Introduction

China’s maritime coercion directed against the Philippines reached a peak in 2024, with ships and boats from China harassing Philippine civilian vessels between July and September 2024.

Such reports of aggressive and dangerous conduct on China’s side have been increasing at an alarming rate. Since February 2023, the Philippines has accused China of unsafe behavior on at least 12 occasions, often within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

To illustrate this, there were two separate “ramming” incidents that had taken place between the ships of the Chinese and Philippine coast guards. One of such incidents caused severe damage to the hull of one of the latter’s vessels in waters near Sabina Atoll, well within the Philippines’ EEZ.

A spokesperson of the Philippine National Maritime Council stated that China’s illegal actions do not contribute to confidence-building measures that are necessary to achieve mutual respect and preserve a rules-based international order.

Despite both sides agreeing in July 2024 to avoid confrontations during resupply missions to Philippine troops at a disputed shoal, recent events have called into question China’s sincerity. A month later, two Chinese planes released flares in the path of a Philippine military aircraft over the Scarborough Shoal, thus contradicting the agreement.

Geopolitical Concerns and Chinese Maritime Aggression

Southeast Asia is beset by a host of maritime security threats, including illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, piracy, sea robbery, illegal trafficking in arms, people, and drugs, as well as environmental crimes.

Institutions responding to these issues have proliferated, both inside and outside the purview of ASEAN. Indeed, the region is considered the “center of intensifying geopolitical competition with multiple potential flashpoints.”

Within Southeast Asia, the Philippines is a major maritime trading hub. Its territorial waters abound with enormous natural resources, beautiful beaches, minerals and hydrocarbon deposits. The protection of merchant, fishing and tourism vessels has thus created the need for constant monitoring of the maritime area. 

Given the tremendous maritime traffic, the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Coast Guard are tasked with dealing with IUU fishing, piracy, armed robbery, the trafficking of drugs and people, as well as the transport of illegal goods by sea.

With such hefty tasks at hand, the intrusion of Chinese vessels has thus added another problem to the mix.

However, it is a mistake to perceive this problem solely from the Philippines’ perspective, as China’s maritime activities can never be extricated from its broader strategic competition with the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.

On the United States’ part, it has political and moral obligations to maintain its position in areas threatened by Chinese incursions, including in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea.

Among others, these include: 1) keeping the regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies; 2) safeguarding US-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, and; 3) upholding its commitments to Japan and the Philippines.

The United States has undertaken various actions to attain these goals, which comprise activities such as: 1) transferring military personnel, equipment and supplies to bases at sites occupied in the South China Sea, and; 2) upholding the July 2016 tribunal award in the South China Sea arbitration case of the Philippines and China.

The Academic Perspective

It should be noted that China’s maritime strategy is derived from serious academic works on naval study and the alignment of military doctrine with national defense modernization, as written by Lidong Wang in “Theory of National Maritime Interest.”

These studies are done by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Science and the PLA National Defense University, which focus on the use of armed force, tactics, and military theories.

Many sea power theorists center their assessments on China’s continental power and its rising international status. Interestingly, some, like James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, found the commonalities between China’s strategy in the South China Sea and the United States’ in the Caribbean Sea.

These studies offer adequate knowledge regarding China’s increasing naval capability as well as the implications of China as a sea power—China’s intrusion into the Philippines’ waters being one manifestation of such.

Accordingly, a narrative has emerged into how the state should pursue its maritime policies. Such studies suggest the expansion of naval influence, the acquisition of deterrent sea power and the focus on the protection of sea lines of communication, according to Wenmu Zhang in Discussion of China’s Sea Power.

As shown, extensive research has been pursued pertaining to Chinese maritime power development.

In 2009, Chinese academics such as Wu Shicun, Xu Liping, Zhang Jie and Zhong Feiteng promoted their ideas on China’s international roles, diplomatic relations with the United States and China’s prominence in Southeast Asia. Their research centered on raising possible policy approaches to resolve debates and foster collaboration in the region.

Other studies also cover non-dispute-related maritime issues. Scholars of these areas posit that the information environment is strategic to China’s energy and logistic supply. Examples include studies on the “Malacca Dilemma” and the “String of Pearls,” which are associated with China’s energy imports and sea control.

Efforts to Safeguard Territorial Integrity

The Philippines has undertaken steps to safeguard its territorial integrity by emphasizing the importance of international law and through engagement with ASEAN.

While leveraging on international law is important, the Philippines still needs to continuously highlight in international forums about China’s violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), especially considering both the Philippines and China are parties to UNCLOS.

For example, the Philippines needs to highlight the outcome of the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration that found China’s claim as incompatible. The arbitration resulted in several key decision points.

Firstly, China’s claims to historic rights and resources have no legal basis. Secondly, none of China’s claimed land features in the Spratly Islands are islands capable of generating a 200-nm EEZ. Thirdly, China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights on several layers: 1) interfering with the latter’s oil exploration activities; 2) prohibiting its fishing vessels from operating; 3) failing to prevent Chinese fishing vessels from operating and; 4) conducting land reclamation in areas where the Philippines enjoys sovereign rights to explore for and exploit natural resources. Lastly, China violated its marine environmental protection obligations under UNCLOS by causing “severe harm to the coral reef environment” with its land reclamation activities and harvesting of endangered species.

Despite this, China has lodged its non-participation and non-acceptance of this ruling.

The impact of the 2016 arbitral ruling is threefold. First, the arbitration denies the effectivity of China’s maritime security strategy in the South China Sea. Second, it denies China’s historic rights claim. Third, it gives independent states recourse to the merits of UNCLOS in the face of China’s sea power in the South China Sea.

In other words, it has reinforced the Philippines’ contention that the actions of China in the South China Sea are “Illegal, Coercive, Aggressive and Deceptive.”

As a strategy to promote this ruling, President Ferdinand Marcos signed Executive Order 57 on 25 March 2024, to deal with issues that impact the country’s national security, sovereignty, sovereign rights and maritime jurisdiction over its extensive maritime zones. The Philippines continues to present the merits of the 2016 Arbitral Ruling in all public forums and implement exhaustive efforts to maintain its full adherence to the rule of law.

Efforts to Counter Maritime Aggression

The Philippines’ strategic alignment with the United States, Japan and Australia is a clear response to China’s intrusion. Under the auspices of the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Philippines can coalesce international support to maintain its position vis-à-vis China’s activities in the South China Sea.

There is strength in number. The leaders of the United States, Japan, India and Australia have collectively declared their concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas,  the “coercive and intimidating maneuvres” by China in the latter.

Even with such support in place, the Philippines must adopt a two-fold strategy to deal with China’s recurring activities within its EEZ.

The first strategy is to allow the United States and other foreign vessels to join the regular resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre, a tank-landing vessel under the Philippine Navy. If the Philippines’ resupply vessels are accompanied by foreign vessels, this may deter the Chinese maritime militia from carrying out its ramming techniques. Thus, the resupply missions can be peaceful and may be completed without any incident.

The second strategy is to allow active-duty Filipino Americans in the United States’ armed forces to join the resupply mission on board Philippine vessels.

The Philippines is one of several countries that recognize dual citizenship, with more than 15,000 Filipino Americans actively serving in the United States Navy, some of whom have achieved ranks of leadership at all levels. 

Many Filipino American officers are known as “mustangs,” naval service members who have worked through their career path from the bottom to the top. This is an honor that is difficult to attain and those mustangs are valuable repositories of knowledge as well as experience wherever they go.

The Philippines may put a request to the United States to allow Filipino-American naval officers to participate in regular resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre and in the patrolling of territorial waters in the South China Sea. The presence of Filipino Americans inside the Philippine vessels would help boost confidence among the Philippine Coast Guard and the Philippine Navy officers.

Conclusion

Chinese aggression within the Philippines’ EEZ has increased dramatically in the second half of this year. These actions have resulted in increased tensions between the two, thus threatening regional stability. Furthermore, despite a joint China-Philippine arrangement, which focuses on refraining from aggression during resupply missions to BRP Sierra Madre, China has not adhered to its commitments. This has called into question the viability of any diplomatic agreements with China.

