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GK Pictures is a collective of researchers and creators who wish to bring Ya’s story to life. We are seeking support and funds for research that will take the team around the country, Europe and the Middle East prior to production. You may contact us at gongkapaspictures@gmail.com.

Introduction

In the tome Terengganu Darul Iman 1881-1936, written by Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, he wrote:

                Bersuka-sukaan di sana ia

                dua tiga orang matinya sahaya

                dibeli pula yang maha mulia

                beberapa cariat muda belia.

                Kulitnya hitam warna gelat

                berkilat pandang seperti shakhalat

                kedua mata putihnya bulat

                rambut seperti di sarang ulat.

                Gemar melihat mahkota negeri

                kulitnya hitam tiada berperi

                diajar pelayan di dalam qasri

                sangat dikasih muda bestari.

                Tiadalah hamba memanjangkan cerita

                di sana tidak lama sang nata

                lepas mengambil haji yang nyata

                kembalilah ia semua serta.

                Di negeri Terengganu tempat sedia

                menderulah datang hamba dan sahaya

                serta kaum kerabat dia

                mengunjungi datang di tanah bahagia.

Hashim wrote about the arrival of dark-skinned slaves, who aroused the curiosity and later acceptance from Terengganu locals. Was this just a story, or were there bondsmen from the Middle East and Africa who lived in the state?

–

When I was a child, my holidays in Gong Kapas, Terengganu, were marked by imaginary adventures or passive curiosity of the neighbourhood. I would stay with my grandparents and their youngest children – and of course my mother – while my father worked abroad. As I grew older, any holiday or reason to go back to Terengganu would see us there.

At that time, in the 1970s and 80s, Gong Kapas was green and lush. My late grandparents’ home was covered with mango and rambutan trees, and behind the house was a wall with an opening to the house behind us. Cats and kittens scampered about. From time to time, goats sauntered in and out of the compound. My late grandmother employed quite a number of maids and help who cooked, massaged, and observed the goings-on in the house. The people from the back of the house trooped into Toknda’s house too to exchange gossip, news and – of course – food.

I was quite young that time, but I was always at the back of the house, because the cats and food were there. My babysitter and the maids would congregate to talk about their men and ghosts. Occasionally, a tall, dark-skinned woman would pop her head in, speak softly, and leave. We never spoke. But I remembered that my cousin, Nadia, would go over to the house behind; she was friendly with the tall lady. That was all I knew of her.

—

By 2006, I was in my mid-20s. I visited Terengganu a lot while my grandparents were still alive. One evening, I was in the garden – which was now a rather strange rock garden – and went inside for a drink. That was when I saw the tall lady, waving at me from outside her window, motioning to me to meet her. I left the kitchen to meet her at the back entrance of her home, thinking throughout the whole process about how very tall she was.

She asked me if I was the grandchild of (now deceased) Tengku Asmak, who was a writer. I nodded.

She asked me to come into her house. In her spare kitchen, she asked me if I knew who and what she was. I shook my head. I only knew that she was called Ya and I assumed she was a very tall Indian Muslim.

She smiled and told me she was an African slave, who came from Mecca.

Terengganu in Brief

To understand Terengganu is to understand its history, which scholars such as the abovementioned Yusoff Hashim have explored in detail.

In his book Terengganu Darul Iman: Tradisi Pensejarahan Malaysia, he describes Terengganu’s geographical challenges that include strong north-east monsoon winds, rough seas and annual floods. These natural conditions shaped the livelihoods of its people, with fishing, skilled labour and farming being the primary occupations. In 1921, the population stood at 66,135, increasing to 95,800 by 1931, with Terengganu town housing around 12,453 residents.

The Terengganu Sultanate traces its origins back to the 18^th century, with 17 sultans ruling since its inception. Mubin Sheppard (1949) details its founding, linking it to Johor’s Bendahara dynasty. In 1718, Sultan Abdul Jalil of Johor was exiled by Raja Kechil, who claimed descent from Malacca’s Sultan Mahmud Mangkat Dijulang. Sultan Abdul Jalil took refuge in Terengganu but was assassinated in 1721. His son, Tengku Sulaiman, allied with Bugis warrior Daeng Perani to reclaim Johor. According to Tuhfat Al-Nafis, Sultan Sulaiman, with Bugis support, appointed his uncle, Tun Zainal Abidin, as Terengganu’s first sultan in 1725.

