Introduction

Security threats to Malaysia go beyond sovereignty and territorial integrity issues. Malaysia’s security, as I argued elsewhere, must be conceptualised via the developing countries’ security framework. The dynamism and interplay between internal and external variables are key to the management of security predicament in the country. Like other developing countries, the idea and concept of-nation-state are still problematic. Social and political identity formation face great challenges, while economic activities and sources still rely heavily on commodities. Hence, Malaysia’s security challenges in 2022 and beyond continue to suffer from in-factor (domestic variables) problems such as a fragile state idea, societal structural issues, and competing identity and ideology. Simultaneously, the outside-factors (external variables) due to the changing structure of international landscape, also pose security challenges to the country.

Malaysia’s Existential Threats

Several existential issues remain a challenge to Malaysia’s security. The politics of race and religion are a major concern as Malaysia’s political system is race-based since independence. For decades, the United Malaya National Organisation (UMNO) has drawn commendable Malay support with little challenges. It was only recently that a new party albeit formed with seasoned politicians, Bersatu, attempted to challenge this dominance.

The Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), though claimed to be an Islamic party can be argued to be nationalist. Its support is largely limited to rural Malay-majority areas. As a partner member in the current government, PAS’ political statements and ideology had occasionally raised tensions with other members, potentially influencing their alliance moving into Malaysia’s 15^th General Election. Its support for the Taleban government, for instance, poses challenging diplomatic tasks for the fragile coalition government.

Although UMNO appears to lose its majority at the 14th General Election, recent by-elections and state-elections show that UMNO is making a come-back. Political analysts, however, have been quick to point out that it is too early for UMNO to “celebrate” its return as it was argued that the opposition still commands large support. But the opposition appears to have failed in forming a united front against the Barisan Nasional (BN), which UMNO has been a dominant coalition partner. It was also argued that, in the last by-elections and state elections, UMNO had played the “racial card” of Ketuanan Melayu (Malay dominancy) by creating fear among the Malays of the possibility that Democratic Action Party (DAP) could once again dominate the government like it did during the Pakatan Harapan (PH) administration. (Abdullah, 2022)

In addition to politicians, Malaysia’s nation-building process have also been hampered by ultranationalist-religious movements (like Perkasa and Hindraf) that stoke fear-mongering sentiments to gain grass-root support. It is, thus, not surprising that racial as well as religious conflicts like May 13, 1969, the Memali, Jenalek, and Kampung Medan occur and continue to threaten the country’s stability.

Another major concern to Malaysia’s national security is threats from radical religious movements. For years, religious radicalism was treated as an in-factor, but since the September 11 incidents, Malaysia has jumped into the bandwagon by supporting the US-led campaign on War Against Terrorism (WAT). The current fight against religiously-inspired terrorism, however, could be a blessing in disguise for Malaysia.  

Since independence, the government was confronted with religious radicalism in the form of demands for Malaysia to be established as an Islamic state. At one time, the backbone of these groups came from PAS members. This created serious political confrontation between two major Malay-based political parties – UMNO and PAS. Several leaders from both parties were arrested under the now abolished Internal Security Act (ISA), for their direct and indirect involvement in those radical groups. Through WAT, government policies and approaches against threats from local religious fundamentalism were strengthened.

Unfinished Statehood Building

The fragile notion of statehood also explains various traditional and non-traditional security threats faced by the country. Its state formation, inherited from colonialism, has been challenged by regional actors. The most salient threat is the territorial claim by the Sulu Sultanate, which is supported by the Manila, to control Sabah. The Sulu Sultanate claimed a major victory when the Paris arbitration ordered the Malaysia government to pay more than RM62 billion compensation to the heirs of Sulu Sultanate. The Malaysian government rejected the arbitration arguing that it was a unilateral decision made without Malaysian government representation. This became a moral boost for the sultanate that attempted to wrest control of Sabah by force in 2013. Jamalul Kiram, the self-proclaimed Sulu Sultan, was the figure responsible for the encroachment. Though Manila distanced itself from the incident, it had failed to issue strong condemnation for the act.

