying the insecurity and anxiety of Indonesians such as the provision of economic assistance. It should also be through eradicating state-perpetrated discrimination. Allowing and even encouraging discriminative actions by the state provides fodder for intolerance. And there have been studies that indicates how an individual’s behaviour may be an outcome of state policies and society’s corresponding response towards them. By taking a tougher stance on intolerance, it may aid in removing the legitimacy of hardline groups. However, the decentralization of power in Indonesia may prevent this from cascading to the local levels where the influence of Islamic leaders on politicians are still strong.

Despite this emerging trend, the worry that Indonesia may develop into an Islamic state with the imposition of Syariah laws maybe baseless. Though seen in Aceh, it has yet to become a source of inspiration for other localities. Even in Aceh, despite reports of public flogging for unacceptable behaviours, they have not implemented new religious regulations since 2007 while most of the current regulations are centred on the use of Islamic clothing.