Introduction

Two months ago, the European Parliament have finally passed the long-awaited Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act that was first introduced in 2021. The regulation was endorsed by the members of Parliament with 523 votes in favor, 46 against and 49 abstentions.

The EU’s AI Act is considered as the final technology-related legislation passed under the 2019-24 European Parliament and Commission, as a part of their mission to create a “Europe fit for the Digital Age”.

With the aim of creating a “futureproof” legal framework for AI regulation in all sectors, some pertinent questions arise. How will the act be implemented? Which key stakeholder would be most impacted by the regulation? Finally, will the legislation have any influence towards AI governance outside of the EU?

Impacts of the Act

Various countries have different approaches to governing AI. The United States prioritizes national competitiveness in AI development, often at the expense of individual rights and privacy. In contrast, China uses AI to maintain social harmony and control through their social credit system. However, both lack significant public criticism of AI systems, hindering the development of trustworthy and accountable AI.

Meanwhile, the EU’s identity is grounded in political values such as freedom and democracy, setting it apart from other global actors like the United States, China, Russia, and the United Kingdom.

The EU AI Act aims to regulate AI use with a focus on human-centric and ethical principles. It is envisioned to address such policy problems as potential violations of fundamental rights due to AI systems, including breach of privacy, bias, inequality and security issues.

The Act sets a broad definition on AI. The act defines it as “a machine-based system designed to operate with varying levels of autonomy, that may exhibit adaptiveness after deployment and that, for explicit or implicit objectives, infers, from the input it receives, how to generate outputs such as predictions, content, recommendations, or decisions that can influence physical or virtual environments.”

Concerningly, this definition appears rigid and thus could be detrimental for the legislation’s adaptability in the future, considering the constant evolution of AI every day. 

The adoption of this landmark law will have several legal consequences.

First, the new rules will prohibit certain AI systems that poses threats to citizens fundamentals’ rights such as biometric categorization system. This means that any AI application that manipulates human behavior or exploits vulnerabilities will be banned. Examples for these are social scoring system, emotion recognition or predictive policing.

Second, the Act will impose transparency obligations on the use of AI and sets certain restriction on the use of general-purpose AI models. If an AI system is designed and deployed to interact with humans, its provider and employer must inform the human users – in a clear and distinguishable manner – that they are interacting with an AI system.

The Risk-Based System

The Act attempts to balance between innovation and risk-based approach with a degree of flexibility, so as to ensure adaptability and legal certainty. To do so, it imposes risk-based categories on AI providers depending on the level of risk that their AI system employs. These range from unacceptable risk, to high risk, to limited risk and to low or minimal risk.

Applications and systems that are considered as unacceptable risk will be banned; such as real-time biometric identification in public areas. AI systems that pose direct threat to people falls under “high risk” and will be strictly prohibited. These include systems that encourage dangerous behavior in children, apply social scoring and classify people based on their behavior, socio-economic status, or personal characteristics.

Additionally, AI systems are always considered high-risk if it profiles individuals based on collected data. In other words, these are the systems that automatically process personal data to assess various aspects of a person’s life, such as work performance and education. Examples for these include systems that determine access, admission or assignment to educational and vocational training or systems that are used for recruitment or selection, particularly targeted job ads, analyzing and filtering applications and evaluating candidates.

Chatbots and generative AI texts are considered “limited risks” and are subject to transparency obligations. “Minimal” or “no risk” systems, such as AI-enabled video games or spam filters, will be free to use and only subject to a voluntary code of conduct.

Implementing the Act

Once published in the EU’s Official Journal, the AI Act will come into force after 20 days, with full applicability expected in two years, except for certain provisions. Prohibitions will take effect six months after publication, while governance rules and obligations for general-purpose AI models will be applicable after 12 months. Additionally, rules for AI systems embedded in regulated products will apply after 36 months.

To aid the transition to the new regulatory framework, the Commission has introduced the AI Pact, an optional initiative encouraging AI developers worldwide to adhere to the key obligations of the AI Act in advance of its full implementation.

Additionally, the EU has also established the “European AI Office” that will oversee the Act’s enforcement implementation within member states. In doing so, it will have the authority to conduct evaluations of general-purpose AI models, request information and measures from model providers, as well as apply sanctions. The Office will collaborate with member states, expert and scientific community, industry and civil society in executing its mandate. This is a testament to EU’s multi-stakeholder approach to AI governance.

Implications for Non-EU Member States

A so called “Brussels Effect” is expected to occur after the adoption of the EU AI Act. It is a situation whereby EU’s introduction of its laws has a worldwide effect in shaping the international business environment and standards. An obvious example can be seen from the not-so recent enactment of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which sets a benchmark for data protection rules around the world, including Indonesia.