The time has come for the Philippines to adopt more creative ways to deter China. The two-pronged strategy of including American vessels and Filipino American naval officers for regular resupply missions may offer a boost to maritime stability.

Filipino officials need to go beyond just diplomatic efforts to address the tensions in the South China Sea. These two creative solutions, which constitute peaceful strategies, may lead to better maritime security and regional stability in the long term.

Introduction

The Philippines has allowed cryptocurrencies to be used as legal tender. Approximately less than 2% of all known transactions in the Philippines are conducted using cryptocurrency but this does not account for transactions conducted in the informal economy. The easy conversion of cryptocurrency to fiat currency could easily be done through the Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) of the Union Bank of Philippines and other registered remittance and transfer companies.

Since the Philippines closely follows US financial regulations, the US White House Executive Order on Digital Assets released on March 2022 is essential to understand the future trajectory of Philippine cryptocurrency policies. The Executive Order stipulated that, “Digital assets may pose significant illicit finance risks, including money laundering, cybercrime and ransomware, narcotics and human trafficking, and terrorism and proliferation financing.” It further emphasized six key priorities: consumer and investor protection; financial stability; illicit finance; U.S. leadership in the global financial system and economic competitiveness; financial inclusion; and responsible innovation. Dr. Alondra Nelson, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) gives an optimistic tone to the potentials of the use of digital assets for the benefit of society. She cites three key takeaways on US cryptocurrency policy: 1) focus on the potential of digital assets in helping the unbanked population, 2) the risk of predation by the crypto industry on vulnerable populations, and 3) the environmental challenge posed by certain digital assets that require high levels of computing power. 

Overview of Cryptocurrency Companies in the Philippines

Cryptocurrency exchanges have been growing in the Philippines. In addition to the 11 operators registered by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), there are 37 crypto exchange operators licensed by the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority (CEZA). (See Table 1: BSP-Approved Cryptocurrency Exchanges). These operators are registered under the Remittance and Transfer Companies with Money Changing or Foreign Exchange Dealing and Offshore Virtual Currency Exchange (OVCE) Service. The CEZA has issued two types of licenses: 24 companies received the Offshore Virtual Currency Exchange (OVCE) Principal License and 13 companies received the OVCE Regular license. The former licensees are allowed to conduct offshore financial technology and cryptocurrency exchange activities while the latter license only permit licensees to conduct offshore crypto exchange activities.

In the Philippines, cryptocurrency has a strong customer uptake. According to BSP Governor Benjamin Diokno, the volume of transactions involving virtual assets grew 362% year on year to nearly 20 million in June 2021. These transactions were worth P105.93 billion in June, up 71% over the same period. This pattern can be sustained due to increasing interest by the Philippine art and media sector to pay for art works using Non-Fungible Tokens (NFTs). A non-fungible token (NFT) is a unique digital code stored on a blockchain, a form of distributed or digital ledger. Non-fungible tokens represent rights to the particular asset. The term “non-fungible” distinguishes NFTs from other digital assets that are fungible or interchangeable, such as bitcoin.

Table 1: BSP-Approved Cryptocurrency Exchanges

The NFTs provide an ability to authenticate virtually anything where there is a need to establish authenticity and ownership. Their popularity has centered on the art and collectibles world. Based on a survey to gauge the Filipino youth perspective on cryptocurrencies, there were three key observations: 1) The number of consumers who are highly aware of the presence of cryptocurrency is still much to be desired; 2) Cryptocurrency is positively viewed as a potential medium of exchange but there is still much skepticism for it to be positively accepted to function as an investment vehicle primarily due to its volatility, and 3) The  attitude towards cryptocurrency and level of awareness significantly influence an individual’s willingness to adopt cryptocurrency.

Several companies have even offered cryptocurrency games. Axie Infinity which is created by Skymavis allows players to earn NFTs and cryptocurrencies by breeding, battling and trading digital pets called Axies. These online games allow creation of money or other rewards and players can exchange real money for game currencies, also known as digital or virtual currencies. Notably, such games have gained attention as they presented Filipinos with an opportunity to earn during the pandemic. There are semblance of safeguards in place to protect players. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an advisory against Pogi Breeds, a company that claims to use people’s money in buying and breeding Axies and in playing Axie Infinity in 2021.

The strong optimism in crypto trading also led the Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to launch a trading platform. UBP bank officials estimated that an average Filipino investor will likely hold 3% to 5% of their personal assets in digital assets like Bitcoin in the next five years assuming markets are “stable,” up from around 1% to 2% now.

The Panorama of Government Regulations

The primordial hurdle for regulators is to balance innovation with the integrity of financial markets and customer protection. The existing regulations carefully nurture innovation, while also guiding it to be responsible. In the Philippines, there are two government regulatory agencies focusing on the cryptocurrency industry: 1) BSP or Central Bank and 2) SEC. BSP adopted a regulatory approach to cryptocurrency through the issuance of Circular No. 944 dated February 7, 2017. This circular requires businesses in the exchange of cryptocurrencies for fiat money in the Philippines to register with the BSP as remittance and transfer companies.

BSP also issued Circular No. 1105, series of 2020, or the Guidelines for the Establishment of Digital Banks. This circular recognized digital banking institutions that can operate and deploy their banking products and services via fully digital platforms. Additionally, the circular stated that only banks granted a license to operate as digital banks may claim and represent themselves as a digital bank. In addition to the minimum capital requirement of PHP1 billion for digital banks, a digital bank license application goes through these stages: (1) the application for approval to establish a new bank; (2) the application for the issuance of a certificate of authority (COA) to register with the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission; and (3) the application for the issuance of the COA to operate as a digital bank. Prior to the issuance of circular No. 1105, digital banking in the Philippines was deployed by traditional BSP-licensed banks through electronic banking services and operations, as regulated under BSP’s Manual of Regulations for Banks (MORB). Under MORB, banks that plan to offer or enhance existing electronic banking services must submit an application to BSP, describing the services to offer or enhance, and how it fits in the bank’s overall strategy. The application must be accompanied by a certification signed by its president that the bank has complied with BSP’s minimum pre-conditions.

BSP circular No. 649, series of 2009 defined electronic money as a monetary value represented by a claim on its issuer, that is: (1) electronically stored in an instrument or device; (2) issued against receipt of funds of an amount not lesser in value than the monetary value issued; (3) accepted as a means of payment by persons or entities other than the issuer; (4) withdrawable in cash or cash equivalent; and (5) issued pursuant to other guidelines of BSP circular No. 649. Further, BSP stipulated that Electronic Money Issuers (EMIs) can be in the form of EMI banks, non-bank financial institutions, or non-bank institutions registered as a money transfer agent. The electronic money which is issued by banks shall not be considered as deposits as they can only be redeemed at face value, which shall not earn interest, rewards and other similar incentives. BSP has issued a draft amendment to the EMI Regulations for public comment, which allows banks to offer electronic money services subject to BSP’s approval under an electronic payment and financial services (EPFS) Type A license, and compliance with prudential criteria provided under MORB. The draft provided classifications between a large versus small-scale EMI bank. Large-scale EMI banks must have a 12-month average value of aggregated inflow and outflow transactions equal to or greater than PHP25 billion (USD478 million). Otherwise, it shall be classified as a small-scale EMI bank. In terms of capitalization, the large-scale EMI banks require at least PHP200 million; the small-scale EMI bank requires at least PHP100 million.

Another important regulation is BSP circular No. 1033, series of 2019, which states that the Electronic Payment and Financial Services (EPFS) license generally applies across all BSP-supervised financial institutions seeking to provide electronic payment and financial services. The EPFS is an inherent part of EMI and digital banking where the requirements are embedded within EMI and digital bank application processes.

Additionally, under SEC’s Rules on Digital Asset Exchange, Section 8 establishes the Mandatory provisions in Digital Asset Exchange Operational Framework. Further, SEC issued Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 2019 to require financing and lending companies to register their online lending platforms. Pertaining compliance, SEC also released a Warning Advisory on 14 unregistered companies which had been soliciting funds from the public in 2018.

