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President Prabowo Subianto certainly seems to be on a mission to finally set his country on a journey to nuclear power generation.

Recently, he has enlisted the cooperation of the United States to, among others, develop Indonesia‘s capabilities in small modular reactor engineering, even as his administration also seeks Russia’s cooperation in the same sector.

In mid 2024, Prabowo was reportedly saying to President Vladimir Putin that “In the field of nuclear energy, we have discussed with Rosatom [Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation] the possibility of cooperating in this field, [including] the small modular reactors as well as the main reactors.” 

Importantly, the Russian Ambassador to Indonesia, Sergei Tolchenov, has indicated his country’s reciprocation of Indonesia’s interest.

Indonesia and Prabowo’s diplomatic efforts appear to have manifested concrete results by the end of last year. Media reports show that Indonesia will build its first nuclear power plant in Bangka Belitung with technologies provided by South Korea at a cost of US$1.06 billion. This bill would include a survey, research, technology transfer and infrastructure, among other things. South Korea reportedly will deliver the prototype reactor by 2028.

At this stage, it is unclear if South Korea is working in conjunction with the United States in assisting Prabowo with his nuclear ambition. However, it is observed that on 4 November 2024, the United States and South Korea established an MOU on Principles Concerning Nuclear Exports and Cooperation. One of its objectives is to create “billions of dollars’ worth of new economic opportunities.”

Indonesia’s nuclear energy ambition is not new and marked by many false starts. In 2015, former president BJ Habibie, himself a scientist, lamented the fact that Indonesia was suffering the economic consequences of not establishing its nuclear energy capabilities.

However, if Prabowo can succeed where others have failed, his success will have regional impact and with that, lessons for its neighbours. To understand the extent of that, one needs only consider Australia’s ban on the use of nuclear energy.

Australia’s nuclear conundrum

In Australia, there is an ongoing debate as to whether the country should set aside its ban on nuclear energy, though it should be noted the debate is driven by ideology rather than fact.

Safety is, of course, part of the debate, but it cannot be said to be a serious consideration of the risks, for these are seldom, if ever, considered in the context of the potential benefits of nuclear energy.

The farcical nature in which the risks of going nuclear are regarded is demonstrated by the ruling Labor Party anti-nuclear campaign. In one instance, the campaign utilised images of deformed pets and animals (such as a three-eyed fish) inspired by an episode of The Simpsons to make its point.

Much of the so-called debate is ill-informed, with even an ex-soccer player and a musician (albeit, one who later became a politician) adding to the noise. Such is the level of noise that Indonesia’s plans of adopting nuclear energy have hardly featured in local discussion.

This is despite the bilateral collaboration under the auspices of the Australia-Indonesia Electricity Sector Resilience Initiative (ESRI), which is established under the Australia-Indonesia Energy Dialogue. ESRI’s work appears to be focused on wind and solar as alternate forms of energy and is likely a reflection of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s desire to see Australia become an exporter of energy generated from these two sources.

However, this is not an excuse to deny the reality of Indonesia’s nuclear energy plans and the lessons that Australia may take from it.

Lessons for Australia

The first lesson to take from the Indonesian experience is that knowledge is lost when one chooses to exclude oneself from any particular area.

Indonesia has shown that the nuclear industry is such that, despite its dual civilian and military uses, and despite being, by nature, at the cutting edge of scientific endeavour, the leaders in the field are prepared to assist and transfer technology even if they themselves are in conflict.

Indonesia may have chosen the United States’ ally South Korea for its first nuclear plant project, but it already has three research reactors in existence. Besides, the country also has the capacity to conduct ore processing, conversion and fuel fabrication, albeit at a laboratory scale.

Australia, on the other hand, has only one research reactor, used primarily for the production of medical radioisotopes. Moreover, in order to secure support for the legislation needed to secure even that lone reactor, then-prime minister John Howard had to agree with the minor parties to ban atomic energy altogether.

Australia, and in particular the ruling Labor Party, is so tied to that ban. Even a recent invitation by AUKUS partners to join in an effort to “speed up development of advanced nuclear technologies” for civilian purposes was rejected as irrelevant to Australia. Clearly, unlike Indonesia, Australia is only falling further and further behind in nuclear technology and research.

The next lesson for Australia is in the management of competing alliances to gain knowledge and intelligence.

That Indonesia has been able to talk to the United States and Russia almost at the same time – while gaining expressions of interest from both – is perhaps within the expectations of even the most junior student of Indonesian politics and diplomacy.

Such a feat, however, may very likely be a mystery to most Australians, where the intelligentsia (such as it is) still talks in terms of balancing the relationship with China (our largest trading partner) and the United States (Australia’s most important ally).

Extracting knowledge and intelligence from both these nations and others does not appear to be an objective anywhere, despite the fact that Australia has for many years drawn postgraduate students from all over the world. There has instead been an overreliance on Chinese students at all levels and this has led to security concerns. For example, it appears that the flow of knowledge and information has only been in one direction, to China.

The third and perhaps most important lesson is also what should be the most obvious: That while net zero is a noble ambition, at the end of the day, the demand for fuel will be driven by price.

It appears that Prabowo and his younger brother Hashim Djojohadikusumo – who represented the former at COP29 – seem to understand that fact. During the convention, Hashim told delegates that Indonesia’s ambition is to reach net zero before 2050 by increasing biofuel use and adopting renewable energy, including nuclear.

This position is markedly different from that of Australia (and some others) that insist that renewables alone – with perhaps a bit of “firming gas” – are superior alternatives to coal, oil and gas. They do so even as Friends of the Earth (Netherlands) admits – in a recent case against Shell before the Dutch Court of Appeal – that renewables cannot compete on price against fossil fuels.

Conclusion

Given the proximity of the two countries, it will be almost impossible for Australia, if nothing else on the grounds of safety and security, to ignore Indonesia’s nuclear adoption. Australia would do well to learn from Indonesia rather than ignoring the fact. It would be best to avoid the comedy of Albanese’s inaugural visit to Indonesia, where Albanese came preaching technology in renewables, even as Pertamina and Malaysia’s Petronas were agreeing to expand exploration and production of oil and gas in Indonesia.