Indonesia’s relatively successful vaccine diplomacy to secure supplies for its citizens signifies the country’s growing soft power at the international stage. Through its various engagements in international forums, the country has managed to publicly shape its own perception as a champion of the developing world by speaking against what it sees as inequality between developed and developing countries. Lacking in hard power in comparison to other more affluent regional peers, Indonesia has shown that it can still punch above its weight in achieving its foreign policy objectives. Through an effective use of its soft power and public diplomacy, Indonesia’s diplomatic success in its vaccination drive demonstrates that hard power is not the only defining factor of how successful a country is in its diplomatic initiatives.

Engagement as the Cornerstone of Indonesia’s Diplomatic Success

Indonesia’s diplomatic success can be interpreted as signs of the country’s growing “soft power.” According to prominent international relations theorist Joseph Nye, soft power is defined as the ability to affect other countries to obtain outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. In 2019, Indonesia was listed as one of top 10 countries in Asia with significant soft power influence. This was measured based on components including enterprise, engagement, culture, digital, education and government institutions. For its vaccine diplomacy, Indonesia’s relative success can be attributed to its power of engagement through its pursuit of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy.

On the bilateral front, Indonesia has channels to speak out against what it perceives as “vaccine nationalism” by developed countries. One example of such activism by Indonesia was evident with Indonesian Foreign Minister’s, Retno Marsudi, efforts as cochair of the Gavi COVID-19 Vaccines Global Advanced Commitment (COVAX AMC) Engagement Group. During Indonesia’s cochairing along with its counterpart, the Ethiopian Health Minister and the Canadian Minister for International Development, the three countries spearheaded diplomatic engagements to ensure that all countries receive adequate allocation of vaccines regardless of their existing economic standing. The meeting was attended by Heads of State, State Officials, international Organizations and major pharmaceutical companies aiming to raise funds to meet global vaccine needs.  This stance was later endorsed by the World Health Organization (WHO) during a Director General’s press briefing on September 2020. Currently Indonesia, Canada and Ethiopia are supporting global vaccination via vaccine diplomacy, coordinated by WHO. The COVAX scheme can be seen as one of Indonesia’s diplomatic successes which other developing countries directly benefited from.

Bilaterally, Indonesia has engaged with China to acquire 50 million doses of Sinovac, making the country the first to use the vaccine with the first dose administered to President Joko Widodo back in January 2021. Indonesia’s diplomatic efforts has made it among the first few countries in Asia to get a head start on vaccinating its population. Other bilateral diplomacy-driven initiatives to secure vaccines has yielded positive results. Health Minister Budi Gunadi Sadikin shared that Indonesia has secured enough buy-ins from its partners to provide a steady supply of COVID-19 vaccines. Apart from Sinovac, Indonesia has secured orders for several vaccines such as such as Sinovac, Pfizer & BioNTech, Moderna, Sinopharm, AstraZeneca with additional plans to acquire Sputnik V.

Noteworthily, