Introduction

The importance of maintaining food security was re-emphasized with the onset of COVID-19. The pandemic has also emphasized the need for countries to invest in new technologies as they strive towards self-sufficiency i.e. reducing their reliance on trade. Previously, the impetus of such technologies was to ensure that the increase in global food demand, a consequence of rising population, will always be met. These technologies, known as agritech, also offer attractive and viable solutions particularly for countries facing limited available land. The following sections provide a brief description of agritech and its attractiveness as a target for attack.

What is Agritech?

Agritech is one of two part of the billion-dollar agrifood industry. This part refers to technologies that targets agriculture producers such as farmers. Unlike traditional agriculture methods, investors are more receptive to these new technologies due to their capability to ensure consistent production and quality. In other words, reducing the risk while increasing the potential Return on Investment (ROI). This is possible as key to agritech is its precise control of almost every factor that impacts the success of the harvest. Employed are sensors that assist in regulating the environment. Benefits include optimizing the use of resources such as fertilizers, preventing resource wastage thus decreasing overheads, decreasing the potential for such media to get leaked into the environment, maintaining an ideal growth environment for the products, and negating the need for succession planting. This potentially means all types of plants and animals can be cultivated anytime throughout the year.

Additionally, agritech will reduce the need for heavy equipment such as tractors as production facilities become more compact from the optimized use of space and reliance on automation. More important for investors is how agritech encourages research to not only better understand the needs of their products but for genetic manipulation for increased resilience and quality of their products. Such research can, thus, create other numerous revenue-generating sub-industries focusing on husbandry, nutrition, health, and breeding. Therefore, adopting agritech will ensure a shift in the recruitment of higher educated and trained personnel.

Currently, the four technologies that are present in Southeast Asia (SEA) are vertical farming, aquaculture, aquaponics, and cultured meat (also known as in vitro or lab-grown meat). Vertical farming is an innovation that leverages on two existing systems: hydroponics and aeroponics. Utilizing either one of these systems, plants are grown in stacks without the reliance of soil and in growth media. This, thus, improves food safety by eliminating soil-based contamination. Additionally, vertical farming improves space usage as it can be built in the form of tall towers or underground.

Aquaculture is the farming of seafood products such as fish and crustaceans. Previously, such farms are built outdoors and are dependent on the quality of existing water source. There is now a push for such farms to be built indoors i.e. overland for greater control. Aquaponics is simply a hybridized closed loop system that includes a hydroponic system and an aquaculture system. Its principle lies in using wastewater generated from the aquaculture system as growth media for the hydroponic system. Water from the hydroponic system is then treated and re-entered into the aquaculture system. Like its name, cultured meats are meats that are grown using cells in bioprocessing facilities. Although aimed at preventing animal cruelty, this technology still requires some animals to be reared and harvested for their cells. As it is still in its infancy, research is still ongoing to not only reduce the production costs but to expand the variety of meats produced in vitro.

Agritech Facilities as Attractive Targets of Attack

Unfortunately, the characteristics that make agritech appealing also makes it attractive targets of attack. Due to its compact processes, an attack on such facilities would result in higher damage and losses than traditional facilities. Additionally, any damage or disruption inflicted on their centralized control network would lead to similar outcomes. Those leveraging on closed loop systems are also vulnerable as an introduction of contaminants in any part of the system can lead to total system failure. Contributing to its attractiveness as targets could be its limited security features and the psychological impact of an attack on such facilities; food being a basic need. Currently, guidelines and gold standards to securitizing these facilities may be limited and may even be overlooked.

Three Groups of Potential Perpetrators

The first group of potential perpetrators are terrorists. Included in this group are religiously motivated terrorists and ecoterrorists. Religiously motivated terrorists, responsible for most contemporary terrorist attacks, have been argued to display organizational learning. They would therefore not only search for new tactics but also targets. Additionally, the ambiguity of whether lab grown meat are religiously permissible may legitimize them as targets. Aquaculture, aquaponics, and lab-grown meats may come under the crosshair of ecoterrorists as they act to advance animal rights. Though lab-grown meats involved a reduced number of live animals, it may be deemed unacceptable as it promotes the continued consumption of meat and the abuse of livestock. It certainly is a disservice to agritech as it requires electricity to power its operations. Unfortunately, in SEA, coal-powered generators are still a major source of electricity. This provides an additional point of contention for ecoterrorists.

The second group of potential perpetrators are those who are disenfranchised by these technologies. This group of individuals are likely those who have lost their employment when traditional farms adopt these technologies. It could also include small-scale producers who lose their livelihoods to agritech facilities. These individuals may carry out attacks uncoordinated and on their own, through anti-technology movements, or get recruited into terrorist groups. Anti-technology movements have been known to exist since the 1800s, most notable is the Luddites.

The third group of potential perpetrators are opportunists. These are individuals or groups who could demand a ransom from agritech facilities on the threat of disrupting their production. Their tactics would likely come in the form of online attacks to the facilities’ essential IT infrastructure. Non-functioning sensors, for example, will be disastrous for such facilities.

Likely Modus Operandi & Implications

Implicit from the list of potential perpetrators, two forms of modus operandi are envisaged. The first centres on perpetrators physically forcing entry into these facilities. Upon their successful entry, they could sabotage production by either inflicting structural damage to essential infrastructure or contaminating essential resources such as growth media. In such a scenario, the perpetrators potential weapons of choice include guns, explosives, and poisons. It is unlikely that perpetrators would resort to using chemical and biological agents in such attacks as introduction of large amounts of easily obtainable contaminants such as dishwashing liquid is enough to disrupt production.

Additionally, in such a scenario, it is thus important to maintain sufficient security to prevent any unlawful entry into these premises, particularly in essential areas such as control rooms. Personnel and vehicle checks at entry points are also essential. These checks are to screen for weapons and explosives. It is also ideal to create a stand-off distance to minimize damage to the main buildings. This would mean creating as much free space between the entry point and the main buildings.

The second likely modus operandi is the online penetration into the facilities IT infrastructure. In addition to constantly ensuring the facility’s cybersecurity, it may be ideal to also consider decentralizing their systems. A decentralized system allows the creation of redundancy and is more tolerant to faults.

Introduction

The intent to employ chemical agents in Indonesia has yet to dissipate. Like the Singapore’s Statutes, here, biological agents are any microorganisms and its components excluding toxins while chemical agents are toxic chemicals and its precursors. This intent is evidenced from the successful assembly of an explosive device that was to disperse the stored abrin. Other prior notable incidents include police intelligence of a plot to deliver cyanide-tainted food to police officers, a failed detonation of a “chlorine bomb” in a shopping mall, and smearing straws with self-extracted ricin at a food stall frequented by police officers. There were also concerns where coronavirus-infected extremists deliberately infecting targets such as the police. However, such opinion is conjecture vis-à-vis extremists in Indonesia.

What It Means?

These incidents demonstrate the perceived attractiveness of chemical agents over biological agents. Additionally, the choice of targets of this type of attacks are largely consistent with previous gun-and-bomb attacks in Indonesia, namely the police. In their rejection of Indonesian democracy, Indonesian extremist ideologues have labelled those maintaining such governance as legitimate targets. Additionally, the Indonesian police have consistently foiled extremist attacks, thus securing them as high value targets for Indonesian extremists. Nevertheless, the public may occasionally be targeted.

Among the types of chemical agents, abrin and ricin (both plant-based toxins), and chlorine gas (a choking agent) will continue to pose a low but lingering threat. Abrin and ricin have estimated oral LD50 values (median dose that is lethal to 50% of a population) of 0.1-1mg/kg and 1-20 mg/kg, respectively. Based on the Gosselin, Smith and Hodge scale, they are also deemed to be super toxic and extremely toxic, respectively. Despite their toxicity, one key limitation, as with other chemical and biological agents, is dissemination. Though they possess lower LD50 values (thus, more lethal) if aerosolized, their efficacy would be dependent on the efficiency of the dissemination method and environmental conditions.

Therefore, dissemination via oral consumption will still be the preferred mode for extremists. Similarly, such modes of dissemination hold several challenges. This includes the purity of these toxins, their susceptibility to high temperature and the lack of control in hitting the intended targets. Unlike a suicide bomb attack in which the attacker acts like a homing device, oral dissemination is dependent on the target consuming the toxin. Therefore, due to its indiscriminate nature, these toxins pose a grave security concern if large enough quantities are acquired to inflict mass casualty incidents.

Though toxins can also be extracted from animals and microorganisms, they pose a lower risk than plant-based toxins. This is due to the difficulty in acquiring these sources of toxins and their subsequent extraction, particularly those from microorganisms such as botulinum toxin. Additionally, these toxins face the same issues as plant-based toxins as the most likely form of dissemination is via oral consumption.

Chlorine gas will remain as a potential weapon for extremists, largely due to its relative ease of production. Like plant-based toxins, manufacturing of this gas does not require a laboratory, could be manufactured without the involvement of laboratory-trained individuals, low manufacturing cost, and relative ease in obtaining raw materials. Additionally, toxic gases have the potential to cause harm to both primary (those exposed upon initial dissemination) and secondary casualties (first responders).

There are, however, key issues with the use of chlorine gas. These issues include inducing death at high levels of exposure (e.g. exposure to 400 ppm to around 1000 ppm is generally fatal only after 30 minutes)  and noticeable traits such as odour, yellowish hue and tending to be close to the floor as it is heavier than air. Additionally, first responders could easily detect toxic gases and its concentrations with portable gas detectors. Its inflammable property, however, is a double-edged sword. Though it may not pose a fire risk to first responders, chlorine gas may survive the initial explosion if incorporated into an explosive device. However, the impact of such a release on victims would be low. Despite its relative low lethality, a key security concern is if the incident is over-sensationalized in the media. Notably, imperative to terrorism is to cause terror amongst the public, hoping to create turmoil.

