Indonesian Women & Terrorism: A Two-Part Analysis (Part 1)

Since the start of terrorism in Indonesia, it was almost certain that the perpetrators of such violence were adult men. Women did not appear to be involved in violence perpetrated by Darul Islam (DI), a key radical movement that dated back to the 1950s. This demonstrates the centrality of masculinity in this movement and, thus, cemented the notion that terrorism or extremism belonged to men.

In Indonesia, women only started getting involved in this movement in the 1980s as DI began its recruitment campaigns in campuses. The recruitment of female students, alongside males, marked the start of their expanding roles. DI began expanding its outreach to campuses as they saw how students were mobilized to protest against the Suharto regime since the 1970s. Additionally, they saw increasing resentment from women towards the regime which sought to repress women’s role from public or political space. Such resentment benefited DI as a means to strengthen its movement of establishing Islamic polity in Indonesia.

Female-centric publications were produced by DI to convince women in believing the group’s purposes. These publications included books such as “Hijab” written by Abu Al A’la Al Maududi and pamphlets such as “The Big Sins and Forgotten Ayahs by the Moslem.” “Hijab” portrayed Zainab Al Ghazali as a mighty female leader who was imprisoned and tortured by the Egyptian government for attempting to instil a pure form of Islam. The hijab consequently became a symbol of a Muslim woman’s faith. This created the notion that women must wear the hijab as a sign of their piety.

Additionally, women were recruited via student gatherings in campuses in the form of intimate women-only religious classes. However, the roles of women in this group were limited to being objects with the sole purpose of reproducing the next generation of jihadis, also known as Allah’s army (Jundullah). Due to this limitation, women were again not involved in violence which continued to be perpetrated by male members of the movement.

Such forms of masculinity continued throughout the 1990s with the formation of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). JI was formed in Malaysia by DI members who fled from Indonesia to escape prosecution. This group subsequently established its networks throughout Southeast Asia. Under the command of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, JI did not permit the involvement of women and children in the group. The group also restricted their members from revealing their involvements and activities to their wives. The basis of these restrictions was that they believed women to be subordinate to men. Even if women were involved in the group’s activities under extraordinary circumstances such as when there is a need or in an emergency, they only played supportive roles such as logistical support.

From personal interviews with several JI members in Jakarta and Java, there were several reasons for JI’s subordination of women:

1. Women are responsible for household chores and to care for their husbands and children. There is no need for them to know of their husband’s involvements in the group as all of JI’s matters are “men’s business.”
2. Women have a tendency to not keep secrets which is essential for covert movements such as JI. As such, informing women of the group’s activities will compromise the group’s safety and the success of the mission.
3. Women are seen as the glue holding their families together if their husbands are caught. By keeping them uninvolved in JI’s activities, these women can continue caring for their children and become their families’ breadwinner.

Reinforcing this subordination is a publication from Pesantren Ngruki, an Islamic boarding school owned by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. This reference book, entitled “The Law of Jihad for Women”, was distributed to their female students at the boarding school. Written by Al Umdah, the book encouraged readers towards “domesticated jihad” which was entirely different from “jihad qital” or war. By framing as such, women were obligated to produce and to raise future soldiers for the cause. Additionally, the group continuously primed female relatives to marry their jihadi members including those who were imprisoned. Such marriages served to strengthen JI’s networks that were in Indonesia, Southeast Asia and the pacific.

In other words, women were unknowingly made to serve JI’s cause by 1) producing and raising future generations of Jihadis, 2) strengthening the bonds within JI via marriages, 3) caring for their families as dutiful housewives, and 4) being pious by wearing clothing that reflects their piety. Therefore, it is not uncommon for these women to express shock and disbelief when their husbands were arrested for terrorism-related offences as they saw their husbands as good members of society, fathers and imams to their families.

