Introduction

Since the introduction of information technology and the Internet, radicalisation and violent extremism (VE) have transcended from the real world to cyberspace. Moreover, the on-going COVID-19 pandemic has also facilitated an increase in online radicalisation at the comforts of their own homes including in Malaysia.

Despite the lockdowns, there must be continued, or even heightened, vigilance as VE is seemingly unaffected by the pandemic. Instead, violent extremists have exploited trauma and disruptionsstemming from the pandemic.  Unfortunately, such trauma and disruptions provide fertile ground for extremist propaganda to manifest, potentially leading to radicalisation. A case in point is the recent attack in a New Zealand supermarket by an Islamic State (IS) sympathizer which demonstrates how IS ideology still appeals to disgruntled Muslims residing in western countries. Worryingly, this is overlayed with fears of a resurgence of bloodshed in the wake of the Taliban’s announcement of an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan.

VE groups have broadened their narratives surrounding the pandemic situation. Here, three new narratives are highlighted: 1) The notion of deeming those who are radicalized as contagious and can spread via simple human interactions. Such notion heightens stigmatization rather than encouraging engagements and interventions with such individuals. 2) Exploiting the mistrust, unhappiness, and mutual grievances from the pandemic to pique the interests of potential members and reinforce current members worldview. 3) Generation of symbols and conspiracy theories amidst the uncertainties of the pandemic.

The traditional approach to preventing and countering VE has always been through hard modalities such as the law, policies, and regulations. However, considering the current pandemic, key actors within the community and the nuclear family unit should also be responsible for preventing and countering VE. One such endeavour would be the community’s provision of support to vulnerable individuals such as youths. However, this is no simple task as technological advancement has allowed vulnerable individuals to shut themselves off from the physical world, trapping them in online echo chambers that could prepare them for violence. The following sections outline the rigid approach taken by Malaysia in dealing with violent extremism, both online and offline.

Hard Approach –Legal Measures

In the war against terror, Malaysia had passed two significant legislations, namely the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015 (POTA) and the Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act 2015 (SMATA). Like others, Malaysia focused on mitigating VE by incorporating laws, regulations and policies. The POTA 2015, which was enacted under Article 149 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution, allows Malaysian authorities to imprison terror suspects without charge for two years without a trial and the possibility of judicial review [Section 13(1)(b)]. The incarceration, however, will be reviewed by the King-appointed Prevention of Terrorism Board [Section 19(1)]. SOSMA is another law created to deal with VE and is a preventive statute that was enacted to safeguard residents’ lives and properties. The Act establishes unique procedures for dealing with security offences and recognises the considerable threats that terrorism, sabotage, and espionage pose to internal security and public order.

In 2007, the Penal Code was revised to cover terrorism-related offences under Chapter VIA. Performing terrorist actions (Section 130C), giving devices to terrorist groups (Section 130D), recruiting terrorists or participating in terrorist acts (Section 130E), providing training and guidance to terrorist groups, and those committing terrorist acts were cited as new offences among others (Section 130F). The Criminal Procedure Code was also changed in light of the new anti-terrorism provision in the Penal Code, granting the police and the Public Prosecutor a broad range of investigative authorities, including the ability to intercept communications. Sections 106A and 106C gave authorities the power to intercept, hold, and open mail and messages sent by telecommunications, with any intercepted communications becoming admissible as evidence in terrorism trials. Without proper human rights, content-based safeguards, these powers could be used with a low threshold of proof. A criticism of such powers is that, if they are based on these unconstrained definitions, investigations into alleged terrorist activities that are defined broadly could lead to a slew of civil liberty violations.