The EU AI Act will highlight the importance of public scrutiny towards AI application in daily life such as surveillance, health, education and law enforcement. It will prompt other countries to assess whether existing AI systems that have been applied within their territory may have caused harm or imposed risks on their citizens.

A definite outcome is that the Act will serve as a strong statement that the EU is able to regulate AI while ensuring that economic interests are still met. This is a manifestation of EU’s underlying legal policy and framework that are always based on the foundation of trade liberalization. This will encourage companies and investors of AI systems in the EU to adapt and comply with the Act. There is a likely chance that the EU will become a global standard for technology regulation which could lead to a greater degree of global coordination on AI.

Implications for Indonesia

While different countries have already progressed in initiating draft policies on AI governance, Indonesia’s progress seems to be on pause due to the recent presidential election. Outgoing President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s administration introduced the National AI Strategy, but it is up to President-elect Prabowo Subianto to carry this agenda forward. The concept of trust in AI is important for Indonesia. It involves strategically framing the narrative to unify societal skepticism towards AI while acknowledging its importance for national development. Like the EU, AI initiatives for Indonesia must be guided by national values, emphasizing trustworthiness and human-centric approach. Indonesia’s AI governance must focus in ensuring that AI programs align with overarching goals of not only economic progress, but also digital and citizens welfare, thereby emphasizing ethical considerations and societal well-being.

Introduction

It has been more than two decades since the concept of blue economy was proposed to the world and since then the concept has progressed through its adoption by international organizations, academia, and the private sector.

Previously understood as a solution to sustainable use of sea resources, the blue economy has expanded in scope, now encompassing such dimensions as economic growth, social inclusion and sustainability for all.

Sustainable management of ocean resources is not without its challenges. The implementation of the blue economy faces challenges from various directions, including the climate crisis, habitat degradation, unfair trade and overfishing. According to the World Bank Group, 57% of fish stocks are fully exploited and another 30% are over-exploited, depleted or recovering.

Fish stocks worldwide are affected by illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing), which is responsible for roughly 11 to 26 million tons of fish catches annually, or US$10-22 billion in unlawful or undocumented revenue.

The Conundrum of IUU Fishing

IUU fishing is a complex dilemma and a major hindrance for nation states to achieving sustainable management of the fisheries ecosystem. IUU fishing involves activities conducted in contradiction to national or international laws.

IUU fishing encompasses such instances as fishing in a country’s waters without permission, fishing in areas beyond one’s national jurisdiction and a range of violations against the rules of Regional Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO). Specifically, IUU fishing also includes various offenses such as fishing in restricted zones, landing in unauthorized ports, possessing false licenses, falsification of catch data, mismanaging fisheries, using prohibited gear, capturing protected species, engaging in illicit activities like human trafficking and drug smuggling, operating stateless vessels or under flags of convenience, employing dangerous, harmful, or banned methods and substances, and subjecting workers to forced labor as well as abusive working conditions.

Thus, the conduct of IUU fishing extends from the concerns of flag, coastal, post and market states. Based on this, we could conclude that a range of actors with competing interests are responsible to tackle IUU fishing.

The Complexities of Regulating IUU Fishing

Several international efforts have been undertaken to combat IUU fishing.

The most evident international law addressing IUU fishing is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This magna carta of the sea treaty encompasses a wide range of state duties and obligations such as the flat state, coastal state, activities in the high seas, governance of migrating fish, as well as the ground stone for the establishment of RFMO.

Under UNCLOS, states also established an implementing agreement namely the UN Fish Stock Agreement  for the management of migratory fish stocks and raising state obligations over resources and registration of vessels.

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) also established a Compliance Agreement addressing the management measures for the preservation of marine resources on the high seas and strengthening the responsibilities of flag states. In 1995, FAO introduced a voluntary code of conduct for responsible fisheries, which up to date over 170 members of FAO have voluntarily adopted.

Furthermore, in 2001 FAO also issued an International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate IIU fishing as a toolbox for states to develop national plans of action to combat the conundrum,. The document also serves as a reference for regional cooperation to assist states in harmonizing their policies.

In fact, since the mid-1990s, numerous efforts have been made on a global, regional and national scale to address IUU fishing. These initiatives encompass voluntary and binding international and regional agreements, enhancements in monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) efforts, collaborative intelligence sharing, and the deployment of innovative technologies for the identification and tracking of fishing vessel activities.

Despite these global legal efforts, it is apparently not enough to tackle and eliminate IUU fishing.

According to the 2021 IUU Fishing Index by Global Intiative, the global score across all state responsibilities and types of indicators went down from 2.29 to 2.24 in 2019, representing only a small improvement.

Therefore, IUU fishing persists as a substantial global challenge, exerting detrimental environmental, social and economic consequences which are all inconsistent with the aims of blue economy.

