Introduction

Education is a gateway to discover the world, going far beyond merely acing exams. It is about understanding the complex realities that shape our existence. In Malaysia, education is an evolving landscape, constantly adapting in pursuit of better outcomes. A variety of roadmaps and blueprints have been laid out to prepare Malaysians for the challenges of the world. One pressing challenge today is the role of religion in society.

In Malaysia, where Islam is the official religion, its influence pervades many aspects of life. The government actively supports Islamic institutions, mosques, and religious education, weaving Islamic teachings into the national curriculum. The relationship between Islam and education often reflects the priorities of the government of the day, influencing how Islam is communicated to the public. This dynamic serves as a reminder of the powerful role education plays in shaping not just intellectual capabilities, but also cultural and spiritual awareness of future generations.

History of Islam in Malaysia’s Educational System

The history of Islam in the Malay Peninsula dates to around the 12th century. Early Islamic education centred in mosques and later evolved into pondok schools. These institutions prioritized religious studies, Quranic teachings, and the Arabic language, laying a foundation for Islamic scholarly traditions in the region. As Malaysia advanced, the government aimed to modernize the education system while preserving Islamic values. During Mahathir Mohamad’s first administration, he emphasized the integration of Islamic values to cultivate a national identity rooted in Islamic teachings. This vision led to the expansion and establishment of Islamic schools and institutions.

Anwar Ibrahim, serving as the education minister from 1986 to 1991, was instrumental in implementing this transformative agenda. His efforts focused on curriculum reform, ensuring that Islamic studies became a core component of education. Through these transformative steps, Malaysia continues to honour its Islamic roots while striving for a progressive, inclusive future in education.

The establishment of Islamic universities in Malaysia represents a significant step toward integrating modern academia with Islamic teachings. Among these institutions, the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), founded in 1983 with Anwar as the second president (1988-1999), stands out. IIUM’s mission is to merge Islamic wisdom with contemporary knowledge, crafting an educational framework that embodies both Malaysia’s Islamic identity and its commitment to global relevance. The university offers diverse programs in fields such as law, engineering, and medicine, each infused with an Islamic perspective to ensure a well-rounded educational experience.

In 1998, the political landscape took a significant turn when Anwar Ibrahim was dismissed from his roles in Umno and as deputy prime minister. Despite this political upheaval, the Islamization agenda continued unabated. Abdullah Badawi, who served as prime minister from 2003 to 2009, made substantial changes to the education system by introducing J-QAF. This curriculum aimed to enhance Islamic education in public schools by focusing on Jawi script, Quranic studies, Arabic language, and Fardhu Ain. Najib Razak, Badawi’s successor, continued to prioritize Islamic education by increasing budget allocations, ensuring that the Islamization agenda remained at the forefront of national education policy.

When Pakatan Harapan emerged victorious in the 2018 general elections, it marked another shift, particularly with the introduction of Jawi in Bahasa Malaysia textbooks for Standard Four students. This move caused a major debate over so-called Islamic elements in the national curriculum, despite Jawi as a script being more about Malay culture. The return of Anwar Ibrahim to power in 2022 has brought about new educational initiatives, such as the introduction of a module on “Imam al-Nawawi 40 Hadith.” This module is now part of the curriculum for Muslim students at various levels, emphasizing moral and ethical teachings derived from the Hadiths—sayings or deeds of the Prophet. These shifts indicate an enduring focus on integrating Islamic values within the educational system, mirroring broader societal trends and political necessities.

In Malaysia, different political parties vie for influence by portraying their commitment to Islam in various ways. Historically, two dominant parties, Umno and PAS, have been leading players in the country’s Malay-Islamic political landscape. However, since around 2015, new parties like Amanah and Bersatu have joined the fray, broadening the competition to appeal to the same voter base. Each of these parties, and their respective coalitions, strives to demonstrate their dedication to Islamic principles, including by shaping national education policies.

Anwar Ibrahim’s ascent to prime minister marked a pivotal moment. His political journey is deeply rooted in his time as a Muslim activist, dating back to his university days. Notably, he led the Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement, known as ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia). Anwar’s decision to join Umno in 1981 initially disappointed some ABIM members and leaders. Despite this, his eventual rise to prime minister under Pakatan Harapan has rekindled hopes. His current position signals a potential shift in the political rewards and strategies of his supporters, particularly those who remained active within Islamic movements.

ABIM’s Significance in Shaping Malaysia’s Educational Landscape

ABIM has been a driving force in shaping Malaysia’s educational landscape by integrating Islamic principles into teachings. Founded in the 1970s, ABIM focuses on promoting Islamic education while fostering a comprehensive understanding of these teachings among Malaysian youth. It blends religious teachings with contemporary educational practices to create well-rounded individuals. The alignment between politics and education under Anwar’s administration strengthened the impact of ABIM’s initiatives.

Concurrently, IIUM has been experiencing notable leadership changes reflecting its commitment to Islamic educational values. With the end of the previous rector’s tenure, Prof. Emeritus Datuk Dr. Osman Bakar took on the role as of September 23, 2024. The position of rector is a political appointment, as that of vice-chancellors in other public universities in Malaysia. Prof. Osman Bakar brings a wealth of experience as a renowned scholar in Islamic philosophy and shares a long-standing personal connection with Anwar, stemming from their school days at the Malay College Kuala Kangsar. Osman Bakar’s alignment with Anwar Ibrahim through ABIM further reflects their shared vision for a holistic Islamic education, aiming to integrate Islamic principles deeply into the academic fabric of IIUM. Under Prof. Osman Bakar’s leadership, IIUM is also witnessing the inclusion of other ABIM-affiliated scholars in deputy rector positions, further ensuring the institution’s adherence to its educational ethos.

Moreover, Zulkifli Hassan, another key figure from ABIM, was appointed as the Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department (Religious Affairs) in December 2023. His prior experience as IIUM’s Deputy Rector for Student Development and Community Engagement underscored his commitment to the university’s Islamic educational goals as well. Malaysia’s current Minister of Education, Fadhlina Sidek, is also the daughter of Siddiq Fadzil, the third president of ABIM right after Anwar. These strategic appointments having ties with ABIM reflect broader efforts to embed progressive Islamic ethics within Malaysia’s educational framework.