There are three potential candidates that extremists may attempt to acquire to expand their chemical agent repertoire. The first is potassium cyanide which was thought to be used in the murder of an Indonesian civilian with no links to terrorism. This case, however, demonstrates how disseminating via oral means can successfully reach the intended target, is lethal and how even civilians can procure it. The second is hydrogen cyanide. Though it may be produced crudely with relative ease and the ease to procure the raw materials, its LC50 (like LD50) for inhalation is 524 ppm for 10 minutes and observable traits such as almond-like odour. Lastly, hydrogen sulphide gas could be chosen due to its relative ease to obtain raw materials as demonstrated its use in numerous suicide attempts globally. Like chlorine gas, its efficacy is dependent on its environment.

Limitations of Biological Agents

There are many challenges that will prevent the use of biological agents by extremists. These can be categorized into acquiring a virulent strain of microorganism, the successful manufacture of viable and pure samples, and dissemination. Collectively, these require time, large finances, a well-equipped laboratory that prevents accidental infections such as a BSL-4 laboratory, and recruitment of trained and knowledgeable individuals. The case of Aum Shinrikyo demonstrates the difficulty of non-state actors acquiring this weapon.

Concerns of infected extremists deliberately infecting victims has yet to be justified. Reasons for this includes the potential to infect their own members and loved ones, the long period that the infected extremist must endure before succumbing to his death, and victims requiring time to develop symptoms. This, thus, prevent extremist groups from claiming responsibility for the attack. Additionally, it would be challenging for these groups to produce recruitment videos based on this form of attacks. Typically, a recruitment video showcasing a suicide bomb attack would feature an interview with the bomber to inspire others to follow suit. Interviewing an infected extremist displaying symptoms may not inspire potential recruits to do the same.

Introduction

In the recent political crisis in Malaysia, Muhyiddin Yassin would have been presented with two options to stabilize the situation. These two options, representing the current public sentiments in Malaysia, were to either call for a snap election in Malaysia or to accept the royal mandate as the eighth Prime Minister of Malaysia, PM8. Muhyiddin decided on the latter and has established his cabinet within the first nine days of his appointment. By employing organizational trust, this commentary seeks to provide insights into how Muhyiddin’s decision to be PM8 as the best option for him and his Bersatu party.

Relevance of Organizational Trust in Politics

In Rousseau and colleague’s 1998 study, organizational trust was defined as “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another.” From this definition, two inferences can be made. The first is the importance of a relationship between an organization and its members. Not only does it ensure a high level of commitment of members to their organization but their willingness to undertake risks with their organization. Second, as a psychological state, it is dynamic and not hardwired such as one’s personality. This, thus, explains the potential for recruitment of new members as well as current member’s exit. These inferences outline the importance for any political organization to develop and maintain a strong and reliable power base particularly during political jostling.

Also, key to this theory is how the organization’s leader is seen as an extension of the organization. This is because the organization’s directions and policies are set by its leader, particularly in organizations with vertical organizational structures. Therefore, the role of the leader is instrumental in developing organizational trust amongst new members and maintaining it in current members. The next sections not only demonstrate how Muhyiddin’s image of being a trustworthy Premier is being developed but also explains the complexity of organization-member relationship in Malaysia’s political background. By understanding this complexity, we can, thus, obtain insights on the political ramifications of his decision.

Working The A-B-I of Trustworthiness to Muhyiddin’s Advantage

Currently, Muhyiddin’s image of trustworthiness is being developed to centre on three factors: his ability, benevolence and integrity. These three equally important factors can be distilled from his actions, achievements, and statements by him and others. With regards to his ability, Muhyiddin has amassed decades of political experience and has held several senior government positions. Leveraging on his experiences, he has recently seen early but limited successes in his choice of cabinet appointees. Through political manoeuvring, he kept to his word of not selecting senior coalition party members who were currently involved in graft trials and foregoing the hotly contested Number 2 Deputy Prime Minister appointment. By creating four senior minister positions, it reduces the potential for power struggle.

Rhetorically, not only is his political career easily accessible via the internet, the recent regular mentions of his career in both local and international news media serves to remind readers of his ability. Further reinforcing this are statements by other coalition party leaders supporting Muhyiddin as PM8. This included statements of their “full support behind Muhyiddin’s leadership” and how his appointment as PM8 have brought about “blue skies” after a period of “dark clouds.” There were also efforts to dispel any compromise to his ability including downplaying any health issues.

Currently, there are still four challenges to his ability which could subsequently affect his trustworthiness. These challenges entail managing the COVID-19 pandemic in Malaysia, ensuring the coalition government does not unravel prior to the next General Election, ensuring the efficiency of his cabinet and steering clear of highly controversial issues, and uplifting Malaysia’s economy. A recent example of a controversial issue is the focus on getting flight attendants to wear Syariah-compliant uniforms by a PAS cabinet appointee instead of their potential retrenchment due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Inherent in political appointments is the notion of servitude to the people and working feverishly in their best interest, exemplifying benevolence. This was also highlighted in Muhyiddin’s first televised message as Premier. He has declared himself to be a “Prime Minister for all”, distancing himself from his initial “Malay first” proclamation. However, his detractors are preventing this by constantly highlighting the lack of minority representations in his cabinet. Policies involving bread and butter issues are good opportunities for Muhyiddin to build his benevolence. This does not only include provision of subsidies but also effective communication to Malaysians when working on unpopular policies. Public communication is also particularly important with global developments that impact Malaysia. The global drop in oil prices for example can work in his favour if Malaysians believe that the cheaper prices is due to Muhyiddin’s benevolence and ability. Such narratives are currently prevalent amongst his supporters on social media platforms.

When discussing about his integrity, one cannot look past how he was sacked from UMNO and his deputy Prime Minister post for his strong stance against then-Premier Najib Razak over the 1MDB debacle. This is still seen today with his decision to not include graft suspects into his cabinet. Muhyiddin has also tackled any “traitor” labels levelled at him head on. He also sought to obtain the moral high ground by seeking Dr Tun Mahathir’s forgiveness for any hurt feelings and his endorsements for the new government. This was a bid to quell the trending #NotMyPM tag and prevent the perception that he has committed the grave sin of betrayal as espoused in Islam. This is particularly important in Muslim-majority Malaysia. As highlighted by Dr Mahathir, Muhyiddin’s integrity is still dependent on how the trials of Najib Razak and others are concluded.

Which Organization? Whose Members? Interconnected Impacts of Organizational Trust

Unlike business entities where the roles of organization and members are distinct, Muhyiddin is an extension of two organizations, political party Bersatu and coalition government Perikatan Nasional. There are also two types of members namely, the Malaysian public and Members of Parliament (MPs). Despite this complex relationship, how successful Muhyiddin inculcates organizational trust will have interconnected impacts on all members. If successful, he not only can step out of Dr Mahathir’s shadow in Bersatu and the Premiership. By doing so, he stands to gain a personality cult status as an effective Prime Minister as Dr Mahathir had once enjoyed. Unfortunately for Dr Mahathir, his stocks have been marred by political tensions within his previous coalition party. With Muhyiddin being seen as the alpha in Bersatu, he could be forgiven for no longer having Dr Mahathir in Bersatu in the future. By gaining organizational trust by potential electorates, he would also be in a better position to keep the Premiership appointment in Bersatu for the next eight years; i.e. completing the remaining three year tenure and securing the next General Election.

With high approval ratings, the current coalition members would face tougher resistance to displace Muhyiddin and Bersatu should they one day decide to. They may instead accept Muhyiddin and Bersatu as necessary kingmakers for their continued opportunity to be a part of Malaysia’s government. This is despite Bersatu possessing slightly smaller number of MPs than Barisan Nasional. Additionally, with this, it will be unlikely that Bersatu “be eaten up alive by the two Malay parties.” Dr Mahathir has also recently predicted that a no-confidence motion against Muhyiddin unlikely to succeed. He attributed this to Muhyiddin potentially offering “sweets” or inducements to Mahathir’s supporters to switch camps. However, it must be noted that to offer sweets and for the sweets to be accepted, one must first possess sweets and has the ability to distribute them. The recipient must also trust that the sweets offered to them will be beneficial and not poison. Therefore, deciding to become PM8 gives Muhyiddin and Bersatu the time and opportunity to ensure that all of these would transpire.

Introduction

It has been argued that news media and terrorism have a symbiotic relationship but what impact does this relationship have on terrorism perpetrators?[1] More specifically, can it help these perpetrators attain a sense of immortality as described in Terror Management Theory (TMT)? The benefit of employing this theory, developed by Greenberg, Pyszczynski and Solomon, is that terrorists can attain immortality not only via extremist ideology such as the belief of afterlife rewards but also via means that can assist them to be remembered after their death.[2] With the current ease of accessing news which is seemingly everlasting on the internet, it may prove useful to gain a better understanding of news media role in the radicalization process. Additionally, by conducting this study in Muslim-majority Indonesia that is also affected by religiously inspired terrorism, it may provide unique insights on how Eastern news media is perceived by such terrorists. Previously, Western news media were regularly associated with facilitating the perception that Muslims were being persecuted via unfair and bias reporting.[3]

By involving former terrorism inmates in this study, insights on whether these participants remain deradicalized or disengaged several years after their release from prison can be garnered from their current views of news media. Both deradicalization and disengagement are commonly cited themes in counterterrorism research. Ascertaining whether these former inmates remain deradicalized or disengaged can provide an indication of how successful they have reintegrated back into their communities. Therefore, this study sought to answer the following questions: (1) What are the perceptions and experiences of former Indonesian terrorism inmates with news media both during incarceration and after their release? (2) Could news media provide an outlet for terrorism perpetrators to seek immortality? (3) How well-adjusted are these former inmates several years after their release from prison? To answer these questions, life stories from two former Indonesian religiously inspired terrorists were analyzed. In the next few sections, several key concepts that guide our analysis are discussed.

