Escalation

Over the past weekend, the United States and Israel launched strikes against Tehran, killing Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, senior leaders and hundreds other. The ripple effects of this are already being felt. While still on the negotiating table over Iran’s nuclear programme, the attack does not bode well for a diplomatic solution.

For weeks now, the world had been bracing for a possible attack on Iran. US warships have been anchored in the Persian Gulf. The USS Abraham Lincoln, a formidable aircraft carrier and in commission since 1989, serves as a reminder of the US presence in the region and the pressure it can exert on Iran.

Israel’s influence on the United States is clear, with joint operations against Iran a clear indication of this. President Donald Trump’s statements and the use of bases in the Middle East indicate that this might be a bigger military campaign than last year’s targeted attack on Iran’s military and nuclear facilities.

Dynamics observed in 2026 have proven to be a continuation of last year’s growing escalations in the region, with significant repercussions for the world. But how will this recent increase in tensions in the Persian Gulf affect Southeast Asia, particularly Malaysia, with its different ties to the region?

Iran holds an interesting position in the region. It has established a presence within ASEAN through its permanent representative and has an embassy in most countries, except Timor Leste.

The two regions are deeply connected economically, politically and even socially. Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohammad Hassan issued a statement a few days ago warning of the global impact a war would have on Malaysia and the region. Since the attacks on Iran this past weekend, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has been issuing strong statements against the Israeli-US attacks, pledging to bring the matter to the Malaysian Parliament. He has warned against further instability and a rise in oil prices, while also promising to support Malaysians in the Gulf countries.

This latest escalation in tensions in the Gulf is part of already existing tensions in the region, revealing the delicate balance on which the Saudi-Iranian-Emirati relationship rests on. It also shows how Malaysia will be affected by this delicate situation and how it sees itself as a voice of reason.

Instability in the Gulf

In recent times, the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf has been shifting. Saudi Arabia and Iran, despite long tensions, have come together since their representatives met in China in March 2023 to improve relations. The détente has proved resilient—Saudi officials have also made it clear that it would not support any action against Iran.

However, in retaliation to attacks on its soil, Iran has hit targets in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This has reversed some of the advances made in the diplomatic relations between the countries, with the UAE recalling its ambassador from Iran on Sunday.

This has served to further increase tensions that had already been building up in the region. The conflict in Yemen started off as very much a Saudi-Iranian proxy war, with Iran backing the Shiite Houthis based in Sanaa while Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries gave support to the Sunni forces based in Aden.

As the relationship was on track to becoming more normalised between Riyadh and Tehran, tensions have lowered between Saudi Arabia and Iran. But it was the United Arab Emirates’ activities in Yemen that revealed a growing rift with Saudi Arabia. Although both started by supporting the same side in the conflict, their backing of different opposition groups in Yemen showed their inability to find common ground on an endgame.

Emirati troops stationed along the Saudi border at the end of 2025 deeply concerned Riyadh, who saw this as a provocation. The United Arab Emirates has since withdrawn its troops from Yemen, but tensions have remained between the two.

Meanwhile, Qatar-Iranian relations last year were put to the test when the United States used its base in Qatar to launch an attack on Iran. Tehran retaliated by sending missiles to the base within Qatar’s territory. The attack left a bitter mark but also shed light on how embedded the United States was in the Gulf, with its various bases and relative freedom to use them for operations against neighbour countries.

This weekend’s attacks continue to put the region under strain. Oman has sought to play the role of peacekeeper, urging for a diplomatic solution and keeping communications with Tehran and its new leadership open. But only time will tell if tensions can de-escalate and the United States, Israel and the Arab Gulf countries do not enter into a reactionary war with Iran.

The ASEAN Split

The Gaza dimension adds complications to the matter. Since the 7 October attacks, the Middle East has plunged into a state of uncertainty and instability. These tensions have affected global affairs and have poured over into Southeast Asia in a few ways.

For instance, Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto has tried to play a more prominent role by committing the country to the Board of Peace (BoP), though this has brought to question Indonesia’s actual commitment to the Palestinian cause.

As the largest Muslim country in the world, there is an expectation for Indonesia to support Palestine and condemn Israel outright. But Prabowo’s decision to join the BoP indicates a shift towards alignment with the United States. The only other Southeast Asian countries that have expressed an intent to join the BoP are Vietnam and Cambodia.

Anwar, on the other hand, has assured that Malaysia will not be joining the BoP if peace and independence for the Palestinians are not guaranteed.

Anwar’s High-Stakes Diplomacy

Anwar has endeavoured to balance Malaysia’s relations with the United States as well as with the Arab world, including Iran. At the most recent ASEAN summit, he entertained a jovial Trump during the latter’s 24-hour visit to Kuala Lumpur—all while also calling for restraint in the Middle East and criticising Israel’s as well as the United States’ actions in the region.

Malaysia, despite its official stand against Shiism, maintains warm relations with Iran. Anwar has even condemned past military actions against Iran. However, Malaysian foreign policy has relied on positive equilibrium between West and East, a delicate balance that has the potential to pull the country in different directions.

A possible war in Iran may present Malaysia with an existential crisis of sorts or at least reveal the difficulty of maintaining such a balance. On the one hand, it has to keep its relations with the United States for the sake of trade and investment, but on the other hand, Anwar has positioned Islam and the Islamic world as an important part of his political agenda.

The growing Saudi-UAE tensions will also present Malaysia with another set of issues. Both have been trying to keep Malaysia close in their orbits, with both the Saudi kingdom and the Emirates hosting Malaysia’s Yang di-Pertuan Agong Sultan Ibrahim recently.

Both are important trading partners for Malaysia. In the case of Saudi Arabia, Malaysia maintains close ties for the sake of the pilgrimage quota. Again, a similar dilemma will be presented whereby Malaysia might find itself caught between two allies. Malaysia has also shown strong support for Iran, condemning the attack on Tehran and the killing of Khamenei.

With concerns on how a war might drive up oil prices, Anwar has promised to maintain the oil price in Malaysia—a very important symbol of stability for Malaysians.

Chokepoints

Thousands of kilometres apart, but it is clear that increased tensions in the Middle East will invariably have global effects. If a war erupts following the recent attacks, any escalation will cause problems for the maritime trade that goes through the Persian Gulf, which is significant in itself. Iran has the power to close the Straits of Hormuz, a major waterway through which international traffic passes. It has already halted traffic through, halting supplies from Southeast Asia to Europe and the rest of the world, causing huge delays and disruption.

Airports in the Middle East have closed, causing great disruption of travel. The bombing of Dubai airport also shows the vulnerability of air travel, while the images of grounded planes further serve as a reminder of the disruptive nature of the conflict. 

Malaysia and Southeast Asia have a voice in what happens in the Middle East, considering their closeness to the United States and the weight of their combined economic power. However, it might be difficult for a collective strategy to come together, with different agendas and new alignments emerging.

The Exclusion of the Palestinian Voice

Indonesia’s decision to join the Board of Peace (BoP), initiated by President Donald Trump, has been defended by President Prabowo Subianto as pragmatic diplomacy aimed at promoting peace in Gaza.

In reality, it exposes something far more consequential than a single policy choice. It reveals a foreign policy increasingly defined by short-term calculations, access-seeking and symbolic politics rather than by principle, strategy, or moral clarity. What is presented as engagement is, in fact, a normative retreat.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the gap between Indonesia’s ambition and its leverage. Indonesia risks failing the Palestinians and in particular the Gazans despite its constitutional pledge to support the independence of oppressed nations.

In this regard, the BoP claims to offer a framework for post-war stabilisation, but it is structurally excluding Palestinian representation. A peace initiative that excludes the very people whose lives and futures are at stake is not an oversight but a political decision reaffirming the old adage of “might is right”.