The spotlight on IIUM arises from its role as both an academic institution and a symbolic battleground for different interpretations of Islamic values in Malaysia. IIUM was also infamous in the early 2000s for alleged links to terrorism during the so-called Global War on Terror. Founded in the 1980s with the vision of integrating religious and modern sciences, IIUM has long been a centre of ideological diversity. Historically, some student movements within IIUM, such as We Unite for Islam (Wufi), have had affiliations with PAS, a major Islamic political party in Malaysia. This has led to conversations about the university’s role in shaping political tendencies, as seen in the presidency of its Student Union (IIUMSU), which has frequently been led by Wufi-affiliated leaders. The election in 2022 of a president from outside Wufi, albeit narrowly, highlights the changing dynamics within the student body.

The emergence of leaders from ABIM, particularly in IIUM’s higher management, introduces a new dimension to the university’s cultural and educational atmosphere. Students’ support for PAS may not necessarily clash with the leadership’s ABIM affiliations, as both groups place importance on Islamic values, though with different emphases. Interviews with Wufi members have shown a commitment to upholding Islamic principles while also recognizing the evolving influence and relevance of their movement. A member’s remark underscores the complexity: “As a Muslim, for me any agenda or behaviour that leads to goodness and to empowering the understanding of Islam must be supported even if they are in opposite circles in the political stage. However, if the agenda brought is an agenda due to political interests, then it must be rejected because this institution is for all regardless of political ideological differences.”

IIUM encapsulates the interplay among Malaysian Islamists, serving as a reflection of the broader societal quest for direction and identity. As the university’s new management shoulders the responsibility of steering IIUM towards fulfilling its founding mission—integrating knowledge with a modern, progressive outlook—it holds the potential to shape a generation of Muslims pivotal to Malaysia’s future. The 2022 general election results underscore a clear demand among Malay voters on Islam’s role as a cornerstone of their identity.  The ongoing debate centres on the vision that should underpin this enigma: should it align with Anwar’s vision of Islam within the Madani framework, or should it lean towards a more traditional and conservative interpretation championed by his political rivals? The educational landscape in Malaysia has become a battleground for these ideological contests, often caught in the crossfire of political agendas. While political socialization within schools and universities is inevitable, given their role in shaping young minds, it’s imperative to maintain educational neutrality. Students should be equipped with values like compassion, respect, and tolerance, which are at the heart of Anwar’s Madani framework, without being subjected to the sway of partisan indoctrination. By nurturing an environment where these universal values thrive, IIUM can contribute significantly to cultivating informed and balanced individuals who can navigate modern-day Malaysia while honouring their cultural and religious heritage.

Introduction

At the end of February, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim re-tabled budget 2023 after forming a government post-15th General Election (GE15). Since then, members of parliament on both sides of the aisle are supposed to debate and discuss how to improve the budget for the benefit of the nation. Unfortunately, in the past few weeks, almost every speech made by the opposition would circle back to the issue of race and religion. This is expected for a coalition that campaigned on racial and religious sentiments in November 2022. While some might say bringing up identity issues shows there is a striking dearth of ideas by the opposition, more worrying than that is their willingness to gamble Malaysia’s already fragile societal fabric for short-term political mileage.

Out of economic ideas, the opposition started to attack Hannah Yeoh, the Minister of Youth and Sports for an initiative organised by an agency affiliated to the ministry called ‘Jom Ziarah’ or ‘Lets Visit’ in an interfaith effort to bring youth to various houses of worship. Instead of lauding this now-cancelled program to instil tolerance and understanding, the Perikatan Nasional opposition charged the Christian minister for conspiring to evangelise Muslim youth.

Protecting Malaysian Muslims?

Similarly, several state religious institutions are sympathetic to this narrative. From the author’s interviews with Malaysian political analysts, this has prompted speculation of a ‘deep state’ against Anwar Ibrahim’s unity government with supporters of the opposition filling up posts in religious departments. The Selangor Islamic Department (JAIS) reminded Muslims to not visit temples and churches for events and ceremonies. After this reminder, the Selangor Islamic Religious Council (MAIS) echoed that events deemed to be influencing Muslim youths are prohibited. This is perplexing considering Muslim countries such as the United Arab Emirates are creating a multi-faith complex called the Abrahamic Family House to bridge the gap between the three Abrahamic religions. Malaysia, instead, seems to be moving further to the right represented by dogmatism. Additionally, instilling tolerance and acceptance appear to be lopsided with the focus on non-Muslims.

This is counter to Quranic verse (49:13) detailing how humans are created into different tribes so that we learn from one another. This verse remains relevant for a multi racial country such as Malaysia. However, JAIS’ stance effectively limits Muslims in celebrating important life events of their non-Muslim relatives and friends such as weddings just because they are held in a church or temple. The celebration is of the people, not the religion.

Is there a need for such limitation? Most states in Malaysia already have a law against proselytising of Muslims by other religions. With this law, there is no limitation for Muslims to visit churches and temples such as in Penang. Similarly, the Sultan of Johor and Sultan of Selangor have decreed that there is no issue for Muslims to visit churches and temples without participating in the religious ceremonies. Sadly, such limitation by JAIS and MAIS assumes the fragility of Malaysian Muslims’ faith. Even if such assumption was true, there should be a prioritization to strengthen Islamic knowledge beyond mere rituals.

A Fiery Mix: Religious Institutions and Politics

Offices such as JAIS and MAIS have a unique position in Malaysia. While the Federal Constitution clearly states that Islam is Malaysia’s official religion, the nine hereditary rulers are responsible as the head of Islam in their respective state with the Agong (Monarch) being the head of Islam for other states with no hereditary rulers. Within each state there is an Islamic department that is responsible to implement Islamic rules which is under the purview of the state according to Malaysia’s federal system. This mix of flexibility and bureaucratization have afforded these departments more power over the years to implement a more conservative brand of the religion. However, these departments are not fully autonomous as certain rulers are more vocal in rejecting their directives.