Immortality and Terror Management Theory

Terrorism, through the lens of TMT, is viewed as a rational choice.[4] Such rationality is demonstrated when people’s behaviors are motivated by the need to assuage anxiety and fear of their eventual demise. By holding onto a cultural worldview such as that provided by terrorist organizations, they can not only live a life of meaning but also the promise of transcending death.[5] Terrorist organizations offer their members both meaningful rewards (for example, the opportunity to attain hero status) and the potential to attain vicarious immortality.[6] Attaining such rewards, however, comes at a price. Members are required to undertake physical risks including sacrificing their freedom and their lives. This has led McBride to posit an existential-terroristic feedback loop in which individuals who identify with radicalized terrorist ideology commit legitimized acts of violence.[7] Participating in such acts of terrorism would eventually increase existential anxiety and thus reinforcing their belief of the radical ideology.

Immortality, as described by TMT, entails two forms: symbolic and literal. Literal immortality is conferred through the belief that by attaining martyrdom, they will be delivered the promise of an afterlife in heaven. Symbolic immortality, on the other hand, entails more diverse forms and thus, can be attained through far more numerous means. Examples of symbolic immortality includes being remembered by others after one’s death, as extensions of the self through children or lasting achievements, and contributing to something that outlives the self.[8] From this perspective, it may seem that news media can serve as biographies and obituaries for terrorism perpetrators, surpassing generations. Consequently, news media may unconsciously facilitate terrorists to attain symbolic immortality through their reporting.[9] However, these perpetrators could be portrayed negatively by news media, counter to their cultural worldview, and may thus not be perceived as a platform to attain symbolic immortality. Such complexity is elaborated in the next section discussing the relationship between terrorism and news media.

A Symbiotic Relationship between Terrorism and News Media

The symbiotic relationship between terrorism and news media have been demonstrated based on studies focusing on domestic and international media.[10] Academics agreeing with this notion opined that without news media, terrorism would have limited effects and that news rely on terrorism coverage due to its high news value.[11] Such high value news are constantly in demand by news media as they are competitive and lucrative businesses obsessed with grabbing the attention of viewers.[12] In addition to satiating public interest, news media are required “to report all major events to ensure their continued legitimacy and credibility as a truthful or free press.”[13] For state-owned news media, such news present an opportunity to create an illusion of heightened danger to drive and justify state policies.[14] Collectively, these highlight the importance of language manipulation and framing in conveying a message and influencing viewer’s opinions.

There are several means of influencing opinions in news media. First, the title of news contents sets the tone for the direction of influence.[15] Next is the naming conventions used in news media to refer to these perpetrators. The use of terms such as “terrorist”, “insurgent” and “activist” imbue different emotions in readers.[16] The selection of the terms employed by news media is generally a reflection of their biasness.[17] The third method of influence is for news media to focus on the amount of people who lost their lives to terrorism.[18] By increasingly focusing on these numbers, it could increase one’s thoughts of death and consequently influence related behaviors. A final method is how the act of terrorism is portrayed by the media. This would include the tendency to focus on a terrorist organization’s barbarism via publishing graphic images, amplifying the true implications of terrorist events, and manufacturing stereotypes and negative associations.[19] Interestingly, the lack of coverage of news that depict Muslim suffering in Western media, for example, can reinforce reader’s notion of Western hypocrisy being present.[20]

It is, thus, evident how news media can polarize their readers’ opinions. At one end of the spectrum, xenophobia and Islamophobia can be encouraged in readers, fueling the need for government policy changes and, unfortunately, conducting revenge attacks on whom they perceived to be associated with terrorism.[21] On the other end of the spectrum, not only does it assist in the formation of identities shaped by the wars in the Middle East, for example, it also encourages the internalizing of suffering and humiliation endured by those whom the readers identify with (for example the persecution of Muslims in any part of the world).[22] Additionally, it encourages the belief of a global plot to eradicate their group.[23] Such negativity, as discovered from numerous focus group discussions with the general public, has directed readers to seek alternate news media perceived by them to be more balanced and fair.[24] Unfortunately, this leaves such readers open to being exposed to online contents developed by terrorist organizations.

News media, in the eyes of terrorists, is a crucial and effective weapon.[25] Understanding the magnitude of influence news media can exert, terrorist organizations have opted for attacks that will appear on the “silver screen.”[26] Also known as the “theater of terror” in numerous studies, opting for such high news value attacks serve multiple purposes.[27] The first is to spread public fear and the threat of future attacks. This is achieved by careful orchestration of such attacks to command attention and magnify their power beyond their actual capabilities.[28] The second is by instilling the perception that “anyone is welcome to try his hand at slicing off the head of Goliath with a paper cutter”, it encourages recruitment for these terrorist organizations.[29] Lastly, by attaining headline status, it provides these groups with the recognition that they are a legitimate threat, provides them with a perception of possessing power, and a sense of obtaining a major political achievement.[30] So, with all these benefits being conferred to terrorist organizations from their relationship with news media, what does it mean for the terrorists themselves? If terrorists also stand to gain from this relationship, how does it impact deradicalization or disengagement efforts?

Background of Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Indonesia

Indonesia’s democracy, since her independence, has regularly been threatened by Islamist elements seeking an upheaval of governance.[31] A notable terrorist organization that threatened Indonesia’s and her regional neighbors’ security was the Al Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Founded in Indonesia before moving to Malaysia, this organization successfully conducted numerous bombings on businesses that were owned by the West and those that were deemed to be un-Islamic as demonstrated in both 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings.[32] This led to an estimated 800 arrests and 60 killed in ensuing counterterrorism operations in Indonesia by 2012.[33] The decline of JI enabled the spawning of numerous splinter organizations including the most recent terrorist threat; pro-Islamic State Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD).[34]

This decline, seen as the fourth phase of JI’s evolution, stems from their shift from operational development and recruitment to dakwah (religious proselytization).[35] Members of JAD were responsible for a total of five separate suicide bombings conducted by three families including their children in Surabaya, Indonesia on 13 and 14 May 2018. Similarly, these triggered hundreds of suspected terrorists to be arrested. Terrorism inmates were previously incarcerated in prisons throughout Indonesia but recently there are efforts to centralize these inmates on a maximum-security island prison. While incarcerated, these inmates can opt to participate in deradicalization programs run by both the government and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs).

However, deradicalization efforts can be marred by two factors. The first is the difficulty in changing their worldview which confers them meaning in life and the promise of immortality as described in TMT.[36] Religious clerics, not only in Indonesia, employed to provide these inmates with an alternative religious thinking and ideology face an uphill task as they would first need to be deemed credible sources of religious information by these inmates. Unfortunately, these religious clerics can be deemed to be government lackeys thus tarnishing their credibility among terrorism inmates.  In addition to receiving remissions of their sentences from the Indonesian government, participation in deradicalization programs can further lead to an earlier release from prison. Unfortunately, an effective evaluation of these inmates not only has yet to be developed but is also not mandatory in Indonesia. Therefore, it is uncertain if these inmates are deradicalized, disengaged or worse, unchanged when released. In this article, “deradicalization” is defined as the ideological or cognitive shift such as the abandonment of the belief that violence is a privileged tool for political struggle while “disengagement is defined as a behavioral change such as refraining from violence or leaving a terrorist organization.[37]

Method

Participants

Data for this study were derived from life history interviews with two former Indonesian terrorism inmates who did not hold leadership positions in their organizations. From a broader pool of research candidates, they were selected due to several factors. These factors were 1) both were members of JI, 2) the highest educational level that both attained were pre-tertiary education and both did not attend madrassahs while younger, 3) both were tried as adults for their participation in terrorism, 4) both were incarcerated within a year of each other, 5) they were incarcerated in the same prison in Jakarta, Indonesia (this is essential as it meant that they would both undergo similar deradicalization programs), 6) they were both handed similar prison sentences of 6 – 8 years, 7) both participated in deradicalization programs while in prison, and 8) both were released from prison in 2014 after receiving remissions. These criteria were developed to minimize variations in participants, providing an opportunity to evaluate the deradicalization programs they underwent. Though they both knew of each other, known from previous interviews and interactions with them since 2017, they were not informed of each other’s participation in this study and were instructed to not inform others of their participation in this study.

To preserve their identities, they were named Farhan and Taufiq, respectively. Both Farhan and Taufiq were married before their arrests. Farhan aged 44 years old at the time of the interview was a father of one while Taufiq aged 35 years old at the time of the interview was a father of two. Unlike Taufiq, Farhan had family members/relatives who were involved in terrorism and were members of JI. In the lead up to their participation in terrorism, both cited the persecutions of Muslims both in Indonesia and overseas as a cause for action. Both were exposed to narratives that required their direct participation in conflict from their membership to JI. These narratives served to motivate them to accept high risks associated with their participation with the promise of attaining afterlife rewards. Unlike some members of JI, both were not sent to Pakistan/Afghanistan for paramilitary training.

Currently, both Farhan and Taufiq claimed to be focused on their employment. Farhan is a dispatch rider while Taufiq is a property agent. With regards to Islamic activities, they have both admitted to leading religious classes while in prison. Their lessons included proselytizing and reciting the Quran to their small groups. Unfortunately, it cannot be ascertained if this included indoctrination of their organization’s ideology and thus, cannot be discounted. After their release, they have continued providing religious classes in their communities to support themselves financially. Due to a lack of interest, they have stopped such classes and sought other forms of employment. Both, however, have admitted to participating in what they perceived as Islamist demonstrations. This included those that resulted from a former Jakarta governor, a non-Muslim, being charged with having insulted Islam during the lead up to the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial elections.

Interview Procedure and Data Analysis

Prior to interviewing these participants, approval from University of Indonesia’s ethics committee and the participants’ informed consents were sought. For this study, Farhan and Taufiq each participated in one session of interview conducted in 2019 and within days of each other to limit the risk of them finding out about their participation in this study. Semi-structured interviews, which consisted of both broad and direct questions, with them were conducted in public settings such as restaurants and coffeeshops. Broad questions included certain phases of their lives such as their entry and involvement with terrorism while direct questions focused on them recounting their experiences with news media both during incarceration and after their release from prison, and their concerns as they attempt to re-integrate back into their communities. Interviews were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia and data was translated into English. Thematic analysis was subsequently conducted from the collected data.

