A Four-Part Series on Extremism and Online Recruitment – Part 4: Mothers and the Internet

Introduction

On Sunday, 28 March 2021, a bomb was detonated in front of the Sacred Heart of Jesus Cathedral in Makassar, South Sulawesi. A newlywed couple, Lukman and Yogi, added themselves to the long lists of suicide bombers in the country. Since the era of Jama’ah Islamiyah, families in Indonesia have been encouraged to participate in terrorism.  Previously,  marriage alliances among jihadists was one of the primary institutions to protect the sustainability of the terrorist organisation and its networks, including the production of next generation mujaheddins. In such circumstances, women simply played the role of child bearing and rearing.

However, women are increasingly playing greater roles in terrorism, demonstrating gender equality between men and women. Additionally, women continue to make significant non-military contributions such as propagandists, recruiters, facilitators, enablers, and as wives and mothers. To confound matters, technological advancement can contribute to the radicalization of children. Children are, thus, caught in between their mother’s influence and that from the internet.

The Increasing Roles of Mothers as a Source of Influence

Mothers have been suggested to employ ‘a robust and methodical indoctrination infrastructure’ to envision their children to strive for the establishment of a caliphate.  Here, mothers play two critical roles.

First, mothers strongly embrace the transmission of ideology to their children. Indirectly, through their commitment to such ideology or organization, mothers and fathers can influence the behaviours of their children who would constantly imitate their parents. This demonstrates   why families are a primary avenue for developing individuals’ social and psychological attributes.

Second, mothers not only represent role models for their children to imitate, but mothers also can effectively persuade their children to comply with the religious responsibility of taking part in jihad. Interviews with the children whose families were involved in the series of suicide bombing in Surabaya in 2018 found that they became attracted to violent ideology through their parents. Notably, their mothers force-fed the children to watch videos depicting the violence that occurred in countries such as Syria, Iraq, and France. As these children were intentionally home-schooled, their mothers indoctrinated them with their ideologies while encouraging them to seek martyrdom. Unfortunately, as evident from these bombings, children are deemed by terrorist organizations in Indonesia to be effective tools for conducting terrorist operations.

Three Significant Ways Terrorists Use the Internet

The increasing roles of mothers and the growing involvement of children in terrorism benefit from technological advancement such as the internet and social media. In general, the internet has been significantly used by terrorist groups in three ways.

First, the internet enables active indoctrination by parents through online platforms that enable access to extremist videos and contents. As seen in the Surabaya bombings, mothers could extensively utilise the visual method of learning through videos for teaching radical values to their home-schooled children. They teach their children to watch such videos routinely and quote the contents as references for their children’s life norm lessons.

Second, terrorist groups extensively use the internet to recruit children and to build the children’s capabilities. There has been an increasing trend of using digital platforms as a breeding ground for developing radical interpretations and augmenting extremism. Such online platforms facilitate the young generation to learn and interact extensively with peers. An example is the case of Ivan Ahmadi Hasugian (Ivan) who attacked a priest in a church in Medan with an axe in early 2016 after his plan to carry out suicide bombing failed. He later shared that he learned the tactic from the internet as  he aimed to mimic the church attacker in Northern France that occurred one month before his attack.

Third, terrorist groups have also exploited the internet to support their technical streams such as fund-raising and weapon procurements. In terms of online fund-raising, terrorists gather money in two ways. First, the groups conduct online fund-raising activities on social media or encrypted chat forums by inviting their communities to donate funds and support to the families of convicted and deceased terrorists through charity groups. Second,  the internet can aid terrorist groups by facilitating international financial transactions through cryptocurrencies and internet-based payment services, or even executing unlawful cyberspace activities, such as hacking and carding, in order to gain large profits for them. In the case of the Surabaya bombing attacks, the terrorist families procured weapons and chemical substances to be used for crafting improvised bombs. They also planned the attacks through online e-commerce platforms to hinder detection from authorities.

Social Media as an Enabler to Strengthen Social Friendships among Youths

Social media is also important for terrorist groups. Terrorists have exploited online communication to impart values, norms, and customs among followers, members and potential recruits. Creating an online space for open conversations strengthens the groups bond through dialogues such as those concerning infidels, personal issues, recruitment, propaganda, and religious discussions.