Two potential drivers for religious conservatism for these institutions are 1) the population of Malays in each state and 2) the amount of religious “spotlight” they encounter. According to the 2020 census, Malays make up 60% of the population in Selangor as opposed to 44% in Penang. Being a majority in Selangor leads to a higher need to defend the Malay’s superior position there than in Penang where they have learned to live as a minority. Additionally, Selangor is the most developed state in the country with many international events held in the urban area. Thus, it is more likely to court controversy for allowing certain events to occur, especially under the PH government which has been accused of promoting liberalism. JAIS comes under the spotlight more often than the religious departments of other states.

GE15 also saw what has been called a ‘Green Wave’ with the Perikatan Nasional coalition defeating Pakatan Harapan heavy weights, including in Selangor where PH has governed since 2008. Numerous hypotheses have been offered as insights to this political shift. Some pointed to the inclusion of youth who are 18-20 years of age as voters for the first time. Deemed “politically uneducated”, most youth fell under the spell of TikTok which saw Perikatan Nasional dominating.

But a more sobering observation is the rising conservatism among millennials and Gen-Xers, even among non-practicing Muslims, who saw Islam as “the solution” especially after coming out of a two-year pandemic. Islam provides an easy and quick way towards “salvation” including support of political parties deemed to be Islamic. Through their support of these parties, they were promised heaven. Islam has become an identity marker, especially to middle class Malays.

Similarly, younger generations grew up in a Malaysia that had completed its “Islamization” process starting from the 1980s. Such bureaucratization and institutionalization of Islam have created a more conservative generation that may be less keen to interact with other races or religions. An example of this is how Malaysia’s national school system is dividing the country along ethnic lines. As more Chinese choose Chinese vernacular schools, Malays prefer attending Islamic schools that mushroomed from the Islamization period.

For the political class it means there is no escaping this reality but to face it head on. There are two options for the current unity government: a) stay on the moderate course on the centre-right of the political spectrum, or b) veer further right to win over these more conservative Malays. In the first few months of Anwar Ibrahim’s government, there is no doubt that it is definitely a conservative government which is a reflection of the people. Anwar made the proclamation on live television that his government would not recognize secularism, communism, and the LGBTQ community. In response to a controversial private event that would have been organised during the holy month of Ramadhan, the Minister of Local Government Development, Nga Kor Ming who is an ethnic Chinese, again highlighted the government’s policy not to recognise the LGBTQ community. Collectively, these are aligned with the sensitivities of Malaysians especially the Malays. However, if the unity government panders further to the right, they may be playing catch-up to Perikatan Nasional and would always be viewed as second best. This would be highly favourable particularly to Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), a component of the Perikatan Nasional coalition. Thus, the survivability of the unity government until the 16^th general election depends on the government cultivating the centre to fight against polarization and religious tension. At the moment, there appears to be an identity crisis of the unity government such as the Minister of Communications and Digital questioning the previous administration’s inaction over a controversial film called Mentega Terbang when Pakatan Harapan has in the past championed for mutual respect. Hopefully, the government would have made it clearer regarding their overall view on religious and racial issues by June 2023 when six state elections are to be called. If they are a conservative government that is simply working towards reforming the country’s institutions, the people deserve to be able to call a spade a spade. Maybe Malay voters, and other conservative Malaysians, would be more receptive of this Pakatan Harapan and in the process reject polarizing parties.

Introduction

UMNO’s recent successes at the state elections have stirred anxiety in Perikatan Nasional (PN). Despite initially working together to cease control from Pakatan Harapan (PH) in 2020, UMNO has refused to continue being a part of the PN coalition and instead chose to continue with the Barisan Nasional (BN). PN and PH’s limited success in both the 2021 Malacca state election and 2022 Johor state election, thus, signifies the need for a new strategy in the upcoming 15^th General Election. Notably, a cooperation between both coalitions could improve their chances to counter UMNO’s dominance. However, why is such a cooperation improbable?      

The Beginning of PN’s Quagmire

Rumours are ripe in Malaysia that the 15^th General Election (GE15) would be held by the end of 2022 despite Parliament’s mandate to do so by September 2023. Among the reasons for this call for election is the failed bid by ex-premier Najib Razak to overturn his 2020 conviction for abuse of power, criminal breach of trust and money laundering. With other UMNO leaders such as Zahid Hamidi and Bung Mokhtar facing court cases themselves, there have been resounding calls within UMNO to pressure Prime Minister Ismail Sabri to dissolve the Parliament and call for early elections. A faction in UMNO famously known as the ‘court cluster’ prefers to have the election soon as they believe BN is in a stronger position and thus would be able to regain parliamentary majority without having to cooperate with PN. Conversely, Ismail Sabri stated that he would prefer to continue with the various reform agenda that was agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding with the opposition before dissolving parliament and to wait for the littoral combat ship (LCS) scandal to evanesce from public discourse. Of course, as a less influential leader within UMNO, Ismail Sabri is trying to stay as prime minister for as long as he could. Previously, UMNO had tried to placate him by promising to support Ismail Sabri as BN’s prime minister candidate in GE15. However, Ismail’s reluctance to interfere in Najib’s appeal has rendered his position almost untenable. While the official party narrative in UMNO is to regain stability for the country, there has been no doubt that the party wishes to regain control of national institutions as they had done in the first 61 years of Malaysia’s history. Additionally, Ismail Sabri has indicated that the tabling of the 2023 budget would be brought forth to early October 2022, further fuelling rumours that election is imminent.

As UMNO tries to reclaim its supposed traditional hold on power, PN has found itself in a quagmire of their own doing. This difficult position faced by PN is akin to the classic prisoner’s dilemma.

Prisoner’s dilemma is a common example within game theory that demonstrates why two perfectly rational individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears to be in their best interests. Since betraying a partner yields greater reward than cooperating with them (on condition the partner keeps silent), all purely rational self-interested prisoners will betray the other.

In the 2020 Sheraton Move, it could be deduced that those who defected from PH were acting rationally as their payoff was greater relative to those who were left behind in the then-ruling coalition. Those who left the PH government were rewarded with opportunities to be a part of the government that succeeded PH. This was made possible with the backing of UMNO and BN. PH, for choosing to stick to its principle, was quickly relegated to its former position as the opposition within government. Anwar Ibrahim, leader of PH, claimed to know of support by 15 UMNO members for him to become prime minister as revealed by former UMNO Supreme Member, Tajuddin Abdul Razak. However, Anwar said that his reluctance to interfere in Najib and Zahid’s court cases costed him the chance to become prime minister.