Non-traditional security threats i.e. illegal migration, Transitional Organised Crime (TOC) are also not new issues to Malaysia’s security. During the colonial period, Southeast Asia was divided into colonial powers’ sphere of influences through bilateral agreement. The British and Dutch in 1824, for instance, divided the Malay archipelagic area into two territories that is presently known as Malaysia and Indonesia. This agreement split ethnic groups and families into two different states which was difficult to accept as the idea of statehood was never fully comprehended by locals. Instead, they were inclined to identify themselves through their ethnicity rather than by forced political identity. Consequently, illegal transborder movements, as defined by state nowadays, is still an alien concept to them. For states like Malaysia, illegal transborder movements entail other security concern like terrorism, human trafficking, arms smuggling, and illegal fishing. This security concern is more pronounced in the eastern coast of Sabah.

Unfinished border demarcation also explains Malaysia’s predicament in facing with a territorial dispute with regional power – China. The overlapping maritime issue is not only relatively new and involve multiple regional players in Southeast Asia, but has only involved another major power, US. With such complexity and China’s willingness (or lack thereof) to resolve the issue, a stalemate or for the status quo to continue in the short-term. However, with China’s continued rise, claims over the South China Sea will become an increasing threat to Malaysia’s territorial integrity.

Finally, Malaysia’ security also relies on a stable international structure. The country is situated in a conflict-prone region. Conflicts in neighbouring countries would have spill-over effects to the country. During the Vietnam War, Malaysia hosted thousands of refugees. When Indonesia was in turmoil in the post-Soeharto period, Malaysia once again became a safe haven not only for economic migrants but also to radical Islamists. This is similarly seen with the Southern Thai and the Mindanao conflicts. Aside from being forced to accept thousands of refugees, Malaysia has also been accused of supporting separatist groups. These rows inevitably create diplomatic tensions with neighbouring countries and contribute to instability in the region.

Conclusion Current security challenges in Malaysia are sandwiched between fragile socio-political structure and the fluid nature of international system. Yet, the domestic sources of threat are still the main security challenges. The inability to address the domestic sources of threat coupled with an uncertain international order could drag the country into larger conflict in the future if not manage properly.

Introduction

Though an expected consequence of the US’s hasty withdrawal, the swift return of the Taliban to Afghanistan’s power politics surprised the world. This development illustrates how the corrupt Afghan government has been practically hopeless and doomed to collapse with the withdrawal of the US troops. Although the US refuses to admit that its withdrawal is reminiscent of its military failure in Vietnam, the Afghan case re-educates top policy makers in Washington that external intervention through military occupation in a socio-culturally complex and politically corrupt nation damages its hegemonic position.

What concerns the international community about the Taliban’s return is its nexus with al-Qaeda (AQ). Notably, the September 11 attack,  the first external attack on American soil, was directed al-Qaeda from its sanctuary in Afghanistan. This attack not only provided AQ with media spotlight on its uncompromising, violent struggle but also brought further attention to the Taliban. Consequently, Muslims became targeted due to the arising Islamophobia.

One may argue that the demise of Osama bin Laden could see the end of AQ’s violent struggle. However, this assumption is far from reality. AQ, through its regional cells, continues to be a formidable force by conducting small-scale attacks such as the attack  UN peacekeepers in Mali. Therefore, the Taliban’s political return could be an indicator of AQ’s return to the global scene, the reinvigoration of terror cells and networks, and a morale booster to global religious violent extremists. Its return could also indicate the consolidation of violent extremist movements all over the world with serious global security ramifications. Though the Taliban is trying to project a new liberal image – promising social and political reforms, but analysts continue to cast doubts over its commitments given its past connections with AQ.

Second Front in Southeast Asia?

The connection between Afghanistan and Southeast Asia could also reignite a “second front” discourse in the region. Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines were the strategic hubs of the AQ affiliate in the region- the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Prior to the US invasion, AQ militant camps in Afghanistan became the spiritual/ideological centre and training ground for JI members.