Furthermore, terrorist groups leverage the use of social media by using encrypted communication applications with typically leaderless forums to complement face-to-face communication. The use of such chat groups benefits them in three ways. First, terrorists utilize private conversations among selected members to steer them towards extremism. Second, virtual interactions on particular applications, like Telegram and WhatsApp, facilitate greater outreach to wider audiences, including diaspora communities, migrant workers, sympathizers, and supporters. Third, younger terrorists prefer such forms of communication because the online community with 24-hour access enables them to build emotional bonds among friends, thus convincing themselves that they are not alone in striving for their jihad goals. Justification of their beliefs is essential to their self-esteem, increasing their likelihood of conducting their attacks.

Previous research on social media usage among Indonesian jihadists shows the increasing use of social media since the inception of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014. Initially, Facebook Fan Pages were created to support IS. Examples of Facebook pages were Para Pendukung Khilafah, We Are All Islamic State, Khabar Dunia Islam which promoted violence and supported international networks, including expanding groups based in Indonesia. Support was subsequently moved to encrypted media to communicate among members, including Telegram and WhatsApp after such Facebook pages were shut down. These platforms are not only more secure, but they could accommodate as many as 200 members.

Generally, encrypted communication platforms hugely benefit jihadist groups in several ways, from religious conversations and private news sharing to the opportunity of promoting online businesses and even to recruit individuals who were prepared to join IS in Syria. These were evident from the following incidents. Previously, there was an Indonesian telegram group named “Wa Aiddu” called for those who wanted to devote themselves to Syria. Ika Puspitasari, a female terrorist convicted in 2017, used Telegram and WhatsApp to be involved in religious study groups which reinforced her extremist views while she engaged with other jihadists. In September 2014, she pledged her allegiance to IS through Telegram. She subsequently graduated from simply joining these virtual groups to initiating other groups in Telegram and WhatsApp to organize fund-raising to finance attacks including bomb-making.  Similarly, Rizky Kurniawan, a local IS follower, was exposed to extremist ideologies after joining a WhatsApp group called MENITI TAUHID in 2017. The group taught him to understand and adopt ideas about false democracy, jihad and IS. Another terrorist, Agus Melasi led several telegram groups like “Penyaringan” to recruit followers and “Istiqomah Jihad”, a private chat group to discuss a plan of crafting a TATP bomb, arrows, and hand-crafted weapon.

Conclusion

Understanding and anticipating the next evolution of online violent extremism is essential in developing future strategic counter-terrorism policies. Drawing lessons from the aforementioned incidents, policymakers and practitioners should also focus on identifying mitigation strategies against the flourishing use of sophisticated technology and social media which terrorist groups abuse to facilitate their indoctrination tactics. This is predominantly utilised by women in the family to involve children in terrorism.

The vast growth of modern technology benefits terrorist groups as a communication and learning launchpad to reinvigorate radical values, norms and customs inside the family unit. It is necessary to complement existing counter-terrorism strategies by monitoring the education pathways of youths both offline and online. Online accounts used for disseminating teachings through videos, private forums, and audios strongly influence the children to engage. Unfortunately, this cannot be eliminated through counter-narratives and censorship techniques. The government should enforce additional efforts targeted at parents in order to strengthen family values that promote moderate religious ethics and customs. This is essential in response to the evolving global trends and threats of violent extremism that recently highlight the tactics of lone-actor attacks inspired by their terrorist ‘idols.’

Furthermore, robust counter-terrorism policies addressing the abuses of modern technology and social media are also required. Despite the extensive benefits of the internet, there is an urgent call to develop effective mitigation strategies through strategic collaborations among domestic agencies and international counterparts. It is also important to create an intervention strategy corroborated with the private sector. For instance, imposing restrictions and policies for e-commerce business in knowing their customers and filtering the limit of purchasing weapons and chemical substances that can be assembled into bombs or used as hazardous materials.

Part 1: Linguistic Appeal of Propaganda

Part 2: Quest for Significance

Part 3: Online Recruitment of Filipino Youths

Women and Children in Terrorism: A Four-Part Analysis (Part 1: Case Study of Indonesia)

Introduction

For decades, the Indonesian authorities had identified the involvement of Indonesian women in terrorism. In the era of Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI), terrorists’ wives have been viewed as loyal supporters for the organization starting from their migration to Afghanistan to their expansion into Southeast Asia.