Irrational for both PN and PH to Cooperate

There are a few versions of the prisoner’s dilemma and one of them is the iterated variant. In a repeated game, players may be less eager to cooperate if their counterpart has not cooperated, resulting in dissatisfaction and a worse outcome.

This has impeded PN from cooperating with PH in the next general election. After the recent state elections, PN has sought to again work together with PH in the name of securing the country from falling into the hands of UMNO warlords once again. While Muhyiddin Yassin led this call, PKR defector Azmin Ali seemingly chose to prioritize the economy over politics. Such efforts were needed when UMNO had clearly ruled out any possible cooperation with PN beyond the current composition of the federal government. With no ally on its side, PN increased its call for the people to abandon UMNO. While the narrative of saving Malaysia from UMNO appears to resonate with urbanites, rural Malaysia continues to view UMNO and BN specifically as the best coalition to provide development as that was their lived experience for decades prior.

What Muhyiddin Yassin, PN chairman, was seeking is the best possible outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma when both prisoners within the game cooperate by keeping silent instead of confessing to their crime. In prisoner’s dilemma, the best outcome for both prisoners would be to not admit to the crime, but if one of them defects, the defector would be set free while the other prisoner would serve a longer jail sentence. Without knowing what the other person would do, the rational choice is always to defect. The dilemma is that if both defect, they would be worse off than if they had cooperated. But for both players to cooperate successfully, they need to hedge on their partner keeping to their end of the agreement. This is where their past defection will come to haunt them. A rational player such as PH, taking past precedence into consideration, is less incentivised to trust Muhyiddin Yassin and PN. It would be noble of PH to trust PN but irrational. Therefore, based on game theory, Rafizi Ramli of PKR is right not to accept PN or even Mahathir’s newly formed Gerakan Tanah Air (GTA) as partners in the next election. It may also be irrational for PH to cooperate with MUDA despite the latter being ready to do so. This is considering the newly established youth party’s refusal to be an official component of PH. Without such commitment, the possibility for the party to defect from this cooperation could be too much for PH to stomach.

Further preventing such cooperation is the refusal of several members of the PN coalition to cooperate with PH. PAS, for example, has clearly stated its refusal to work with PH. To prevent the risk of these members exiting PN, any calls for cooperation with PH is all but dead. Despite both PN and PH likely to be at the losing end in the next general election, it would be the most rational choice for them.

Beyond Game Theory?

Of course, political coalitions are not merely based on game theory. Political players are, after all, more than numbers and formula. Though unlikely, PH may be swayed by Duverger’s law going into GE15. According to this law, a plural electoral system would most likely produce a two-party system. If votes continue to be split three-ways, there would be a lot of wasted votes and those elected into power may not represent the majority. Based on previous state elections, the winner would most likely be BN in GE15. Questions remain as to 1) whether the possibility of such an outcome compel both PN and PH to irrationally cooperate, and 2) how stable would such cooperation be?

Introduction

It was proposed that the Malaysian government needs to be cautious in responding to this latest development out of Afghanistan’s storied history to avoid further schism between supporters and detractors of the Taliban in Malaysia. Among supporters, the most vocal is the Islamist PAS party, which is currently part of the loose Perikatan Nasional coalition that makes up the federal government in Malaysia. Two months after PAS President’s reflections on the Taliban in August 2021, this development was again broached during the 62^nd PAS Youth Muktamar (general assembly). This time, Khairil Nizam Khirudin in his former capacity as Youth Chief, proposed that if China, a Communist country, could establish relationship with the Taliban, Malaysia should do the same as a nation with a majority Muslim population. This was ostensibly intended to humiliate Malaysia into action. However, logical counters included how Malaysia, unlike China, has no immediate geopolitical concern that necessitates a diplomatic relation with the Taliban since Malaysia and Afghanistan are situated in different regions.

Working Within the System

Beyond party leadership, it is seemingly quiet at the grassroot level for three potential reasons. First, PAS and its allies in the Perikatan Nasional were more focused on domestic issues such as the recently concluded Melaka state election in which Perikatan Nasional faced off against UMNO, a former ally of PAS in the short-lived Muafakat Nasional. Second, and more importantly, PAS members at the moment are split, especially in Kedah and Terengganu, between those who are in support of the realization of hudud law and those against it. Notably, most, if not all members of PAS are supportive of the idea of implementing hudud law as part of the end goal for the party, especially after the split in 2015 with progressive Malays who then formed the Amanah party. However, the crack today is between those who agree and disagree that Malaysia is ready for hudud implementation as part of Syariah penal and criminal code. In other words, PAS members would not want to diverge from the expected norm of a Muslim in support of ‘Syariah-ization’, but reservation continues regarding the actual implementation of hudud in multiracial Malaysia. Those who are in support of the implementation of hudud law would be assumed to also be more supportive of the Taliban because of its vocal proposal to implement a specific form of Islamic rule in Afghanistan. The Taliban would become the standard-bearer for these PAS supporters. However, it must be noted that not all members within the party are supportive of such a move to imitate the Taliban and hastily implement hudud law. Thus, it would be very unwise for PAS to bring up the Taliban issue at the grassroot level for fear of losing support by its ‘moderate’ members. Lastly, even among PAS leaders, several were unimpressed when the party is likened to the Taliban. Despite support by the party’s president for a supposedly reformed Taliban, other party leaders from Selangor and Kelantan have voiced their discontent whenever the party is linked with the Taliban. They accuse the opposition of doing so to portray PAS as backward and intolerant. This shows that the party is unwilling to play up the Taliban issue nor tolerate PAS being equated with the Taliban at the risk of upsetting party members and the general Malaysian population.

As a political party that has participated in electoral politics since before independence, PAS is more pragmatic than idealistic, and since 2020, it has been argued that the party pivoted to becoming opportunistic. Unlike the Taliban, PAS has always sought power via the ballot box, even when they claimed that the Taliban takeover was a people-led initiative. The party appears to understand that the foundation of a stable and legitimate government lies within the people’s support. Therefore, PAS is far from a radical party but instead has always been willing to work within the parameters of the constitution. The democratic nature of PAS is deduced in three ways: the lack of anti-systemic strategies such as revolts and violence, the acceptance of losses in election, and the democratic practices in party elections.