Soft Approach and Public Engagements

The war on terror has always been military detention and neutralisation of terrorists. However, it is ideal to complement such hard approach with a de-radicalisation strategy or soft approach focused more on human security than national security. This strategy would target marginalised communities that are vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist groups. Thus, the role of communities in preventing and responding to terrorism has been prominent in current government strategies.                                                                                                            One non-legal measure in preventing VE is engaging non-governmental actors, the private sector and academics while providing knowledge for the push and pull factors in terrorist recruitment. Another preventive measure is the counter-propaganda strategy, which aims to confront disinformation campaigns and promote non-violent values by providing counter and alternative narratives. A community can also attain a similar sense of security provided by the government, albeit from a different method such as the softer approaches, including defining mainstream boundaries through creating acceptable boundaries and passive observation of the environment to ensure compliance. In other words, community policing. Though similar to the rigid approach through securitisation, communities can achieve the same outcome via social justice.

Public engagement efforts include a wide range of initiatives, such as actively involving communities, schools, universities, youth agencies, police, and families of violent offenders and those considered at risk of radicalisation. Together with Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Singapore, Malaysia has state-sponsored de-radicalisation programs that provide counter-terrorism intervention for mid-ranking and grassroots members of radical organisations .Support ranges from various mechanisms such as mentoring, life skills, skills counselling, anger management training, education opportunities, sports, job placement/employment assistance, family support, drug or alcohol rehabilitation program and housing support. Such integration of soft and hard legal approaches to oppose extremist ideologies and ideas with proper guidance and vital religious precepts is reported to achieve a high success rate of 97.5 per cent.

In early 2016, Malaysia also built a counter-messaging centre intended to erode IS’s appeal by exposing the group’s message of hate and violence while also promoting inclusiveness. Furthermore, in an attempt to harmonise a softer approach, the National Security Council (NSC) created the Counter-Terrorism Policy in 2017, which emphasises five points, namely condemning all forms of terrorism, guaranteeing security for hostages’ lives and properties, prioritising negotiated solutions, avoiding hostage exchanges to settle the problem, and striking action as a last resort if negotiations fail. However, despite non-legal preventive actions or bottom-up strategy, Malaysia, unlike Indonesia, appears to place greater emphasis on securitisation mechanisms or a law enforcement-centric approach rather than close partnership with civil society.

Conclusion

Combatting violent extremism would be effective with the inclusion of community and civil society. However, relying on a rigid approach or securitisation by the government alone would be problematic to prevent and counter violent extremism. Therefore, legal and non-legal approaches must be in synergy to effectively counter and prevent terrorism. Such synergy would lead to more public-private sector and civil society collaboration and cooperation. Furthermore, before communities can rebuild their faith and trust in government, governments must put their faith and trust in them. If and when this occurs, community-based counterterrorism will become more common and effective. Perhaps the time has come for the government to realise the potential of the community as a whole in countering the narratives of violent extremism. If there is one thing that we can learn from this pandemic, terrorism will always find ways to evolve.

Introduction

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the spread of violent extremist ideology has increased. Because of social restrictions, there has been a shift in tactics used by violent extremists to spread their ideologies and conduct their activities. For instance, violent extremist organizations are now more reliant on technology and social media to spread their ideologies. Also, the pandemic has altered the domestic threat landscape and provided a platform for people of various ideologies to openly advance agendas and propagate justifications for radical and nationalistic misinformation, fake news, and conspiracy theories. The potential rise in online terrorist content and a broader acceptance of it, ostensibly due to the significant number of lives affected by the pandemic, increases the chances of radicalization. Unfortunately, Malaysia is not spared from this threat.

Trends of Radicalization during COVID-19

The internet is a double-edged sword. While increasing access to knowledge, it also promotes radicalization and indoctrination through digital media. Its low cost, dynamic, globally-connected, and decentralized networks facilitate online radicalization. Additionally, the emergence of technology has created pathways for diverse ideologies to take root. Social media, for example, serves as a tool for jihadi recruitment. From personal interviews with local law enforcement agencies, Malaysia is experiencing similar trends.