By joining such an arrangement without protest or conditions, is Indonesia ready to accept the criticism that it is willing to enforce peace in Gaza without the involvement of the Palestinians?  Surely Prabowo’s attempt at securing diplomatic proximity to powerful actors should not come at the expense of Palestinian independence?

Humanitarian Aid?

Prabowo has attempted to justify this position through humanitarian rhetoric, emphasising aid delivery and claims of reduced suffering.

This framing is not merely inadequate but also misleading. Humanitarian access is often used in situations of occupation and asymmetric violence to evade international scrutiny while the systems that support violence are left intact.

Crucially, this narrative ignores the reality that Israel has systematically weaponised aid and frequently blocked access as a tactic of war despite diplomatic entreaties. There is no guarantee that Indonesia’s presence in the BoP would deter Tel Aviv from repeating such violations.

Aid that flows without responsibility does not signal development but risks sending signals that Indonesia is accommodating Trump’s interests and his allies’. Prabowo’s aid narrative could end up legitimising a political grouping that preserves the causes of violence by confusing relief with justice.

The Fragmentation of Global Governance

The institutional implications of the BoP further underscore the weak direction of Prabowo’s foreign policy vision. The initiative has emerged as an alternative body that sidesteps the United Nations, taking shape as a parallel forum where participation is selective and decisions rest largely on political discretion.

This, of course, contravenes Prabowo’s vocal commitment towards multilateralism. Endorsing an ad hoc mechanism (the BoP) designed to bypass existing institutions (the United Nations) does not strengthen global governance but fragments it. For a country that has long promoted international law and is also subject to it, this marks an inconsistency in foreign policy posturing.      

What makes this particularly head-scratching is Indonesia’s lack of leverage within the initiative. Unlike major powers, Indonesia possesses neither the economic stick to sanction violations nor the military carrot to guarantee security.

Without diplomatic relations with Israel, Jakarta holds no bilateral cards to play; it cannot threaten to withdraw an ambassador or freeze trade assets it does not have. Consequently, Indonesia is relegated to the role of a “rule-taker” rather than a “rule-maker” in the BoP. Indonesia also holds neither a veto power nor the economic weight to steer its agenda.

Status Affirmation and the High Table

However, symbolism matters. Joining the BoP may not be the one political currency that ushers Prabowo to an election victory in 2029, but it lends values to his effort in crafting an image as a statesman and boosts his international standing.

For Prabowo, participation in the BoP serves a different purpose: status affirmation. Being seated at the high table provides visual proof of Indonesia’s (and his own) elevation from a peripheral observer to a central player

Nevertheless, pursuing this may further erode Indonesia’s diplomatic identity. For decades, Indonesia’s foreign policy settled on a clear normative foundation, articulated through the principle of bebas aktif (independent and active) and embodied in its leadership of the postcolonial world. Under the current president, this tradition is no longer an identity, as foreign policy becomes transactional and personality-driven. The result is not flexibility but drift.    

The danger of this deviation from tradition extends beyond Gaza. By aligning with a neo-imperial project driven by the preferences of a single great power, Jakarta’s credibility across the Global South weakens. Many developing states continue to rely on multilateral institutions as a safeguard against arbitrary power. Indonesia’s

Defenders of Prabowo’s approach frame this manoeuvre through a rationalist lens, echoing Lichbach & Zuckerman’s logic of utility maximisation. The logic is seductive: the utility of being inside the room shaping the conversation implies higher payoffs than the costs of shouting from the outside.

History shows that peace imposed without justice does not endure, and reconstruction without accountability entrenches grievance. If the BoP were serious about ending the conflict, it would prioritise restraint of violence, legal accountability and political inclusion.

On the contrary, Israel has resumed its indiscriminate bombing campaigns in Gaza, rendering any talk of “post-war stabilisation” premature and absurd. Curiously, despite this escalation, Indonesia has not demanded that the BoP enforce a halt to the violence.

Even though his decision has been met with criticism, including from the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), CSOs, experts and NGOs, Prabowo has not sought to reverse or suspend Indonesia’s participation in the BoP. Instead, he has invited MUI, Islamic organisations, as well as former ministers and vice ministers of foreign affairs to join him in consultation meetings.

In doing so, the government has essentially shifted the responsibility onto respected figures such as religious leaders, former ministers and experts to validate Indonesia’s decision to join the BoP. This is critical especially to rally public support, which has been rather cold. The policy itself remained

Way Forward

Indonesia still has a choice, but that choice requires political courage. A principled foreign policy would insist on Palestinian representation, openly challenge the normalisation of impunity and draw clear boundaries around participation in the BoP. Most importantly, it would recognise that withdrawing legitimacy from a flawed process is sometimes more powerful than lending it.

Indonesia, however, has thus far shown little inclination to exercise that option. 

What is at stake is not merely Indonesia’s position on Gaza, but its role in the world. Indonesia risks becoming a state that attends every forum yet stands for nothing, that speaks the language of peace while accommodating injustice. This is a serious erosion of the country’s diplomatic legacy.  

Peace is not built through access, ceremony or proximity to power. It is built through the willingness to confront power in defence of law and human dignity. Until Prabowo’s foreign policy recovers that willingness, Indonesia’s global presence will continue to grow louder and emptier at the same time.

The Hedging Trap

At the recently concluded World Economic Forum in Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney propounded a more provocative and unspoken take on a reframing of the stance of middle powers within the current state of international relations.

Middle powers, he argued, do not stabilise the international system by hedging endlessly or positioning themselves as neutral intermediaries. However, global stability comes from the discipline of states consistently and respectfully binding themselves to the workings of the international global order, absorbing short-term costs and offering predictability in an increasingly multipolar world.

This was not simply a clarion call for such rhetorics as ideological alignment or moral posturing. Instead, Carney’s speech was a realistic pivot on how great powers redefine the international order (some more opportunistically). As such, the strategic value of middle powers lies in their willingness to treat commitments as constraints rather than conveniences.

Carney’s framing is uncomfortable for Malaysia and ASEAN. Malaysia (and Southeast Asia as a whole) largely positions itself as an active upholder of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). During Malaysia’s helming of its chair in 2025, ASEAN also led to the diplomatic agility and convening power of the regional bloc. On the same breadth, however, these same qualities providing agility present a risk of producing an entirely adverse outcome, that is, an ASEAN that is consensus-based but increasingly shaped by external forces rather than redefining neutrality.

The question is no longer whether ASEAN remains relevant, but whether it is becoming something closer to a geopolitical coworking space.

The “Coworking Space” Metaphor

The ASEAN approach has historically derived its strength from openness and ambiguity. Consensus decision-making, non-alignment and an emphasis on process have allowed it to convene competing powers and avoid overt confrontation. These features have enabled ASEAN to survive periods of intense geopolitical rivalry and should not be dismissed lightly.

Therefore, the root problem is not that ASEAN conv

Meetings proliferate. Declarations multiply. Yet when the curtains draw, the distance or divide between process and consequence grows wider save for truly meaningful commitments.

This is where the “coworking space” metaphor becomes analytically relevant. Like a shared office environment, ASEAN offers neutral space, procedural access and reputational benefits. Everyone – should they be interested – can be offered a seat at the table.

Nevertheless, no state is required to commit beyond attendance. Responsibility for outcomes remains diffused. The infrastructure is valuable and brings together great powers while reconciling their relationships with middle powers, but it does not enforce discipline for the international global order.

This shift does not reflect irrelevance. On the contrary, ASEAN is in high demand. However, over-usability without authority carries risks. When an institution becomes primarily a platform rather than a rule-shaper, it risks professionalising flexibility at the expense of institutional gravity.

Carney’s argument rests on a simple but demanding premise. Middle powers cannot outcompete great powers materially, but they can reduce uncertainty through credible self-constraint.