Results and Discussion

Presence of Three Forms of News Media in Indonesia

Unlike most countries, Farhan and Taufiq opined that there were three forms of news media in Indonesia; namely 1) local/national news media, 2) international news media, and 3) Islamist news media. Both defined Islamist news media as those that were sympathetic towards Islamist causes. Such sympathy was evident to both Farhan and Taufiq from the more favorable language used and the intentions behind covering terrorism incidents. Interestingly, they considered publications from the two biggest Islamic mass organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, to be “grey.”[38] Despite these organizations championing Islam in Indonesia, both Farhan and Taufiq considered them to be pro-government. They believed that by adopting such stance, these organizations may produce articles that were not too favorable to terrorism perpetrators.

To date, both Farhan and Taufiq have been interviewed by all three news media. When comparing their time while incarcerated and after their release from prison, they recounted that not only was there a difference in frequency of them being interviewed by news media but also the types of news media interested in them. They described being more frequently interviewed after their release from prison than while incarcerated. During incarceration, news media expressed their interest in them mainly during their court hearings with an abrupt decline after their sentencing. The increased frequency in being interviewed could be due to an expansion of interview topics.  Prior to their release from prison, they were asked about their involvements in their terror attacks. This included their motives and the sentences awarded to them. Post-release, topics expanded to include their re-integration into their communities and opinions about terrorism incidents that were recently conducted. Additionally, while incarcerated, both were interviewed by all three news media. Upon their release from prison, such news media interview opportunities were limited to only local/national and international news media. Through interactions with their peers, they came to believe that former terrorism inmates will generally experience such varying frequency and interest from news media.

Varying Naming Conventions Applied across the Three News Media

Due to news media respective biases, Farhan and Taufiq recalled being referred to differently in both Islamist and non-Islamist news media (i.e. local/national and international news media). In sympathetic Islamist news media, they recalled being referred to as either an “activist” or a “mujahideen” while in “grey” publications, they were referred to simply as “perpetrators” without any mention of the term “terrorism” and its derivatives. Conversely, in non-Islamist news media, they were referred to as a “terrorist” or a “former terrorist” dependent on the time they were interviewed. Additionally, in local/national news media, they recalled being labelled as “napiter” or “mantan napiter.” Napiter is a shorthand for narapida terorisme (terrorism inmate) while “mantan napiter” is short for mantan narapida terorisme (former terrorism inmate). All these labels were valued differently by Farhan and Taufiq.

They preferred to be labelled as an “activist” or a “mujahideen” as these terms present their actions in a positive light. The term “activist” is appealing as it presents the notion of them seeking to transform an unjust world.[39] They were ambivalent about being referred to simply as a “perpetrator” as it does not categorize their actions as terrorism but also does not celebrate their actions. The terms 1) “terrorist”, 2) “napiter”, 3) “former terrorists” and 4) “mantan napiter” upset them as they still do not deem their actions as acts of terrorism even after their release from prison. Such perception is an indication that they are not deradicalized but had simply disengaged from violence. They, however, understand the use of these four terms as they rationalized that these news media were pro-government. Such rationalization demonstrated their vast power difference between them and the government, painting their struggles as David versus Goliath. Of these four terms, “mantan napiter” was deemed by both to be most acceptable for two reasons. They stated that the term included the word “mantan” or “former” which they felt allowed them to be dissociated from a negative term i.e. terrorism. Additionally, the term “napiter” was viewed by them as a specialized term that was only understood by some. Similarly, this further enabled them to distance themselves from being associated with “terrorism.”

It is upsetting to be labelled as a “terrorist” by the [news] media. But I understand why they do so and I do not have much problem with it… To me, terms used by Islamist [news] media are most appropriate to describe us [terrorism inmates]. [Taufiq]

Personally, I am uncomfortable with these terms [referring to the terms “former terrorists” and “mantan napiter”] but it is alright… [Of the two terms] I actually prefer mantan napiter as this term is not known by all. [Farhan]

Additionally, they did not want to be referred to as “terrorism experts” nor “terrorism analysts” despite them providing their opinions about terrorism incidents after their release. Though such terms are perceived positively by the general public, there are several possible reasons for their rejection of these terms. Apart from truly not possessing data, they may also be attempting to hide whatever information that they have from their continued online communications such as via WhatsApp and Telegram with their peers who were still incarcerated. If so, this was to prevent them from getting into trouble with the Indonesian authorities or to prevent them from being labelled as a traitor by their peers. Fear of being labelled a traitor would compromise their attainment of symbolic immortality which demonstrates that a cognitive shift has yet to take place. Additionally, the fear of authorities and its consequences further support the notion of disengagement instead of deradicalization.

Preference to be Featured in Islamist and International News Media over Local/National News Media

In terms of preference, Farhan and Taufiq ranked Islamist news media to be most favorable, followed by international news media, and lastly, local/national news media. It is no surprise for them to prefer Islamist news media considering their perceptions that this news media was fair and accurate, and presented them favorably to readers. Therefore, Islamist news media enables them to be remembered and prayed for by their peers and by Muslim readers. Additionally, Farhan believed that terrorism inmates asserted control over Islamist news media as this news media would listen to complaints whenever these inmates objected to their articles. After their release, Farhan and Taufiq are still yearning to be interviewed by Islamist news media. This is because of their perceptions of how just these news media are and the ability to reach out to similar-minded readers.

Islamist [news] media have yet to interview me after my release [from prison]. This is common for all mantan napiter [former terrorism inmates] but I still want them to interview me… The only way I can get interviewed by them is if I played key roles in events such as 212 demonstrations… I was there but only as a spectator. [Taufiq] (In 2017 and 2018, a series of demonstrations were held in Jakarta in response to calls to defend Islam after the former Jakarta governor was deemed to have insulted Islam in the lead up to the 2017 gubernatorial election.)

It is surprising that they next preferred interview opportunities from international news media as they have blamed Western news media for contributing to the persecutions of Muslims and the rise of Islamophobia. The first reason for their preference is the wide outreach they can get from these news media. While incarcerated, Farhan yearned to be interviewed by news media of countries whose citizens were casualties of his attack.

We were taught to conduct attacks that would capture the attention of international [news] media from Al Qaeda. We shouldn’t be bothered about conducting attacks that won’t make it into the news… By getting interviewed by [news] media from countries whom I have hurt, they will understand the seriousness of my actions… [Farhan]

To him, this was a way to inflict terror and trauma to these countries by putting a human face behind these attacks. Farhan continued yearning for such opportunities post-release from prison. This time, he opined that by garnering international attention to him, he could help the Indonesian government eradicate terrorism in Indonesia through collaborations with foreign governments. Unfortunately, such intentions may simply be an attempt to sound noble as Farhan, if given the chance, would like for news media to continue referring to him as a “mujahideen.” Another reason for their preference for international news media is that if they disagreed with how their articles turn out, these news media were too far for them to protest. This may also indicate how insignificant the perceptions of international readers of them were to them. The third reason is that they felt like “important people” in their communities as foreigners would visit their residences after their release from prison. This sense of importance is due to their communities rarely seeing foreigners yet alone having them visit their residences. Related to this sense of importance is the sense of stardom that they first experienced while incarcerated and has continued even after their release from prison.

During the early stages of my trial, a prison guard told me to be prepared to feel like an artiste. That I should also watch what I say to the [news] media. [Farhan]

To be honest, most mantan napiter [former terrorism inmates] will feel like celebrities after their release [from prison] because of all the attention they receive from the [news] media. But not me [spoken with a grin; suggesting that he too believed that he was a celebrity but was simply acting coy]. [Taufiq]

Garnering interest from international news media were also seen as opportunities for them to travel abroad. Such opportunities are extremely rare for them due to their financial constraints. It is also noteworthy that it is common practice for former Indonesian terrorism inmates to request for financial compensation for their participation in interviews. Generally, financial compensations requested from international organizations will be higher than those locally based, thus, further heightening the preference for interview opportunities from international news media. Interestingly, Farhan opined that the amount of attention and financial compensation that a former terrorism perpetrator can gain is one factor that drives the continuation of terrorism in Indonesia. This belief stems from the high unemployment rate and a significant portion of Indonesians earning below the average national monthly income. In addition to economic deprivation yet to be proven as a reliable indicator, financial compensation received from these opportunities serve as supplemental income.[40] This is evident from the need for former terrorism inmates to seek employment after their release from prison.

They least preferred local/national news media as these news media are seen to be pro-government and therefore, will portrait Farhan and Taufiq in ways that they disagree with. This sentiment stems from how significant they value the perspectives of local/national readers who are majority Muslims. Farhan was particularly cynical of local/national news media whom he considered to be more money-oriented than publishing accurate news articles. This meant that these news media would intentionally manipulate Farhan’s statements to make them more news-worthy and interesting.

During my time in prison, I found out that these journalists [from local/national news media] will turn my 100-word statement to a 1000-word essay… They [journalists from local/national news media] are very interested in having me interviewed. This is because if they can get a statement from me, no matter how short it is, they will get IDR 300,000. If they can get my statement and my photo, they will get IDR 500,000. [This is substantial as the average monthly income in Indonesia around their time of arrests was around IDR 3.5 million] [Farhan]

Negative Impact of News Media Coverage on Their Post-Release Lives

Despite enjoying the benefits from receiving attention from news media after their release from prison, both Farhan and Taufiq cited a negative impact. Both highlighted their belief that their communities still harbored distrust of them despite welcoming them back after their release. This sense of distrust concerns them as they feared of one day being rejected by their communities. Farhan’s and Taufiq’s frequent interviews with news media would serve as a constant reminder of their past to their communities. This sense of distrust would be exacerbated if their community members were questioned by the authorities about Farhan’s and Taufiq’s recent whereabouts and activities. This would create a perception that both Farhan and Taufiq were in trouble with the law again.

