Introduction

Ismail Sabri took the oath of office as Prime Minister of Malaysia on 22 August 2021 before His Majesty the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, six days after the resignation of Muhyiddin Yassin and his Cabinet. Muhyiddin’s 17-months administration was unstable from the start because of the diverse interests among the loose Perikatan Nasional (PN, National Alliance) coalition members, particularly the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO).

Following Muhyiddin’s resignation, the Agong requested that members of parliament (MPs) submit their statutory declaration on their choice of a new PM. Despite underlying distrusts, the components of the former PN nominated UMNO’s Ismail Sabri as the PM and were united in rejecting opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim and his ally, the Democratic Action Party (DAP).

Circulation of Elites, Malaysian-Style

The days that immediately followed Muhyiddin’s resignation were filled with strategies among the MPs to name a candidate that would have a majority support. Notably, the components of the loose coalition—Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front), PN, Sarawak-based Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS, Sarawak Parties Alliance), and four independent MPs—were not willing to support a candidate from outside this arrangement.

UMNO, with the largest number of MPs, nominated Ismail Sabri Yaakob, the former deputy prime minister who was acceptable to the other components in the coalition. In terms of UMNO’s hierarchy, two other leaders are above Ismail but the president, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi is facing corruption charges in court, while the deputy president, Mohamad Hasan is not a member of parliament. Ismail, thus, seemed to be the person at the right place and the right time. With 114 members supporting him, Ismail has a thin majority in a Dewan Rakyat(the house of representatives) of 222 members.

Ismail’s appointment as the PM marked the return of UMNO to the country’s leadership after a 38 -month absence from the office. He is also the third PM appointed after the 14^th general elections in 2018 that removed UMNO-BN from power. His appointment was the result of defectionsfrom Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (BERSATU, Malaysian United Indigenous Party) and some MPs from Pakatan Harapan (PH, Alliance of Hope) in February 2020.

The return of UMNO to the office of prime minister is a case of circulation of elites in Malaysian politics. The Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto (d. 1923) suggests that no matter who takes over the political office, it is in fact a circulation of elites. This theory explains that the elites, not the ordinary people, are the real determinants of the government. Whether a regime change is done through elections or other means, it is a group of elites who is replacing another. The role of the people in general is just as supporters to the elites.

In the Malaysian context, the elites have been from the same party since its independence, except between May 2018 to February 2020, where leaders from PH filled the executive offices. Even then, the prime minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad was once the president of UMNO. His successor from PN, Muhyiddin Yassin was also an UMNO deputy president who was sacked in June 2016 for alleged insubordination to the then president, Najib Abdul Razak.

Contextualising Ismail Sabri’s Cabinet

Support for Ismail Sabri’s premiership came from the same MPs who initially supported Muhyiddin. The latter lost his support from 14 UMNO MPs who reasoned that they could no longer support Muhyiddin for his insolence towards the Agong’s decree that the emergency ordinances be laid and debated in parliament before the emergency ended on 1 August 2021.

BERSATU’s immediate response following the resignation of Muhyiddin was to sustain the Malay-Muslim unity government that it had worked on establishing since February 2020, but at the same time ensure that UMNO leaders who are tainted with corruption charges would not be part of the new Cabinet. The party also demandedthat the post of deputy prime minister be held by one of its senior leaders.

Prime Minister Ismail had the same pool of leaders as Muhyiddin’s to choose his Cabinet from, namely the 114 MPs who supported his nomination as the PM. Public sentiment also ruled out a number of UMNO MPs who were facing corruption charges in court, including former PM Najib Abdul Razak and UMNO’s president, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi. His Cabinet should also be inclusive with representatives from different ethnic groups and East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak.

These conditions limited Ismail’s choices for his Cabinet and thus unsurprisingly, his Cabinet would not look too different from his predecessor’s. There were only a few non-Malay BN MPs to choose from; two ethnic Chinese and one Indian in its ranks. For Sabah and Sarawak, however, there is enough ethnic diversity for Ismail to choose his Cabinet members from.