Patani tradition states that he fled to Patani after his adoptive father, Wan Derahman, was wrongly executed and was sheltered by the ruling Queen Nang Chayam. During Sultan Abdul Jalil’s visit to Patani, an agreement was made to divide Johor’s territories, with Terengganu assigned to Tun Zainal Abidin. After Abdul Jalil’s death, Patani honoured the deal, sending Tun Zainal Abidin and 80 Patani families to Terengganu, where he was installed as sultan. He further strengthened ties by marrying the queen’s cousin, Che Puan Besar. The settlement, Kampong Patani, still exists today.

One of the most well-known rulers was Sultan Zainal Abidin III who ruled from 1881 to 1918. His reign marked Terengganu’s transition from a nominal vassal of Siam to an Unfederated Malay State under British protection. He was known for his charisma, personal adherence to Islamic law and efforts to modernise Terengganu. Breaking from isolationist policies, he embraced reforms and welcomed foreigners. He maintained Terengganu’s independence by showcasing historical manuscripts proving sovereignty and resisting British interference. With the support of religious leader Tok Ku Sayyid Paloh and noble Haji Ngah Muhammad, he opposed colonial control.

Despite his efforts, the 1909 British-Siamese Agreement was signed without Terengganu’s knowledge, placing the state under British influence. Sultan Zainal Abidin III countered by introducing Itqan al-Muluk (Terengganu State Constitution) in 1911, ensuring leadership followed Quranic principles and upheld Malay-Islamic identity. He passed away on 26 November 1918 at the age of 54, deeply mourned by his people.

His successor, Sultan Muhammad Shah II, was born on 1 May 1889 in Kuala Terengganu to Cik Khalthum binti Haji Daud, also known as Cik Istana. His reign was short-lived due to British pressure. The 1918 Bucknill Commission investigated his rule, citing mismanagement, particularly in land and mining concessions. British officials deemed him illiterate and temperamental, justifying their intervention. In 1919, he was forced to accept a British Adviser, officially integrating Terengganu into the British Empire. Struggling under colonial oversight, he abdicated after 18 months in favour of his brother, Sultan Sulaiman Badrul Alam Syah, to take control.

Sultan Sulaiman’s rule (1920–1942) saw Terengganu fall further under British control. British-backed officials attempted but failed to install Tengku Besar Mahmud, a prince of full royal blood (meaning both his parents were of royal descent), as sultan. His reign was marked by natural disasters, including the devastating 1926–1927 floods, and peasant uprisings led by Haji Abdul Rahman Limbong against British taxation policies. The Japanese invasion in 1941 worsened conditions – he died in 1942. His son, Sultan Ali, was later dethroned in 1945 due to a series of alleged misconducts – from holding wild parties, associating with unsavory women, to being pro-Japanese – and was replaced by his uncle, Sultan Ismail Nasiruddin.

The early 20^th century was a turbulent period in Terengganu’s history, marked by frequent shifts in power. Foreign pressures from British colonial administrators and Thailand played a significant role in shaping the decisions of Terengganu’s rulers. The legacy of Sultan Zainal Abidin III endured, as three of his sons became sultans, each navigating the challenges of British colonisation and governance. The evolution of Terengganu from an independent sultanate to a British protectorate, and eventually a part of Malaysia, was deeply influenced by the strength, or weakness, of its rulers. Ultimately, Terengganu’s history is inseparable from the story of its sultans, whose leadership defined its fate.

The Slave Trade in the Malay World: A Global Context

The story of slavery in the Malay world is a truly global one. It is one that can be told alongside the story of how trade and ideas came from the Middle East to the people of Southeast Asia. It is a tale of intricate networks, of characters from all walks of life, told within a wide context that sees the overlapping of religion, local and international geopolitics and economics.

By looking at slavery in a Malay(sian) context, we gain insight into a new history, one that brings together themes that are familiar to us. We are talking about European imperialism, cosmopolitanism, trade networks, Islam, Malay identity and even Malay power. It also involved non-Europeans and local traders who were heavily involved in the trade of slaves, namely from East Africa.

