Part of an ongoing article series on Indonesia’s regional elections 2024.

Introduction

Indonesia’s recently concluded regional head elections revealed a significant yet underexplored phenomenon: The participation of reformed terrorists, often dubbed as “credible voices”, in the democratic process.

For individuals who once opposed Pancasila and democracy, this marks a profound shift. It also carries far-reaching implications for Indonesia’s democratic consolidation and deradicalisation efforts.

Based on an exclusive interview with reformed terrorists, this piece highlights their participation in the elections, evolving views on Pancasila, aspirations for a democratic system and perspectives on political Islam, highlighting the challenges as well as opportunities of their sociopolitical integration.

Evolving Views

Radical and terrorist groups in Indonesia, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), have long condemned democracy and Pancasila as un-Islamic, advocating instead for a sharia-guided Islamic caliphate as an alternative.

These groups view democracy as a concept imposed by Islam’s enemies – the West – and perceive Pancasila as incompatible with their interpretation of Islam, owing to its pluralistic and inclusive principles.

Figures like Aman Abdurrahman, an Indonesian Daesh ideologue, have labelled the Indonesian government as kufr (infidel) and thagut (tyrannical), labelling Muslims who support democracy or Pancasila as equally guilty of kufr. This opposition often leads to violence, particularly during elections, as exemplified by the arrest of suspected terrorists months before last year’s presidential election.

For some, however, this rejection of democracy and Pancasila has begun to shift. Reformed terrorists, through deradicalisation programmes in prison and community engagement, have transitioned from staunch opposition to active participation in democratic processes.

This is consistent with Walter Lippmann’s pseudo-environment concept, which shows how people act based on narratives and cultural influences, not reality. These radical individuals have stopped opposing democracy once they are placed in a community that challenged their previous beliefs with alternative narratives, ones that promote democratic values and moderate Islamic teachings.

After their release from prison, reformed terrorists now view democratic participation not as a betrayal of their faith but as a way to contribute positively to society. The discussion below provides some examples.

Examples from West Java

According to the National Counterterrorism Agency, as of April 2024, Indonesia is home to 2,059 reformed terrorists, approximately 43% of whom have either been conditionally released or pledged allegiance to the state (abandoned their radical views).

In the lead-up to the 2024 regional elections, several political candidates sought their support, recognising their symbolic and strategic influence.

Munir Kartono, a reformed terrorist and credible voice from West Java, shared that a regent (bupati) candidate approached him during the campaign, seeking to leverage his influence within a community that includes nearly 50 reformed terrorists. While Munir declined to endorse a specific candidate, he actively promoted peaceful and successful elections.

Once influenced by Daesh-JAD narratives, Munir’s perspective shifted thanks to the deradicalisation programmes he participated in. These programmes introduced him to alternative narratives and facilitated intensive engagements with figures such as academics and religious leaders, broadening his understanding of Pancasila and democracy.

Though previously an opponent of democracy, Munir is now part and parcel of the nation’s democratic process. He views events like regional elections as opportunities to contribute to the society. Munir now believes that democracy, as a concept, should not be conflated with its flawed implementation, asserting that if problems arise, the actions of individuals, not the concept itself, are to blame.

Even now, Munir acknowledges that while he has embraced Pancasila and democracy, he remains critical of contesting election candidates. He carefully evaluates their campaign promises and takes into consideration aspects such as their appearance, style and Islamic identity—although the latter is no longer a dominant factor in his decision-making process.

Perspective from East Java

Arif Budi Setyawan, a credible voice and former JI affiliate from East Java, has had the same experience.

Like Munir, he was approached by political candidates, including a regent candidate and someone running for the Regional People’s Representative Council. He was even invited to join a candidate’s campaign team – though he was later snubbed.

Arif explained that his initial rejection of Pancasila and democracy stemmed from his perception that these systems are corrupt and flawed. This is a demonstration of Lippmann’s stereotype concept, whereby people use their cognitive shortcuts (or simplified reasoning) to simplify complex realities into fixed ideas (or rigid assumptions).

In Arif’s mind, radical narratives previously reduced democracy into symbols of corruption and un-Islamic governance, reinforcing his opposition and discouraging participation in democratic processes.

However, deradicalisation programmes challenged and dismantled these stereotypes. Arif came to see democracy as distinct from its flawed practitioners, recognising it as a framework that, when aligned with Pancasila, could benefit both Muslims and the broader community. He believed that adhering to Pancasila helps Muslims achieve their goals and aspirations.

Arif views regional elections as equally critical as presidential elections due to their localised impact. He believes regional leaders’ work and promises can be more closely monitored, perceiving voting as an ikhtiar (effort) towards a better future for his religion.

“If the candidate doesn’t deliver, it’s not our fault—we’ve done our part. The rest is on them,” according to him.

Arif prioritises realistic campaign promises and proven track records when selecting candidates, rejecting superficial qualities or overly idealistic agendas. This reflects a significant departure from the radical stereotypes he once held, as he now evaluates candidates with a more nuanced understanding of democracy’s potential to drive meaningful change.