Areas of Concern

The cryptocurrency industry while replete with opportunities, also carries with it significant risks. The industry has to establish technological solutions to operationalize new compliance standards and establish appropriate Know Your Customer (KYC), due diligence and reporting procedures. The Wire Transfer Rule, also called the ‘Travel Rule’, requires states to take precautions to ensure that Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs) monitor and share customer data among themselves and with the relevant government authorities.

A second area of concern is the cybersecurity risk. There is a need for a coherent approach to the regulation and oversight of cryptocurrencies in terms of cybersecurity. The different levels of cybersecurity adoption by cryptocurrency companies need to be evaluated by government regulators to ensure if the cybersecurity in place is secure and safe in terms of personal data privacy protection. The increases in security breaches and digital surveillance highlight the need for improved privacy and security. For instance, an electronic system operator should respect the privacy of personal data and treat it as confidential. There is a need for BSP and SEC to appoint third party organizations to ensure that data privacy follows Republic Act 10173, known as the Data Privacy Act. This is a law that seeks to protect all forms of information, be it private, personal, or sensitive.

A third area of concern is the lack of an enabling law governing government oversight of this industry in terms of sanctions and remedy. The industry is growing at a phenomenal rate but there are no specific provisions for redress on the part of the customers. Moreover, since the industry is still evolving, there may be regulatory “grey areas” or possible misinterpretations of risk, regulation or compliance on the part of well-meaning government regulators. Additionally, for any disputes on cryptocurrency transactions, there are no clear guidelines on which specific government agency the consumers can file their cryptocurrency-related complaints. SEC has a penalty clause covering Digital Asset Exchanges in Section 82 which is classified as Prohibited Acts. Despite this penalty clause, there is a need for SEC to closely collaborate with Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in order to arrest and prosecute the violators of these penalty provisions.

A fourth area of concern is consumer protection. The Republic Act 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Act of the Philippines of 1991 is the legal basis for consumer protection in the country. The law embodies the state policy on the protection of consumers and establishes standards of conduct for business and industry in the country. However, this law was passed before the inception of the cryptocurrency industry. Therefore, there is a need to amend this law in order to include consumer protection in the financial technology and cryptocurrency industries. Consumer protection providers should incorporate transparency, impartial treatment, trustworthiness, privacy and safety of customer data and information, and simple treatment of complaints and customer disagreement resolution into their operations, along with fast and inexpensive charges. Currently, BSP regularly publishes information about registered cryptocurrency companies and Digital Asset Exchange companies and it encourages customers to only deal with them. BSP also publishes warnings including those on bitcoins.

The fifth area of concern focuses on inheritance issues. It is unclear how this asset can be passed on to one’s heirs. Another serious area of concern is the use of cryptocurrency for terrorism funding.

Two Lacunas

While the conversion of cryptocurrency to fiat money is regulated by BSP, authorities may find it difficult to pinpoint individuals involved in the transaction as PhilSys – the Filipino Identification System – has not reached 100% registration for all Filipino citizens. Moreover, the SIM Registration Law was vetoed by President Rodrigo Duterte last month due to serious freedom of expression concerns.  Several senators inserted in the draft bill at the last minute requiring the mandatory registration of all social media accounts of each citizen. Additionally, the continued proliferation of prepaid mobile SIM numbers makes it difficult for law enforcement officials to closely monitor transactions including cryptocurrency transactions. Collectively, these two lacunas provide terrorists with enough room to exploit cryptocurrencies for terrorism financing purposes. The Philippines is on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF’s) grey list due to “strategic deficiencies” in its money laundering and terrorism financing system. A terrorist-linked money laundering operation involving cryptocurrencies generated funds, which were then allegedly used to finance the activities of terror networks operating in the conflict-ridden Mindanao region in the southern Philippines.

In the context of the socio-political environment, several concerns were highlighted. Since privacy and anonymity is guaranteed by the cryptocurrency, it may be useful for illicit purposes by transnational organized crime groups. Terrorists and criminals are highly resourceful and will find ways to commit crimes. Major thefts have occurred (the bitcoin-exchanges of Mt. Gox35,), illicit transactions have occurred (the bitcoin-marketplace of Silk Road38 where people can buy and sell narcotics and other illicit items), fraudulent practices by specialized computer hardware manufacturer (the manufacturer Butterfly Labs39) have occurred. However, it is not clear at all that these crimes would not have occurred if there were no cryptocurrencies.

Another serious concern is that cryptocurrencies make arbitration and adjudication of disputes between transacting parties difficult, if not nearly impossible. Where should one go and to whom should one complain? There is a need to carry out an extensive education for law enforcement and prosecution officials on cryptocurrency trading and investments. In fact, there is a need for a dedicated Philippine National Police unit focusing on crime-related cryptocurrency transactions.

International Coordination

An ASEAN Cryptocurrency policy has yet to be crafted. Due to the lack of standardization of cryptocurrency regulations, the acceptance of cryptocurrency as legal tender varies greatly in Southeast Asia. Cambodia has integrated blockchain into their public goods system. Singapore hosts successful cryptocurrency start-ups while Malaysia has a thriving cryptocurrency sector. In Indonesia, the government is applying tax on digital transactions starting May 2022 including cryptocurrency. However, in Muslim-majority Indonesia, there are factions against cryptocurrencies. The National Ulema Council, or MUI, has deemed cryptocurrency as haram, or not permissible, as it has elements of uncertainty, wagering and harm. MUI asserts that if cryptocurrency as a commodity or digital asset can abide by Shariah tenets and can show a clear benefit, only then can it be traded.

Challenges remain in terms of inter-country law enforcement cooperation and enforcement actions. The standardization of cryptocurrency policies within Southeast Asia and the process of enhancing the understanding of law enforcement officials about the workings of this industry need to be improved. Due to cryptocurrency’s fast-moving and innovative technology, products and solutions, law enforcement officials need to acquire new skill sets to keep pace with the knowledge requirements for risk and compliance functions.

The Philippine regulatory authorities aim to achieve the broader goals of fostering financial inclusion, promoting competition and delivering better outcomes for society. These goals are also pertinent to the cryptocurrency industry. Nevertheless, trust is needed to maintain the societal conventions regarding the use of money. The regulatory authorities need to provide, an open, neutral, trusted and stable platform. The level of regulatory oversight and investor transparency at these venues has not matched similar platforms for corporate bonds or equity securities. Additionally, there is a need for a clear disclosure requirement to cryptocurrency companies in order to warn customers of the risk of loss.

Conclusion

It is in the interest of Philippine regulatory authorities to allow the cryptocurrency sector to continue its phenomenal growth in the absence of a 100% uptake on the National ID and the SIM card law regulating SIM card use for personal mobile phones. Without the full enforcement of these important strategic policies, targeting strict regulations for the cryptocurrency sector will simply lead to unintended policy consequences: interfering in seamless payments and lending systems; hampering income revenues from cryptocurrency investments and trading; and, crippling the thriving Philippine art and music sectors which have benefited from different NFTs.

Cognizant of the risks of AML and CFT, it is also essential to increase the expertise and technical capabilities available to Philippine regulatory authorities so that AML/CFT is reduced or completely eliminated. The regulatory authorities can work on the development of Public-Private Partnerships in cryptocurrency transactions. The Philippine government can also implement the upgrading of prosecutorial and law enforcement expertise and capacity with the purview of enforcing regulations in the medium-term. Government regulators must also pay attention to the monitoring of new cryptocurrency players and the testing of emerging industry procedures to faithfully comply with FATF rules. Finally, regulatory authorities, LEAs and cryptocurrency companies should consult each other and develop typologies and indicators for terrorist financing methodologies and potential asset storage operations in the field of crypto transactions.