As time passed and with the imprisonment of numerous JI members, women began to yearn to be involved in “jihad qital.” As evident in 2008-2009, several women began expressing their thoughts and yearnings of jihad on social media. However, they were still unwilling to reveal their female gender in their profiles. Instead, they used male nom de guerre while discussing in chatgroups belonging to this radical group. Despite the passing of time, the restriction of women to participate in “jihad qital” was still enforced. This was because JI have yet to consider Indonesia to be in a state of war. Consequently, femininity in violent extremism was yet to be considered a necessity for the group.

Women were still considered by JI to not only be second class but who lack the capacity to understand serious matters. Although their access to such violent endeavours were restricted, women were given pseudo autonomy in making decisions related to their children’s education and upbringing. This pseudo autonomy was due to the expectations by the groups via their husbands to raise future jihadis. Women were also given some space to contribute economically to their family via several professions including trade, teacher, and herbalist. They were restricted from pursuing a career and working in places where males were also employed.

Part 2: Change in Terrorism Landscape in Indonesia.

Indonesian Women & Terrorism: A Two-Part Analysis (Part 2)

When Abu Bakar Al Baghdadi declared a caliphate based in Iraq and Syria in 2013, Islamist militants in Indonesia were disappointed with JI and their affiliates. This disappointment stemmed from the failure to achieve similar successes in Indonesia despite the time and resources invested. Their yearning to participate in “jihad” reignited their ambitions to establish Indonesia as an Islamic state. It was, thus, an easy option for many including those from JI to switch allegiance and setting up an ISIS franchise in Indonesia in 2014. With reignited ambition, the group held weekly long marches in the main roads of Jakarta to announce their presence in Indonesia and to recruit new members.

However, in the early stages of this new movement, masculinity still predominated in this group. This was evident as participants of these long marches and in oath or bayat swearing ceremonies were males. Females were still restricted from participating in “jihad” as seen from the 2016 bombing in Central Jakarta. Perpetrators of this attack were all males. However, one key difference with JI, ISIS Indonesia eventually accepted women’s involvement in their group.

One key driver is that globally, women were unafraid of expressing their intents of participating in “jihad qital” without concealing their gender. This inspired Indonesian women to do the same so as to not be left behind. Social media, thus, became an effective tool to recruit women and for their subsequent bayat swearing. Towards the end of 2016, ISIS permitted women to actively participate in their jihadi movement. This expanded women’s role from the household to the “battlefield.” In December 2016, the arrest of Dian Yulia Novi cemented her as the first women in Indonesia to be “permitted” to being directly involved in an attack. She was instructed by the group to conduct a suicide bombing at the Indonesian Presidential Palace.

Dian, however, was not the only nor the first Indonesian women who supported ISIS. Previously, Indonesian women such as Tutin Sugiarti, a former migrant worker in Taiwan have expressed their loyalty to ISIS. Additionally, Tutin was responsible for motivating Dian to become a martyr and for introducing her to facilitators by matchmaking Dian to an ISIS member.

In addition to being permitted to participate in “jihad”, the group enabled women to decide how to do so. This further expanded their roles to include fundraising, propaganda creators, campaigners, and recruiters. Examples of other Indonesian women include Ika Puspitasari (foiled suicide bomber), Aisha Lina Kamelya (creator of a pro-ISIS channel on Telegram), and Ratna Nirmala (persuaded her husband to migrate the family to Syria). It is also notable that a pro-ISIS group in Indonesia established a business front known as “Umahat Aseer’s Kitchen” to raise funds for terrorism activities. Despite the expansion of roles, women still do not enjoy the same access as men in the group. Planning of attacks still remained a men’s domain. Women were to also abide by men’s decisions. However, this was not to last as the terrorism landscape in Indonesia encountered another shift marked by the 2018 Surabaya bombing.