Figures 1 and 2 reproduced from IPAC Report No. 68

Rational Choices of Women who Joined Religious Terrorism

Terrorists acknowledge the dominant role of women in the organization because women have the capability to transmit and develop psycho-social norms among family members. Children tended to imitate their mothers’ behaviours, especially in initiating a conversation about jihadism, Islam and politics, and even watching extremist videos together. That belief then impacts the ideological perspectives of the children.

Harmon and Holmes-Eber highlighted a sceptic viewpoint within the society that justified the general feminine impressions of women compared to men. This proclamation influences the motivation of terrorist groups to recruit women as mediators in operational and tactical actions. The public views women as victims rather than as perpetrators. Thus, they ignore the gender expectation and self-image of women enabling them to escape attention from authorities. This is the reason why terrorists then exploit them in certain select roles such as messengers, recruiters, and suicide bombers.

Previous research about gender and terrorism revealed the four types of motivations of women who joined a terrorist movement. First, they joined a terrorist group as a way of supporting their husbands who played an important role in these groups. Marriage alliances, including in Indonesia, were the most strategic way to impart the fundamental ideology to family members. The bonding also forced women to demonstrate their proactive efforts in developing extremist values among the family members. Umm Zahra and Umm Umar, two ISIS brides whom ISIS fighters married with, revealed a related motivation. Even if their husbands were killed in battle, they felt proud of their husband’s accomplishments, and never spoke a word of grief or sadness. Such wives were also glorified by the community. The wife of a shaheed (martyr) will be honoured among the community and will be taken care of by ISIS through assistance such as monthly financial support for the widows and their children.

The second motivation is the bonding among women fighters through friendships. Similar to their male counterparts, female terrorists were also encouraged by the social connections they had developed among their peers, including the group-level effects. For instance, women consider relationship matters as important motivators to engage in terrorism. These relationships entail the acquaintances between male and female jihadists which form the groups’ social networks. Furthermore, for women, friendship is critical as it enables them to share a common interest and to forge interpersonal bonds, among others. They could develop this connection through social interactions on campus, or as relatives of activists, and even their co-involvement in crimes. Other factors that also influence the relationship between individuals include socio-demographic variables of education, employment, history of domestic violence, mental illness or substance abuse.

Furthermore, the author examined that self-actualization against saturated feeling and grievance was also a significant motivation for women to join violent extremist groups. This sensation emerged as they attempt to find a way out of socio-economic inequality; psycho-social issues related to unfortunate life experiences like the loss of a loved one, patriarchal authority, domestic violence, or the dishonour of being raped. Social media also confounded this unease and even provoked women to personally select the most extreme option, including joining youth radical groups, which promise an answer for their turmoils. In Indonesia, Siska Nur Azizah and Dita Siska Milenina were two women who were instigated to be ISIS supporters fighting against thogut. They also admitted that their learning about Islam were gathered from social media, encrypted messaging platforms and internet prior to their pledging allegiance to support ISIS.

Lastly, a strong desire for female emancipation also becomes a critical motivation for women who strongly envisioned themselves as terrorist fighters or terror groups supporters. Katharina Kneip discovered that the attraction came from their seeking independence from parental control and Western oppression. As also seen in Indonesia, they also expected honour, respect, and power from the ISIS community and likely pursued equality with men as agents of fundamentalist Islam by revealing their pledge to ISIS. Some women idolized certain figures in their extremist community and made efforts to imitate them because they were attracted by images created on various social media platforms.

Tactical Contributions of Women to Terrorist Groups

The author investigated three prominent roles of female terrorists: instrumental support, operational support and organizational support. Instrumental support consisted of roles that offer tangible items and/or services including funds, fighters, materials, and shelter. Operational support included the skills to prepare and execute an attack including the bomb-making. Also, organizational support referred to the provision of socio-cognitive and interpersonal aspects for network expansion, recruitment, propaganda and also spreading the exchange of ideas and access to information.