The Canada Model

Within this framework, Canada’s posture under Carney is not neutrality but consistency. Commitments across trade, climate, security and finance are treated as mutually reinforcing rather than siloed. Red lines are not always explicitly drawn, but they are legible. Most importantly, reversals on international commitments carry reputational and political costs that send a message to partners and adversaries alike. A self-constrained model does not preclude flexibility but offers solace.

Carney’s intervention invites a comparison. Canada’s credibility as a middle power does not stem from hosting dialogue or maintaining maximal manoeuvring space. It stems from being predictably constrained. Partners know what Canada will not do, what it is willing to bear costs for and where its commitments are likely to endure beyond electoral cycles.

ASEAN’s ambiguity, by contrast, is often treated as an end in itself. Non-alignment becomes synonymous with optionality. Commitments are framed cautiously to preserve consensus, sometimes to the point where external actors struggle to identify substantive limits. Over time, ambiguity that is not backed by institutional consolidation risks being interpreted as indecision.

This also explains why hedging, long treated as a prudent middle-power strategy, is increasingly strained. Hedging worked best in an environment where issue areas could be compartmentalised—where security, trade, technology and regulation could be managed in parallel without forcing alignment across domains.

The Breaking Point of Strategic Hedging

That assumption no longer holds water. Today’s strategic competition is cross-cutting; supply chains and digital standards alike. In such conditions, attempting to hedge everywhere often results in being credible nowhere and ironically self-seeking in nature. What once preserved manoeuvring space now risks signalling indecision, particularly to actors seeking reliable partners rather than flexible interlocutors. Hedging has not become illegitimate, but it has become more costly, demanding a degree of internal coherence and prioritisation that many middle powers have yet to institutionalise.

The issue is not rhetorical ambition but coherence. How often do Malaysia’s regional commitments translate into binding domestic frameworks? Where do partnerships generate enforceable expectations rather than aspirational signalling? To what extent are policy choices aligned across ministries, rather than managed in parallel?

Carney’s midd

By committing more deeply in specific domains, states can increase credibility overall even if it narrows short-term options. For ASEAN, the lesson is similar but more complex. ASEAN’s diversity and consensus-based structure make wholesale institutional hardening unrealistic. Where ASEAN chooses to lead, it must move beyond hosting and toward structuring, clarifying implementation pathways, consequences for non-compliance and the limits of ambiguity.

Without this shift, ASEAN risks becoming indispensable but inconsequential: a venue everyone uses, but few take seriously as a source of constraint. In a geopolitical environment defined by sharper competition and thinner trust, that is a precarious position.

Carney’s framing also challenges a deeper assumption about middle powers. Influence is often equated with room to manoeuvre. Yet as great powers become less predictable, manoeuvring room without credibility becomes less valuable. What others increasingly seek is not mediati

This is where ASEAN’s neutrality narrative begins to fray. Neutrality without institutional depth does not insulate middle powers from pressure; it delays confrontation without resolving it.

Canada’s experience suggests that choosing constraints earlier may preserve autonomy later by reducing the frequency and intensity of external testing.

From Hosting to Structuring

None of this implies that ASEAN should replicate Canada’s posture. The contexts are fundamentally different. But the underlying principle that middle powers derive influence from disciplined self-binding rather than unlimited flexibility is transferable

The strategic risk for ASEAN is not marginalisation but dilution. By becoming a permanent coworking space for global powers, ASEAN may retain visibility while losing leverage. The process will continue, but authority will thin. Malaysia, operating within this environment, will face increasing pressure to choose where credibility matters most.

Carney’s Davos address should therefore be read less as a prescription than as a provocation. It asks whether middle powers want to be endlessly usable or selectively reliable. In a world where great powers increasingly treat rules as optional, the middle powers that matter may be those willing to treat commitments as costly and therefore credible. For Malaysia and ASEAN, the strategic question is no longer whether flexibility is useful. It is whether flexibility without discipline can sustain influence. The answer, increasingly, appears to be no.

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A Trans-Pacific Moment

For the majority in Southeast Asia, baseball seems a distant spectacle, a sport watched from afar, if at all. Yet, on the night the Los Angeles Dodgers and the Toronto Blue Jays met in Game 7 of the 2025 World Series in Toronto, baseball briefly became a sport impossible to ignore.

What caught everyone’s attention was not just the event but also Ohtani Shohei, the Dodger’s Japanese two-way star player, whose presence alone could turn a regular game into a global broadcast.

Fans in Japan shifted their Sunday around games and sports commentators brimming with national pride. Even if one did not understand the rules of baseball, there is a sense of a moment of high drama, the kind of “winner-takes-all” occasion that we in Southeast Asia may associate with a World Cup Final. It was a euphoric moment for enthusiastic baseball fans and casual followers alike.

Ultimately, in the game, the Dodgers secured a 5-4 victory, delivering them back-to-back World Series titles, the first baseball franchise to do so in a quarter of a century since the famed 1998-2000 New York Yankees.

Throughout the series, Ohtani’s presence proved consequential in ways beyond any single play. Ohtani is not simply a star athlete; he is an anomaly that breaks the modern logic of the sport.

Baseball, since the early 20th century, has operated on the assumption that no individual can dominate both as a pitcher and a hitter. The physical demands and divergent skill sets prove to be a Herculean requisite for any baseball player.

Ohtani has dismantled this entirely, and he does so dominantly.

To illustrate, in Game 4 of the National League Championship Series, equivalent to a semi-final before entering the World Series, Ohtani produced a performance that commentators instantly declared the greatest in playoff history: six scoreless innings and three home runs at the plate.

This should not have been possible—it is comparable to a footballer scoring a hat trick while also keeping a clean sheet. The totality of his talent and performance at this level is simply inconceivable.

When an athlete redefines the constraints of

The resulting “Ohtani economy” produced an estimated US$770 million in value across viewership, sponsorship, merchandise and social engagement. Additionally, the Dodgers secured approximately US$75 million in Japanese sponsorships after his arrival, alongside a 32% increase in Asian viewership of Major League Baseball (MLB). Even before Ohtani was called a Dodger, the Canadians, whose Blue Jays launched an ambitious recruitment campaign to get Ohtani, found themselves in a cultural triangle connecting Tokyo, Toronto and Los Angeles.

It is here that a sporting story transforms into a global discourse. Scholars of international relations describe figures like Ohtani as non-state diplomatic actors, capable of shaping public sentiment, transmitting cultural meaning and fostering shared experiences.

These are elements that ASEAN can consider to enhance regional soft power beyond formal diplomacy. As Malaysia’s ASEAN Chairmanship 2025 draws to a close, the attempts to position cultural diplomacy as a strategic instrument becomes an ever-present appeal.

The question derived is also clear: what lessons can a region of 11 nations draw from the way a single athlete helped turn a North American sporting event into a genuinely trans-Pacific cultural moment?

ASEAN’s Cultural Diplomacy in a Visibility-Driven World

If Ohtani and his growing prestige show us anything, it is that cultural influence moves through people, in that we follow stories, personalities and industries that grow around them. This shift in the diffusion of culture carries important implications for ASEAN, where the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) has been placed at its forefront during Malaysia’s 2025 chairmanship.

At the 34th ASCC Council Meeting, ASEAN Member States (AMS) reaffirmed Malaysia’s priorities in the cultural sphere, which include “Cultural Heritage for Value Creation” as well as “Youth and Sports Potential for All to Foster Growth, Unity and Excellence”.

Recent initiatives, from the China-ASEAN Gen-Z Youth Festival 2024 to the ASEAN Film Festival 2025, show how cultural spaces continue to soften tensions and deepe

To Malaysia’s credit, Kuala Lumpur is doubling down on ASEAN’s belief that unity arises from consistent social engagement, rather than a grand spectacle. In this sense, ASEAN’s cultural diplomacy is fundamentally different from the high-performance, revenue-driven models of sports leagues such as MLB. Its value lies in sustaining relationships and stability rather than monetising attention and visibility.