Undoubtedly, PAS has always been an ideological party with the establishment of an Islamic state as its end goal. Without such narrative, there would be little distinction between PAS and UMNO. But creating an Islamic State similar to the Taliban’s rule from 1996 until 2001 is more of an idealistic goal than a possible experiment for the party. Being practical, PAS will maintain its character as an electorally active party in Malaysia that seeks power through legitimate channels with a specific Islamist ideology as a means to gain support and win elections. They would not want to wrest power beyond the ballot box because it would not work in Malaysia, and they lack the capacity for it. PAS may rhetorically support the Taliban’s implementation of ‘Islamic law’, but it knows that the Muslim Brotherhood model of working within the system is more realistic to be applied in multicultural Malaysia.

The truly ideologue among PAS would perhaps be inspired by the Taliban and may want to see more concrete actions within Malaysia, but not to the point of going beyond the ballot box. They already had their ‘mini-victories’ now that they are in the federal government since March 2020. Among those victories are the state of Kelantan’s Criminal Syariah code which came into effect on 1 November 2021. Among the provisions are distortion of Islamic teachings, disrespecting the month of Ramadan, destroying houses of worship, and 21 other offences. Besides that, the northern state of Kedah, which is also under PAS’ rule, has decided not to renew the business licenses of 4D lottery shops in November 2021, with a similar policy already in place in Kelantan and Terengganu. However, it can be argued that the latter two states have about 94 percent Malay population as opposed to 76 percent in Kedah; therefore the ban would affect a larger number of non-Muslims in Kedah. Nonetheless, PAS has made progress now that they are part of the larger coalition in government. Although these ‘wins’ are in states ruled by PAS, there is no denying that the strengthening of its political position at the federal level allows for these changes to take place. It must be noted that these changes were done through legal channels, such as the passing of the Criminal Syariah code in the state legislature in 2019. Thus, the possibility of PAS taking over Malaysia in a fashion similar to the Taliban seems very unlikely.

PAS has always been supportive of other countries or territories that have succeeded in implementing hudud law such as in Aceh and Brunei. However, the pragmatism of PAS cannot be denied even at the international stage such as PAS supporting Iran on the Palestinian issue at the same time it continues to warn of the danger of Shiism. By looking at recent events or even at its own history, PAS’ sensible approach to politics becomes clear. The oft-cited example is the fact that PAS has yet to table the controversial RUU 355 bill on enhancing the Syariah courts (although the government has said it is working on it). Since PAS became part of the federal government in 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic, they have argued that it is not the right time to proceed with the tabling of the bill. In an interview with the author, an MP from PAS even argued that this proves the party’s commitment towards one of the objectives of shariah, which is to protect the lives of the people. On another note, the party was on board with the Perikatan Nasional’s female candidate for the Chief Minister of Melaka despite previously being against the nomination of Wan Azizah Wan Ismail as the Menteri Besar for Selangor. Historically, we saw PAS working closely with the left-wing Democratic Action Party until 2015. That alliance was abandoned for strategic reasons because the party was losing support in the Malay heartland. Instead of imitating the Taliban, we see that PAS’ trajectory is very much dependent on the semi-democratic context of Malaysia than mere ideological zeal.

Introduction

The Taliban entered Kabul swiftly, unopposed on 15 August 2021 after more than 18 years of insurgency. The offensive that began in the spring of this year coincided with the withdrawal of American troops that was completed on 31 August 2021, before the 20^th anniversary of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. 20 years ago, when news of the twin tower’s collapse spread across the globe, the world saw images of Palestinians celebrating in the West Bank and in refugee camps by firing gunshots in the air.

Recently, there are similar accounts of jihadists in Yemen and Syria celebrating the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. This is unsurprising as they are members of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups. Even Hamas, a Palestine-based Islamist organisation, posted on its website a congratulatory message to the Taliban for successfully liberating Afghanistan from occupying forces. Hamas deemed it as proof that the Palestinians may one day achieve the same victory over Israeli occupation. Many analysts have made the call that the Taliban’s success will embolden jihadists in other countries to continue with their struggle because it may pay off in a few decades. Malaysia, a country with arguably different sets of challenges and political system, also saw similar exuberant reactions by Islamists that find in the Taliban a role model.

Responses by Malaysian Leaders

Coincidentally, when the Taliban toppled President Ashraf Ghani’s regime, Malaysia also witnessed a change in leadership. From Muhyiddin Yassin, the premiership changed hands to his deputy, Ismail Sabri Yaakob. As Malaysia experienced a vacuum in leadership, no official statement was immediately made by the government on the Taliban’s takeover. Two weeks later, the new foreign minister, Saifuddin Abdullah, took a cautious approach by saying that Malaysia will observe the developments in Afghanistan before recognising the Taliban. Similarly, Zambry Abdul Kadir, the secretary-general of the former coalition in power, Barisan Nasional (BN), did suggest for the Malaysian government to take a wait-and-see approach based on the international community’s reaction. Besides these two men, Malaysia also received a response was from the Islamist party, PAS. Here, it must be emphasized that PAS is not a jihadist organisation. It is a political party that has participated in Malaysia’s electoral system since 1955. However, as an Islamist party, PAS obviously empathises with the Taliban and views their struggle to implement “Islamic rule” as similar to its own objective.

Thus, three days after the fall of Kabul, PAS International Affairs and External Relations Committee chairperson, Mohd Khalil, uploaded a congratulatory message to the Taliban on various social media platforms. It was widely condemned by netizens who found it appalling that a mainstream party in Malaysia is openly supporting the Taliban when its various human rights abuses are well known. After years of being exposed to the concepts of wasatiyyah (moderation) and Islam Hadhari (“Civilisational Islam”) within the social discourse, some Malaysians disagreed with the Taliban’s ideology steeped in Pashtunwali (the traditional way of the Pashtun people). They viewed it as being radical from the more moderate version of Islam practiced in Malaysia. As a result of this attention, the post was quickly deleted to supposedly avoid Mohd Khalil’s social media accounts from being taken down. Nonetheless, it is clear that this is not a mistake by a rogue member of PAS, as the party’s president, Hadi Awang (who is also Mohd Khalil’s father) took it upon himself to explain on the party’s online portal that the Taliban is now a different entity than when it ruled Afghanistan from 1996 until the 2001 American invasion. Since PAS has become a more united party following the departure of progressive members in 2015, there has been no public repudiation from other party members. The Taliban is, of course, appreciative of PAS’ gesture.