Such perceptions of distrust also affect their self-esteem as they constantly fear new friends and new neighbors shunning them upon knowing their past. Though both Farhan and Taufiq do not mind sharing their past to others, they are always worried that their friends and neighbors would not accept their past due to what they have read from news media. Therefore, they are constantly living their lives in a state of damage control. This would also make them more sensitive to jokes about them by those who knew of their past. Jokes about getting Farhan to bomb their opponent soccer team after losing for example, though comical, concerns them as it encourages those who do not know of their past to wanting to find out more about them. This is particularly concerning for them as their “background can be easily found on Google” from news media articles. Their friends would likely rely on local/national news media which both Farhan and Taufiq least trusted and least preferred.

Interestingly, Farhan and Taufiq were not concerned about any misunderstandings that their families could have from reading online news articles about them. This is because they could exert more control over their families’ opinions about them. Due to kinship and possibly the desire to not be associated with something shameful, they may be more receptive to understanding why Farhan and Taufiq were involved in terrorism. Supporting this is King, Noor and Taylor’s study in which they discovered that their participants, immediate relatives of Indonesian JI members, agreed with their kin’s involvement in terrorism.[41]

I am not too worried about that [in the context of how his family could read news articles about him online]… At most if my children were to ask, I would provide them with an explanation… I will tell them that everything is not like what it seems in the [local/national news] media… In the [local/national news] media, I would be referred to as a perpetrator of a crime. But when I talk to my family, I will tell them that, according to me, I was not involved in a crime. [Taufiq]

Conclusion

Based on how preferable they view Islamist news media and how significant they value the opinions of Indonesian Muslim readers, it is indicative that Islamist news media is a platform for terrorism perpetrators to attain symbolic immortality. Such immortality can be attained by being remembered favorably by Muslim readers. Though the international and local/national news media provide them with a wider outreach, these forms of news media only facilitates them gaining popularity and a sense of importance in their communities after their release from prison. Such gaining of popularity and importance will assist them in gaining a favorable image within their communities. Since they value the opinions of their communities based on their concerns of one day being rejected by them, it is indicative that international and local/national news media can assist them in gaining symbolic immortality, not through the contents of their news article but awarding former terrorism inmates a favorable image within their communities. The three news media may not be useful in helping terrorism perpetrators in being remembered by their families due to the belief that they can exert control over how their families perceive of them.

Garnering a favorable image within their communities would be important to individuals such as Farhan and Taufiq as it provides them with a cover to hide their true worldview. From their interviews, it is highly suggestive that Farhan and Taufiq are disengaged and not deradicalized due to their lack of cognitive shift from the worldview propagated by their terrorist organization. This was seen from their belief that their involvement in the attacks are wrongly classified as terrorism. This meant that they still believed that their actions were necessary responses to the persecution of Muslims globally. Additionally, the Indonesian government’s decision to classify terrorism as an extraordinary crime and the specialized treatment accorded to them by news media and not to perpetrators of general crimes could serve to harden their worldview. This would consequently make it harder for these individuals to deradicalize. Though there may be a concern that disengaged terrorism perpetrators may be temporarily suspending the pursuit of violence, future research could attempt to elucidate if the increased opportunity to attain symbolic immortality after their release from prison is one reason to no longer pursue literal immortality via martyrdom. This could, thus, contribute to research on the drivers of individual-level disengagement and to the debate of whether there is a tendency for former terrorism inmates to return to terrorist activities.[42]

Being disengaged from their continued belief that their violent actions were not criminal is concerning. As terrorism perpetrators could receive normative support from their immediate relatives, disengaged individuals may themselves serve as sources for normative support for their kin. Normative support, both explicitly and implicitly, would, thus, provide a favorable environment for their kin to pursue terrorism. Fortunately, there are other considerations before an individual decides to pursue terrorism. In other words, it is not definitive for the kin of disengaged terrorism perpetrators to pursue violence. This, however, could be different for former terrorism inmates who have yet to be deradicalized or disengaged. Instead of simply providing normative support, the kin of such individuals could be encouraged or even compelled to violence. Of particular concern would be the children of such individuals who are impressionable, would have no control over the type of education they would receive, and would generally follow their parent’s instructions out of fear of disrespecting their parents. The death of a 12-year-old Indonesian boy in Syria while fighting for the Islamic State in 2016 provides support for this concern. Prior to his death, he sent a voice message to his mother seeking his parents’ support and prayers. At that time, his father was in prison for a terrorism-related offence.

This, thus, highlights the importance of not only evaluating terrorism perpetrators while incarcerated but also their family members. Such evaluation should also be extended to those who have been released from prison. Through these evaluations, interventions for example mandatory religious classes and counselling sessions can be prescribed to those in need. It is also important for these evaluations and interventions to be carried out consistently by all parties, both government and non-government agencies, involved. Fortunately for Indonesia, such consistencies can be achieved by the National Counterterrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme or BNPT) playing a central coordinative role.

[1] Russell F. Farnen, “Terrorism and the Mass Media: A Systemic Analysis of a Symbiotic Process,” Terrorism 13(2) (1990), pp. 99-143.

[2] Jeff Greenberg, Tom Pyszczynski, and Sheldon Solomon, “The Causes and Consequences of a Need for Self-Esteem: A Terror Management Theory,” in Roy F. Baumeister, eds., Public Self and Private Self, pp. 189-212 (New York, NY: Springer-Verlag).

[3] Scott Poynting and Barbara Perry, “Climates of Hate: Media and State Inspired Victimisation of Muslims in Canada and Australia since 9/11,” Current Issues in Criminal Justice 19(2) (2007), pp 151-171.

[4] Tom Pyszczynski, Zachary Rothschild, and Abdolhossien Abdollahi, “Terrorism, Violence, and Hope for Peace,” Current Directions in Psychological Science 17(5) (2008), pp. 318-322; Megan K. McBride, “The Logic of Terrorism: Existential Anxiety, the Search for Meaning, and Terrorist Ideologies,” Terrorism and Political Violence 23(4) (2011), pp.560-581.

[5] Jacob Juhl and Clay Routledge, “The Effects of Trait Self-esteem and Death Cognitions on Worldview Defense and Search for Meaning,” Death Studies 38 (2014), pp. 62-68.

[6] Lindsay H. Dewa, Carol A. Ireland, and Jane L. Ireland, “Terror Management Theory: The Influence of Terrorism Salience on Anxiety and the Buffering of Cultural Worldview and Self-esteem,” Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 21(3) (2014), pp. 370-384.

[7] McBride, “The Logic of Terrorism: Existential Anxiety, the Search for Meaning, and Terrorist Ideologies.”

[8] Enny Das, Brad J. Bushman, Marieke D. Bezemer, Peter Kerkhof, and Ivar E. Vermeulen, “How Terrorism News Reports Increase Prejudice against Outgroups: A Terror Management Account,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45 (2009), pp. 453-459; Dewa et al., “Terror Management Theory: The Influence of Terrorism Salience on Anxiety and the Buffering of Cultural Worldview and Self-esteem”; Arnaud Wisman and Nathan A. Heflick, “Hopelessly Mortal: The Role of Mortality Salience, Immortality and Trait Self-esteem in Personal Hope,” Cognition and Emotion 30(5) (2016), pp. 868-889.

[9] An example of a study on how the media is demonstrated to unconsciously assist terrorism: Ayla Schbley, “Religious Terrorism, the Media, and International Islamization Terrorism: Justifying the Unjustifiable,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27(3) (2004), pp. 207-233.

[10] Examples of such studies include: Hien la and Selena Pickett, “Framing Boko Haram’s Female Suicide Bombers in Mass Media: An Analysis of News Articles post Chibok Abduction,” Critical Studies on Terrorism (2019), pp. 1-21; Adrian Cherney and Kristina Murphy, “Being a ‘Suspect Community’ in a post 9/11 world – The Impact of the War on Terror on Muslim Communities in Australia,” Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 0(0) (2015), pp. 1-17; Mahmoud Eid, “The New Era of Media and Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36(7) (2013), pp. 609-615; Das et al, “How Terrorism News Reports Increase Prejudice against Outgroups: A Terror Management Account”.

[11] L. John Martin, “The Media’s Role in International Terrorism,” Terrorism 8(2) (1986), pp. 127-146; Anne Aly, Stuart Macdonald, Lee Jarvis and Thomas M. Chen, “Introduction to the Special Issue: Terrorist Online Propaganda and Radicalication,” Studies in Terrorism & Conflict, Micheal J. Kelly and Thomas H. Mitchell, “Transnational Terrorism and the Western Elite Press,” Political Communication 1(3) (1981), pp. 269-296.

[12] Eid, “The New Era of Media and Terrorism”; Kelly and Mitchell, “Transnational Terrorism and the Western Elite Press.”

[13] Farnen, “Terrorism and the Mass Media: A Systemic Analysis of a Symbiotic Process.”

[14] Ibid.

[15] Henrik Fürst and Karin Idevall Hagren, “Frames of Death: Media Audience Framing of a Lethal Drone Strike” in Tora Holmberg, Annika Jonsson, and Fedrik Palm, 2019, Death Matters: Cultural Sociology of Mortal Life, pp. 221-239 (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan).

[16] La and Pickett, “Framing Boko Haram’s Female Suicide Bombers in Mass Media: An Analysis of News Articles post Chibok Abduction”; Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins, “The Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 38(11) (2015), pp. 958-975.

[17] Poynting and Perry, “Climates of Hate: Media and State Inspired Victimisation of Muslims in Canada and Australia since 9/11.”