Tensions in the South China Sea Series: A Five-Part Series (Part 5)

Introduction

Highlighting the 2016 Arbitral Award in his United Nations General Assembly speech, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte emphasized its importance amidst the challenge posed by Chinese maritime militia in Philippine territorial waters. The first five months of 2021 has been a delicate period for Philippine-China bilateral relations with respect to the South China Sea issue. The Philippines has been filing protests almost daily since March 15, 2021 when 220 Chinese vessels started swarming around Julian Felipe (Whitsun) Reef. Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana had demanded that China recall these vessels while dispatching a naval task force to patrol the area. Emphasizing Philippine’s diplomatic efforts to resolve this issue, Department of Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Elizabeth Buensuceso met Chinese Ambassador Huang Xilian the following month to repeat the Philippine’s demand.

The Philippines has already filed around 100 diplomatic protests against China’s various incursions in the West Philippine Sea despite the Duterte administration’s vaunted “pivot to China” foreign policy. Ivy Banzon-Abalos, executive director of the Department of Foreign Affairs’ (DFA) office for strategic communications, stated that the country has filed 99 protest notes as of May 28, 2021. The DFA then filed the 100th diplomatic protest against the “incessant deployment, prolonged presence, and illegal activities” of Chinese vessels particularly off Pag-asa (Thitu) Island. The DFA asserted that the “Pag-asa Islands is an integral part of the Philippines over which it has sovereignty and jurisdiction.”

The Philippines has also stepped up its patrols in the South China Sea. From March 1 to May 25, 13 law enforcement or military vessels from the Philippines patrolled waters around the contested Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal at least 57 times.

The Philippines has also received international support in this issue. The US State Department released a statement that the “US stands by its ally, the Philippines.” Similarly, Canada, Japan and Australia also affirmed their support for the Philippines during this stand-off.

Notwithstanding the international support, this article primarily focuses on Philippine’s reactions to China vis-à-vis in the South China Sea and a short-term outlook for the Philippines and its regional neighbours.

Strengthening Posture via New Naval Bases and an Amphibious Military Force

Philippine’s strategic posture is guided by its National Marine Policy. This entails maintaining a proactive maritime administration ensuring effective implementation and enforcement of all laws, regulations and recommendations. Through this policy and in addition to diplomatic measures, two bills are pertinent to Philippine’s response to the South China Sea issue. The first is the introduction of House Bill No. 9420, the Philippine Navy Forward Operating Bases Act, authored by Representative Johnny Pimentel. This Bill proposes 12 new naval bases; four naval bases positioned in Luzon’s western seaboard and three in the eastern coast to guard the West Philippine Sea and the Philippine Rise. These naval outposts will serve as future staging and resupply sites for the Navy’s warships and battle craft to address future incursions.

The second Bill facilitates the reinforcement of Philippine’s maritime security efforts via the presence of an amphibious force. Senate Bill 1731, authored by Senator Sonny Angara, provides the Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) with its own charter. Consequently, the PMC will become the fourth service branch of the country’s armed forces that is equal and mutually independent as the three existing branches of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP): the Philippine Army, the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy (PN). The presence of the PMC is vital considering the country’s archipelagic makeup which requires a comprehensive yet rapidly deployable amphibious military force that is primarily mandated to conduct seaborne and on-shore tactical operations to protect the country’s territories, communities, and inhabitant. This is evident in the PMC’s capabilities to provide ground combat, combat support, combat service support, aviation component, and other units necessary for the pursuit of its mandate.

To increase capability in countering and interdicting the potential coastal threats in territorial waters, the PMC recently adopted the Archipelagic Coastal Defense (ACD) Concept. This ACD adopts a strategy of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) for its joint operations with other units. The ACD underscores that the composition of coastal defense is not limited to missiles, rockets, and guns, but is also defined by having capable and ready maneuver forces, support systems, maritime forces, and sustainment capabilities. The concept emphasizes the simultaneous development and integration of these capabilities that will determine the strategic and operational success of the ACD Concept. The creation of a Coastal Defense Regiment (CDR), a unit that is designed to protect the country’s shores, ships, and amphibious task forces against an invading enemy and to improve support of naval operations, will be developed within the PMC. The PMC will also procure shore-based anti-ship missile system (SBASMS), shore-based air defense system (SBADS), Man Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS), Multi-launched Rocket System (MLRS), and the deployment of howitzers.

Further Strengthening of Naval Assets: Fleet, Bases and Equipment

To strengthen maritime security, the PN developed the Strategic Sail 2020 Plan which states that the PN will “adopt a dynamic and responsive naval organization.” This entails the PN fleet being classified into six categories: Ready Force, Patrol Force, Service Force, Assault Craft Force, Naval Air Group, and Naval Special Warfare Group. These categories empower the PN in being dynamic and responsive by ensuring a continuous and cost-effective capability that facilitates the overall mission planning. Moreover, the fleet plan also builds upon the specialization of each force and it enhance their respective competencies in each operational run. The PN continuously upgrades the seven regional force commands based throughout the Philippines. This includes acquiring more ships and submarines, and developing new naval stations. It also means establishing advanced radar facilities for better monitoring.

As a way to enhance coastal defense capabilities in the South China Sea, the Philippines has implemented a full-scale modernization of the Navy. The PN has commissioned two guided-missile frigates for better technical capabilities and stronger firepower in order to deter incursions of foreign vessels in the South China Sea. Philippine Secretary of Defense Delfin Lorenzana said that the completion of the frigate acquisition project “marks the advent of our future fleet towards having a modernized and multi-capable Philippine Navy.” Moving forward, the PN procurement plan from 2022 to 2025, centers on the acquisition of four more frigates, 12 corvettes, 18 offshore patrol vessels, 40 fast-attack interdiction craft and 42 smaller multipurpose attack craft.

In a bid to further increase intelligence gathering in the South China Sea, the Philippines plans to acquire French submarines in the near future. Moreover, in order to be able to improve the country’s coastal defense capabilities, the PN is building a naval station in Palawan and upgrading the Subic Bay Naval Base. Furthermore, as a way to enhance interoperability in joint military exercises with other Asian navies in the South China Sea, the PN participates in the annual holding of Staff-Staff talks with the Vietnamese Navy. The sixth iteration of Staff-to-Staff Talks (STST), regarded also as one of the confidence building measures, was held between the Philippine Navy and the Vietnam People’s Navy (VPN) at VPN headquarters in Hai Phong city on November 26, 2019. In a bid to facilitate the identification and detection of hostile targets, better radar systems were installed. Additionally, the PN expanded the National Coast Watch Center (NCWC) by installing various radar outposts around the base to allow the military to monitor events in the South China Sea in real time. The NCWC is also better equipped with the deployment of local radar systems such as the Synthetic Aperture Radar and Automatic Identification System for Innovative Terrestrial Monitoring and Maritime Surveillance (SAR with AIS) Project. The SAR with AIS Project focuses on terrestrial monitoring and maritime surveillance on high priority areas through simultaneous radar image and automatic identification system (AIS) data acquisition through the NovaSAR-1 satellite developed by Surrey Satellite Technology, Ltd. More importantly, with better monitoring, the NCWC can better unite the efforts of the PN with the Philippine Coast Guard and the Philippine National Police Maritime Group.

Balikatan 2021 Exercise: Show of Strength, Strengthening Ties with US

As part of its bilateral engagements, the AFP and US Military conducted the 36th Balikatan Exercise from April 12-23, 2021. This was a large-scale exercise with 736 AFP and 225 US Army personnel. The Balikatan Exercise not only demonstrated both countries’ shared commitment to peace and stability and the adaptability of US and Philippine forces, but also a step towards seeking new ways to strengthen security cooperation between two traditional allies.

Philippine Support for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific

While building its military capabilities, the Philippine Government also fully supports a free and open Indo-Pacific. In his speech at the Nikkei Forum, President Rodrigo Duterte called for countries in Asia to act responsibly and within a system of norms, commitments and obligations. This includes the peaceful resolution of disputes in line with international law.

In a recent development, the Philippines has retained the Visiting Forces Agreement(VFA) via President Duterte’s retraction of the VFA termination letter sent in 2020. Through the VFA, the US government will continue to render humanitarian and military assistance to the Philippines through regular deployment of US military personnel. This agreement also allows US aircrafts and vessels to enter the Philippines based on implementing agreements. Their presence can further aid freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea.

