Introduction

On 22 January 2025, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah took part in a discussion on the revision of the Minerals and Coal Mining (Minerba) Law organised by Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR). This was a follow-up effort after both organisations decided to accept mining concessions from the government.

Their inclusion in the revision discussion signifies their shared approach to mining management and the participation of religious organisations.

On paper, the revision of the Minerba Law is intended to improve people’s welfare through equitable distribution of welfare founded upon the principle of economic justice. NU’s and Muhammadiyyah’s participation in the mining industry could also boost their organisational independence.

At first, the government’s offer of mining concessions could be perceived as a strategic move to address the CSOs’ frequent requests for funding to ministries and agencies.

However, critics argue that the organisations’ involvement would remove them from their grassroots bases while simultaneously detaining them in the elites’ political dynamics. Furthermore, by accepting mining concessions from the state, it could be posited that both NU and Muhammadiyah might have given up their independence as

What this means is that both organisations have become integral components of the state – thus serving the interest of the government of the day.

The granting of mining permits to the two was finalised through the issuance of Government Regulation Number 25 of 2024. This new regulation allows NU and Muhammadiyah to establish mining companies or business entities under their wings. The two, however, have relatively different ways of managing their concessions.  

NU’s chairman, Yahya Cholil Staquf, mentioned that his institution had received a Special Mining License Area of around 25,000 to 26,000 hectares in East Kalimantan. NU has also formed a company engaged in mining, namely PT Berkah Usaha Muamalah Nusantara.

Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah obtained a coal mine in South Kalimantan, formerly managed by the Adaro group.

Regardless, the concession offers mark the shift in the relationship between these two CSOs and the state.

Shifting Dynamics

Signs of this changing relationship started to emerge during former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’

At the 34^th NU Muktamar (Congress) on 22 December 2021, Jokowi announced his offering of mining concessions to NU. This was not Jokowi’s only manoeuvre in the event – he also tilted the Congress to favour the election of Yahya Cholil Staquf, his close ally, as chairman of NU’s executive council over Said Aqil Siradj.

Similarly, Muhammadiyah has been offered mining concessions and management rights, though there is no evidence that any such offer was placed during its congress.

President Prabowo Subianto has also continued Jokowi’s tactic of bringing the two CSOs into the state’s fold. Like Jokowi, he has appointed elite NU and Muhammadiyah figures to important positions within the government structure. Such a tactic ensures that his administration receives solid support from Indonesia’s two largest CSOs.

These include the appointments of NU’s Secretary General Saifullah Yusuf (Minister of Social Affairs), NU’s Rais Syuriah Prof KH Nassruddin Umar (Minister of Religious Affairs) and General Leader of the Muslimat NU Arifah Choiri Fauzi (Minister of Women’s Empowerment and Child Protection).

Meanwhile, Prabowo also appointed Muhammadiyah’s Secretary General Abdul Mu’ti and former chairman of the Muhammadiyah Student Association Raja Juli Antoni as Minister of Primary and Secondary Education and Minister of Forestry, respectively.

All of these appointments are on top of numerous state supports, such as programmes that support universities affiliated with the two CSOs. The recent passing of the revised Minerba Law has also resulted in additional state backing.

For example, the state has assisted NU in the creation of 250 NU-owned enterprises and engaged NU to provide Makan Bergizi Gratis (Free Nutritious Meal) – Prabowo’s flagship programme – to students studying under NU’s pesantren. The state has also cooperated with Muhammadiyah in the MBG programme as well as in such areas as migrant workers, education and social affairs.

Convergence and Divergence

In general, the distance between the state and CSOs should not be underestimated. The political positions and attitudes of CSOs are closely related to the prevailing political dynamics shaped by the state. CSOs, thus, could either support or oppose government policies or programmes, depending on the nature of their relationship.

In the political context, NU and Muhammadiyah play an active role in influencing policy discourse from both outside and inside DPR.

Examples include their shared rejection of the Pancasila Ideology Direction Bill in 2020 and their simultaneous push for the government to pass the Sexual Violence Bill in 2022. These examples also illustrate the alignment of both organisations on national and social issues.

They have also diverged on particular issues. Muhammadiyah, for example, rejected the government’s move to revise the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Law in 2019, while an NU element supported it.

This division is more apparent in the controversy surrounding the Constitutional Court’s (MK) decision to reduce the age limit for presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Following the verdict, a number of professors, rectors and students of Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY) voiced their opposition, stating their concern that the state’s institutions have failed to perform their functions.  However, their position was contradicted by the organisation’s leadership, suggesting that Muhammadiyah is also not united on this issue. In contrast, NU tended to remain silent on the subject, indicating that the CSO has aligned itself with the state’s interest.

Nuances such as these gave birth to the narrative that the two organisations have been “bribed” with the mining concessions in exchange for dialling down their criticism of the government.

Meanwhile, in practical politics, many NU cadres dabble as members of various political parties, though most are concentrated as members of Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB). The same dynamics can be observed between Muhammadiyah and Partai Aman

This is not a strange phenomenon in Indonesia’s political landscape, especially considering both PKB and PAN could trace their roots all the way back to NU and Muhammadiyah, respectively.

Both organisations also allow their cadres to partake

CSOs No More?

Observing these examples above, several key points can be inferred. Firstly, both NU and Muhammadiyah were rather fluid in their relationship with the government – they can swing from being staunch oppositions (the Pancasila Bill) to ardent supporters (the Sexual Violence Bill). Secondly, NU and Muhammadiyah could channel their aspirations through their associated political parties in order to keep their distance from the government.

Despite these instances of divergence and opposition to the government, both groups display their convergence once again in their acceptance of the mining concession offer. This ensures that NU and Muhammadiyah have access to lucrative economic opportunities that could fund their activities while also retaining their seats in Indonesia’s elite political game. However, it should be underlined that it would also increase their dependence on the state and weaken their position as CSOs.

With two of Indonesia’s largest CSOs now orbiting around the state’s gravitational field, power will be increasingly centralised on the state and diminish the spirits of political reform and decentralisation spurred by reformasi.

The question now is this: with both organisations having accepted the concessions, do they still have the capacity to represent and channel the voice of the grassroots communities they claim to represent?

Conclusion

Since the beginning of reformasi, both CSOs have had complex experiences ranging from opposing to partnering with the government. Recently, however, there are instances showing that the state aims to influence the activities and orientation of the two organisations. The mining concession offer is just one such strategy employed by the state to secure the support and non-opposition from the two groups.

When that is achieved, then the state would not only obtain the loyalty of NU and Muhammadiyah but potentially also the associated political parties despite the distance that exists between the CSOs and the parties. As a result, CSOs are no longer considered independent and seem to have been successfully weakened through a process of political resource distribution that is entirely state-centred.

Introduction

In general, Indonesia’s female legislative candidates (caleg) faced a steep challenge to be elected to the House of Representatives (DPR) in the country’s Pemilihan Umum (general election – Pemilu) this year. Their main competition did not just come from male candidates – who continue to dominate the seats in the legislative body – but also fellow female candidates backed by oligarchs or political dynasties.

This is because women’s representation remains an issue. Law Number 12 2003 decrees that each political party must ensure that 30% of its contesting candidates are women in order to ensure more women can get elected.

If we look at the statistics, the number of female calegwho contested in Pemilu 2024 had indeed exceeded the 30% quota as determined by the Law. Nationally, the figure stood at 3,676 out of 9,917 total caleg (37.07%).

Despite this encouraging trend, most political parties failed to nominate enough women in their nomination list to meet the minimum quota of 30% in all 84 electoral districts. This shows that women continue to be underrepresented in a majority of electoral districts.  

This concern was what encouraged activists to fight for 30% representation of women in each district. Alas, the last election only saw 127 successful female caleg, far from the pined 30% quota (at 21.9%)

Achieving such feat had been difficult in the past. Back in Pemilu 2019, only 118 women were elected to DPR’s 575 total seats, amounting to a mere 20.5%. This paltry figure was already an increase from Pemilu 2014, whereby only 97 out of the total 560 seats were won by female candidates (17.3%).

The Role of Political Parties

Political parties play a crucial role in ushering female caleg to legislative seats – each has the responsibility to prep

However, parties have different approaches towards such regulation, driven primarily by differing political interest and capacity to meet the requirement. It means that the success rate for these candidates varies from one party to the next.

This is exemplified by the success of an Islamic political party in nominating successful female candidates. There is a running assumption that Islamic parties is very much patriarchal, providing more advantage and space for men than women.

In Pemilu 2024, the Islamic-leaning Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) is the only political party that succeeded in filling up 30% of its nomination list with female candidates in all electoral districts, as mandated by the Law.

No other party achieved a similar height, which goes to show that political parties are yet to be sufficiently dedicated in nominating and, eventually, realizing the minimum women’s representation in the legislative body. Furthermore, it further accentuates the significance of parties as the first “gatekeeper” that women must deal with in order to be elected.

Worse, there are signs that the parties’ nomination system is driven by the dynamics of political pragmatism – ties to oligarchs and political dynasties rather than political ideologies. It has been argued before that accumulation of power, instead of gender perspective, is the driving force behind parties’ decision to field female candidates. These go to show that women’s representation continues to be a footnote, a marginal objective in the bigger pursuit of other political interest.