Since 2019, violent extremist groups have exploited the prevailing pandemic to advance their cause. Violent extremists are riding on the rising public anger due to the pandemic towards governments. By leveraging on this public anger while providing “solutions”, violent extremist groups intend to increase opportunities to overthrow governments while increasing public support for themselves. Not only does the pandemic aid violent extremist groups in their attempts to destabilize national security, but it is also an opportune time for groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) to rebuild after years of counterterrorism efforts against them.

Additionally, violent extremist groups have adapted their narratives around the pandemic. There is a growing sentiment that radicalized individuals are contagious and can spread the “disease” through interactions like the coronavirus. Unfortunately, this breeds mistrust towards specific communities, establishing the fertile ground for recruitment by violent extremist groups. Such groups would exploit the mistrust and mutual grievances to garner support from potential recruits while reinforcing their members’ worldviews.

This phenomenon is also experienced in Muslim-majority Malaysia particularly in certain Malay communities. These communities generally propagate the belief that COVID-19 is “God’s punishment” for those who do not share their ideologies. They also propagate anti-vaccine propaganda.

Malaysia is currently facing threats from several violent extremist groups, including Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Abu Sayyaf Group, and IS. Additionally, Malaysia’s political instability has exposed the country to the possibility of politically-driven radicalization, in addition to religious-based extremism. Noteworthily, politically-driven radicalization has yet to culminate to terrorism in Malaysia. From personal interviews, the authors found that in Malaysia, such radicalization is connected with a range of issues, including politics, religion, race and gender relations, and the government’s failure to manage the pandemic effectively.

The abrupt change of government in Malaysia has also created several uncertainties, affecting the drafting and implementation of P/CVE policies by government agencies such as the police and intelligence. The change of government has led to a change in priorities and agenda within the new government. The new government has shifted their focus from hard policing to soft policing and has called for the participation of civil society to join the government in being first responders of radicalization and terrorist attacks. Malaysia is also concerned about JI leader Abu Bakar Bashir in Indonesia as his release might reactivate JI networks in Malaysia. Currently, the JI network in Malaysia has shifted its allegiance to IS-linked groups in Southeast Asia and have decentralized cells operating in both online and offline domains.

The nexus between violent extremism developments in Indonesia and Malaysia is evident. In the latest Indonesian church bombing in March 2021, Malaysian sympathizers have supported calls for more powerful bombs to be used for future attacks in their social media accounts which includes both Malaysian and Indonesian followers. As Indonesian extremists target the police and non-Muslims, there is a possibility that the Malaysian followers may adopt such notions, potentially leading to the police and non-Muslims being targeted in Malaysia.

Furthermore, prior to COVID-19, there was an increasing trend of violent extremism in East Malaysia due to the increasing support for such groups in Sabah and the southern Philippines. These groups have established Tawau and Sandakan in Sabah as new transit points for their entry into Southern Philippines and Myanmar. Users of these transit points include both Malaysians and foreigners of diverse nationalities including those from distant conflict zones. The list of those arrested includes Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iraq, Myanmar, the Philippines, Turkey, Yemen and Xinjiang.   It is likely that these transit points will be utilized again once travel restrictions are lifted. In addressing this growing threat from its citizens and foreigners, the Malaysian government has ratified the international treaties on terrorism from the United Nations Security Council Standing Committee on Terrorism.

The Malaysian government has supported other international efforts to combat violent extremism. This includes supporting ASEAN’s collaboration with Canada and Russia to combat International Terrorism and the establishment of the ASIA-Europe meeting (ASEM), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Counter-Terrorism Taskforce and Commonwealth Committee on Terrorism (CCT).  Malaysia has also supported regional efforts, including the ASEAN Political and Security Blueprint (2015-2025), The 2017 Manila Declaration, and the ASEAN Plan of Action to Prevent and Counter the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism (ASEAN PoA PCRVE). One notable international initiative that Malaysia developed was the 2015 Langkawi Declaration on the Global Movement of Moderates. This declaration outlines measures to promote moderation and curb extremism globally. Malaysia’s support for these initiatives stems from its long history of grievances concerning the political, economic, racial, ethnic, and religious and ease of spreading hate-related ideologies.