IUU Fishing in Indonesian waters

As an archipelago, Indonesia is faced with multitude of challenges associated with IUU fishing. In the maritime sector, Indonesia is a significant contributor, accounting for approximately 34% of the fish products from the ASEAN region reaching global markets. The economic impact of IUU fishing in Indonesia is anticipated to be as high as USD 3 billion annually.

Issues of IUU fishing have received noteworthy attention by the Indonesian government. In 2014, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo declared an anti-IUU fishing plan, prohibiting illegal fishing in Indonesia and introducing the policy of sinking vessels caught engaging in the activity.

During the same period, the then-Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries implemented additional policies, such as Regulation Number 56/PERMEN-KP/2014 which was designed to halt the exploitation of fish resources by foreign-made fishing vessels with sizes ranging from 150 to 400 gross tons.

In 2015, through Presidential Regulation No.115 of 2015, the government established Task Force 115, tasked to eradicate illegal fishing. The task force operates by maximizing the use of operational personnel and equipment (such as ships, aircraft and other technologies) belonging to the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the Navy, the Police, the Attorney General’s Office, and other relevant institutions.

Regardless, due to large scale and complexities of IUU fishing, it is still difficult for the government to completely eradicate the conundrum. Combatting the issue has been a priority for Indonesia as it is included in one of the Maritime Defense and Security programs. Furthermore, apart from enhancing MCS system, it has been suggested that local fishing communities are to be involved in cooperating and combatting against IUU fishing.

Tackling IUU Fishing: A Collaborative Effort

Tackling IUU fishing requires a multitude of approaches involving not only states, but also private actors, societies, civil organizations and academia.

On 5 December 2022, the Center for World Trade Studies of Universitas Gadjah Mada, in collaboration with Circular Economy Forum 2023 and WTO Chairs Programme, held the International Workshop on Blue Economy.

Recognizing the importance for Indonesia as an archipelagic state and a member of ASEAN, the implementation of blue economy becomes increasingly compelling. The forum maintained that the application of the blue economy in Indonesia is intended to tackle environmental degradation, particularly in the maritime sector, while also serving as a catalyst for national and global economic development.

One of the panels of the forum specifically discussed the international regulation on fisheries and international economy practice. Several of the speakers addressed on how the WTO Fishery Subsidies Agreement (FSA), which was proposed by the EU and Indonesia, could serve as a basis to pressure states to prevent harmful subsidies being contributed to the conduct of IUU fishing. The FSA will prohibit certain forms of fishery subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing as well as eliminate subsidies that contribute to IUU fishing.

Furthermore, members are obliged to take special care and exercise due restraint when granting subsidies to vessels not flying their flag and when granting subsidies to fishing or fishing related activities regarding stocks the status of which is unknown.

Such approach, if taken into concrete steps, could become a profound way for states to tackle IUU fishing. However, the agreement would only come into force after two-thirds of the WTO member states register their approval. Despite this, the forum serves as a testament of how academia could contribute towards combatting IUU fishing as a pretext to promoting the blue economy.

Steps Forward

The complexity of IUU fishing is not only rooted in the variety of activities involved, but also the concern of overlapping jurisdictions, prompting some scholars to consider it as an act of transnational organized crime.

Thus, a collaborative effort is required to establish not only legal instruments, but also to enforce these regulations. Such collaborative effort must be coordinated and in line with achieving the goals of the blue economy in sustainably managing ocean resources for the benefit and livelihood of all.

Everyone needs to realize that our ocean resources are limited. If it is not up to us to save them for future generations, then no one else would carry out the task.

Introduction

Indonesia has recently seen an influx of foreign universities establishing branch campuses locally. Monash University was the first to enter in 2021, prompting others like King’s College London and Curtin University to do the same across a number of cities like Bandung, Denpasar and the soon-to-be Indonesian capital city of Nusantara in the coming years.

While only offering only a few postgraduate degrees currently, these institutions aspire to tap into the country’s young population by eventually establishing undergraduate programs.

The trend of internationalizing higher education has gone for quite some time particularly with the red carpet that is provided by Indonesia’s Omnibus law. Previously, foreign universities were allowed to establish their branches in Indonesia under the condition that it works in cooperation with Indonesian universities and prioritizing Indonesian lecturer and manpower. With the existence of the Omnibus law, foreign universities are no longer limited by accreditation and geographical requirements.

In a more specific context, these types of education – which consists of courses/programs where the student is located in another country different from the awarding institution – is termed transnational education. The global demand for transnational education has not only been academically motivated, but also includes reasons such as migration, political and economic security, employment, and even tourism.

While modes of transnational education may vary – such as partnerships, distance or virtual education, student exchanges – a particular form of “establishing branch campus” becomes a unique challenge for Indonesia.