New Cabinet: More of the Same

Prime Minister Ismail announced his Cabinet on 27 August 2021, comprising of the same number of 31 ministers and 38 deputy ministers as his predecessor. He also avoided controversy or even infighting within UMNO by not nominating a deputy prime minister. It seemed that anyone he nominates from BERSATU—which may be necessary to keep his PM’s position—would not be acceptable to UMNO, which may jeopardise his already fragile position.

Muhyiddin’s earlier template of having four senior ministers was retained, with the same personnel except for Hishammuddin Hussein Onn who took over the position vacated by Ismail Sabri. The Cabinet size was not trimmed despite criticisms of it being oversized. In Prime Minister Ismail’s case, he needed to have representations from the allieswho supported his appointment.

The Cabinet’s most notable appointment was Khairy Jamaluddin as the Minister of Health. Formerly the Minister of Science, Technology and Innovation, Khairy overshadowed the then health minister in his capacity as the Head of the Special Committee for Ensuring Access to COVID-19 Vaccine Supply (JKJAV—Jawatankuasa Khas Jaminan Akses Bekalan Vaksin COVID-19). Furthermore, Ismail Sabri also retained Tengku Zafrul Tengku Abdul Aziz as the Minister of Finance amid demands that the position be given to UMNO.

Of Muhyiddin’s Cabinet members, five were not re-nominated. Ismail instead named five new ministers, three of them senior UMNO leaders who were also ministers in previous administrations—Mahdzir Khalid, Noh Omar and Shahidan Kasim. Again, this emphasizes Ismail’s limited options. Politically, UMNO has slightly increased its representation in Cabinet. More importantly, Ismail has managed to build his power base for a possible challenge to the party’s top leadership in the next party’s election that is scheduled to be held before 29 December 2022.

Despite the uncertainties over the resignation of Muhyiddin Yassin as prime minister, the events that followed were anti-climactic. The Cabinet line-up largely consisted of the same people, with some changes in portfolios. In fact, this new Cabinet is nothing more than a Cabinet reshuffle. To gain Malaysian’s trust, Prime Minister Ismail requires them to prove their initial performance within the first 100 days. The question is: can the recycled Cabinet, most of whom were ministers since March 2020 with diverse results, deliver better performance in their first 100 days with Ismail Sabri?

Introduction

Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin’s resignation on 16 August 2021 made him the shortest-serving prime minister in Malaysian history. He will be remembered mostly for his failures in managing the country’s health and economic crises.

Back in March 2020, when Malaysia began its battle against the Covid-19 pandemic, Muhyiddin took over the elected government, on the pretext that the incumbent had failed to address people’s grievances. With the support of some PKR (Parti Keadilan Rakyat—People’s Justice Party) rebels, he convinced the Agong that he had the majority.

Rocky Administration from the Start

His administration was largely Malay-Muslim, since his Perikatan Nasional (PN—National Alliance) coalition did not have many Chinese and Indian representatives. That government promised to be inclusive, yet the cabinet composition was anything but.

The government was also treading on dangerous grounds when it decided to work with the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), when some of its leaders were facing corruption charges. It was rocky from the start because it could not sufficiently satisfy politicians in UMNO seeking to be freed of such charges.

His government also included Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam se-Malaysia—PAS), the conservative Islamist party that fiercely opposed Pakatan Harapan, which it painted as liberal and anti-Islam. Muhyiddin’s Malay credentials went way back before the 14th General Election in 2018 when he wanted PAS to be part of the electoral pact against UMNO, which PAS refused because of its opposition to DAP. Tun Dr. Mahathir overruled that attempt and decided to align Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Malaysian United Indigenous Party—Bersatu) with Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope).

In its early days, Muhyiddin’s administration managed to address the perception that Malay rights were under threat. With a largely Malay cabinet, some rightist concerns were managed.

His cabinet was however bloated, with 72 ministers and deputy ministers, mainly consisting of those who aligned with PN. Those who were not given cabinet positions were appointed chairman in government-linked companies. In a leaked audio of a meeting, he was heard saying that this is part of a “scheme of things” to solidify his majority in the government. Conspicuously missing from these positions were UMNO leaders facing court cases.