Nonetheless, the strength of ASEAN’s inward-facing cultural model also reveals its limits. It was built to prioritise stability and consensus, both of which frequently necessitate slow, patient relationship-building rather than the quick pursuit of visibility.

However, it now sits uncomfortably within a global cultural environment where attention, speed and repetition increasingly determine whose stories are seen and whose identities travel.

Sports, in particular, have taken off as a major player in the realm of soft power. Research in this field

The link between visibility and influence has also been noted:  “The use of sport in shaping the international image of a state can also take the form of showcasing sport-related assets during the non-sporting event.”

In this visibility-oriented global landscape, ASEAN’s cultural diplomacy, grounded in patient internal engagement, often competes against far stronger engines of global attention.

This is where Ohtani becomes illustrative. It is not simply his individual brilliance that drives his global reach, but also, importantly, the commercial ecosystem that surrounds him. The machinery of broadcasting, merchandising and sporting infrastructure that propelled him to international fame is boosted by digital storytelling that operates at a speed ASEAN was never designed to match.

Each time he delivers, the world seems to know at once: a home run in Los Angeles can light up screens in Tokyo, Seoul, Mexico City and Cuba within seconds. In fact, Ohtani’s return to pitching with the Dodgers was the most-watched regular-season game in MLB.TV history.

ASEAN, by contrast, works on a different clock. Its cultural diplomacy prioritises slow, incremental, steady trust-building over the fast-paced exposure that drives global cultural markets. Ohtani operates within a platform designed for an international limelight, while ASEAN’s mechanisms are structured to maintain unity within the region.

There is no question about Southeast Asia’s cultural depth. ASEAN is not lacking in genuine stories, art forms or identities. What is missing is the machinery that carries these stories outwards: production networks, commercial partnerships and platforms that enable narratives to travel beyond borders.

This is the gap where the Ohtani playbook helps illuminate: it demonstrates how cultural influence now travels through networks of production and amplification that do not exist at the regional level.

What ASEAN Can Learn

The way forward lies in empowering individuals who have the capability to carry stories across borders. Cultural diplomacy works because people become symbolic ambassadors, and the visibility generated by celebrated individuals can project a cultural message before any official programmes do.

ASEAN has this prerequisite. The shortcoming lies in the deliberate strategy to identify, support and position talents as the embodiment of Southeast Asia, rather than simply as representatives of their home countries.

The success of the Ohtani phenomenon relies on a two-way flow of talent, capital and attention. Japan sends its cultural figures to North America, and the latter reciprocates through viewership, sponsorships and cultural engagement. ASEAN frequently excels at showcasing culture but rarely at constructing these exchanges.

Sports diplomacy research repeatedly emphasises the value of this logic. Envoy programmes, bilateral training systems and mobility schemes contribute to the deepening of ties. There is plenty of room to adapt these ideas beyond just sports; think about things like joint film production grants or co-funded creative fellowships. The principle is simple: what the region shares with the world must also have a way of coming back, carrying new audiences, new networks and new momentum into Southeast Asia.

Subsequently, if recognition must circulate, then ASEAN must also reckon with the machinery that makes this possible. The commercial ecosystem that made Japanese stars in MLB possible – broadcast clips, merchandise cycles, endorsement economies and digital storytelling – is the very definition of the soft power of markets.

If ASEAN hopes to elevate its cultural profile abroad, it must rethink its cultural assets as marketable. It is through these platforms that audiences accumulate, narratives repeat and identities gain traction, ultimately turning regional heritage into a competitive advantage.

Conclusion

Ohtani’s global influence is not a lesson for ASEAN to replicate, but it indeed reveals the conditions under which cultural influence travels today. ASEAN certainly does not lack culture, talent or diversity. It merely lacks the pathways that allow these to move with momentum.

Its traditional, consensus-driven approach still matters for internal cohesion; hence, the true challenge lies in combining the two models. It remains to be seen whether ASEAN can preserve its cultural authenticity while also building an ecosystem to project its image globally. Perhaps, if baseball can travel far, ASEAN’s stories can too.

Introduction

Indonesia has consistently supported the One China policy, which views the Republic of China (Taiwan) as an inseparable part of the People’s Republic of China (China).

Recently, however, several countries have questioned the essence of the One China policy and challenged the United Nations Resolution 2758, which views the latter as “the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations.” This Resolution, which was passed in 1971, consequently removed Taiwan’s seat.

These countries maintain that the Resolution does not restrict Taiwan’s participation at the United Nations and objects to the notion that China could assert authority over Taiwan, although rising geopolitical tension might have encouraged such a position.

The Netherlands and the European Parliament are of the position that the Resolution does not entail Taiwan’s exc

Although these are the stances of certain European countries, their arguments are nonetheless valid and need to be taken into consideration.

Since the adoption of the Resolution, China has been actively promoting the “One China, Two Systems” principle, despite differing interpretations by both nations. Even in Taiwan, the two largest political parties – the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) – have distinct China engagement policies.

DPP, for instance, is pro-independence from China. Its victories in the 2016 and 2024 elections incited concerns on the mainland’s part, which has pursued the agenda of reunification. In response, DPP has consistently sought international support to enhance legitimacy and reduce its dependence on China, including in the economic sphere.

In 2016, for example, then president Tsai Ing-wen introduced the New Southbound Policy (NSP) to diversify Taiwan’s economic partners. More recently, Vice President Hsiao Bi-Khim made a rare speech in Brussels, echoing Taiwan’s values of democracy and pleading for international support.

Instances such as this have worsened relations between the two. In response, Beijing has undertaken multiple steps to lessen Taiwan’s legitimacy, such as influencing Taiwan’s allies to cut off diplomatic relations. In 2019, the Solomon Islands announced it recognises only China, prompting Tsai to state that China used dollar diplomacy to shake Solomon’s decision. Similarly, in 2024, Nauru cut off diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favour of China.

Between China and Taiwan

With mounting pressure to reinterpret the Resolution, Indonesia would be inadvertently pressured to revisit the matter as well.

Indonesia has diplomatic relations with China but also acknowledges Taiwan as a nation. Indonesia’s relationship with China has varied in history, marked by strong political ties during the Soekarno years that were suspended following China’s alleged involvement in the 1965 tragedy. Ties were restored in 1990 and have seen an upward trend since. On the other hand, Indonesia and Taiwan agreed to establish the Taipei Economic and Trade Office (TETO) in Jakarta, though this does not function as a normal embassy.

In his first overseas visit, President Prabowo Subianto reaffirmed Indonesia’s relationship with China, rehashing Indonesia’s stance with regard to Resolution 2758 and supporting China’s efforts to achieve a peaceful reunification with Taiwan. These are consistent with his predecessor’s policy, which also subscribed tosupported the One China policy. 

Indonesia and China have extensive economic relations. In 2024, Indonesia received the highest amou

At the same time, Indonesia seeks to m

Trade volume between Indonesia and Taiwan in 2024 was US$10.8 billion, far below that with China. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s investment in Indonesia, by 2024, reachedamounted to US$184 million, primarily in the tech sector.

At the same time, people-to-people relations have also improved; Taiwan hosts students who attend many top-ranked Taiwanese universities that charge lower tuition costs than European and American universities do. Taiwan is also home to Indonesian migrant workers. In 2025, the number of Indonesian migrant workers reached 313,000, up from 2024, making it one of the top sending countries for three years in a row.

Indonesia’s Stance

With the ongoing push to reinterpret the Resolution, Indonesia may soon find its position precarious, albeit marginally, especially if the geopolitical tension involving China worsens.

It would be challenging to expect countries with strong political, economic and sociocultural links to China to revise their position. They might, nonetheless, face a dilemma in which they are forced to choose between China and those seeking to reinterpret the Resolution.

The difficult position does not emanate from diplomatic or non-diplomatic relations but from pragmatic considerations. 