Increasing Women’s Representation

Still, the fact remains: Pemilu 2024 saw a small increase of elected female representative from Pemilu 2019. With 127 out of 580 seats (21.9%) won by women, a history was made – this is the highest number of elected women in the country’s DPR. The figure has actually increased in the last three elections. In 2014, the number of female candidates elected was 97 and later increased to 118 in 2019.

This is a notable achievement, considering a sobering fact that lies deeper.

Based on our observations, as many as 17 political parties participating in Pemilu 2024 did not meet the 30% quota requirement for female caleg in all electoral districts as mandated by the Law. Among these are the biggest and oldest parties such as Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP), Golongan Karya (Golkar), Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) and Demokrat.

However, if we scrutinize the female caleg closer, a new reality soon emerges. What is interesting is that some of these successful candidates are relatives of prominent party elites, bosses of big corporates or higher-ups in other notable offices.

These include names such as Atalia Praratya (wife of the former Governor of West Java, Ridwan Kamil), Futri Zulya Savitri (daughter of PAN Chairman Zulkifli Hasan), Pinka Hapsari (daughter DPR Speaker Puan Maharani), Novita Hardini (wife of the Regent of Trenggalek Mochamad Nur Arifin), Meitri Citra Wardani (daughter of the founder of Tenang Jaya Sejahtera [TJS] Group Tulus Widodo), Lita Machfud Arifin (wife of former East Java Regional Police Chief Machfud

We are not trying to cast a generalization by arguing that all elected female representatives hail from oligarchy or political dynasties. Some did get elected using a more populist app

If we are only considering those hailing from political dynasties, the analysis gets more interesting. Almost half of all elected female candidates have ties to political dynasties (58 out of 127, or 45.7%). This substantial figure cannot be overlooked and further stresses the linkage between one’s upbringing and success in winning a seat.   

Those who ran with the backing of oligarchs or political dynasties certainly have more advantages compared to other aspirants, often referred to as “seat warmers” in Indonesian colloquialism. These include access to patronage, potentially greater funds and, as will be explored below, higher opportunities to grab top slots or “beautiful numbers” in the ballot.

For these female caleg, access to political and financial resources could very much translate into a higher opportunity to be elected. However, this also means that the political contest is tilted in favor of those with such background, to the detriment of female caleg from other backgrounds. In other words, while women are already underrepresented in the parties’ nomination list, female calegwith politically advantageous ties further narrow down the opportunities for other female caleg to be elected.

This, in turn, indicates a deeper nuance to the whole phenomenon of “female caleg”, whom we must not lump together into a sort of monolithic group. Not all female caleg play on the same level playing field, with those from certain backgrounds can draw greater resources to win elections. On top of that, regardless whether they have such an advantage or not, they still have to compete ag

Top Slots, Beautiful Numbers

Indonesia’s election adopts th

With political parties favoring female calegfrom political dynasties, there is a possibility that these calegmay be given top or beautiful ballot numbers. The names mentioned above exemplify this.

Atalia Praratya, whose candidate number was “4”, ran under Golkar, which party number was also “4” in the ballot. Both Novita Hardini and Shanty Alda Nathalia ran under PDIP (“3”); both placed third in the ballot. Meanwhile, Lita Machfud Arifin and Rahmati Herdiana were both number “2” in their respective party list. Last but not least, Futri Zulya Savitri, Pinka Hapsari and Meitri Citra Wardani all received the top slot.

Considering all of them were successful in their respective electoral district, it is no wonder that calegin general vie for top or beautiful numbers in the ballot. How female calegcan secure these numbers vary.

For example, Minister of Trade Zulkifli Hasan, had blatantly demonstrated his support to daughter Futri Zulya Savitri, who successfully ran with candidate number “1”. It can be surmised that his position as Chairman of PAN had a big influence on this.

Others had to lobby and gain the favors of oligarchs and party elites. Incumbents usually obtain number “1”, but highly popular candidates have the bargaining power to be accorded one of the attractive numbers.

The 30% quota for women is based upon the agenda to attain equality for women. However, as this section shows, the arena is not equal in the first place – those with advantageous connections can easily grab parties’ favor and thus secure a more attractive candidate number in the ballot.

Conclusion

This piece aims to demonstrate that the noble agenda to achieve a minimum women’s representation in the DPR is still a distant dream. While Indonesia has achieved history by electing the highest number of female representatives to the DPR, this was achieved not for the pure interest of attaining gender equality in the country’s highest legislative body.

The most important actors in the equation, i.e., the political parties, still act out of political interest instead of gender equality as an ideology. Because of this, they are thus exposed to pressures from oligarchs and political dynasties who also wish to have their favored candidates elected. Caleg who successfully ran with attractive numbers, as exemplified above, is an indication of this influence. Looking ahead, a questio

Introduction

Prabowo-Gibran’s victory in the 2024 Presidential Election, with 58% of the total votes, could influence the future relationship between President Joko Widodo and his party, PDI-P. The former seems to have a decent post-presidency prospect in the next government, while the latter is more likely to function as an opposition. The PDI-P-Jokowi tension has been heating up long before the election and reaching its peak during and after the election.