Malaysian Legal Landscape and Threat of Terrorism

To combat violent extremism in Malaysia, the government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) and the Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act (SMATA) in 2015. These legislations adhere closely to UNSC 2178.  Previously, in 2012, the Internal Security Act of 1960 (ISA), widely used for violent extremism offences, was replaced by the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) 2012. The difference between SOSMA and POTA is that the former is a procedural law while the latter is a detention law.

SOSMA, in lieu of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), governs the procedures for arrest, temporary detention, investigation, and trial of an individual in cases involving offences against the state, terrorism, organized crime, and human trafficking. In other words, SOSMA is explicitly used for violent extremism cases, while CPC is used for general offences. Notably, in 2007, Chapter VIA was added to the Penal Code to address security concerns related to violent extremism and espionage.

Despite these general laws in addressing terrorism, upholding the rule of law remains challenging particularly during COVID-19. Violent extremists have sought to profit from disturbances caused by COVID-19 by riding the wavetops of divisiveness and hate speech, magnified by the pandemic. The threat has become even more challenging to contain, as low-cost, low-tech attacks against soft targets by so-called lone wolves have become increasingly prevalent. Since 2020, only seven have been arrested for violent extremism offences. However, only four people were charged, with the rest released due to lack of evidence. According to the authors’ interviews with law enforcement officials, the pandemic was initially seen as a blessing in disguise as violent extremists in Malaysia were seemingly more concerned about sustaining their daily lives than conducting attacks. However, as aforementioned, the pandemic awards terrorist groups here time to rebuild, readying them for attacks. Any attacks conducted in the short-term will be particularly detrimental for Malaysia as the country is reeling from 1) high COVID-19 infection rates, 2) political instability, and 3) economic downturn due to the pandemic.

Additionally, the travel and social restrictions seemingly have an added effect of reducing the number of attacks in Malaysia. Coincidentally, the number of violent extremism-related arrests have also reduced during this period. However, the actual threat of violent extremism should not be measured by the number of arrests or a rule-based approach. Instead, an indicator should be based on monitoring social media platforms and social messaging platforms commonly used by violent extremist groups such as Facebook, Telegram and WhatsApp. Based on personal interviews with Normah Ishak, Malaysia’s first female counterterrorism chief, the Malaysian Special Branch will continue this policy of active monitoring under her leadership to maintain peace and security in the country.

The Malaysian law enforcement authorities (LEAs) have also adopted a soft approach in mitigating this threat. This was implemented in 2016 by Datuk Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay, Normah Ishak’s predecessor. The Religious Rehabilitation Program that was subsequently developed is based on reeducation and rehabilitation of those found guilty of violent extremism. Reeducation is aimed at correcting political and religious misconceptions while rehabilitation entails comprehensive monitoring of these individuals following their release. Additionally, upon their release, these individuals will be assisted in their reintegration into society. From personal interviews with the authors, LEA officials shared their belief that as with general crime offenders, convicted violent extremists should be given a second chance at life. A soft approach would better serve to convince these offenders to give up their pursuit of violence.

Facilitating this second chance highlights the need to involve other stakeholders such as religious, educational, cultural, and youth leaders. Additionally, to enhance detection of violent extremism, these stakeholders should be given appropriate training to pick up any red flags within their localities. This stems from the importance of community and society-based monitoring.

Nationally, the Ministry of Home Affairs’ pending national action plan is crucial in aiding and guiding the approach taken by relevant LEAs. Taking a soft approach is clearly in tandem with the growing danger of lone-wolf attacks, which are more challenging to detect. By involving the community, early intervention is possible as they would be the first to identify any indications of would-be violent extremists.