Since Prabowo took office, his foreign policy has demonstrated Indonesia’s intent to get closer to China. In January 2025, Indonesia officially joined BRICS, despite the previous administration’s intent to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) instead for its economic benefit.

By aligning closer with the Global South, especially Russia and China, Prabowo might have intensified the previous administration’s inclination to grow closer to these countries. A case in point: despite violent riots spreading across Indonesian cities in late August, Prabowo still made an effort to attend the 2025 China Victory Parade a few days later.

Furthermore, a leaked conversation between Prabowo and Minister of Defence Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin pointed towards the former’s commitment to mainta

Conclusion

These signs suggest that, under Prabowo’s leadership, Indonesia aims to consistently adhere to the One China policy, despite Taiwan’s efforts to rally international support. This seems to be motivated more by pragmatic considerations than a strict observation of an international norm.

Indeed, Indonesia’s position is intertwined with China’s that it is almost impossible to imagine a scenario whereby Indonesian policymakers would seek to revise this. However, this does not mean that the country cannot extend its diplomatic hands and support to Taiwan, albeit with certain constraints. Despite the awkwardness that the One China policy creates, Indonesia would always welcome cooperation with Taiwan, such as through the NSP umbrella. Finally, amid growing tensions between Japan and China over Taiwan, Prabowo will likely be pragmatic and avoid meddling in China’s internal affairs. Although the call to revisit Resolution 2758 might come in the future, Indonesia will certainly approach the subject wit

Opting for Soft Power

The South China Sea (SCS) is one of the most strategic and disputed maritime regions in the world. Territorial disputes, particularly between China and ASEAN countries, are a factor that disrupts regional stability and impacts global trade.

China’s unilateral claims and extensive land reclamation have escalated tensions with several ASEAN Member States (AMS), exposing the limits of ASEAN’s ability to maintain regional stability. Despite two decades of negotiations over a code of conduct, ASEAN’s collective response has remained weak, largely due to divergent national interests and varying levels of economic dependence on China.

These internal divisions weaken ASEAN centrality and reduce the organisation’s capacity to act as a cohesive security actor in the region.

Reliance on hard power only sharpens the existing tension over SCS. Therefore, ASEAN needs to strengthen its role by prioritising soft power through functional cooperation. This approach can strengthen trust and open opportunities for achieving sustainable political solutions.

Soft power focuses on shaping preferences through attraction

Environmental and Humanitarian Causes

Globally, soft power has proven instrumental in easing tensions, as seen in the role of the European Union’s environmental and cultural cooperation in stabilising the post-Cold War relations, or Japan’s use of development assistance and cultural diplomacy in Southeast Asia.

This approach aligns with ASEAN’s emphasis on functional cooperation as a trust-building mechanism that is not susceptible to political deadlock.

Soft power is directed at priority sectors, such as the restoration of the degraded SCS ecosystem. More than 70% of coral reefs in the South China Sea (SCS) have been damaged by reclamation, overfishing and pollution. ASEAN can encourage joint research or establish a multilateral marine park in the disputed area. This step avoids sovereignty debates while responding to ecological threats, which affect everyone, in a concrete manner. Such an initiative could foster valuable collective knowledge, guided by the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC).

Meanwhile, the maritime region sees frequent typhoons every year. ASEAN can design an emergency response protocol by making disputed islands neutral aid centres. This effort would not only provide humanitarian benefits but also build a tradition of cooperation in the region.

Furthermore, fish stocks in the region have declined by 70-90% since the 1950s due to overfishing. A joint management agreement is important for food security for all parties whose maritime interests lie in the SCS.

Intelligence Diplomacy

In addition to environmental and humanitarian cooperation, ASEAN can also utilise intelligence mechanisms to strengthen soft power diplomacy.

The Our Eyes Initiative (OEI), launched by Indonesia in 2018, should be expanded from its focus on counterterrorism to include maritime security issues, illegal fishing and grey-zone tactics in the South China Sea. If packaged as a confidence-building instrument rather than a coercive force, the OEI could provide an avenue whereby intelligence cooperation is preventive in nature and aimed at maintaining stability.

Intelligence diplomacy has the potential to complement Track 1.5 and Track 2 by offering a closed dialogue space when formal negotiations reach an impasse. Through this mechanism, ASEAN can unify perceptions of threats and strengthen regional resilience without division. This way, intelligence could also play a role in supporting ASEAN’s centrality while strengthening soft power leadership in the management of the SCS.

Furthermore, intelligence sharing on issues such as illegal fishing, maritime smuggling and grey-zone tactics supports economic security while strengthening ASEAN’s credibility as a provider of regional stability.

Indonesia’s and the Philippines’ Roles

In this regard, Indonesia, as a non-claimant in the SCS, is strategically positioned to lead this soft power agenda. Indonesia, as the largest country in ASEAN, could emerge as an honest broker and normative leader.

Several steps that Indonesia can take include: 1) promoting minilateral projects such as marine research and joint environmental programmes with selected partners; 2) strengthening the capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat to manage technical cooperation, and; 3) aligning soft power initiatives with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) to ensure consistency with the organisation’s broader strategy.

Beyond Indonesia, claimant states and involved parties could also employ soft power tools to foster trust, such as joint humanitarian response mechanisms, environmental protection initiatives and people-to-people exchanges. Expanding this approach from a national to a regional level would help reinforce ASEAN’s collective leadership and complement ongoing security dialogues, including those involving the Philippines, ASEAN chair for 2026.

The Philippines is a test case for the effectiveness of soft power. Despite winning the 2016 international arbitration, Manila continues to face pressures from China through naval maneuvers, water cannoning and laser interference with its coast guard. This situation has led to domestic demands for a firm response.

However, the Philippines could pursue a dual strategy of strengthening its defence alliance with the United St

As ASEAN chair, the Philippines would have the opportunity to strengthen regional unity by promoting deep-sea governance norms, raising maritime economic issues on the ASEAN agenda, and proposing symbolic measures such as renaming the SCS to the Southeast Asian Sea to affirm collective identity. Strengthening ASEAN’s internal funding is also important to prevent initiatives, especially those related to marine resources, from becoming dependent on external donors.

Limitations and Looking Forward

Soft power strategies are not always effective. Their goal is not to quickly resolve sovereignty conflicts but to create a more stable and manageable environment. In practical terms, functional cooperation can only succeed if it does not interfere with territorial claims, which require careful formulation and negotiation.

Every initiative must be managed by a neutral ASEAN institution and packaged as a mutual benefit. Therefore, they should not give the impression of supporting specific claims.

China might view such efforts with suspicion, perceiving them as restrictions or internationalisation issues. Conversely, China might also embrace them as a safe way to demonstrate its commitment to “mutually beneficial cooperation”. Therefore, ASEAN must be able to emphasise that this framework is inclusive and beneficial to everyone, including China.

ASEAN must actively leverage the financial resources and technical expertise of Dialogue Partners such as Japan, Australia and the European Union to strengthen its position. All initiatives must remain under ASEAN’s control and leadership. Communication must be expanded through intelligence cha

Strategic threats such as the exploitation of the seabed economy and hybrid threats, including underwater cable sabotage, must be taken more seriously. ASEAN has great collective strength, but unfortunately it is often not used properly. This potential can be realised as real regional influence under the Philippines’ leadership. Ultimately, resolving the conflict in SCS cannot be achieved solely through legal or military means because the dynamic is too complex. A more practical approach is to strengthen soft power diplomacy through the principle of ASEAN centrality. By focusing on issues and benefits for all parties, ASEAN can build trust and a culture of cooper

Pragmatic

President Prabowo Subianto’s first year in office has tested the limits of Indonesia’s diplomatic reach, despite questions about its coherence.

The country’s foreign policy now operates in an international environment more volatile than any since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Great-power rivalries have intensified, the regional order has become increasingly fragmented, and middle powers have struggled to assert their agency.