On the administration front, the government was unfortunate to have had to channel most of its energy fire-fighting the Covid-19 pandemic. Its early responses were admirable because the virus was relatively contained. However, it faced the dilemma of balancing life and livelihood. The relief and stimulus packages that his administration offered, while not a total failure, were simply inadequate in easing the people’s hardship. Unfortunately, infection rates soared when his administration reopened some economic sectors after the movement control.

When his allies in Sabah tried to overthrow the Parti Warisan Sabah (Sabah Heritage Party)-led government, the Chief Minister responded by dissolving the assembly, consequently forcing a state election. Though Muhyiddin’s alliance of parties managed to narrowly win this state election, it came at a hefty cost with little gains. From this victory, he was able to install his party man to be the new chief minister. But this win was marred by a new wave of Covid-19 infections due to large-scale election campaigning. This provided the opposition ammunition to attack his leadership on the pretext that he was only interested in consolidating his power at all cost.

This power struggle is also evident in state assemblies. In some states, he managed to get Bersatu to hold onto power, but in several others like Malacca, Bersatu ceded control to UMNO. UMNO also managed to replace Bersatu for state leadership in Johor and Perak.

Failing to Legitimise his Power

Muhyiddin had failed in implementing an effective pandemic management which could have helped legitimise his power. Additionally, his administration was quick to claim credit when infection rates declined but were equally quick to blame the people for not adhering to safety and hygiene protocols when infection rates soared.

Muhyiddin also tried to project an image of a likeable PM but was not receptive to opposition. His attempts to silence the opposition included short parliamentary sittings and thwarting any attempts to test his majority via a speaker who would do everything to deny a confidence motion.

Meanwhile, UMNO—at least the faction aligned with its president, Zahid Hamidi—began to show displeasure at the Muhyiddin-led government. Both Zahid and former PM Najib Razak were still facing court cases. Najib had also previously been convicted of corruption. UMNO began to highlight the failures of the government in managing the disease and economic crisis, and distanced itself from the government, even when most of the ministers addressing these issues were from UMNO.

To further his consolidation of power, Muhyiddin successfully declared National Emergency on his second attempt with the Malaysia’s King also known as Agong. Through this, he suspended parliament until the Agong decreed in July 2021 that it should be held before the emergency ended. To Muhyiddin’s advantage, he planned the session to entail only briefings instead of the normal sitting.

It is ironic that someone claiming to uphold Malay special position is in direct confrontation with the palace, but Muhyiddin did just that. It was also unprecedented that the Agong had to ask the speaker of the Dewan Rakyat for the speaker’s confidence in the PM. The Agong had no choice but to do so as the direct confrontation was publicly carried out.

Despite the pressure coming from the palace, Muhyiddin still wanted to cling on to power. As his last resort, he offered to carry out reforms not dissimilar to what Pakatan Harapan had wanted to do. Unfortunately for him, this was too little too late.

Towards the end of his premiership, he showed that he had lost touch with the ground. When UMNO made a firm decision to withdraw its support from PN with 14 of its members writing to the King to state their withdrawal, it was clear that his days were numbered. Two of his ministers from UMNO resigned. Instead of shoring up support and filling these vacancies, he appointed Ahmad Faizal Azumu, former MB of Perak who was overthrown by UMNO, as his adviser with a ministerial status.

On several occasions, he has also shown his insensitivities with the people’s plight. When civil society started a campaign to ask people in economic distress to fly a white flag if they are in need of food or other assistance, his response was that there was no need to, because his government’s assistance was already adequate. He even jokingly said that they should fly the dark blue flag (which is PN’s colour). Despite his public relations campaign of being everyone’s “Abah” or “father”, he somehow had projected himself as arrogant and insensitive.

He had his chances, but from the beginning, his flirting with UMNO was nothing but a political suicide. He should have seen it coming. After all, it was UMNO that sacked him.