The Philippines remains a staunch ally of the US in the Indo-Pacific. It supports the Freedom of Navigation operations which is regularly conducted by the US. The Philippines and Japan affirmed their commitment to upholding freedom of navigation in the South China Sea at the first meeting of Japanese defense minister Nobuo Kishi and Secretary Delfin Lorenzana last October 23, 2020. They issued a joint statement “calling on concerned parties to desist from any action and activity that contravenes the Asean-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea as these generate tension, mistrust and uncertainty, and threatens regional peace and stability.”

Bleak Short-Term Outlook for ASEAN and South China Sea

Like the developments in Myanmar, the policy of non-interference will prevail among ASEAN countries on issues affecting the South China Sea. Brunei, the current ASEAN Chairman, continues to adopt this policy. Unfortunately, ASEAN, as a collective body, has been incapacitated by this principle of “non-interference.” This is evident from the silence and inaction of ASEAN and China on Myanmar which has encouraged the Myanmar military to terrorize its own people.

The bleak short-term outlook for the ASEAN and South China Sea is characterized by the “principle of non-interference” and the Chinese insistence on bilateral discussions with ASEAN members on the South China Sea. Additionally, each member country has developed their own preferred way of dealing with China, particularly on specific issues that are of great importance to them. However, their ways generally centre on the crucial aspect of not antagonizing China.

Strong Philippine-China bilateral relations persist despite the tension caused by Chinese maritime militia at the Whitsun Reef. During the pandemic, China has donated 1 million Sinovac-made Coronavac to the Philippines and made available an additional 1 million doses. Chinese investments in the “Build, Build, Build” program of the Duterte Administration remain committed.

Another bleak development is that the South China Sea has largely been overtaken by the Covid-19 crisis and the need for a coordinated regional response to the pandemic. Correspondingly, all negotiations on the South China Sea are put on hold in deference to the Covid-19 Delta variant that is afflicting the citizens of the ASEAN. The primordial focus of the ASEAN-China Forum is on Covid19 regional cooperation. The Mission of China to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI), supported by the Permanent Mission of the Philippines as country coordinator for ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations, organized the Jakarta Virtual Forum on 29 May 2020 which brought together experts to discuss areas where regional cooperation on COVID-19 need to be strengthened.

In its conduct of foreign policy, the Philippines remains committed to peaceful means as set out in the 1982 Manila Declaration on Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes. The Preamble of the Manila Declaration highlights the obligation of all States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means. Unfortunately, China is never keen on using international platforms to discuss South China Sea issues. But China’s successive diplomatic notes to the Philippines has emphasized the paramount importance of bilateral meetings with respect to all negotiations on the South China Sea.  It is expected that future discussions on claims on the South China Sea will remain within the ambit of bilateral relations between China and any one of the ASEAN states.

Part 1: South China Sea: The Need for Strong and Persistent Policies

Part 2: Indonesia and Maritime Rules-Based Order in the South China Sea

Part 3: Changing Realities for Malaysia in the South China Sea Dispute

Part 4: Malaysia’s Diplomacy in the South China Sea: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea

A Four-Part Series on Extremism and Online Recruitment – Part 3: Online Recruitment of Filipino Youths

Introduction

The Islamic State (IS) significantly benefits from the internet: its online contents can be simultaneously accessed anytime, anywhere, across multiple devices. Within Southeast Asia, the Islamic State-East Asia (IS-EA, a regional chapter of IS) maximizes the utilization of the internet, specifically via social media, to disseminate their politicoreligious propaganda and to recruit. Compared to the internet, traditional media was more expensive, had limited outreach, and impeded youth recruitment globally. Due to their prowess, IS-EA is even feared in its use of social media. Unfortunately, Filipino youths are not spared from IS-EA’s influence.

Telegram Still Prevalent for Online Recruitment of Filipino Youths and Terrorism Financing

Currently, Telegram continues to play a role in bolstering support and encouraging more attacks in new areas, including sub-Saharan Africa and the Indo-Pacific region. This is evident from the prevalence of pro-IS chat groups in Telegram and its use to recruit and coordinate attacks globally as observed from the November 2015 Paris attacks and 2016 Brussels bombings. Pro-IS chat groups such as the Furqan network facilitates rapid transmission of key messages including the 2019 interview of Abu Bakr al Baghdadi to their followers. Additionally, the authors had recently shared information on potential terrorist plots communicated via Telegram to authorities in countries such as the US and the Philippines. In the Philippines, suicide bombing tactics by female terrorists and guides on Improvised Explosive Devices assembly are commonly disseminated to IS-EA followers through Telegram.

Similarly, Telegram is also instrumental in IS-EA’s recruitment and terrorism financing efforts in the Philippines. To recruit Filipino youths, IS-EA has called for youths to establish a state based on their warped interpretation of Islam which would not only make the country more insular but adversarial to almost all other countries. Exploiting their financial vulnerabilities, these youths were also promised financial gains for their participation. Additionally, chat groups such as the “Expansion of the Caliphate in East Asia‟, “Sharq Asia‟ and “East Asia Wilayah‟ were created to attract foreign recruits to travel to the Philippines.

During the Marawi Siege, Telegram was also instrumental in channeling funds to support IS-EA efforts while displaying the close rapport between similar-minded terrorists from Indonesia and Malaysia. Via Telegram, a member of terrorist group Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD) based in Indonesia was tasked to collect funds from individuals he did not know in various cities in Indonesia from January to March 2017. Notably, this request came from a former Malaysian lecturer participating in the siege. Such interstate coordination will likely continue due to their challenging nature to uncover. Among others, uncovering them is dependent on close coordination between authorities from various countries.

Skillfully Tying Physical and Online Efforts for Recruitment

Addressing youth recruitment by IS-EA requires simultaneous efforts on both the physical and virtual worlds. This is because of IS-EA skillfully tapping on both avenues to recruit youths. IS-EA online youth recruitment started as early as 2016 on platforms such as Facebook. Such platforms had proven successful as they have been previously used by the group for fundraising efforts. Additionally, to increase its outreach, the local dialects of Maranao, Yakan and Tausug were frequently used on these platforms. To further target Filipino youths, recruiters have also targeted them on online gaming platforms. This entailed building from being part of the same team or alliance in online games to becoming friends offline, before inviting potential recruits to their terrorist cell.

Simultaneously in the physical world, IS-EA notably recruits children using non-coercive means by gradually exposing them to the group’s ideology, worldview and apocalyptic vision. The organization convenes public events aimed at raising awareness of the group, attracting children by offering them toys, candy or ice cream just for showing up. Additionally, IS-EA child soldiers and youth recruits from economically disadvantaged families in the Philippines to provide timely surveillance information, accompanied by photos and videos, in exchange for receiving not only either cash incentives or crystal methamphetamine (locally called “shabu”), but also to get something as basic as regular top-ups or reloads for their prepaid mobile phones. This not only allows these recruits to continue playing addictive online games, but also being “groomed” by recruiters via in-game chat functions.

Such close nexus was demonstrated during the Marawi Siege. The IS-EA fighters used social media to announce the start of the Marawi Siege. For example, the first news that militants had taken to the streets of the Islamic City of Marawi on May 23, 2017, came from Facebook. Pictures of masked men carrying assault rifles and waving the black flag of the Islamic State were swirling across social media well before Philippine and international news channels picked up the story. By the time the military and the media had begun to respond, Marawi’s residents were already streaming out of the city by the tens of thousands to seek refuge from the violence. In the months leading up to the siege, there had already been speculation that extremist groups were trying to use social media to reach and recruit Muslims across Mindanao.

The online recruitment of Muslim youths for the siege accompanied offline efforts. The authors uncovered that a heavy volume of cash was needed to sustain the IS-EA fighters during the Marawi Siege, as families demanded hefty payments in exchange for support. Moreover, like their foreign counterparts, the Maute terrorists were focused on expanding their area of control, taking hold of natural resources and commercial centres, producing and distributing illegal drugs, and the stockpiling of weapons and ammunition. Military sources pointed out that each of the Maute-supporting family received PhP50,000 (~USD1,030.00). Separately, individual youth fighters recruited from these families received PhP30,000 upon joining IS-EA and those who made it to the main battle area received Php70,000. Additionally, there were more than 2,000 child soldiers who were training in secluded areas around Marawi City with at least USD 6million paid in cash to the desperate Maranao and Filipino parents.