Indonesia has answered this uncertainty not with a clear doctrine but with pragmatic activism that seeks advantage wherever it can be found. The question is whether this opportunism represents adaptation or drift.

Jakarta’s conduct during Prabowo’s first year shows a steady replacement of long-standing principles with transactional reasoning. The government has entered forums that once stood at the opposite poles of world politics.

By joining BRICS while simultaneously applying for an OECD membership, Indonesia has signalled a preference for participation over persuasion. Each move delivers tactical flexibility. Nevertheless, the sum of these engagements reveals an absence of hierarchy among goals.

From Participating to Positioning

In other words, diplomacy has become a quest for position rather than a pursuit of purpose.

This shift is clear in how Indonesia manages its great power relations. Prabowo’s decision to make China his first foreign trip destination after inauguration was not merely about timing but also signalling a degree of dependence. Beijing’s role as Indonesia’s main investor and trading partner now threatens ASEAN centrality, as growing economic reliance narrows Jakarta’s capacity to lead the regional agenda and steers diplomacy away from regional cooperation.

Engagement with Washington continues but is increasingly commercial, centred on defence procurement and tariff talks rather than strategic dialogue. The United States remains a partner of necessity – not of vision – as cooperation serves sh

Between the two giants, Prabowo has pursued tactical balance without strategic design.

What Indonesia practices today could be described as selective alignment. The government builds ties issue by issue, shifting partners according to material interest.

In defence, Jakarta turns to France for prestige procurement. In infrastructure, it looks to China for capital. In multilateral arenas, it speaks of inclusivity but rarely articulates what that means.

This pattern may signify that we have entered the era of multipolar bargaining, yet it departs from Indonesia’s earlier identity as a middle power that mediated rather than traded. The moral authority once derived from non-alignment has shifted into cautious neutrality.

The Erosion of Regional Leadership

This pragmatic turn has had the most severe impact on regional diplomacy.

ASEAN, once the anchor of Indonesia’s international posture, now functions mainly as a ceremonial reference point. Prabowo’s government participates fully but rarely takes the lead.

Plans for the region’s Myanmar conundrum, the South China Sea and economic integration have proceeded without Indonesian initiative. Even during its ASEAN chairmanship, Jakarta’s diplomacy on Myanmar produced little movement beyond procedural engagement, despite the lauded initiative to introduce the Five-Point Consensus and extensive consultations.

Enduring commitment to the Consensus should not be mistaken for progressive steps in this subject, and, as a result, ASEAN’s and Indonesia’s credibilities take a hit. The perceived decline in ASEAN centrality is not the resul

Leadership has been replaced by attendance, and consensus by convenience. Indonesia’s neighbours quietly observe this absence, adjusting by pursuing their own hedging strategies rather than waiting for Jakarta to set direction. The idea of Indonesia as a first among equals has quietly dissolved into the background noise of regional diplomacy—a reality underlined by calls for Jakarta to reclaim the leadership it once embodied within ASEAN.

Indonesia’s approach to global crises follows the same logic. The president’s appearance at the Gaza peace conference was intended to be diplomatically safe; however, questions have arisen about whether his statement carries substance.

His call for balance between Palestinian independence and Israeli security echoed international platitudes rather than Indonesia’s traditional support for justice and decolonisation. The phrasing implies a false symmetry between occupier and occupied, weakening Indonesia’s commitment to anti-colonial solidarity. At home, it unsettled parts of the public who see any reference to “Israeli security” as a break from Indonesia’s historic support for Palestine and the moral idiom of the Global South.

It also confirmed that Jakarta now values acceptability over advocacy. While middle powers such as Brazil, Turkey and South Africa redefine their roles through moral entrepreneurship – mediating conflicts, advocating reform of global governance and pursuing justice in Gaza – Indonesia has chosen silence. The country that once shaped the moral vocabulary of the Global South now sounds unsure of its convictions, losing credibility among emerging powers and letting others set the normative agenda. This hesitation limits Jakarta’s capacity to shape norms, weakens its leverage in multilateral arenas and erodes its claim to post-colonial agency.

Centralisation without Coherence

Behind these choices lies a deeper structural change. The foreign ministry, once the guardian of professional diplomacy, has been overshadowed by the very president. Policy direction now flows from the palace, where a small inner circle of advisers shapes decisions. The absence of a full-time, autonomous foreign minister has weakened coherence across portfo

This centralisation has already shown its costs, from inconsistent messaging between the palace and the foreign ministry over Indonesia’s stance on Gaza to overlapping presidential announcements on defence partnerships that left diplomats struggling to maintain policy clarity.

With Prabowo at its helm, Indonesia’s external behaviour reflects individual preferences more than institutional planning. In this sense, Prabowo’s foreign policy is not incoherent by accident but by design. It concentrates authority in one office and measures success through visibility rather than results.

To its supporters, this concentration represents efficiency. They argue that Indonesia must move quickly in a competitive region and that a strong presidency ensures unity of voice.

However, unity without deliberation produces fragility. When diplomacy becomes an extension of personal command, it loses continuity. Partners find it difficult to read Jakarta’s intentions because they depend on the president’s shifting calculus rather than on stable commitments. Influence that relies on charisma tends to fade when attention shifts elsewhere.

International confidence is cumulative, not theatrical. It grows through predictability, not surprise.

Strategic transactionalism, the hallmark of Prabowo’s first year, has advantages in a fragmented order. It enables Indonesia to navigate rivalries, attract investment and maintain flexibility, but it also carries two long-term costs.

The first is conceptual. By reducing foreign policy to bargaining, Indonesia abandons the intellectual framework that once gave its diplomacy coherence. Without a guiding set of ideas, future governments risk drifting from one tactical alignment to another, eroding predictability and weakening the country’s credibility as a strategic partner.

The second is reputational. When every engagement is treated as a transaction, others respond in kind, and subsequently, trust erodes. Indonesia risks being seen as a country that is always available but rarely reliable. Over time, this perception will make partners reluctant to invest political or economic capital in deeper cooperation. It also undermines Jakarta’s ability to lead or broker consensus in regional affairs, where credibility depends as much on consistency as on capability.

The irony is that this instrumentalism emerges just as Indonesia’s objective weight appears to be increasing. Its economy continues to expand, and its diplomatic reach has widened through new memberships and partnerships. Yet, these gains remain shallow, constrained by limited institutional capacity and a lack of strategic coherence.

Material power alone does not translate into influence without an anchoring narrative. For decades, Indonesia’s global relevance came from its ability to turn its limitations into a philosophy of conduct. The language of moderation, dialogue and respect for sovereignty made it a moral middle power. Today, that narrative has thinned. Jakarta’s speeches sound fluent but empty, full of participation but short on authorship.

Conclusion

Foreign leaders and observers often describe Prabowo’s diplomacy as restless or hyperactive, but the more accurate word may be absorptive. Indonesia is absorbing the logic of other powers rather than articulating its own distinct perspective. Its leaders invoke independence yet mimic the transactionalism they claim to balance. The longer this continues, the more Indonesia’s foreign policy risks resembling a mirror rather than a compass.

In its second year, the government must decide whether to remain a flexible participant or recover its identity as a strategic actor. A coherent policy can still be pragmatic if it has clear priorities such as defence modernisation that supports regional stability, partnerships that reduce dependency and engagement that protects equality and restraint. These aims require discipline to prevent pragmatism from drifting.

Indonesia’s strength lies in its ability to bridge divided powers. To reclaim that role, Prabowo must restore institutional authority and return diplomacy to a process rather than a personality-driven approach. Continuity beyond electoral cycles will make foreign policy durable and presidential strength more credible.