[18] Dewa et al., “Terror Management Theory: The Influence of Terrorism Salience on Anxiety and the Buffering of Cultural Worldview and Self-esteem”

[19] Aly et al, “Introduction to the Special Issue: Terrorist Online Propaganda and Radicalization”; Eid, “The New Era of Media and Terrorism”; el-Sayed el-Aswad, “Images of Muslims in Western Scholarship and Media after 9/11,” Digest of Middle East Studies 22(1) (2013), pp. 39-56.

[20] Akil N. Awan, “Radicalization on the Internet? The Virtual Propagation of Jihadist Media and its Effects,” RUSI 152(3) (2007), pp. 76-81.

[21] Hafez and Mullins, “The Radicalization Puzzle: A theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism”; Cherney and Murphy, “Being a ‘Suspect Community’ in a post 9/11 World – The Impact of the War on Terror on Muslim Communities in Australia”; el-Aswad, “Images of Muslims in Western Scholarship and Media after 9/11.”

[22] John C. Amble, “Combating Terrorism in the New Media Environment,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35(5) (2012), pp. 339-353; Paul B. Rich, “Understanding Terror, Terrorism, and Their Representations in Media and Culture,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36(3) (2013), pp. 255-277; Ülkü Güney, “‘We See Our People Suffering’: The War, the Mass Media and the Reproduction of Muslim Identity among Youth,” Media, War & Conflict 3(2) (2010), pp. 168-181.

[23] Anne Aly, “Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism in the Australian Popular Media,” Australian Journal of Social Issues 42(1) (2007), pp. 27-40.

[24] Awan, “Radicalization on the Internet? The Virtual Propagation of Jihadist Media and its Effects”; Aly, “Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism in the Australian Popular Media.”

[25] Shane Kingston, “Terrorism, the Media, and the Northern Ireland Conflict,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 18(3) (1995), pp. 203-231.

[26] Scott Atran, “Pathways to and from Violent Extremism: The Case for Science-based Field Research,” Statement Before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats & Capabilities (2010).

[27] Anat Shoshani and Michelle Slone, “The Drama of Media Coverage of Terrorism: Emotional and Attitudinal Impact on the Audience,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31(7) (2008), pp. 627-640; Yariv Tsfati and Gabriel Weimann, “www.terrorism.com: Terror on the Internet,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 25(5) (2011), pp. 317-332.

[28] Shoshani and Slone, “The Drama of Media Coverage of Terrorism: Emotional and Attitudinal Impact on the Audience.”

[29] Atran, “Pathways to and from Violent Extremism: The Case for Science-based Field Research”; Aly et al, “Introduction to the Special Issue: Terrorist Online Propaganda and Radicalization.”

[30] Ralph E. Dowling, “Victimage and Mortification: Terrorism and its Coverage in the Media,” Terrorism 12(1) (1989), pp. 47-62.

[31] Ian Chalmers, “Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia,” Asian Studies Review 41(3) (2017), pp. 331-351; Davide M. Jones and Michael L. R. Smith, “Ideology, Networks and Political Religion: Structure and Agency in Jemaah Islamiah’s Small World,” Politics, Religion & Ideology 13(4) (2012), pp.473-493; Sidney Jones, “The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 59(2) (2005), pp. 169-178.

[32] Chalmers, “Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia.”

[33] Andrew T. H. Tan, “Evaluating Counter-terrorism Strategies in Asia,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 13(2) (2018), pp. 155-169.

[34] Julie C. Hwang and Kirsten E. Schulze, “Why They Join: Pathways into Indonesian Jihadist Organizations,” Terrorism and Political Violence (2018), pp. 1-22.

[35] Gillian S. Oak, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s Fifth Phase: The Many Faces of a Terrorist Group,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 33(11) (2010), pp. 989-1018.

[36] McBride, “The Logic of Terrorism: Existential Anxiety, the Search for Meaning, and Terrorist Ideologies.”

[37] Clarke R. Jones and Resurrecion S. Morales, “Integration versus Segregation: A Preliminary Examination of Philippine Correctional Facilities for De-Radicalization,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 35(3) (2012), pp. 211-228; Raquel da Silva, Pablo Fernández-Navarro, Miguel M. Gonçalves, Catarina Rosa and Joana Silva, “Disengagement from Political Violence and Deradicalization: A Narrative-Dialogical Perspective,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2018).

[38] Chalmers, “Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia.”

[39] Hafez and Mullins, “The Radicalization Puzzle: A theoretical Synthesis of Empirical Approaches to Homegrown Extremism.”

[40] Michael King, Haula Noor and Donald M. Taylor, “Normative Support for Terrorism: The Attitudes and Beliefs of Immediate Relatives of Jema’ah Islamiyah Members,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34(5) (2011), pp.402-417.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Julie C. Hwang, “The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadists: Understanding the Pathways,” Terrorism and Political Violence (2015), pp. 1-19.

Introduction

Despite the “war on terror” since 2001, there is now a commonly accepted rhetoric that “terrorism is not going away.”[1] To confound this new security norm, states not only have to respond to threats within their borders but also must respond to their citizens leaving to join terrorist groups overseas. New security concerns include how states are to respond to their citizens deported en route to their destination or those returning home after successfully linking up with terrorist groups overseas. These concerns will become more severe as tighter border control is implemented to prevent individuals from illegally linking up with terrorist groups and as terrorist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) lose territory, potentially igniting an exodus back to respective home countries.

Indonesia, for example, not only conducts rehabilitative programmes in prisons for their terror inmates but also in shelters that accommodate deportees. The intention is to rehabilitate or change these individuals and facilitate their return to the community. However, the important and frequently debated question is, what kind of change is sufficient?

This question then centres on two types of approaches that are frequently employed: deradicalization and disengagement. Disengagement is often referred to as a behavioural change which does not require individuals to change their worldview. These behaviours include leaving a group, changing one’s role within the group and renouncing violence. Whereas deradicalization is referred to as a cognitive shift. This would mean a complete fundamental change in mindset, sympathies, and attitudes.

The premise of deradicalization programmes is to encourage and facilitate individuals involved in terrorism to change their worldview. Through this change and the subsequent need to avoid cognitive dissonance, these individuals would adopt behaviours such as those described above. Due to the behavioural changes stemming from the individuals’ newfound believes, the effects of this approach are seen as longer lasting than that from disengagement. This explains why states are focused on deradicalization rather than disengagement. Unfortunately, deradicalization is difficult to achieve as demonstrated in this preliminary study of 17 former terror inmates in Indonesia. This study then sought to obtain insights on how the former inmates explained their imprisonment for terrorism to their children. This was to understand the risk of these children being exposed to violent ideologies from their recently released parents, generally seen as a credible source of information.

This paper discusses the issues of both deradicalization and disengagement, the methods employed by the former inmates to explain their imprisonment for terrorism to their children, and a potential approach to ensure these children steer away from terrorism. This paper, thus, intends to contribute to changing the “terrorism is not going away” rhetoric.

Method

In this study, 17 male former terror inmates ranging from 26 to 46 years old were interviewed. The selection criteria for these interviewees were that they were released from prison for a terrorism offence in the last five years since 2018 and that they were residing in the Greater Jakarta region, also known as Jabodetabek. This included Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, and Bekasi. Questionnaires were administered during the interviews. Interviewees were identified and referred to via snowballing technique.

A limitation of this study is that it only provides a snapshot of what the interviewees’ lives to the point of the interview. It cannot be used to predict future actions taken by these interviewees. Additionally, this study requires further expansion to be representative of Jabodetabek and Indonesia.

Deradicalization vs Disengagement

Academics such as Andrew Silke posits that deradicalization “is exceedingly difficult” and “that disengagement is a more realistic outcome.”[2] He argues that deradicalization programmes that are mainly based on changing individuals’ ideology would have limited success as there are numerous other more important factors that explain why individuals engage in terrorism.[3] Additionally, such programmes face added issues such as whether their religious content are perceived to be credible by the participants. He also cited studies that have indicated that the risk or re-offending by terror inmates are generally low to begin with.[4] This explains his belief that many will leave terrorist groups even “if they never experience a deradicalization program.”[5]

In this study, 14 interviewees stated that they participated in deradicalization programmes while in prison. These programmes were conducted not only by the state but also non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The remaining interviewees did not participate as two claimed that they were not offered such programmes during their stint and the other did not want to disappoint an influential terrorist leader. For those who participated, their reasons for participation included truly wanting to change, wanting to satisfy a condition for early release, to obtain financial incentives, to pass the time, and wanting to find out what these programmes were about. Apart from these programmes, 11 interviewees cited interactions with other terror inmates as another reason for them renouncing violence. Though these inmates played a role in changing the behaviour of the interviewees, they were members of a terrorist group. Thus, it was unlikely that they would inspire a complete change in mindset, sympathies, and attitudes. Therefore, it is highly likely that the interviewees were disengaged rather than deradicalized.

Another issue of deradicalization is how to assess if an individual can be deemed as deradicalized. In this study, all the interviewees stated that they were motivated to partake in terrorism as they believed Muslims around the world were persecuted. They continue to believe of this persecution post-release in light of developments such as in Myanmar and Palestine. Among the interviewees, eight cited that they only needed the Indonesian government’s permission for them to take up arms again.[6] This reluctance to participate stems from the fear of repercussions by the authorities. One even stated that though he was still seeking martyrdom, he did not want to get involved in these conflicts for fear of getting apprehended en route to his destination. Also, all of them preferred and supported the implementation of Syariah laws in Indonesia while eight still distrusts the Indonesian government or their agencies.[7] Therefore, it can be argued that while all the interviewees are disengaged, several have simply transited to being non-violent extremists who temporarily renounced violence.

The study next focused on gaining insights on the possibility of the interviewees’ children being exposed to violent ideologies through these disengaged individuals. This was conducted by uncovering the methods employed by the interviewees to explain their imprisonment for terrorism to their children. As demonstrated in previous recent terrorism cases, parents play a vital role in their children’s involvement in terrorism.[8] The next section begins by first discussing how policymakers should view youths; namely either “vulnerable” or “susceptible.”