For decades, scholarship on slavery has mainly concentrated on the Atlantic trade. In recent years, however, scholars are looking at other geographical contexts for slavery, especially eastwards, from East Africa, through the Middle East, down the Indian Ocean and to the Malay Archipelago.

The Indian Ocean has emerged as a new context of study. This mass body of ocean has been a witness to the movements of peoples and goods, facilitating travel, trade and even colonialism. Scholars such as Amal Ghazal and Fahad Bishara have contributed to this field by examining the trade networks that connected various points along the Indian Ocean, from Zanzibar to the Indian continent. Slavery scholars are also beginning to look at this context to broaden the global scope of slavery’s history.

The demand for slave labour from East Africa stemmed from the expansion of European-controlled plantations in the 18^th century. In the French-held Mascarenes islands (the group of islands of which Mauritius belongs to), slaves from the East African coast were trafficked to the sugar plantations there. Plantations owned by Arab Muslims growing cloves and dates in the East African islands of Zanzibar and Pemba in the Persian Gulf region also increased the demand for slaves. Demand increased even further with the growing dominance of the British in the region who wanted to maintain their imperial control by propping up slave dependent economies. Slaves did not only appear on plantations, but also in other places too, from factories to the household.

When the European powers arrived, they took slaves from the eastern part of Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) and southern India as a labour force for their newly conquered and established cities in Asia. The Dutch relied extensively on the populations of Batavia to work on building sites or warehouses. Some of them were also owned property of Dutch citizens.

The African slave trade started in the 15^th century, when European powers expanded their lands in the Americas. They traded with local African leaders along the Western coast of Africa, gaining slaves to be brought across the Atlantic to work on European-owned plantations in the Atlantic coast of the Americas and on the Caribbean islands. However, it did not take long until the Europeans started trading slaves from the eastern coast of Africa eastwards for their possessions in the Indian Ocean.

For instance, the Portuguese were the first to bring slaves from Mozambique and Madagascar over to South Asia. Hundreds of thousands of Africans were taken and forcibly resettled on this route, as claimed by Shihan de Silva Jayasuriya. Termed Afro-Asian communities in India, they can be found in Gujarat and Karnataka, the two coastal states facing the eastern coast of Africa.

However, slavery in Southeast Asia cannot only be understood within the context of European imperialism. As noted by Anthony Reid, there was a “fluid spectrum” and conditions of bondage. He pointed out the ambiguous, if contradictory, position of slave – both as a property and person – as part of the household but also an outsider. In the Southeast Asian region, the concept of bondsmen, as opposed to slaves as property, had been in existence for centuries. In the Angkor court, slaves would be taken from less fixed populations, such as fishermen, cultivators and hunter-gatherers.

Furthermore, when examining slavery in Southeast Asia, it is also important to consider the role played by Islam. Stephanie Cronin has urged to move away from viewing slavery within a Eurocentric lens and to understand the institution of slavery within a religious-ideological framework. Much of how Islam and slavery is understood has been through a post-abolition Western discourse that is orientalist and othering in its approach.

In the Middle East, slavery had been in existence since ancient times. The arrival of Islam provided a new legal framework for slavery, but the practice did not die out. While domestic slaves and such were commonplace in the Muslim world, so too was the rise of elite slaves, who were taken by Islamic leaders to hold high positions in the government and military. In some cases, such as the Mamluks in Egypt, they even went on to overthrow their leaders and rule.

Muslim traders had been coming to the Malay lands along tried and tested routes through the Indian Ocean, even before the arrival of the Europeans. They were also active in the trade of slaves from East Africa. These African slaves who were brought over to Southeast Asia lived in a more open slave society, as compared to their Atlantic counterparts. Scholars such as Titas Chakraborty and Matthias van Rossum have urged the need to emphasise the local character of “Asian” slaveries. Many married into the local population and assimilated relatively well into the local population. Islamic law stipulated for fair treatment for slaves, disallowing exploitation, cruelty and prostitution. They were entitled to a formal contract and had the right to access legal aid and protection. Arab leaders took slaves from a variety of communities, including Christians in the Balkans and Africans. In Southeast Asia, local laws, from imperial Chinese ordinances to laws of the Melaka sultanate covered the rights of slaves.