Online Radicalization of Filipino Youths

After the Marawi Siege, IS-EA factions relied on the traditional revenue sources they employed prior to pledging allegiance to IS, including remittances and criminal activities such as kidnap for ransom and extortion. According to law enforcement officials, this steady stream of income supports the online radicalization of Filipino youths. Based on a 2018 study, it was found that 1) online networks replicated offline communities and 2) extremist messaging in the Philippines is highly localized, and connects with local grievances that spring from the municipal or provincial level. To replicate offline communities digitally, most recruiters use networks such as Facebook to target individuals they already have a connection with.

Government Intervention to Disrupt Online Recruitment

The Philippine Government intends to disrupt online youth recruitment by terrorist organizations through tapping bilateral partnerships with its closest defense ally, the United States. However, efforts to disrupt online youth recruitment by relying on one defense ally alone may prove insufficient in the long-run. One example of such bilateral efforts is several countering violent extremism–themed programmes in Mindanao conducted by Equal Access International (EAI). EAI trained local civil society members in Mindanao to design and implement locally based countering violent extremism (CVE) campaigns. Additionally, through EAI’s two tech camps, the designated local fellows were given funding to carry out their peace promotion projects. Another example is the Philippine military efforts to disrupt online youth recruitment which is funded by Countering Violent Extremism efforts of the Operation Pacific Eagle–Philippines (OPE-P), an overseas contingency operation. The OPE-P is a counterterrorism campaign conducted by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies, to support the Philippine government and its military forces in their efforts to counter IS-EA and other priority violent extremist organizations in the Philippines.

Policy Recommendations

Community partnerships are a crucial component of effective disruption of online youth recruitment. At the core of this critical disruption is to empower mothers who are the first to identify changes in the behavior of their own sons and daughters who are constantly exposed to the internet and may also be active users of various online games which can be exploited by extremist recruiters. Community leaders need to actively work with parents and teachers to help spot and disrupt the online youth recruitment of radical groups as early as possible.

Online gamers also need more tools and better access to in-app mechanisms to instantly report and notify game creators about extremist content or “grooming” towards radicalization done via in-game chat functions. P/CVE experts need to be more pro-active in partnering with online gaming communities to enable gamers to challenge the statements that extremists have shared on various online gaming platforms. Policymakers may also push for the creation of an opensource software that will enable all online games to automatically identify and remove extremist content from their gaming platforms.

Law enforcement agencies should work to empower local communities with appropriate information and instruments they need to build their own capacity to disrupt, challenge and counter youth recruitment of radical and extremist groups, in both the real world and the virtual world. A whole-of-society approach can be applied to enable law enforcement officials to work directly with communities to exchange information and best practices in thwarting online recruitment by extremist groups that prey on the vulnerable and highly malleable minds of children and youths.

Effective criminal justice responses to threats presented by the use of the internet by terrorists require governments to develop clear national policies and laws dealing with, inter alia: (a) the criminalization of unlawful acts carried out by terrorists over the Internet or related services; (b) the provision of investigative powers for law enforcement agencies engaged in terrorism-related investigations; (c) the regulation of Internet-related services (e.g. ISPs) and content control; (d) the facilitation of international cooperation; (e) the development of specialized judicial or evidential procedures; and (f) the maintenance of international human rights standards.

Part 1: Linguistic Appeal of Propaganda

Part 2: Quest for Significance

Part 4: Mothers and the Internet

Women and Children in Terrorism: A Four-Part Analysis (Part 2: Philippines-ISIS in East Asia and the CPP-NPA Communist-terrorist Network)

Introduction

After the retreat of the IS-Maute forces from the Marawi Siege, there is an estimated number of 165 women who are supporters of ISIS East Asia in the surrounding areas of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte. Based on personal fieldnotes, these women have an average of 6 to 7 children. Most of these women focused on providing safe haven to the ISIS Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) composed mostly of Malaysian and Indonesian nationals. Given the refusal of the Indonesian Government to accept women and children of ISIS FTF, these families are expected to make the Philippines their permanent residence.

Increasing Combat-readiness of Female Extremists

The specific skill sets of the ISIS East Asia female combatants have now incorporated Improvised Explosive Device (IED) assembly and conducting suicide bombing activities. In recent suicide bombings in the town of Jolo, Sulu province, female members had assumed significant lead roles in carrying out suicide roles. These women decided to take on more than the usual combat support roles. In most cases, female terrorists are heavily involved in the procurement of weapons and ammunition.

Female combatants also help in the procurement, recruitment, training and the handling of terrorism financing tasks. They, too, conduct intelligence gathering, transporting supplies and arms, logistics, food, resistance, and offering nursing services for the wounded. Despite their participation in combat, they are not expected to be rewarded with authority or political power over the male combatants.

For female combatants of terror groups operating in the Philippines, their skills entail identifying safe havens for fighters and the provision of food, medicines and clothing. Child soldiers, on the other hand, help provide surveillance activities of the police and military units in the area. The nondescript tandem of female terrorists accompanied either by their own babies or other child soldiers is an effective strategy to avoid detection by local authorities.

More recently, Jevilyn Cullamat, the 22-year-old communist-terrorist daughter of a CPP-NPA-NDF-linked Filipino lawmaker was killed in an encounter between government troops and New People’s Army rebels in Surigao del Sur. According to the 3rd Special Forces “Arrowhead” Battalion of the Philippine Army, Jevilyn Cullamat served as an armed medic of the New People’s Army. By recruiting family members, terrorist groups can avoid detection and capture by limiting contact with outsiders and increasing the costs of defection for individual members. Family members also provide an additional source of labour; women and children contribute to terrorist groups through support roles, such as providing food or medical care and maintaining camps, as well as direct participation in attacks.

Women occupy strong political and social roles within their respective terrorist groups. They actively take part in strategic supporting roles that are necessary for warfare. Due to their dedication to daily and mundane tasks, they are highly regarded by other members. These women recruit their sisters and close cousins, their respective husbands, and their own children. For many of these women, the terrorist groups provided a space where they could share their political ideas, a fundamental right that was previously denied to them by their families and communities. These female leaders organized meetings between terrorist women’s groups and meetings between the leaders of terrorist groups contributing to their collective empowerment. Their decision to join terrorist groups can be seen as a way of seeking protection for their families and improving their chances in life. Since these women are given false hopes by terrorist organizations during the recruitment phase and false dreams of a better life, they were pushed to join these terrorist organizations without really fully understanding what they are getting into.

In countries and communities wherein girls and women seek a place of importance or significance, some fall into the trap of being part of what we call the “Sisterhood of Destruction.” Increasingly, more girls and women become masterminds, and not merely accessories to crimes and acts of terror, in the Philippines.

Continued Recruitment of Child Soldiers into Extremism

Children are more vulnerable than adults when a nation faces on-going warfare because family, society, and law cannot fully provide adequate legal and physical protection for children.  This is despite the presence of a UN convention catered to children. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 seeks “…to ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities.”

As of 2020, a former ASG member disclosed to the authors that there is an estimated 150 child soldiers in the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) comprising several battalions prepared to go to war at any time.

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) had actively recruited individuals from 15 years of age and above and providing these minors improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and high-powered guns. During the Marawi siege, however, the ASG and ISIS were discovered to have recruited and radicalized child soldiers as young as 6 to 8 years old. Even the youngest child combatants, both girls and boys, served in some of the world’s most destructive war zones. They were utilized as frontline soldiers, spies, cooks, messengers, and porters. Children were instrumental, small and easily unnoticed in suicide bombings and in other surprise attacks.