Youths: Vulnerable or Susceptible?

The two terms that have been commonly used to describe potential recruits of terrorism particularly youths are “vulnerable” and “susceptible”. Taking reference from the terms’ usage in biological studies, the term “susceptible” is argued to be a more adequate description. In these studies, “vulnerable” is used to describe an organism that is intact but fragile while “susceptible” describes being injured and predisposed to compound additional harm.[9] By labelling youths as vulnerable, policymakers may run the risk of glossing over core issues youths would have by viewing them as intact but fragile or easily influenced.

It is essential to note that radicalization brings meaning to individuals in their daily lives. In other words, how can an individual be viewed as intact when there seems to be a void which unfortunately could be filled by radical ideology? By labelling them as “susceptible”, policymakers would acknowledge the myriad of issues affecting youths. For example, the continued perception from their parents that they are victims of discrimination and violence is a means to end it. Another example is the trauma experienced by children as they witness the arrest of their parents. In this study, several interviewees cited that their children behaved differently after witnessing their arrest. This included in being more withdrawn and introverted, and expressing resentment to authorities.

Due to the presence of diverse motivations, it would suggest that a large population is susceptible to terrorism. However, how does one reconcile the fact that terrorism is perpetuated only by a small population? One explanation is the presence of a mechanism to resist terrorism. This mechanism centres on, among others, family obligations, logistical costs, financing and fear.[10] There have been reported cases in which individuals resisted participating in terrorism due to the importance they place on family obligations.[11] The concern stems from their worry about the fate of their family should they pursue violence and the perception of their family members of their actions. Currently, numerous mothers who have lost their children to terrorist groups are sharing their experiences to the public.[12] This is done with the intent of providing other parents with a better understanding on how they can prevent their children from getting involved in terrorism.

Logistical and financial costs could act as a barrier, particularly if there is a need to travel beyond their immediate residences.[13] Unfortunately, can be circumvented when terrorist groups such as IS reportedly provides monthly wages and accommodations for its recruits while living in their territory. Fear primarily refers to the fear of security forces.[14] This entails the fear of facing legal repercussions and in some cases fear of torture.[15]

By looking through the lens of “susceptible”, policymakers would see three factors to address; 1) the susceptible individual, 2) leveraging on sources of influence that are deemed to be credible by the susceptible group to counter such ideologies; and 3) countering sources of radical ideologies. Studies have shown that credibility is essential for the message to “stick” to the target audience.[16] Credibility also influences the persuasiveness of a message, determined by how the audience perceive the expertise and trustworthiness of the source.[17] Judgements of expertise and trustworthiness do not necessarily relate to the technical knowledge of the source (e.g. a person’s religious or scientific authority), but can be derived from the source’s life history. This is why personal videos by martyrs and efforts to preserve their memory is such an important tool used by extremists to legitimize their cause among the mass audiences.[18] This is also particularly important for children whose parents were involved in terrorism. This is because parents are generally deemed as credible sources of information by their children.

For families where only one of their parents was involved in terrorism, the other parent can play a vital role in steering their children away from terrorism. Leveraging on these parents can also address the three factors as described above. This role is particularly powerful as children will have first-hand experiences of the difficulties in raising the family as a single parent. This hardship and emotional pull can then be leveraged to prevent a repeat in their family. However, what may be required would be provide these parents with the necessary understanding and tools to further increase its effectiveness. This is discussed further in the following sections.

Three Methods Employed to Explain Imprisonment

In this study, it was discovered that interviewees employed three different methods to explain their imprisonment to their children. As outlined in Table 1, they were namely: 1) leaving it to their spouses (i.e. wives) to explain; 2) not explaining to their children; and 3) explaining in a manner sympathetic to radical ideology. These methods are listed from the least detrimental to the most detrimental.

Though the wives of the two interviewees could not be interviewed, insights on how they explained to the children can be obtained from the interviewees. It is highly likely that their wives would explain their fathers’ imprisonment in a manner that would prevent their children from getting involved in terrorism. This was evident from how the wives were concerned with their husbands’ whereabouts after their release from prison. This concern likely stem from not wanting to repeat the traumatic experiences they encountered during their husbands’ imprisonment. During this period, the wives experienced a sudden increase in their familial responsibilities. In addition to raising the children single-handedly, they also had to financially support the family including their husbands, and to schedule family visits to prisons. One of the two interviewees also recounted that his wife had to deliver their third child on her own as he was not granted permission to visit her.

Most of the interviewees stated that they did not explain to their children as they did not see a need to. These 11 also stated that they simply wanted to move on with the lives. However, the issue with this method is that they are simply leaving their children to face any stigma due to their involvement in terrorism.[19] Additionally, with technology, it is difficult for them to hide their past. Unfortunately, for one interviewee, this was how his son’s classmates found out about his imprisonment. That subsequently led to the bullying of his son including hurling insults such as being a “terrorist’s son.” Due to this bullying, the interviewee resorted to leveraging on his old network to move his son to an Islamic boarding school, pesantren.

The final method employed is the most detrimental as it involved explaining the interviewees’ imprisonment in a manner that is sympathetic to radical ideology. For one interviewee, he shared that he explained to his child that “those making bombs for the umat are not criminals.” He then shared that he was doubtful to give consent to his child joining the police or military. This was because he feared his child might be “ordered to kill other Muslims” and thus making the child “an enemy of Islam.” He added that, instead, he hoped that he joined movements perceived to be fighting in the name of Islam. He stated, “God willing, he [his son] becomes a commandant for Jihadis.” The remaining three interviewees had similar explanations. They shared to their children that their actions were for a religious cause and to defend Muslims who were being persecuted.

This, thus, poses a serious concern. In addition to these families including their children having to face stigma from their communities, the explanations given by their father would cement the notion that Muslims were being discriminated against despite living in a Muslim-majority country. This does not necessarily confirm that these children will get involved in terrorism in the future. However, they may be predisposed to other issues such as intolerance.

Women as Safeguards against Radicalization

Leveraging on family members as safeguards against radicalization is ideal. This is because of their close relationship, considered as credible sources of information and most importantly, they can provide consistent, long-term support and guidance. Therefore, one proposed approach to ensure that the children of terror inmates do not themselves get involved in terrorism is through the wives of these inmates.

The concept of this approach is to reach out to the wives of inmates, including those convicted for terrorism and for general crimes, during their husbands’ imprisonment. By bringing women of diverse backgrounds together, it would also enable them to mutually provide emotional support while promoting acceptance of diversity within these women. The main premise of these gathering would be to provide these women skills and a sustainable source of income. Obtaining a constant source of income is a major concern of convicted individuals such as in this study. The type of skills provided would focus on skills that could be conducted at home such as making tradecrafts. This would therefore enable easier management of their household duties. Additionally, they would be provided training on conducting e-commerce and leveraging on social media platforms to widen their marketing outreach.

Simultaneously, these women would be provided parenting classes that would assist them to build closer bonds with their children particularly after a traumatic experience such as their husband’s arrest. This would include potential ways of explaining their husband’s imprisonment to their children. It also aims to provide these women problem-solving skills for any issues that their children may face. Lastly, it aims to provide these women with the knowledge of readily available avenues that they can contact when in need. Through this approach, attention would be focused on susceptible youths, credible sources of influence are leveraged, and is a means to countering potential sources of radical ideologies.

[1] Examples of this rhetoric include those by the 911 commission (https://edition.cnn.com/2014/07/23/politics/9-11-report-decade/index.html) and by former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center in the US (http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/center-law-security-resilience-monaco-rasmussen)

[2] Silke A, (2011), “Disengagement or Deradicalization: A Look at Prison Programs for Jailed Terrorists”, CTC Sentinel, 4:1, 18-21

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] When asked why they did not require financial support from the government to participate in such conflicts, they stated that they could obtain funds from their community through donations.

[7] Of the remaining interviewees, five stated that they trusted the Indonesian government and their agencies while four expressed mixed feelings.

[8] Examples include the death of a 12-year-old Indonesian boy, whose father was a convicted terrorist, fighting in Syria with the Islamic state in 2016 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-militants-school-insight/indonesian-school-a-launchpad-for-child-fighters-in-syrias-islamic-state-idUSKCN1BI0A7) and the family involved in three suicide bombings in Surabaya in 2018 (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/19/indonesia-blasts-surabaya-family-from-good-neighbours-suicide-bombers).

[9] Kottow MH (2003), “The Vulnerable and the Susceptible, Bioethics, 5:6, 460-471

[10] Cragin RK (2014), “Resisting Violent Extremism: A Conceptual Model for Non-Radicalization”, Terrorism and Political Violence, 26, 337-353

[11] Ibid

[12] Examples can be found on: 1) https://highline.huffingtonpost.com/articles/en/mothers-of-isis/; 2) https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-acfd761e-0dff-46f7-87a4-96cec7824254; 3) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/31/dont-call-police-stop-men-joining-isis-call-mothers

[13] Cragin RK (2014), “Resisting Violent Extremism: A Conceptual Model for Non-Radicalization”

[14] Ibid

[15] Ibid

[16] Cherney A (2016), “Designing and Implementing Programmes to Tackle Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons from Criminology”, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 9:1-3, 82-94

[17] Ibid

[18] Ibid

[19] All 17 interviewees stated that they and their families’ have faced stigma from their communities since their arrest for terrorism.

Introduction

In August 2017, Indonesian authorities uncovered a plot to use chemical and radioactive explosive devices by a pro-IS cell in Bandung, Indonesia. This is the second known attempt by terrorists in three years using unconventional weapons. In 2015, an explosive device containing chlorine was detonated in a shopping mall in Jakarta, Indonesia. The detonation, attributed to IS returnees from Syria, did not cause any casualties. Both incidents highlight the continued interest by Indonesian terrorist groups for unconventional weapons. This could be due to the potency and fear-generating potential of such weapons.