Hadi Awang’s position is somewhat understandable given the contradictory accounts of current developments in Afghanistan. While the group’s spokespersons—from Sohail Shaheen to Abdul Ghani Baradar—have reiterated their commitment to protect females and minorities, there have also been reports of supposed Taliban members going door-to-door looking for officials who had worked with the previous government despite promising them amnesty. There were also credible claims made of summary executions of civilians and former security forces.

Due to these conflicting claims, Malaysia has witnessed a polarising effect on its citizens with some supporting PAS and the Taliban takeover as part of a larger global movement to implement “Islamic rule” to replace the supposedly inferior liberal democratic system. Supporters claimed that true Islamic governance would be based on the implementation of hudud law and the strengthening of the Syariah Courts in Malaysia. Hudud law refers to fixed punishments ranging from public lashing to the amputation of hands. Implementation of hudud law has been a divisive issue in Malaysia with Mahathir Mohamad mentioning to the author in an interview that hudud is not appropriate in a multi-ethnic country. Nevertheless, these calls have not waned with proponents continuously demanding for its implementation in the past few years. Conversely, there are those who are rightfully wary of the Taliban given their previous atrocious record on human rights abuses. Unfortunately, these people who have publicly criticized the Taliban have been called Islamophobes for holding such opinion.

Malaysians who were labelled Islamophobes even included Muslims. For example, Syed Saddiq, the young independent member of parliament, was labelled an Islamophobe by netizens despite being a Muslim after expressing his disdain over Mohd Khalil’s well-wishes to the Taliban. Syed Saddiq was not the only person who was criticized after coming out with a scathing attack on the Taliban. Another prominent figure is Professor James Chin, a Malaysian scholar at the University of Tasmania. He wrote on his Twitter account that he was branded an Islamophobe for talking about the Kabul takeover. Therefore, Malaysia is arguably more divided now than in 2018 when Pakatan Harapan (PH) toppled the ruling coalition, BN. Now, any criticism against a person or movement claiming to represent Muslims would be instantly met with vitriol.

What can Malaysia do?

According to the moderation theory, a radical political group may choose to take a more moderate stance when and if it is allowed to participate in the political process. However, the Taliban has made it clear that it is not interested in having any kind of democratic system in Afghanistan. Therefore, the moderation theory within a national framework may not work on the Taliban. What might work, instead, is if we allowed the new regime to participate in an international framework. It is clear that the Taliban, especially the political commission based in Doha, has come to realise that it cannot govern a middle-size country such as Afghanistan without international support. States and non-state actors can thus use this opportunity to provide conditional financial aid to the Taliban—such as requiring girls to be allowed an education—if it wishes to access funds for the country’s development. What the world needs right now is a stable Afghan government that can prevent another devastating attack like the one on Kabul airport allegedly perpetrated by the so-called Islamic State. The UN has also released a resolution urging the Taliban to ensure safe passage of Afghans wanting to leave the country.

Malaysia is only an emerging middle power, with little leverage in terms of financial aid. In what it lacks, Malaysia makes up in its position as an arguably progressive Muslim country that could influence the political agents in Afghanistan. This position is best exemplified by the call for an emergency OIC meeting as Malaysia is best seen as a mediator. Domestically, the Malaysian government may take this opportunity to buy time without being branded as either pro- or anti-Taliban. Through this intersubjectivity, Malaysia might convince the Taliban to respect human rights and simultaneously reduce the polarisation within Malaysia by deflating the spirit Islamists within the country. Rather than forcing Malaysians who support the Taliban into a figurative corner, it is better to reach out in dialogue so that the Malaysian government is not seen as illegally censoring diverse opinion.

Currently, with PAS being part of the federal government, there are still uncertainties about the future implementation of Syariah law in Malaysia. However, given PAS’ record while it was in government in the last 17 months, it appears that the party recognises the limitation of governing a multi-ethnic country. Nevertheless, to placate Islamists, the government has drafted a five-year roadmap to empower Syariah law. The support for this effort has been important enough to even get the attention of UMNO, a Malay-nationalist party. While it is indeed a slippery slope as the Islamists may end up demanding more to the chagrin of non-Muslims, the Malaysian government has no option but to find this balance soon so as not to allow the further disintegration of the Malaysian fabric.

Introduction

When it comes to the process of global Islamisation, Malaysia is not an outlier. Since the 1970s, Muslims around the world have consistently progress towards greater piety; spiritual Hijrah or the heart’s migration from veneration of worldly desires to the true worship of Allah. Of course, the genuine Hijrah of Muslims should be lauded and supported as being a better Muslim translates into being a better human being. However, the concern is that these ‘born-again Muslims’ do not uphold or champion true Islamic faith in accordance with the Qur’an because their changes are simply window dressings to fit social expectations.

With the rise of globalisation and the metaphorical flattening of the earth, there is now greater contestation for public space. According to social movement theory, different actors do so to fit into pre-existing beliefs of the masses. Instead of being kept out of public sphere, Islam is today embraced by a wider section of Muslim society including in Malaysia. The government or the state can no longer make exclusive decisions when it comes to the role of religion within society. There is also the rise of new voices for Islam that include celebrities, entrepreneurs, and the new intellectuals. Muslims in Malaysia are now spoiled for choices when it comes to portraying piety in what is termed as “pop Islam”, or popular Islam.