One year on, Prabowo has shown that Indonesia can move quickly in every direction but not yet that it knows where it is going. The past year, indeed, brought visibility and applause, but there will be expectations for Prabowo henceforth to insert substance into his calls, petitions and speeches. A diplomacy built on transactions may endure turbulence but will not shape it. Indonesia must move from flexibility to authorship or risk remaining active yet weightless, present in every room yet absent from every decision. The test for Prabowo’s next years is not whether Indonesia can be everywhere, but whether it can be consequential anywhere.

Opening Doors

Timor-Leste is set to become a full member of ASEAN at the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur this October, terminating its longstanding accession process.

While there is an air of optimism and positive expectation – at least from the official perspective – the general reaction is more subdued. There is an uncertainty as to how an ASEAN membership can contribute to Timor-Leste’s development and improve the wellbeing of its people.

Since its formal application in 2011, Timor-Leste has been consistent and certain about opportunities and potential for development brought forth by an ASEAN membership based on economic and sociopolitical calculations.

To begin with, Timor-Leste sees that the region’s economic trend has been on an increase, from an economy valued at

With further growth to be achieved by tapping into other potential areas, including blue and digital economies, ASEAN offers boundless prospects for Timor-Leste.

Along with its vast market, the cultural diversity of the region provides a unique opportunity for Timor-Leste to showcase its unique culture and arts, giving more chances for the locals to connect with their regional peers to initiate, grow and expand businesses in this sector.

Such exposure would not only contribute to the local economy but also promote and strengthen people-to-people relations, providing a platform for the grassroots-driven development, which is also emphasised in the desired outcomes of ASEAN Master Plan on Rural Development. For Timor-Leste, strong people-to-people relations with immediate neighbouring countries is vital for its survival.

Furthermore, a small country like Timor-Leste cannot afford to navigate the dynamics of today’s world politics without being part of a regional bloc. With somewhat strained relations with Australia due to an ongoing dispute over the development of the Greater Sunrise oil field in the Timor Sea, it is in Timor-Leste’s best interest to join the bloc.

ASEAN could offer a safety net, allowing Timor-Leste to stand its ground in its engagement with Australia. An ASEAN membership provides the cushion needed for Timor-Leste to assume a strong stand regarding development options for the Greater Sunrise

On that note, joining ASEAN would also erect a degree of barrier that protects Timor-Leste from menaces emanating from neighbouring countries.

Timor-Leste is well aware that Southeast Asia’s landscape can be unpredictable and susceptible to conflict, as evidenced by the recent armed confrontation between Cambodia and Thailand and the ongoing civil war in Myanmar. Therefore, by becoming a member, Timor-Leste could shield itself from such disturbances extending to its shore.

Downsides

The benefits discussed above have merits and provide rationales for the country to join the regional bloc. However, with the accession taking place only in a matter of days, Timor-Leste must also ready itself for the challenges that will come with that membership.

Chief of that is Timor-Leste’s economy. In the last two decades, Timor-Leste has continued to rely on the money generated from its oil revenue, which has been administered through the Petroleum Fund (PF). However, the sovereign fund is under serious risks, as withdrawals from 2009 up to 2025 – flagged to finance the state’s spending – have exceeded the Estimated Sustainable Income (ESI).

According to PF’s Annual Report 2024, receipts from oil and gas since its inception amount to US$25.45bn, of which US$17.413bn, or 68% of the total, has been transferred to the state budget.

However, to date, Timor-Leste still struggles to enact a trickle-down economy, as development has not fully reached the remote parts of the country, where 71.4% of the population live. Consequently, the country remains dependent on oil revenue, a public expenditure-driven economy that lacks diversity in its portfolio.

This situation, in return, contributes to an urban-rural divide, which is signified by a higher incidence of poverty in rural areas compared to urban areas. This also means that there is still limited access to basic services and economic opportunities for the majority of the people living in the rural areas.

Timor-Leste, as such, continues to he

Worse, based on the 2022 census, 38.6% of the working-age population in rural areas have no schooling at all. If we include those that completed up to lower secondary education, the figure stands at 92.1%. This indicates a low level of educational attainment, exposing the reality that the country is far from ready to absorb the benefits that come with an ASEAN membership.

Timor-Leste, recently, has approved a number of legal instruments to comply with ASEAN requirements and conducted various capacity-building activities to prepare itself for the membership. Once it officially becomes a member, Timor-Leste must expect an increased movement of people, goods, services, investment and capital due to the ASEAN single market and production base principle.

However, a free flow of people, goods and services could expose Timor-Leste to security risks. A recent United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report gives a concrete example that Timor-Leste is vulnerable to attack from organised crime networks that use sophisticated schemes. These include the use of FDI to set up infrastructure for criminal activities and the exploitation of citizenship-by-investment schemes to carry out their criminal operations.

It also reveals that Timor-Leste does not yet have adequate legal and security systems in place to fight against organised crimes. Its regulatory environment remains weak, while its digital infrastructure and cybersecurity continue to be below average. With 42% of its people living under the poverty line, a lack of employment opportunities and an absence of a strong accountability mechanism, an ASEAN membership has the potential to expose Timor-Leste further to the risks of organised crimes from outside the country.

Backlash from ASEAN members is a potential, too.

Over the years, Timor-Leste has set itself apart through its democratic credentials, which have become its source of pride. This is supported by the assessment of Freedom House , which has rated Timor-Leste as “free” in 2025 with strong scores for political rights and civil liberties. In fact, in the Southeast Asia region, only Timor-Leste is rated as “free”, showing that it stands above others when it comes to upholding freedom and democracy.

This, however, might put Timor-Leste at odds with the rest of the grouping. For example, Timor-Leste’s charge d’affaires was expelled from Myanmar due to a meeting held between  the Timor-Leste

Such backlash could be more frequent when Timor-Leste becomes an ASEAN member due to the ASEAN principles of non-interference, quiet diplomacy and consensus-based decision-making. Timor-Leste has a choice to make in terms of keeping the prestige of maintaining its status as the most democrat

Conclusion

In the end, Timor-Leste must recognise that becoming an ASEAN member would not automatically translate into its growth. Nevertheless, it must prepare itself better to take advantage of the opportunities presented by it. Development is a long-term endeavour, and it must be initiated from within. For Timor-Leste, there is an urgent need to shift the paradigm towards development that is driven by science and backed by solid knowledge. Timor-Leste must also improve the quality of its human resources in terms of technical capacity and integrity. These two aspects will form the foundation for future development of the country, with or without ASEAN.

Introduction

The election of Prabowo Subianto as Indonesia’s president seemed to signal a new era of a more active Indonesian foreign policy, at least initially.

Previously, former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo preferred a more practical approach, treating foreign policy as a support for national development throughout his 10-year rule. Consequently, Indonesia earned the reputation of prioritising national interest over playing a significant role in global diplomacy.

Jokowi himself showed a lack of interest in the area, viewing foreign policy simply as an avenue to earn economic advantages. As he himself remarked, “What’s the point of having many friends if we only get the disadvantages? Many friends should bring many benefits.”

Prabowo, in contrast, has every intention to leave a personal mark on Indonesia’s foreign policy and to play a significant role in global diplomacy, especially as a global power broker. Throughout his campaign for presidency, he stressed the need for Indonesia to become the leader of the Global South.

Even before he was inaugurated, he already had a whirlwind global tour by visiting China, Japan, Malaysia, the Middle East, Singapore, France, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, Australia, Brunei, Laos and Thailand, all in the span of April to September 2024. He was only inaugurated in October 2024.

After he was sworn in, he went on to visit China again, followed by trips to the United States, Peru, Brazil, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates and finally Egypt, all before the end of 2024.

Beneath the dizzying foreign visits, however, there are two major problems in Prabowo’s foreign policy.

The first is the lack of strategic purpose, which analysts have sarcastically labelled as a directionless approach to diplomacy, even akin to sleepwalking, and motivated by personal ambition.

The second is its apparent neglect of ASEAN itself that, in the end, may be detrimental to Prabowo’s own ambition to become the leader of the Global South.