However, could this signal a preference by Indonesian terrorist groups to use unconventional weapons other than biological agents, namely chemical and radioactive agents? Additionally, despite their similarity in employing unconventional weapons, police issued contradictory statements for both cases; one assuring while the other potentially alarmist. What is the potential impact on the Indonesian police’s image due to such contradiction?

Why Chemical and Radiological Weapons?

One reason behind using chemical and radioactive agents could be their slightly easier production process over biological agents. Two cases in point are the botched attempts by the Japanese cult-terrorist group Aum Shinrikyo and the transnational Islamist militant group Al Qaeda to produce biological agents. These were despite their vast finances, employment of scientists and presence of laboratories. Aum Shinrikyo eventually gained notoriety for releasing a chemical agent (sarin gas) in Tokyo subway in 1995, killing 12 people.

Despite their ambitious plot, the recent Indonesian cell did not succeed because it lacked the capabilities to produce such weapons. Firstly, it is likely that the cell did not have any technical knowledge in natural sciences. The reliance of the cell operatives on a manual to produce radiological dispersal device exposes their lack of expertise.  This manual was written by Bahrun Naim, an Indonesian militant based in Syria. Possessing only a degree in Informatics Engineering, his inexperience in unconventional weapons was evident. He mislabelled radiological dispersal devices as nuclear bombs and his guidelines for producing radioactive materials were flawed.

Another possible reason behind using chemical and radioactive agents by the Indonesian terrorist cell could be the fairly localized impact of such weapons. In other words, the spread of these agents is limited; restricted by factors such as wind and susceptibility to heat. This is ideal for Indonesian terrorist groups who have mainly targeted foreigners or foreign-owned businesses and the police, regarded as infidels. This suggests that Indonesian terrorists shy away from being perceived as directly attacking the general Muslim population. One deviation was the 2016 church bombing in East Kalimantan, Indonesia.

As opposed to chemical and radioactive agents, biological agents could be perceived as not only having the potential to target indiscriminately but would also have far reaching effects. In reality, only some biological agents have the potential to cause epidemics. The impact of using such infectious biological agents would be detrimental to these groups. Firstly, due to their inexperience, terrorist groups risk prematurely releasing the biological agent during its manufacture. This would put their members and the communities they seek to influence and recruit from at risk of infection. Secondly, it would be a challenge to convince Indonesians that their targets were the police or foreigners when there is no control over who would be infected. Again, this would affect their recruitment potential due to public backlash. Therefore, any plots involving biological agents have a low possibility of going past the planning phase and was likely considered only for its potential for eliciting fear.

Differing Police Media Statements in Both Incidents

In the 2015-botched chemical attack, the Indonesian police adopted a reassuring stance. The police stated that “there was no need for alarm as the explosion had an extremely low impact.” They even likened the explosion to “the bursting of a balloon.” While in the recent incident, the police took a contrary stance. They described the potential of the dirty bomb to “have more destructive impact” than an explosive called Tri-cyclic Acetone Peroxide (TATP). The police added that such bombs “could burn anything and make it hard for people to breathe.”

There are merits in issuing alarmist statements. Such statements would signal the need for the general population’s involvement in mitigating the threat of terrorism. It would highlight the need for heightened vigilance by citizens. However, such statements should also be calibrated to highlight that the authorities can adequately respond to any threats by terrorist groups. This is where the Indonesian police’s statement in the recent incident could be improved.

Disregarding a reassuring tone could be detrimental to the police’s image. First, people look to the police to ensure their safety. Therefore, the public’s trust in the Indonesian police’s capabilities should not be compromised. By presenting a bleak situation without any assurances could also motivate the public to be vigilant but for the wrong reasons. They would be motivated by fear and the perceived lack of safety provided by the police. Vigilance due to such motivations could breed suspicion and distrust amongst communities.

Another potential negative fallout of such statements will be equipping the police critics with more ammunition for criticism. The police could be falsely accused of attempting to manipulate the population’s opinion for their own benefit such as the need for a higher police budget. In July 2017, the Indonesian National Police chief announced that the annual police budget has doubled since 2014.

Such statements, if issued regularly, would also undo the years of good police work in maintaining security. The lack of assurances of safety would only bolster the argument that the police alone is not sufficient in managing the terrorist threat in Indonesia. Currently, the military has been pushing for a larger role in counter-terrorism in Indonesia. It would be useful to not contribute to this momentum as such initiatives require measured considerations. One consideration is that police and army in Indonesia have different training cultures. For instance, the police inculcate a culture of apprehending suspects for prosecution by the legal system, while the military is geared towards combat.

At the international level, it could lead to two possible outcomes. The first would be the perception of growing sense of insecurity in Indonesia. This in turn could lead to a decline in foreign investments and tourism; potentially affecting resources for national development and security. The other outcome would be for neighbouring countries with vested interest in Indonesia, such as Australia, to increase foreign intervention such as funding. However, such interventions have setbacks. One would be that it could send the message that terrorism could be used as a bargaining chip to gain concessions. Such conduct would not aid in building mutual trust in mitigating terrorism.

Introduction

The impetus to revise Indonesia’s Anti-Terrorism Bill of 2013 has once again gained traction. Law and Human Rights Minister Yasonna Laoly stated that the suicide bombing in Solo, Indonesia on 5 July 2016 – on the eve of the end of the fasting month of Ramadan – has made “us realise again that the threat of terrorism is real”. Echoing this are Indonesian lawmakers who are pushing for the revision in attempts to prevent further attacks.

Proposed changes include revoking the citizenship and barring the return of Indonesians who engage in terrorism activities overseas. Although the revisions are intended to keep Indonesians safe from future attacks, will revoking citizenships and barring the return of perpetrators achieve this objective?

Short-Term Gain, Long-Term Loss

Revoking citizenships could be effective in deterring Indonesians from travelling overseas to gain skills which could threaten Indonesia. It could further dissuade individuals motivated by a sense of adventurism and the pursuit of financial rewards as promised by groups such as IS from travelling to conflict regions. If coupled with a grace period that precedes the implementation of this law, it may provide greater motivation to disillusioned Indonesians in Syria to return.

In other words, Indonesians in Syria are given the opportunity to return to Indonesia with their citizenship intact within a specific period of time. Therefore, if implemented, it is imperative for Indonesia to develop a holistic programme to receive them prior to their return. This programme should include providing financial assistance for them to rebuild their lives, particularly those who have sold off their assets to fund their trip to Syria.

Indonesia joins a list of countries that have either implemented or are considering revoking citizenships as a counter terrorism measure. As with these countries, Indonesians have been filmed burning their passports and renouncing their citizenships as part of IS propaganda. However, their actions should not legitimise their government to implement such measures.

Indonesia also differs from most of these countries as they would only revoke the citizenship of individuals with dual nationalities. Therefore, the issue of stateless and potentially dangerous individuals would arise, if implemented in Indonesia. Apart from the ethical concerns of such a scenario, such measures promote NIMBY-ism (Not-In-My-Back Yard) and thus affecting the national security of states these stateless individuals have taken refuge in.

No Guarantee Against Future Attacks

Another issue would be that such measures would not prevent or make these individuals lose interest in organising attacks in Indonesia. The attacks in Jakarta and Solo exemplified this as investigations are uncovering linkages to an Indonesian who is currently with IS in Syria. With the advancement in technology such as social media, militants do not need to have a physical presence to instruct or teach individuals skills such as bomb making.

Revoking the citizenships of such individuals would also create the issue of how Indonesia would respond to threats by stateless individuals.  By being stateless, these individuals may be seen as fair game to be eradicated without any legal ramifications. However, such hard approach would only make them martyrs and reinforce the narrative that Muslims are being persecuted. It must also not be forgotten that these individuals would still have familial connections in Indonesia.

Therefore, the individual’s citizenship and life may be taken away, but his ideology would live on through his family. This would not only reinforce the cycle of terrorism in Indonesia but make it return with a vengeance, thus, endangering Indonesians that the measures sought to protect.

The third issue is the enforcement of such measures. If implemented, sufficient evidence must be gathered before revoking a citizenship. It is insufficient to gather evidence solely via monitoring their social media accounts where they commonly pose photographs of themselves in Syria holding weapons. These measures would, thus, entail diverting resources to ensure that individuals have engaged in terrorism activities overseas beyond a reasonable doubt before revoking their citizenship.

Involving the Military & Alternative Measures

Interestingly, the Indonesian military have joined the debate for law revision by calling for the armed forces (TNI) to be given greater role in fighting terrorism. The Chief of TNI’s Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS) have called for the TNI to be involved in operations for early detection of terrorist activities and to interrogate suspected terror groups, especially those connected with international terrorist networks.

The TNI would, thus, be a potential candidate to assist with the enforcement of these measures. However, would such involvement be in Indonesia’s best interest especially with the current developments in the South China Sea?

Lastly, it is noteworthy that on 9 February 2016, Indonesia had convicted four returnees for their participation in militant training in Syria. Despite the returnees receiving lesser sentences than what prosecutors had sought, their sentencing was an important step. This is because this is believed to be the first successful conviction of Indonesians joining an overseas conflict. Therefore, revoking citizenships would be a drastic escalation if options such as longer prison sentences coupled with opportunities to participate in deradicalisation programmes are not explored. Revoking one’s citizenship may be perceived as not providing a second chance for those who later become disillusioned. This would only reinforce the notion that the only option for them is to maintain a militant life.

Indonesia has correctly focused on preventing their citizens from engaging in terrorism overseas in a bid to maintain national security. However, Indonesia should consider alternative measures rather than the reliance on drastic measures. These measures could be adopted from Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programmes that are currently implemented overseas. This would include developing a comprehensive counter ideology platform to dissuade citizens from travelling overseas to join militant groups and to not engage in violence if they do leave, and to facilitate their return albeit with repercussions that would commensurate with their infractions.