His emphasis on candidates’ knowledge, coupled with guidance from respected ulama, reflects his reformed approach to democratic participation, free from the oversimplifications that previously shaped his worldview.

Symbols and Associations

As the majority religion in Indonesia, Islam has significantly influenced the country’s politics since before independence in 1945. Consequently, the adoption of religious symbols and associations in campaigns continues to be a prominent feature of Indonesian politics, particularly during elections at both national and regional levels.

For instance, candidates who utilise religious symbols, such as female candidates wearing hijab, tend to receive more significant support from Muslim voters compared to those who do not.

Like Islam in politics, radical Islamist groups have also been a recurring presence throughout Indonesia’s sociopolitical history, from the Darul Islam movement in 1948 to the emergence of terrorist groups like JI in 1993 and JAD in 2015. The recent disbandment of JI in June 2024 raises the possibility that its members may become more active in formal political processes.

However, reformed terrorists like Munir and Arif view political Islam in Indonesia as far from ideal, both before and after their transformation. As shown above, they acknowledge the gap between the ideals of political Islam and its practical implementation in the country.

Munir, for instance, observes that political Islam in his regional community remains closely tied to identity, be it Islamist or not. Yet, he believes that individuals can embrace multiple identities rather than being confined to a singular one, suggesting that one can be both an Islamist and a nationalist simultaneously.

In the context of regional elections, Munir expressed that while he does not criticise voters who base their choices on religious preferences, he emphasises that these preferences must not lead to violence or manipulation of religious leaders (ulama and kyai) for political gain. Overall, he believes that Indonesian political Islam, in its current form, falls short of embodying true Islamic values and integrity, often fostering division instead of unity.

In addition, Arif similarly highlights religious leaders’ significant influence in regional politics, particularly in areas like East Java, where the Nahdliyin culture remains strong. He observes that politicians often leverage religious leaders and pesantren owners with large followings to shape voter preferences, highlighting their utilisation of religious symbols and associations.

The bottom line is that both Munir and Arif are concerned with the “exploitation” of religious figures as political tools. This sentiment reflects broader issues in Indonesia’s national and regional elections, where the interplay of faith and politics compromises the integrity of both.

Democratic Vision

Overall, despite their critiques, Munir and Arif emphasise the importance of political participation and the role of religious identity in shaping voters’ choices, especially in regional elections. Having once held radical views, they now stress the importance of democratic participation, such as in elections, while critically engaging with political Islam, reflecting their transformation as reformed individuals.

Both envision a future where Indonesia’s politics matures, realising its democratic ideals guided by the principles of Pancasila and a genuine commitment to public welfare. They hope for national and regional leaders who actively listen to public aspirations and work to curb money politics, recognising its corrosive impact on the very democracy they have painstakingly come to trust. In the end, the participation of reformed terrorists in Indonesia’s regional elections symbolises a broader ideological shift and a reconciliation between faith and democracy. It also indicates the success of deradicalisation programmes in Indonesia, offering hope for a more inclusive and resilient democratic future.

The Intersection between Terrorism and Politics

Terrorist narrative and propaganda, particularly that of jihadi groups, are not just tools for spreading ideology. They are sophisticated political disinformation machineries designed to distort reality, manipulate perceptions and incite violence.

These extremist messages have found fertile ground in Indonesia, where latest major events, such as the 2019 presidential elections and the Covid-19 pandemic, have facilitated the surge of fake news, national polarization and an increasing distrust in the government.

Generally, disinformation is understood as false information deliberately and often covertly spread (such as by planting rumors) to influence public opinion or obscure facts.  

However, Thomas Rid argued in his book Active Measures that disinformation is not necessarily all lies; it can be accurate information presented in a harmful way. Typically, it mixes about 80% of facts and 20% of falsehood to deceive the audience. Think about messages that aim to misrepresent the truth by planting hoaxes in them.

In the political context, examples include the false claim about the origins of AIDS, the Pizzagate conspiracy during the 2016 US election and the allegations of Jokowi’s Chinese heritage during Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election. All these cases share the trait of blending truth and lies.

Interestingly, these traits are also present in jihadi terrorist narratives. Per Rid’s definition, these narratives blend authentic references from the holy texts with twisted interpretations to support their agenda.

Findings from my personal conversations with reformed terrorists align with this. The extremists combine the holy scriptures and the perceived global oppression of Muslims to attract followers.

Terrorist groups like Daesh are masters of this art. They can quickly spread their disinformation globally using social media platforms’ wide reach and anonymity, which algorithms study user preferences and amplify these messages by providing similar content. This digital shift has increased the impact of their propaganda, making it harder to control.

For instance, it was found that YouTube’s algorithms do recommend extremist content to users who actively search for it. This is occurring on other video-sharing platforms as well, such as what happened to migrant worker Ika Puspitasari who was hooked on extremist content after seeing it on Facebook.

The employment of bots and buzzers in disinformation campaigns has only complicated the matter, as these things foster confusion, erode trust in government and media, and contribute to societal polarization in the long run. This trend was very popular during the US and Indonesian elections, signifying the close association between methods of disinformation campaign and politics.