Instrumental Support

First, take the case of Jumiatun alias Umi Delima, the wife of Santoso who was a prominent former leader of Mujahidin Indonesia Timur – MIT Poso network, which shows how women become an important figure in assisting their husband’s work. Not only was Jumiatun involved in operations but also financing including accommodating money transfers between the Philippine-based Abu Sayyaf Group and Indonesian-based entities. Another example is the case of Rosmawati alias Umi Yazid and Agustiningsih, who was convicted of terrorist financing crime because of her involvement in the fund-raising activities for operations and logistics.

Operational Support

The cases of two former domestic workers working overseas, Dian Yulia Novi and Ika Puspitasari exemplify this form of support. Both Dian Yulia Novi and Ika Puspitasari alias Tasnima Salsabila were convicted for their failed attempts to conduct suicide bombings in Jakarta and Bali, respectively. Interestingly, not only were both acting on behalf of pro-ISIS elements, their husbands played important roles in instigating their participation in such attacks. Dian was likely acting in support of Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), which her husband Solikin was a member of, while Ika was imprisoned for her support of Katibah al-Iman. Besides providing operational support, Ika also offered instrumental support by assisting a terrorist cell led by Abu Jundi, in purchasing weapons, ammunition and explosive materials. It was discovered that she sent her salary worth US$ 615 to Abu Jundi’s account through her husband’s, Zainal Akar, account.

Organizational Support

In 2017, Indonesian women were found to actively supported ISIS through Yayasan Infaq Dakwah Center (IDC), established in 2009, and through a public fund-raising movement called Gerakan Sehari Seribu (GASHIBU). The modus operandi of fund-raising was via social media campaigns such as on Facebook, private forums on Telegram and WhatsApp. Both programs were aimed at ensuring the well-being of the wives and widows of terrorist prisoners by supplying financial compensation for their family’s health insurance, educational scholarships, etc. The focus on women and children enabled these groups to build emotional connections with them which perhaps ease the transmission of extremist values to the next generation.

In addition to the roles of women involved in a terrorist group, developing organizational support is essential in expanding the network, particularly in relation with children. The Surabaya bombing incident was another mark of family-involved violent extremism which is becoming a trend in the Southeast Asia region. There is an imminent risk of transmitting radical ideology from parents to their children. They believed that this parenting style aligned with their commitment and loyalty to the adopted ideology. Also, they were enchanted by after-life rewards that could see them reuniting in paradise. Unfortunately, children might consider this to be usual family practices because they trust their parents as guardians, and they tend to imitate their parents’ behaviour in shaping their family’s ideological preference. For example, Saifurrasul, 13 years old male who died in Syria in 2016, was the son of Brekele or Saiful Anam, who is currently imprisoned for his contribution in a series of terrorist acts in and around Poso.

What’s Next?

Women provide a unique avenue for terrorist organizations to invigorate their efforts through their significant roles in terrorism and terrorism-financing purposes.

It is, thus, essential that the Indonesian government consider four strategy adjustments to better address this issue. (1) The government, especially the national security forces, should address any biased perspectives of viewing women as victims rather than perpetrators. This should include finetuning investigations of female terrorists by considering their potential convictions for terrorism-financing. (2) Instead of developing policies only in the areas of law and financial regulation, the sociological aspects and non-discrimination of women and children who have been exploited by terrorists must be considered. Though challenging, such exploitations could be uncovered through structured intervention programmes. (3) Encrypted messaging and social media platforms increase access for terrorist recruitment of women and children. Therefore, it is imperative for the government and the private sector to collaborate to improve countermeasures related to vulnerable groups, including those working as female migrant workers. These collaborations should entail securing online communications and social media channels including new payment technologies, e-commerce platforms, and online parcel deliveries to further stem the risk of emerging terrorism and terrorist financing. (4) There should also be greater monitoring efforts of migrant Indonesian workers working overseas including their transnational and domestic movability, and their financial profiles.

Part 2: Striving for Peace in the Philippines amidst Increased Combat-readiness and Continued Recruitment of Women and Children

Part 3: The Invisible Women and Children of Malaysia: The Vulnerability of Stateless Persons to Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Part 4: The Shape of Contemporary Conflict in Southeast Asia: How Violent Extremism has Changed Our Women and Children