The (Controversial) Foreign Policy President

The concept of a “foreign policy president” is not new. Former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) was also known for his interest in foreign policy, such that he strengthened the foreign affairs unit in the State Palace into “the Presidential Staff for Foreign Affairs”, led by highly competent diplomat Dino Patti Djalal.

It was even observed that this office bypassed and usu

Prabowo, however, appointed Sugiono – a trusted, loyal career politician from his own party – to serve as his foreign minister. Sugiono notably has no foreign policy background aside from being the vice chairman for the Defence, Foreign and Information Affairs Commission of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR).

Sugiono’s appointment indicated that Prabowo desires to assert himself as the authoritative voice in Indonesia’s foreign policymaking, thus bypassing or entirely ignoring bureaucrats in the Foreign Ministry.

Prabowo’s preference to bypass bureaucracy was evident in his first three momentous foreign policy decisions in the beginning of his administration.

First, on 9 November 2024, he signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China, which acknowledges that Indonesia has an overlapping claim with China over the South China Sea. The MoU also states an agreement by both to jointly develop the disputed area.

Tempo, a respected Indonesian news magazine, report

Not surprisingly, this decision proved to be controversial and caused an uproar, forcing the Foreign Ministry to issue a clarification that Indonesia has not recognised China’s claim in the South China Sea.

In a stroke of a pen, by ignoring the bureaucrats, Prabowo managed to undermine Indonesia’s decades of foreign policy position in pursuit of economic benefits, an action that may come at the expense of ASEAN, an important cornerstone in Indonesia’s foreign policy.

ASEAN Abandoned?

The second momentous foreign policy decision was Foreign Minister Sugiono’s decision to skip the Informal ASEAN Foreign Minister’s Meeting that took place in Bangkok on 20 December 2024 in order to accompany Prabowo on his state visit to Egypt. This prompted the local English-language newspaper The Jakarta Post to ask whether Indonesia was abandoning ASEAN.

Granted, Prabowo did attend the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur on 26 May 2025, where he declared ASEAN as one of the most successful organisations in the world and stressed the need to safeguard its centrality and cohesiveness.

His actions, however, did not support his statements.

Sugiono’s absence from such a crucial meeting, coupled with the aforementioned joint statement that undermined ASEAN’s common position in the Code of Conduct negotiation with China, sends strong signals that Prabowo is not taking ASEAN seriously.

But this is not something that should be considered as a surprising revelation.

ASEAN was not even featured prominently and positively during the presidential candidate debate on 7 January 2024, with Prabowo conspicuously not mentioning ASEAN at all. Ganjar Pranowo, another candidate, did stress the need for ASEAN to be fixed due to its sluggishness.

The question, of course, is whether Prabowo, who ended up winnin

It is not surprising that many would question the value of ASEAN, considering its reputation as just a talk shop and its sluggishness in its decision-making process. One analyst bluntly calls it boring.

It cannot be ignored that ASEAN still serves an important function in Southeast Asia, notably in aligning the national priorities of its member states so that they share a common interest on a particular issue. This, however, requires a heavy lifting from whoever wants to advance their agenda.

As the largest country in Southeast Asia with an established legacy of leadership, Indonesia has the unique position of becoming a natural leader of ASEAN, especially with everyone in ASEAN implicitly acknowledging that the grouping simply could not function without Indonesia’s participation.

Essentially, Indonesia could influence ASEAN by simply being present in its events and functions. Even during years of Jokowi’s administration, despite his indifference, he still let Retno Marsudi, then foreign minister, maintain Indonesia’s active participation in ASEAN. She managed to strengthen Indonesia’s position and advance Indonesia’s agenda,

Granted that these two were driven more by a lack of alternatives than a coherent national strategy. Still, they served Indonesia’s interest, notably to unite Southeast Asian nations in order to prevent the region – and especially itself – from being dragged into a conflict that it does not want due to the growing tension between the United States and China.

Therefore, regardless of Prabowo’s declaration, his actions speak louder than his words. By not spending necessary time and political capital in ASEAN, Prabowo ends up neglecting Indonesia’s leadership, allowing other countries in Southeast Asia to take over the mantle and push their own agenda.

Without Indonesia’s leadership, ASEAN risks becoming irrelevant, pushing member states to seek support and network outside the region, thus undermining Indonesia’s own power and leadership in the region.

A Piece of BRICS

Prabowo’s third momentous foreign policy decision was his decision for Indonesia to join BRICS.

For many years, BRICS – a loose bloc of states then comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, whose goal was to build an alternative multilateral institution that was not dominated by Western nations – had been extending its membership invitation to Indonesia.

The invitation was initially refused during the Jokowi administration due to the fact that there was no clear benefit in joining BRICS economically, while the political cost due to the backlash from the West was quite certain.

Not long after Prabowo’s inauguration, however, the invitation was accepted, with Prabowo sending Sugiono to attend the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, on 24 October 2024. Sugiono later justified the decision to join BRICS as a manifestation of Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy as well as motivated by potential economic benefits.

From an economic perspective, this decision is actually questionable.

It is a fact that BRICS is a group of states with economic problems. Russia is under an embargo by the European states due to its invasion of Ukraine. South Africa is facing an economic stagnation. Brazil is equally experiencing economic problems. China is facing a trade war with the United States and sluggish consumer spending. India is perhaps the only one in better shape, but it is lagging way behind China economically.

Moreover, at this point, trade between members of BRICS is actually not that robust, with most intra-trade between member states coming from their trade with China. Considering the fact that China has already been Indonesia’s main trade partner, it is questionable how much extra benefit Indonesia could gain from joining BRICS.

But Sugiono’s most crucial justification, which is as a manifestation of Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy, does not hold water. In light of global political instability caused by the US-China tension and the invasion of Ukraine, Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS can and will be construed as Indonesia finally picking a side.

This suspicion is further reinforced after Prabowo decided to skip the G7 Conference in Canada to visit President Vladimir Putin in Russia instead. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the BRICS Summit in Brazil on 6-7 July 2025, President Trump started putting pressure on BRICS, threatening to slap a 10% levy on imports from member countries despite Indonesia’s protestation that the Summit did not aim to antagonise the United States.

A New Foreign Policy

Prabowo has all the intentions to finally place Indonesia at the centre stage of global politics and as a Global South leader. This is not something to be criticised for. Rather, it is high time for Indonesia to act like a global leader in light of global instability, the United States’ decision to scale down its role in global affairs and the desire of many nations, including Indonesia, for a more equitable global order.

The problem is in its execution. Prabowo’s whirlwind global tour has no strategic logic behind it. Indonesia simply shows up without any clear p

In fact, Prabowo should play with the cards that Indonesia currently owns. For example, Indonesia should play to its strengths as the ASEAN leader and a bridge between competing blocs.

Furthermore, Indonesia should invest time, energy and political capital into issues where Indonesia can and does make strong impacts. Forget the idea of being a global peacemaker that could end Israel’s continuing war in Gaza and genocide of the Palestinians, that is not supported by the majority of Israelis themselves,  or Russia’s barbaric invasion of Ukraine. Neither Benjamin Netanyahu nor Putin will listen to Prabowo.

Instead, Indonesia should look at troubles closer to home.

The risk of ASEAN becoming more and more irrelevant is becoming higher. The management of the Mekong River remains rife with conflict. Border clashes between Cambodia and Thailand. The Philippines is slowly drifting away from ASEAN – and therefore Indonesia’s influence – and becoming closer to the United States due to the lack of support for its stance in the West Philippines Sea.

Myanmar remains a mess, with its government mistreating its population, creating more regional instability. Relationships with Australia and New Zealand are ripe for more strengthening, especially in light of Trump’s mistreatment of his erstwhile allies. Meanwhile, the ongoing cross-strait crisis in Taiwan demands more attention from Southeast