Pop Islam Could Lead to Artificial Piety

Pop Islam is the phenomenon that can be observed across the Muslim world in which Islam has been rebranded and repackaged so that religion is no longer treated as separate from a person’s life. Instead, Islam informs the way we dress, eat, travel, and consume entertainment, among others. Although it is not bad, pop Islam makes it difficult for us to distinguish between the fundamentals of the religion as taught by the Prophet and what has been marketed as ‘Islamic’. For example, wearing modestly is taught and expected of male and female Muslims. However, buying and wearing a hijab that is sold at an exorbitant price is far from being modest. This is a minor example of how such ostentatious behaviour could possibly lead to accusations of artificial piety. Worse, it might cause frustration from those who cannot afford such luxury which could lead to social discord. Similarly, there are now discussions over the aptness of performing the Hajj or Umrah every year by affluent Muslims when that money can be spent to help those in need. It is not the ritual that is being questioned, but whether some Muslims are doing so for dubious reasons.

This social construction of Muslim piety combines religion with social class and politics in the modern world. Muslims in Malaysia want to be part of the narrative of a modern Muslim that has progressed since Mahathir Mohamad”s administration in the 1980s. Being a modern Muslim is defined as partaking in the capitalist and consumerist world without having to abandon one’s Islamic faith. This post-Islamist world is no longer a state-centred phenomenon but is dispersed through Islamic marketisation since the 1990s. Consequently, we can see that those who are part of this public display of piety are mostly from the middle-class who can afford to ‘buy’ piety. From the author’s personal interview with a Member of Parliament from the Islamist PAS party, he talked about how the religious discourse in urban Klang Valley surpassed the quality of religious sermons in mosques in rural Kelantan. This shows that religiosity is better embraced by urban folks. As religiosity is equated with the middle-class, it is not surprising that the phenomenon of pop Islam is spreading to rural Malaysia as well, as more Malays crave to be identified with the Muslim middle-class.

Hijrah and Post-Islamisation in Malaysia

When discussing about the Islamisation of the market in Malaysia, it is unavoidable to mention how the country pioneered Islamic banking and finance in the 1990s. Since then, the halal industry has grown in other sectors including food, travel, cosmetics, and modest wear with halal exports amounting to RM43 billion in 2017. It is not a surprise then that Malaysia tops four indicators in the State of the Global Islamic Economy Report 2020/21.The pervasiveness of the halal industry has turned it into a norm that Muslims in Malaysia rely on the halal logo before making any purchases or economic transactions. Choosing to avoid doubt is not an issue, but it becomes divisive for multi-cultural Malaysia when non-Muslim businesses are shunned for no solid reasons such as the Buy Muslim First (BMF) campaign.

Another example of Muslims turning to religion in Malaysia can be seen in the mushrooming of alternative treatment centres based on Islamic teachings or Quranic verses called ruqyah. Such treatments to resolve various problems from physical pain to emotional turmoil are usually offered by religious clerics as part of their business venture. While it has been around for decades, there is no doubt that some Muslims today put more trust in such treatments than in conventional medicine. This becomes a problem, for example, when a well-known influencer who always gives Islamic talks tells thousands of her followers to stop taking medication for anxiety.

The entertainment industry in Malaysia is also not exempt from this phenomenon of pop Islam as seen in reality television shows that aim to produce charismatic young Islamic preachers. The first was Imam Muda (Young Imam), which ran for three seasons beginning in 2010. The fact that the show was followed by two others, Pencetus Ummah (Inspirator of the Ummah) and Da’i (Missionary),both premiering in 2013, proved that there is an appetite for Islamic reality TV. Make no mistake, these shows are first and foremost produced for entertainment, but is ‘purified’ by its focus on Islam. These celebrity preachers then ‘graduate’ to become an ‘ustaz’, or a cleric. Unfortunately, there have been controversies surrounding these instant preachers; a case of one step forward and two steps back for the cause of Hijrah in Malaysia.

Finally, the most obvious of these Hijrah phenomena is in the attire of Muslim women in Malaysia. If it was difficult to spot a person wearing the headscarf when the country first gained independence, it is now the other way around. More Muslim women are wearing the headscarf, or tudung, with modest fashion taking over the country. The numbers speak for themselves: dUCk scarves, founded by Vivy Yusuf, has sold over 1 million scarves since launching in 2014 while Naelofar Hijab, founded by celebrity Neelofa, hit RM50 million in sales in its first year of operation in 2014. All of this would not have been possible if not for the normalisation of the hijab in the media nearly 20 years ago started by celebrities such as Wardina Safiyyah.

Nevertheless, the hijab has now become synonymous with being a female Muslim who mostly put it on without much thought on its significance to cover a person’s modesty. As a result, there have been multiple cases over the years of women donning the hijab acting out in road rageor accused of bullying. Like the controversial celebrity preachers, these actions have brought more harm than good to the image of Islam. Yet, female Muslims will continue to don the hijab because it has now come to a point where those who do not wear the hijab are stigmatized. When bias leads to discriminatory practices, it is time to re-evaluate this Hijrah narrative for that is not what Islam stands for.

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

As a Muslim, it is definitely a joyous occasion to see fellow Muslims experience a spiritual Hijrah. Hopefully, the desire to become better is a personal choice that is free from coercion or shame. However, as has been argued, it has become more difficult to separate authentic piety from a desire to avoid ignominy. When Hijrah does not come naturally, there is an ensuing contradiction between a person’s outward appearance with their actions that are deemed un-Islamic.

Furthermore, in a multiracial country such as Malaysia in which politics is tied to the ethnic make-up of society, pop Islam can easily be appropriated by unscrupulous politicians who are looking to make a quick gain at the polls. If the Islamisation narrative is hijacked by disingenuous persons, it could lead to extremism and social disharmony in Malaysia. This has already been done by savvy entrepreneurs. Currently, pushback from the community is unfolding with numerous celebrities being called ‘penunggang agama’, which literally means religious riders, or those who are taking advantage of Islam for their own agenda. While Islam preaches harmony, the exploitation of the people’s wish for spiritual Hijrah could possibly create friction within society.

Introduction

Malaysia has always been a Muslim-majority country, but the rise of Islamic populism is a worrying trend that began in the past few years, culminating in the current rule of the Perikatan Nasional coalition. During Barisan Nasional’s (and its predecessor) six-decade in power, Islam has been successfully institutionalised. As a result, there was no doubt among the Malays regarding Islam’s special position in the country. This changed when Pakatan Harapan came to power.