Before this transpired, a series of occasions indicated internal party friction. In 2015, the party’s chairman, Megawati Soekarnoputri, frequently reminded its members during internal party meetings that PDI-P’s status is above the government and all party members will always be party officials, even though one is a President. She also insisted that Jokowi was just a regular party member without PDI-P. This statement annoyed Jokowi as the media still portrayed him as the party’s puppet. Subsequently, Jokowi appeared to behave differently towards PDIP, slowly distancing away from the party and wielding his power beyond the party as indicated in the recent election.

Jokowi’s presidency and administration will end soon as Prabowo-Gibran will be the official successors in October 2024. It also means that in a few months, PDI-P will no longer be on the government’s sid

The Crack Inside Government

During the ten years of Jokowi’s administration, Megawati was very critical of his policies and had publicly expressed her disappointment. An example is Jokowi’s appointment of those he deemed reliable as key ministers in his rather than senior members of PDI-P. The current Coordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs and Investment, Luhut Binsar Panjaitan (LBP), is heavily relied on by Jokowi, due to their close ties since Jokowi was a mayor in Solo. Arguably, LBP is among those with whom PDI-P disagrees with for inclusion into Jokowi’s administration. LPB had played a massive role in narrating the election postponement as well as sounding the idea for the third term of Jokowi as President, which further distanced relations between Jokowi and PDI-P.

Jokowi’s reliable ministers have also offered him a clear post-presidency prospect rather than PDI-P. Seeking political power after stepping down from the presidency through his son is a rational decision, yet it created factions inside the party. Although PDI-P has been a political vehicle for him in the last two decades and Jokowi wining all the elections he contested, PDI-P’s support for him has not only waned but also deteriorated to vocal criticisms.

Therefore, Jokowi’s attitude towards PDI-P indicates that he does not want to regarded as an ordinary member of the party once he steps down from the Presidential Palace. As long as Soekarno’s family members, such as Megawati Soekarnoputri and Puan Maharani, is in charge, Jokowi cannot lead the party. Instead, Jokowi is more likely to be a party chairman of Gerindra or Golongan Karya (Golkar), two big players in the Prabowo-Gibran coalition.

The current relations between Jokowi and PDIP create a crack inside the government, impacting the change of current government officials. While senior members of PDI-P are still in the

Democrat Party and PDI-P has hardly been friendly towards each other as demonstrated by the decades long frosty relationship between Megawati and former Democrat Party’s chairman, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Therefore, Democrat Party could not or at least would not join the government as long as Megawati is still in charge. Interestingly, Jokowi has chosen such bold step to show his position by opposing Megawati’s stance with the appointment of AHY as minister.

Jokowi-PDI-P: A Burning Bridge?  

Further deterioration is envisaged due to several critical factors. First, the unforgettable 2024 Presidential Election, with plenty of controversies and changes in regulation, will be regarded as a means to weaken PDI-P. In this election, votes for the party declined, and their Presidential candidates received the lowest votes at 16%. Such systemic loss cost PDI-P a crucial position in the government side.

One of the controversies was the social assistance program known as bansos distributed days before the election day. While this program was intended to assist the less fortunate throughout the archipelago, it cannot be dissociated from the notion that the program was to indirectly facilitate support for Prabowo-Gibran. This was attributed to Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani, allocating the state’s budget to distribute for this program under the instructions of Jokowi.

Notably, the Minister of Social Affairs, Tri Risma Harini who is a PDI-P cadre, was not involved despite his ministry being responsible fo

Second, PDI-P is slated to be a strong opposition against the upcoming Prabowo’s administration. Being in the government, PDI-P is aware of efforts to stymy the oppossition such as the use of the current state budget and the lack of state officials who oppose the government. Interestingly, while Jokowi’s and Gibran’s PDI-P party status are still unclear as no official resignations have been announced, the duo would be part of the upcoming government.

PDI-P is also unlikely to join the government for various reasons. In his latest maneuvers, the relationship between Golkar and Jokowi is strengthening rather than PDI-P and the latter. Additionally, Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI), a party in the Prabowo-Gibran coalition, has recently reported PDI-P cadre, Ganjar Pranowo who ran in the election, to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) on suspicion of corruption. PDI-P’s disappointment with Jokowi could stem from his silence over the matter. Collectively, Jokowi’s relationship with PDI-P is bound to deteriorate with the former favoring Prabowo-Gibran; outweighing his loyalty to PDI-P. An important question to ask is whether the bridge between Jokowi and PDI-P is set to burn? In other words, could it culminate to a burnt relationship as exemplified by the PDI-P-Democrat Party relationship?