Terrorist groups such as Daesh, Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) or the recently disbanded Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) fit the same mold. Their ultimate goal is to establish a caliphate in Iraq, Syria or Indonesia, overturning the status quo and replacing existing governments with their own rule, thus revealing their political ambitions despite their proclaimed religious objectives. Interestingly, they have also employed bots to magnify their disinformation campaign.

Having considered these points, the similarities in the processes of both terrorist groups and political actors cannot be overlooked. Through their pursuit of power and ability to govern, terrorist groups’ agendas are political in nature. Besides, they also use disinformation tactics similar to those employed by legitimate political players, such as the use of bots and blurring the lines between facts and lies in their messages.

It is easier to detect hoaxes, fake news and the likes when several factors are present, such as high literacy, strong education, solid trust in government, high social capital as well as fair and just political process. In such conditions, terrorist narratives and disinformation may not take root in the society.

But what happens if these conditions are not met?

Is Indonesia Vulnerable?

The unfortunate news is that the political landscape of the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, especially since the contentious 2019 presidential election and the Covid-19 pandemic, has become more vulnerable to disinformation.

This has created perfect opportunities for jihadi groups to exploit tensions and erode trust in the government.

High internet penetration and social media usage in Indonesia are not matched by high media literacy and education, making the majority of the population sitting ducks for disinformation campaigns.

Low trust in the government and its institutions, coupled with polarization and identity politics, has made it harder for the government to combat disinformation, as the government does not enjoy high trust from the governed.

This condition is suitable for terrorist groups to spread their hate-filled disinformation against the government as part of their radicalization efforts. Once radicalized, individuals find it difficult to change their minds, even when presented with facts and logic by the government.

Lee McIntyre, in his book On Disinformation, argues that many disinformation believers or deniers – those who deny facts even when shown clear evidence – are driven by values and identity, not just facts. Their beliefs are part of who they are, so presenting them with counterfactuals may be perceived as an attack on their identity.

Worse, disinformation facilitates an “us vs. them” mentality and pushes individuals to view those who disagree with them as enemies. This mentality is written all over the takfiri ideology, which views the government and its institutions as enemies. As a result, many members of JI and JAD who were arrested refused to participate in the authority’s deradicalization program, thus undermining its effectiveness.

This is reflected in the government’s struggle to earn public trust. Key government institutions – including the House of Representatives (DPR), the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and the National Police (Polri) – were among the least trusted institutions last year.

High profile cases of corruption and power abuse in the past two years alone have damaged Polri’s reputation, which will need some time to be rehabilitated.  Furthermore, recent wrong turns by the government also play a factor. For example, the cybersecurity disaster affecting the country’s Temporary National Data Center casts doubt over the government’s competency to protect the nation’s interests.  

If similar misfires persist, public trust in the government will likely decline further. This could render people more vulnerable to terrorist groups, which propagate the beliefs that the government has transgressed (taghut) and that no positive outcome can emerge from a government led by infidels.

This is clear from both past and recent arrests made by Densus 88. The 2022 Astana Anyar suicide bomber, a terrorist recidivist, harbored hatred towards the police and the government. More recently, a 19-year-old in Malang was arrested for planning to bomb religious houses after being influenced by similar Daesh propaganda.

Thus, anti-government campaigns may easily find an audience in a society that has growing discontent with the government. This is a major risk that the authorities must attend to.

Way Forward

The World Economic Forum has ranked disinformation as the most significant global risk for the next two years and the fifth greatest over the next decade. Therefore, addressing this issue is crucial, especially in the context of Indonesia, where political instability might enable terrorist groups to spread their wing.

Will McAvoy of The Newsroom: “The first step in solving the problem is admitting that there is one.”

The Indonesian government should not turn a blind eye or be in denial about the disinformation issue, as terrorist groups can easily exploit it. Furthermore, it is imperative for the authorities to acknowledge and immediately ameliorate the mistakes that they have committed, as ignorance and dismissiveness would only hamper the government’s effort to rebuild public trust. 

There is no silver bullet for this. Due to the political nature of the disinformation used by terrorist groups, continuous efforts to educate the public and raise awareness about its dangers and the political elements within their propaganda are necessary.

Other steps, such as fact-checking initiatives, are important, but public campaigns and face-to-face conversations with those who sympathize with radical ideology can also be effective, especially when involving “credible voices” like reformed terrorists and Daesh returnees.

Moreover, coordinated efforts between governmental and non-governmental entities must also be improved. This is especially true for agencies like the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT) and Densus 88 of Polri, as they are the primary authorities the public relies on for matters related to counterterrorism and counter violent extremism. Displaying competence and reliability would help boost public trust.

Furthermore, improving media and digital literacy, along with education, are essential for long-term solutions. This is especially important given the rise of AI, deep fakes and generative AI, which make it even more difficult to differentiate between fake and real information. As a final thought, tackling this issue requires a comprehensive strategic communication approach involving all stakeholders, including the government, media, religious organizations, civil society groups, youth organizations and technology companies.