From “the Backyard to the Dining Room”

The bombings of three churches in Surabaya on May 2018 changed the face of terrorism in Indonesia. Pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia adopted a novel tactic of using entire families including their children to conduct attacks. Prior to this attack, children have been involved with terrorism since 2016. This includes the arrest of Fakri (mapping police posts as potential targets), Ivan Armadi Hasugian (church bombing in Medan), and Ridho Pratama (bombing in Samarinda). Ostensibly, these cases eased the use of entire families for attacks. Shortly after the Surabaya bombing, three families were involved in suicide bombing attacks.

The use of this tactic was not entirely accepted within the pro-ISIS movement in Indonesia. The de facto ISIS Indonesia leader was against the tactic while the ISIS leader in West Java supported the tactic and left it to the family to plan their actions. Apart from the change in modus operandi, it is worrying that this tactic involves both teenagers and underaged children who do not understand their involvements.

Several reasons have been cited to permit the involvement of such underaged individuals:

1. The difficulty of conducting preventive intervention for such families as families are considered to be private spaces that cannot be interfered with.
2. The parents wished for their children to enter heaven as a family regardless of whether their children agreed or disagreed with their parent’s worldview.
3. The parents intend to protect their children from stigmatization and bullying that surviving family members of terrorism perpetrators faced. Rather than experiencing such lifelong burdens, the parents believe that their children’s involvement is the best option.
4. The parents worry that their children will be raised in a manner that they do not agree if their children did not participate in the suicide attacks. Involving their children in attacks negates this worry.

The bombings in Surabaya, Sidoarjo and Sibolga also signifies the change in women’s position in radical movements. Women now hold an equal position as men, no longer are they seen as impediments. This is because pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia support gender equality and gender mainstreaming in terrorism. Such equality is not only limited to adults but also applies to children with certain caveat. Although children are invited to participate in violence, their involvements generally involve adults. In Indonesia, it is still rare for children and teenagers to conduct lone wolf attacks which entails being solely responsible for planning to executing the attack. Challenges for such lone wolf attacks include access to resources, conviction to carry out the entire process, and the cognitive ability to plan. Despite the limited cases, violence conducted by children and teenagers in Indonesia are solely perpetrated by males. There have yet to be documented cases of lone wolf attacks by female children or teenagers.

The Role of Gender in Preventing and Countering Terrorism in Indonesia

In Indonesia, women are actively contributing to efforts at preventing terrorism. Being involved as either individuals or part of organizations, these women not only played supportive roles but many have spearheaded such efforts. Additionally, there are now programmes that target women from participating in terrorism. Fatayat NU is an example of a mass organization that is actively involved in such programmes in the community. Their programmes include religious education by female Islamic scholars or ulama, increasing the capacities of female Islamic teachers or ustazah, and developing the capabilities of female branch members to arrest radical movements at the grassroot levels.

Unfortunately, the involvement of women in counterterrorism efforts are still lacking, particularly at strategic levels and stages prior to terrorists being sentenced in court. The roles of male and female officers are balanced post-sentencing and post-release of these terrorists. There are many female prison officers who are not only responsible for managing female inmates but also males. Similarly, many female parole officers are responsible for both female and male releasees.

Away from these roles, women are not involved in surveillance operations even if the alleged perpetrators are women. Surveillance operations are conducted solely by male intelligence officers. This is similarly encountered during apprehension of terrorist suspects. Again, male officers are responsible for making the arrests despite the suspects being female. This is largely due to Detachment 88 (D88), the Indonesia’s special counterterrorism unit, is male-dominated. Female officers are usually involved during the female suspects court hearings. These roles are “domestic” in the sense that they are to care for their female suspects as they undergo their hearings. These roles include guarding and protecting these suspects.

Lastly, the rising threat of Indonesian women in terrorism not only necessitates the involvement but also the leadership of women in Indonesia’s National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) and D88. Currently, many strategic positions in these organizations are helmed by men. The inclusion of women will enable a women-centric approach to prevent women from participating in terrorism and managing women convicted of terrorism in Indonesia.

Part 1: Women in The Early Era of Terrorism in Indonesia