Nonetheless, the Southeast Asian threat environment has changed. Previously, Southeast Asian authorities had to contend with mitigating threats mainly from JI. However, this has changed with the presence of Daesh (Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah fi Al-Iraq wa Al-Sham) which saw the realignment of groups such as Abu Sayyaf (ASG) and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT). Both, AQ and Daesh, are different entities with contrasting ideological principles. Though both groups are Sunni Salafi striving to install an Islamic governance, AQ rejects Daesh’s takfiri arguments for its deviations from its interpretation of Islam. Additionally, AQ is focused on anti-Zionism and its mission against the US for its support to governments in Middle East. For Daesh, its ideology combines radical Salafism and Wahabism, offering its followers a narrowed understanding of Islam. Its strict adherence to the precepts of Prophet Muhammad’s life and legitimizing bloody sectarian killings on those they deemed to be apostates do not augur well for Islam’s image. Their incompatible goals and interpretations have led to numerous armed conflict between these groups.

Therefore, the possible threats of the Taliban’s political return to Malaysia’s security need to be contextualized with the current threat environment. AQ is currently benefiting from its affiliations with the Taliban. Afghanistan could once again serve as AQ’s safe haven for its militant training and planning for attacks. To reignite its Southeast Asian reach, AQ is also reconnecting with JI. Conversely, Daesh is gradually losing its grips in Syria and beginning to re-establish its base in Southeast Asia with the help of MIT and ASG. It is, thus, inevitable that both groups compete for supremacy over Southeast Asia.

Though Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) was quick to congratulate the takeover, citing its confidence of Taliban’s new image, Malaysia is still assessing the situation and is, thus, implementing a cautious approach on recent developments in Afghanistan. The major concern among policy makers is its potential impact on Malaysia’s counterterrorism efforts and politico-security. At the operational level, the enforcement agencies continue to strengthen its counterterrorism strategies, such as by beefing-up intel gathering activities and border control, to restrict the movements of violent extremists into or out of Malaysia.

Malaysia, henceforth, needs to be cognizant that potential or future terror threats by regional affiliates of AQ and Daesh. Threats to Malaysia’s security would come in multiple forms. First is the recruitment process by these groups.  Daesh’s social media accounts have proven to be a successful strategy in recruiting its followers compared to that of AQ’s old fashioned usrah method. However, this method could still be effective as there are still hardcore followers in Malaysia. Based on the author’s conversation with a senior officer of the Special Branch (SB) of the Royal Police of Malaysia (PDRM), at least five percent of those who were undergoing rehabilitation programs continued to subscribe to their violent worldviews. These hardcore followers were formerly AQ’s Malaysian leaders and have now joined Daesh to continue their political struggle. Unfortunately, they were also successful in influencing other inmates with Daesh’s propaganda. Consequently, these terrorist inmates are detained in isolation cells. Under Malaysia’s legislation, former AQ members like Yazid Sufaat, could not be detained indefinitely and have been freed. If left unmonitored, these hardcore individuals could return to their violent struggle.

Second is the strengthening of regional terror networking. Malaysia has so far been spared from direct or large-scale terrorist attacks compared to its neighbours like Indonesia and the Philippines. However, Malaysia has been accused of producing terrorists in the region like Hambali, Nasir Abbas, Dr Mahmud Ahmad, and Nordin Mat Top. Thus far, Malaysia’s resilience to terror attacks stems from its experience and expertise in managing potential terrorist attacks since the British colonialization of the country. Terror threats have been countered through several preventive laws, intel cooperation, and enforcements. Although all these hard approaches could not guarantee Malaysia to be from terrorism, it has at least mitigated possible major attacks. Under these new circumstances, Malaysia must also rely heavily on soft approaches.

As with previously, the current threats are complex and regionally connected. AQ and Daesh have set up their Southeast Asian bases in countries that are politically unstable, have weak law enforcements and have large followers to achieve their goals. Since the September 11 attack, Tawau and Semporna of Sabah, for instance, have been used as transit points by foreign terrorists to move between Sulawesi Island of Indonesia and Tawi-Tawi islands of the Philippines. Sabah’s eastern coast is the most convenient travel choice for terrorist groups to smuggle weapons and explosives due to open sea and porous border. Although the pandemic has hampered movements due to border closures and restrictions, these terror groups will continue to reconnect through underground networking on various social media platforms.

It is imperative for Malaysia, henceforth, to continue to work closely with neighbouring countries to prevent future terror attacks. Recent developments in Afghanistan cannot be taken lightly due to the simultaneous threats from groups affiliated with AQ and Daesh.