Through studying the presence of African slaves in Southeast Asia, we thus gain insight into a long history that encompasses different geographic spaces that are united by trade, networks and religion across the Indian Ocean.

Part of an ongoing article series on the impact of the Middle East conflict on Southeast Asia.

Introduction

Switching on the hourly news in Malaysia, whether in Malay, English, Tamil or Chinese, a viewer might be a little surprised to see the broadcasters wearing a Palestine solidarity scarf around their neck.

Since the eruption of the recent Israel-Gaza war on 7 October 2023, Malaysia, under the leadership of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, has placed itself strongly in the Palestine camp.

In international forums, he has called for Western leaders to halt arms sales to Israel and has publicly sided with Hamas leaders—offering support and pledging solidarity.

The ever-escalating situation in the Middle East has invariably caused disruptions, increased global tensions and sustained the Palestine solidarity movement in new ways.

Frequent large-scale demonstrations all over the world have changed the narrative of the Palestine solidarity movement, bringing new awareness and supporters to the cause.

The involvement of new countries such as Iran also shifted the narrative to view the Islamic Republic as proactive and able to stand up to Israel.

Malaysia’s Stance

For Malaysia, these developments have solidified the country’s traditional foreign policy stance as well as its societal behaviors and discourse. The governmental rhetoric on Palestinian solidarity brings home Malaysia’s unique foreign policy alignment in the ongoing Israel-Gaza war. On one hand, it can show outward support for Palestine without jeopardizing its relations with the West.

Malaysia has often regarded itself as a “small country” but possesses the self-awareness and confidence to be able to punch above its weight and shift foreign policy stances when necessary. With its upcoming chairmanship of ASEAN, Malaysia will be playing an even bigger symbolic regional role to ensure stability and economic advancements for its members.

During the Cold War, for instance, despite a history of fighting a communist insurgency, Malaysia refrained from joining the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and instead opted for non-alignment.  

Driven by its desire to be friends with all, Malaysia has historically opted for neutrality as well as being morally balanced in its international approach. However, this does not mean that it refrains from being active in its support for certain causes.

Despite keeping cordial relations with the West, Anwar has maintained pressure for a ceasefire and, when possible, has shown Malaysia to be aligned with Palestine.

In April 2024, Anwar made an official trip to Germany to discuss trade relations and bilateral ties. He openly criticized Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s pro-Israel alignment, which drew international attention.

The situation appears a little more complex when examining Malaysia’s relations with the United States in the last year.

Washington has expressed concerns over Malaysia’s support for Hamas, especially after Anwar met with Ismail Haniyeh before the latter’s assassination in July 2024. Furthermore, it is the US government and businesses that have become the target of Malaysian anti-Israeli sentiment.

For years, Malaysian leaders have kept alignment with Washington deliberately opaque so as not to draw the ire of the country’s Muslim majority population, who oppose US support for Israel.

Since the war, any major deals between the two countries have come under scrutiny. When it was revealed that US company BlackRock was going to buy a 30% stake in managing Malaysia Airpots Holdings Berhad (MAHB), Anwar was accused of duplicity.

The war has revealed the difficulty Malaysia has always faced between support for Palestine and its desire to be close to the West.

In many ways, the rhetoric Malaysia has built around support for Palestine helps to mitigate this. From regulated demonstrations with Anwar in attendance to newscasters with Palestine scarves, there is a performative aspect of Malaysia’s support.

When Others Joined the Fray

Since its start, the Israel-Gaza war has come to include other countries and organizations, such as the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran. Malaysia has expressed support for all of them, venturing into new kinds of rhetoric and public support.

Despite not having any ties with Hezbollah, in comparison to Hamas, Malaysia condemned Israel’s assassination of Hasan Nasrallah. Similarly, Malaysia has openly supported Iran’s sending of missiles to Israel.

Such statements reflect an emerging shift in Malaysia’s foreign policy that is open to alignment with Iran.

Malaysian-Iranian relations have not always been straightforward, with Malaysia outwardly partaking in sanctions but also breaking sanction regulations when it comes to shipping and economic exchanges.

Furthermore, anti-Shi’i sentiments exist in Malaysia, with strong religious laws that discourage Malaysians from practicing Shi’ism.

Despite this, Malaysia has always made a distinction between Iran and Shi’ism, allowing for cordial bilateral relations but ensuring the practice of Shi’ism by non-Malaysians is discreet.