Challenges

Despite the market driven spirit to promote multicultural, diverse and internationalized outlooks among students, the existence of foreign universities is still rife with challenges.

The most general concerns relate to the cultural and practical constraints.

The former is due to the lack of academic and intellectual cultures among the academics and students. The perspectives and theoretical approaches that are given by foreign academics undoubtedly brings novelty to the learning process of Indonesian students. However, these theories and experiences are often difficult to be translated into the context of Indonesia’s situation. There needs to be an effort to contextualize internationally-influenced study materials into the Indonesian context.

In terms of language, there is a risk of a paradoxical situation between English being used as the medium of instruction and it being a foreign language. This challenges students who do not use English as their first language but are being assessed by “native speaker” academics. This raises the question whether the use of English as a primary indicator is appropriate.

Additionally, the concern of the westernization of Indonesian culture, tradition and heritage is inseparable. This is due to the different academic and teaching norms that come from the instructor’s background. This concern correlates with the risk of the use of non-contextual curriculum, by which students are forced to learn from the lens of western-instructors.

Taking a broader view on the entire higher education landscape, there are also issues related to access and affordability which is an age-old problem not just in Indonesia but everywhere in the world. As seen in the case of the United Arab Emirates, which is the hub of foreign universities (especially American) today, a dual market may bring about problems related to the workforce. The mere existence of foreign universities – without added efforts to increase equality of access (in various forms) may – for one, result in a very divided job market and thus economic opportunities.

Remedies

In order to overcome these concerns, there are a few things that could be done to optimize the benefit of transnational education for Indonesia.

The first key success component is a relevant curriculum. It has become a mainstream understanding that education needs to be contextualized in order to create a seamless transition from school to the real world. However, the question then is how should this “contextualization” take form.

Incorporating cultural values and national language into the learning process are options that comes naturally to mind. While this is a convenient answer and a good starting point, things should not stop there. The entire curriculum should be constructed in a way that benefits both the students and larger populace by bridging supply and demand, with the society’s overall condition in mind.

Being relevant in a developing country like Indonesia, for instance, means prioritizing practicality over diversity of courses. Degrees in Jewish civilization or theatrical arts may not attract many (if any) students as compared to engineering or medical sciences, especially given the high tuition cost. By extension, high-in-demand programs should also ascertain that the content delivered is not too much ahead of the nation’s capability such that the knowledge gained may not be utilized –  a lesson the Indonesian government learned the hard way through its Endowment Fund (LPDP). A balance should be struck between promoting the advancement of theoretical science and ensuring that national economic and social interests are satisfied, at least in the short-term.

Second, the establishment of foreign universities in Indonesia should always support national public and economic interest. There is a need to enhance the integration of foreign universities in Indonesia with the educational policies and initiatives of local universities. This improvement should focus on increasing opportunities for both domestic students and lecturers to gain international exposure from foreign universities. This expansion should encompass not only student exchange programs and scholarships but also include lecturer exchanges, collaborative research initiatives, and fellowship programs for academics.

Finally, the entry of foreign institutions could and should be leveraged as a means of improving equity in educational accessibility. The first form of equity is that of geographical distribution. Despite having thousands of islands, Indonesia’s higher education suffers from the classical pitfall of Java-centrism, seen from the fact that all of the top 10 universities are located on the island. The government would play a crucial role in pushing new entrants to bring world-class education to more parts of the country by providing incentives and/or limiting campus establishment per city. Bearing in mind the relatively low number of tertiary education enrollment in the country, particularly in regional areas, further alignment of interest so as to balance the interests of these institutions with that of the country’s to make education accessible to as many people as possible instead of just those in the urban areas.

Inclusivity in terms of access across economic classes is also something that should be deeply considered and systematically addressed. Foreign universities are almost always associated with expensive fees. Tuition is largely unaffordable for most, even in opulent cities like Jakarta. That said, imposing set quotas for high-potential, underprivileged students would be instrumental in increasing intra-area inclusivity. With LPDP, the government could also engage in co-funding schemes with the universities directly. Doing so would also help ensure that bright, well-educated talents would tangibly contribute to the country.

Generally speaking, as a policy or its guiding principle, the government should be very cautious on where they should draw the lines between foreign and domestic universities. For example, differentiated treatments with regard to administration and financing should be formulated such that there is enough incentive for foreign institutions to support the aims of equitable opportunities for all Indonesian citizens, but not excessive that it becomes predatory to its own public and private institutions that have long contributed to the nation’s development.

Depending on the lens used, the existence of universities from abroad can be both a challenge and an opportunity. On the one hand, there are problems that our own institutions have not been able to address, but on the other, these institutions can help alleviate the burden by bringing best practices and facilities to more people nationwide. The government now stands amid the situation as the deciding factor and architect.