In the last three years alone, between 2016 to 2019, the Communist Party of the Philippines took pride in being able to recruit over 8,000 students for their underground movement, a former communist rebel stated during a Senate hearing on alleged military red-tagging last November 3, 2020. Jeffrey Celiz, alias “Ka Eric,” told senators that a CPP-NPA-NDF document seized from the National Democratic Front (NDF) consultant Vic Ladlad revealed that majority of the over 8,000 youth recruits came from senior high schools, which pertained to 16 or 17-year-old targets for recruitment and radicalization by the CPP-NPA-NDF communist-terrorist network.

The commonplace perception about child soldiers was that those most likely to be recruited were:

(1) economically poor;

(2) separated from their families;

(3) displaced from their homes;

(4) living in a combat zone; and

(5) with limited access to education.

Globally, while it may be true that the predominant recruitment of child soldiers takes place in areas where there is little or no government presence at all, in the Philippines, the insidiously pervasive nature of the CPP-NPA terrorist network has led to the phenomena of mass recruitment among children and youth leaders from good and God-fearing families enrolled in elite schools and not just public academic institutions.

“90 percent of the cadres of the CPP-NPA-NDF come from schools. Lahat kami dun nanggaling halos (most of us were recruited from schools). We all started through a legal organization, but they are not purely legal,” said Jeffrey Celiz, a former cadre of the CPP-NPA who served the communist-terrorist movement for 27 years.

Early Intervention and Reintegration Programmes for Sustainable Peace

A successful approach in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) demands identification of early signs of radicalization and the mitigation of individual and collective grievances, structural factors and drivers that in the worst case may support or fuel violence. Key actors need to be engaged through cross-sectoral efforts to prevent and counter the spread of radicalization and recruitment in their local communities. Particular focus should be put on the role of women, youth, children, local stakeholders and civil society, including religious and community leaders.

Initiatives aimed at reintegrating individuals willing to leave violent extremism behind and return to their communities should also be enhanced and encouraged — while keeping in sight that, according to a new study, education, not employment, is the key to reducing recidivism among ex-combatants. The authors also identified several factors that are associated with a return to crime among ex-combatants: factors such as anti-social personality traits, weak family ties, lack of educational attainment, and the presence of criminal groups are highly correlated with recidivism.

The success rate of the thousands of former terrorists and former rebels’ reintegration will be key for sustainable peace in a country that has been ravaged by internal armed conflict for over five decades. Ideally, if successfully reintegrated into their local communities, former violent extremists can serve as messengers to their communities and regions, questioning the narrative that made them commit to violent extremist ideologies in the first place. It is our clarion call for government authorities to invest sufficient resources for (1) methodical convictions in terrorism financing; (2) a long-term deradicalization program for radicalized children, youth, and women; and (3) a holistic program to treat post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) for individuals and families afflicted by war and conflict.

Part 1: A More Effective Counterterrorism Strategy for Indonesian Women by Acknowledging Their Motivations and Tactical Contributions

Part 3: The Invisible Women and Children of Malaysia: The Vulnerability of Stateless Persons to Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Part 4: The Shape of Contemporary Conflict in Southeast Asia: How Violent Extremism has Changed Our Women and Children

Women and Children in Terrorism: A Four-Part Analysis (Part 4: CVE Assessment for Southeast Asia’s Women and Children)

Introduction

Local and Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) rely on the presence of women and children to circumvent detection by authorities. Women and children garner less media attention for their actions and are often perceived as victims rather than perpetrators in the theater of terrorism and violent extremism (VE). If the right opportunity exists terrorist organizations can exploit gender and age stereotypes to their advantage.

Women and children aligned with terrorist groups leverage gender and age dynamics for their benefit by claiming ignorance of terrorist acts in an attempt to minimize their culpability. When government authorities view male and female adherents of terrorism as distinct threats bearing different degrees of risk, these policy makers fall into the inherently flawed implementation of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and Deradicalization programmes. Skewed views that downplay the threat of women and children involved in terrorism activities are detrimental to the security and stability of the nation state. Consequently, it is vital for justice systems to recognize that women more actively facilitate or perpetrate violence, and play the most integral role in the recruitment and radicalization of children to become the future leaders of terrorist organizations.

CVE in Southeast Asia

Indonesia

Indonesia does not have specific laws and regulations that specifically address CVE. The policies for countering VE are inscribed in Law No. 15 of 2003 on the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism (the Anti-Terrorism Law). Using this law, combatting terrorism focuses on prosecution by the special anti-terror detachment, better known as Densus 88. The prevention of terrorism or the handling of conditions prior to terror acts occurring have been less rigorous both for men and women. The Coordination Forum on Terrorism Prevention (FKPT) involving religious leaders, youth organizations, academia, and civil society leaders focus primarily on seminars to stimulate dialogue on the prevention of terrorism. However, the women’s special role in terrorism is seldom tackled in these seminars.

Philippines

Some Filipino women take on significant roles in preventing violent extremism and terrorism through raising awareness on the importance of early guidance and detection by helping parents, guardians, and educators mentor children and youth to veer away from radicalization and terrorist recruitment, and by engaging their respective communities in strategic activities and events. In 2019, UN Women convened three conversations with a total of 32 male and female community peace advocates from women’s groups and civil society organizations from around the Bangsamoro to discuss their perspectives on violent extremism. Among other recommendations are to intensify rights education, gender equality, social cohesion and peaceful narratives in educational curricula and instructional materials and create opportunities for women’s participation in formal and non-formal peace mechanisms such as local peace and order councils, and barangay peacekeeping.

In a serious bid to stem the spread of violent extremism, the Philippine Government through Proclamation No. 216 imposed martial law in Mindanao in May 2017 when local Maute terrorists and Daesh/ISIS-backed FTFs seized the city of Marawi. The peaceful implementation of martial law from 2017 to 2019 led to fewer violent incidents due to the checkpoints installed between geographic areas consisting of municipalities and cities, implemented curfews, and the strict regulation of firearms and ammunition.

Another worthy CVE initiative is that of the International Alert UK Philippines, which established a Violence Intensity Index in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao through a Conflict Monitoring System. Members of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) communist-terrorist network are encouraged by the Philippine government to peacefully surrender in order to avail of the Enhanced Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-CLIP). E-CLIP benefits include guaranteed safety and security; Php50,000 (USD1,040) in cash as livelihood assistance; an open-ended monthly allowance of Php21,000 (USD436) for meals and Php15,000 (USD311) for mobilization expenses; employment; loan processing for business capital; firearms remuneration amounting to the value of turned-in firearms; education; livelihood training; and free housing provided by the National Housing Authority (NHA) in coordination with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Former NPA terrorists are also given the option to stay in their place of origin and be given Php450,000 (USD9,368) for the renovation of their old house. From July 2018 to November 2019, Php171.6-million (USD3.5-million) in financial assistance was reportedly released to 2,882 CPP-NPA surrenderers.

The Department of National Defense guarantees that “the budget of E-CLIP is intact and ready for release, and as soon as the former rebels obtain their Joint AFP-PNP Intelligence Committee (JAPIC) clearance, they will immediately receive their benefits.” The government has lauded the more than 10,000 former NPA terrorists who have surfaced and returned to the fold of the law since the Task Force Balik-Loob (TBFL) managing the E-CLIP was organized in 2018. Of the 10,000 former NPA terrorists, only about 3,000 so far have been awarded the E-CLIP benefits due to the “very stringent vetting process implemented to ensure that the program won’t be taken advantage of.”

Malaysia

Malaysia has yet to craft its own national action plan on P/CVE. The actions taken by the state are based on the experiences of other ASEAN countries. Malaysia has to craft a CVE action plan that is bottom-up, taking into close consideration the nuances and complexities of violent extremism in a highly diverse society. This well-tailored CVE action plan entails reflecting the stark realities of stateless persons who provide the cheapest form of labor with no healthcare benefits, no minimum wage, and no legal protection, which are favored by business interests, and are thereby the most vulnerable to violent extremism, and terrorist recruitment and radicalization. Moreover, the government should be prepared to develop a set of mechanisms (both legal and operational) for the rehabilitation of violent extremist offenders (VEO), returnees, and deportees. The new government needs to appreciate the essential role non-state actors can play in CVE efforts. Non-state actors, consisting of civil society organisations (CSO), contribute to holistic CVE efforts, including preventive programmes and rehabilitation and reintegration (R&R).