The conflict and Malaysia’s support for Iran are political and this distinction remains in place, meaning that there is unlikely to be a relaxing of anti-Shi’i sentiments or regulations.

The escalation of the war in the Middle East and the possible increased involvement of Iran may see Malaysia stepping up its support for Tehran, which may reduce sectarian tensions but place further strain on its relations with the United States.

Malaysians React

The Israel-Gaza war has also impacted the Malaysian society in extraordinary ways. On one hand, it has led to interesting discussions on Malaysia’s role in international solidarity, on immigration and on social consciousness. On the other hand, it has also contributed to societal tensions with the dominance of the Malay-Muslim community in the Palestine issue.

Indeed, since 7 October, Malaysia and Malaysians have shown a strong front against Israel, while actively taking part in the boycott movement against corporations that have shown support for Israel or who have refrained from divesting.

McDonalds and Starbucks became the main targets of boycotts, with both companies reporting losses in the millions of ringgit.

The Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement is regarded as the most significant and effective form of international solidarity for the Palestinians. Since 2005, it has brought awareness to the struggles of the Palestinian people against the Israeli apartheid regime and has brought together people from across the world to be a part of a highly globalized resistance movement.

For the first time, Malaysia has joined this movement in full force, actively supporting BDS. Calls for boycotting, divesting, and sanctioning have come from different corners of Malaysian society, from the government, politicians and social media influencers. Indeed, there is a lot of pressure to use social media as a platform of solidarity.

In Malaysia, the pro-Palestine movement is divided along racial lines, with the Malay-Muslim population leading the narrative of presenting Palestine as a predominantly Muslim cause.

However, this is not to say that other races and religions are not engaged or that all Malays are fully supportive. Palestine, with a Muslim majority, has since the 1980s been seen as a key plight for the Islamic world. The symbol of Al-Aqsa, the third holiest site in Islam after Mecca and Madinah, is palpable and reaches Muslims all over the world at a basic and instinctive level.

This narrative has not changed, with many Muslim charities and organizations from Islamic Relief to Friends of Al-Aqsa, using Palestine as a focus point. 

The adoption of Palestine as a Muslim concern is not something novel. After all, Palestine had for a long time become a focal point for the Islamic world, even if the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is seen to have abandoned the Palestinian liberation movement.

This in turn has led to the rise of Muslim youth fundamentalism and the adoption of Palestine as an issue by individual Muslim countries. The prolonged Israel-Gaza war has placed Palestine again at the heart of the debate, with growing frustration at the lack of collective response and reaction from the Muslim world, particularly the Arab countries.

As such, the conflict has seen Malaysia and Malaysians become part of a new global movement for Palestine. This increases Malaysia’s confidence on an international level and within the Islamic world, something that Anwar builds on from previous Prime Ministers, including Najib Razak, who made Malaysia into a guardian of disenfranchised Muslims.

Palestine has certainly provided Malaysians with an avenue for expression and political participation on a wider level. A country that has avoided protests, Malaysia has allowed for controlled public demonstrations for the public to show their solidarity, often with Anwar in attendance.

In addition, participation in BDS has made Malaysia a part of a wider movement, building transnational solidarity links with the establishment of BDS Malaysia. This in turn has become a new platform of scrutiny for Malaysia’s deals with foreign companies.

Conclusion

The tensions in the Middle East do not show any signs of dissipating. A year since the start of the Israel-Gaza war, Malaysian society has also reached a state of sustained solidarity for Palestine and Palestinians, with the boycott continuing against businesses considered unfriendly to the cause.

With the change in the global narrative towards the Palestinian issue, more widespread support from all aspects of Malaysian society may be observed, with growing awareness of Palestine as a human issue rather than a religious one. However, the dominance of the Malay-Muslim in directing the solidarity will most likely stay in place.

Malaysia has opted for a balancing act between support for Palestine and continuing cordial relations with the West. However, if a war were to erupt between Iran and Israel, we might see strong rhetoric in support of Iran, though this may not mean a break in the relationship with the West. Malaysia’s positioning as a neutral “friend to all” should be able to withstand some strain on its relationship to the West while accommodating an orientation in its foreign policy that sees support for Palestine and Iran.