Populism as a political strategy seek to replace the supposed corrupt elites with those who represent “the people”. Since the values of the Malay majority have always been assumed by the Malaysian government, and UMNO as a party championing Malay rights specifically, there was little need for populist rhetoric by the elites before 2018. Unfortunately, when the Barisan Nasional government was defeated by Pakatan Harapan in the 14th general election, the new government was portrayed by its opposition as threatening Islam’s special position in Malaysia. Islamic populist strategy was thus employed in the rhetoric of both UMNO and the Islamist PAS party as proof that they represent the true values of the Malay voters.

Islamic populism in Malaysia:

The Pakatan Harapan coalition comprised of two multiracial parties—PKR and DAP—and two Malay-centric parties—Bersatu and Amanah. In contrast to the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional, Pakatan Harapan resembled a more consensus-style decision making process. Because DAP leaders, known for their secular ideology, were seen as being on an equal footing with other Malay leaders in the coalition, accusations were thrown of Islam being under threat. Taking advantage of the Malays’ suspicion towards the Pakatan Harapan government, UMNO and PAS, two sworn enemies since PAS split from UMNO in 1951, formed an alliance in 2019 called Muafakat Nasional as a response to the devastating defeat they encountered in the previous general election.

UMNO and PAS leaders engaged in populist strategy steeped in Islamic rhetoric by alleging the Pakatan Harapan government of failing the majority Malay population. Examples can be seen in a number of incidents such as the recognition of the Unified Examination Certificate (UEC), the ratification of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the introduction of Jawi calligraphy in school syllabus. Although defending Malay rights have always been important to both parties, bringing these issues to the forefront as part of its political discourse is a relatively new innovation by UMNO which found itself in the opposition during Pakatan Harapan’s 22-months rule. Furthermore, as a response to the Jawi calligraphy controversy, a Malay-Muslim coalition called Gerakan Pembela Ummah (Ummah) promoted the Buy Muslim First (BMF) campaign. This shows that Islamic populism was not an exclusive strategy of political parties, but also for other Islamic organisations that wanted to take advantage of the Malays’ dissatisfaction with the Pakatan Harapan government.

Attacks by the Malay opposition arguably worked to weaken Pakatan Harapan as less than two years later, the Mahathir-led government was toppled in a soft coup by members of his own party. The newly formed Perikatan Nasional government consists mainly of three Malay-based political parties: UMNO, PAS, and Bersatu. After forming the new government, Perikatan Nasional was viewed positively by 74% of Malay voters, in contrast to the meagre 17% positive feedback received by Pakatan Harapan. It is not hard to see how Perikatan Nasional’s strategy of Islamic populism had been one of the reasons for its success in this war of perception. Populism, as a thin ideology, is known to be about politics of public opinion rather than about substantial policy goals. This explains the political infighting between UMNO and Bersatu as they do not have clear objectives except to defeat Pakatan Harapan and to block Anwar Ibrahim from becoming prime minister. As a result, the Perikatan Nasional government now holds on to power with a slim majority especially after three UMNO members withdrew support for Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin. Alas, we may not know the exact standing of the government as Malaysia went into a so-called health emergency on 12^th January 2021 that disallows Parliament from sitting.

Knowing that their survival is hanging by a thread, the Perikatan Nasional government has resorted again to a strategy of Islamic populism especially following several recent court cases. The government has vowed to strengthen the Syariah court by introducing a five-year roadmap that includes the amendment of the Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Bill 355 (RUU355). This would allow the Syariah courts to mete out hudud law as prescribed in the Qur’an. More worryingly, after the High Court declared that non-Muslims are allowed to use the word “Allah”, UMNO was quick to claim that Muslims are willing to go to the streets over the matter. Even Zahid Hamidi, UMNO’s current president, mentioned in his speech at the party’s annual general meeting that UMNO will prioritise the strengthening of the Syariah court systemas long as the people vote the party back into power. With other state Islamic religious bodies joining the government in appealing the High Court’s decision, there is no doubt that UMNO is playing to the public’s sentiment.

Reactions of Non-Malays

The growing Islamic populism in Malaysia is challenging the rights and liberties of non-Malays as best exemplified in the right of non-Muslim speakers of Bahasa Melayu who have used “Allah” to mean God for generations. Thus, the most affected are the bumiputras in Sabah and Sarawak, two states in East Malaysia that have real concerns that the Islamisation process across the sea would spill over into their territories. Jeffrey Kittingan of STAR, an ally of Perikatan Nasional in Sarawak, has reminded PAS that the incumbent coalition could not secure a two-thirds majority in the next general election if the sensitivities of the people in East Malaysia are not taken into consideration. The relative silence of other non-Malay parties shows a level of pragmatism and understanding over the current temperature of Islamic religiosity in the country.

More than political fallout, the impact of growing Islamic populism in Malaysia is the growing polarisation within society between Muslims and non-Muslims. For this reason, populists have always been branded as antagonistic to democracy, because instead of uniting the people, populists find success in wedging a gap among the people to illustrate the “us” from the “them”. The Islamic populists in Malaysia are peddling to the people’s base instinct to defend Islam since the religion is tied to their identity as Malays and also to their political claim over Malaysia (or specifically, the concept of Ketuanan Melayu). As a result, Malaysia is seeing the disentangling of its social fabric with many non-Muslims leaving the country because they have lost all hope in the possibility for democracy to save the country.

Danger of Islamic populism

Why should we be concern with the rise of Islamic populism in Malaysia? After all, Islamisation of Malaysia’s society and administration have been ongoing since the 1970s. The problem today is that the Islamisation project is now tied to power-grabbing elites who are facing a diverse Malay electorate. These populist elites may operate within a democratic framework, but their commitment to democratic values is unpredictable. Liberal democracy requires whoever governing in Putrajaya to respect the rights and liberties of the minorities who do not vote for them. Unfortunately, populists see these minorities as “others” who do not deserve a modicum of respect. As the ideas of these Islamic populists spread in society, extremist views among the Malay population may increase. These extremists are unfortunately less tolerant to democratic ideals, and the fear is that when all else fails, they would resort to violence. Although this is not an immediate concern, it is imperative to strengthen democratic norms in Malaysia to avoid such possibility. With the country’s limited experience in democratic forbearance, it is up to the average democrats in Malaysia to defeat Islamic populism and right-wing extremism through civic engagement and discourse.