Child Soldiers

Child soldiers in Southeast Asia have been continuously targeted for recruitment by violent extremists and terrorist groups. Child soldiers do not have access to education, thus, they experience a negative personal transformation during their time in paramilitary service. Thus, it is important that all CVE efforts should include youth leaders as important participants. The UN Security Council Resolution 2250 issued in 2015 puts youth at the center of processes and policies for the sustainable development of peace and security.

P/CVE for Female Migrant Workers

Southeast Asian female migrant workers are attracted to imbibe terrorist causes in their search for a secure sense of stability amid the challenging array of societal forces and influences at work and in their personal lives. Governments that rely on the regular remittance from overseas workers to keep their economies afloat will need to design free but mandatory programs that would require old and new applicants aspiring to work abroad, or to continue to work abroad, to all undergo at least a 5-day course on P/CVE. This intervention will dramatically reduce the recruitment and radicalization of overseas workers preyed upon by local and foreign terrorist groups that exploit the financial resources of selfless workers who can be manipulated to send their hard-earned income and/or liquidate their personal investments to finance terrorist activities.

During the last 20 years, most counterterrorism efforts have been reactive, focusing largely on military and security measures. With the increasing national security threats from both FTFs and local terrorists who take advantage of vulnerable migrant workers, governments in Southeast Asia must collaborate in spearheading a P/CVE program specifically targeted to migrant workers and their children.

Millions of migrant workers and the children they leave behind under the care of extended families back home need to undergo P/CVE workshops to prevent their children from being recruited and radicalized by violent extremists and terrorists lurking not only in schools and colleges but also online. Parent-child relationships of migrant workers are often heavily strained by the many years of geographical separation and rely on cyberspace technologies to stay connected. When many governments in Southeast Asia depend on regular remittances to keep their economies afloat, especially in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, it becomes both an economic and moral imperative for such governments to assume responsibility in ensuring that the children left behind by said migrant workers are given proper guidance, which includes P/CVE programs.

Indonesian female migrant workers often have a low level of formal education, lack basic religious knowledge, experience intense social and individual pressures, live apart from their families, and have poor access to government services. These factors heighten their personal vulnerabilities which are then fully taken advantage of by recruiters belonging to terrorist organizations. There is an increasing pattern of women who are lured by online propaganda that preyed upon their feelings of deep marginalization and isolation as female migrant domestic workers. These female migrant workers are then exposed to radicalized teachings through social media. Despite being radicalized, these workers stay within the mold of what their community expects of them — as a daughter, wife, and mother. A clearer understanding of these specific influencing elements will facilitate a more enduring rehabilitation process. One Indonesian woman working in Hong Kong returned to Banten, in western Java, in 2015 to become the second wife of Adi Jihadi, a militant who was arrested in 2017 for purchasing arms and training in Mindanao with Isnilon Hapilon, who had been declared ISIS’s emir for Southeast Asia.

In the Philippines, the CPP-NPA communist-terrorist network deliberately targets for recruitment and radicalization the children and youth leaders in schools who have either one or both parents working as Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). The absence of parental discipline and guidance opens up the children of migrant workers to embrace radical ideologies and extremist views. Recruiters from terrorist organizations also have a preference to groom the children of migrant workers because they receive a significantly huge monthly allowance from their parents working abroad, and they are able to condition these young people to invest their financial resources and time to organize, agitate, and mobilize their peers at school to join CPP-NPA-NDF-linked youth organizations and anti-government activities. Daesh/IS-backed FTFs based in the Philippines marry Filipino women from Muslim communities that can provide them safe havens. It becomes the role of the Filipino wife of FTFs to receive and forward terrorism funds. Based on the author’s personal interviews from 2017 to 2018 in Marawi, local Daesh/IS-funded terrorists also use Filipino domestic helpers working abroad as conduits for regular remittances.

Some countries do not publish migration data or make them available to the public. For example, Singapore does not publish any data on inflow of foreign workers given the sensitivity to high dependence on migrant workers. Similarly, Malaysian data systems are not transparent. Female migrant workers are reportedly embracing radicalized forms of religion and violence after being exposed to extremist content on social media. Three women worked as domestic workers in homes across Singapore. But in their spare time, they promoted ISIS online, donated money to militants overseas, and became so radicalized that at least one was ready to die as a suicide bomber in Syria, according to Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs. The women, all Indonesian nationals, were arrested in September under Singapore’s Internal Security Act on suspicion of taking part in terror financing activities and face up to 10 years in prison and fines of up to $500,000 Singapore dollars (~USD$362,000). Most of the cases identified so far involve Indonesian nationals.

While waiting for each of the ASEAN governments to adopt a more enlightened approach, existing practices and policies concerning women and children in P/CVE need further refinement and polishing. At a broader and wider level, more attention must be applied to the realities of the experiences of these women especially that of migrant workers, and their children.

Part 1: A More Effective Counterterrorism Strategy for Indonesian Women by Acknowledging Their Motivations and Tactical Contributions

Part 2: Striving for Peace in the Philippines amidst Increased Combat-readiness and Continued Recruitment of Women and Children

Part 3: The Invisible Women and Children of Malaysia: The Vulnerability of Stateless Persons to Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Introduction

Even in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, groups affiliated with ISIS-Philippines continue efforts to recover from battlefield losses, recruiting and training new members, and staging suicide bombings and attacks with IEDs and small arms that targeted security forces and civilians. ISIS-Philippines affiliates active in 2019 included elements of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), the Ansar al-Khalifa Philippines (AKP), and the Maute Group. The Philippines remains as a preferred destination for Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) from Indonesia, Malaysia, and countries in the Middle East and Europe.

Southeast Asian extremists and potential terrorists have been influenced by the desire of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) to turn Southeast Asia into a theatre of conflict like Mosul and Raqqa in Iraq. The Islamic State (IS) wanted to declare an East Asia Wilayat, or province of the caliphate, in the Philippines. In the battle of the southern Philippine Islamic city of Marawi, IS wanted to replicate what they had previously established in Iraq and Syria. The siege of Marawi shows that IS can co-opt local groups and undermine the sovereignty of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member states and their bilateral and regional security cooperation.

Additionally, these four elements including rogue Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) members continue to impede progress between the Philippine government and MILF toward a political settlement of long-running insurgencies. In January 2019, residents of the region passed a referendum to ratify the Bangsamoro Organic Law to implement the national government’s peace agreement with the MILF. Ratification of the law established a new, more autonomous regional government led by the MILF in February 2019. Despite such challenges to peace from religious extremists, the Philippines faces a deadlier threat.

CPP-NPA Terrorist Network Deeply Entrenched in the Philippines

The Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) terrorist network relentlessly continues to attack security forces and civilians, and the government sustains military and law enforcement operations against the communist-terrorist group (CTG). Official records — i.e., combat reports and death benefits to soldiers’ families of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) — show that

Credit: Steven Pabalinas

No Women and Children Convicted of Terrorism in the Philippines

More recently, on September 18, 2020, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for release and protection filed against the CPP-NPA-linked youth activist group Anakbayan in connection with the alleged disappearance of a student who was a minor at the time of her recruitment. On October 26, 2020, the Department of Justice also dismissed the case against the respondents for violation of Republic Act 9851 or the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, And Other Crimes Against Humanity. More recently, last October 29, 2020, two former female child soldiers of the NPA recently filed a case against NPA Eastern Visayas Regional Party Committee for violations of Republic Act 9851 (Philippine Act on Crime Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity) and Republic Act 11188 (Special Protection of Children in Situations of Armed Conflict Act) before the Leyte Provincial Prosecutor’s Office on November 21, 2020. The siblings also filed rape charges against CPP-NPA leader (Regional Party Committee Head), Paterno Opo alias “Yoyo Dodong”. It remains to be seen if there will be terrorism-related convictions in Philippine courts by 2021.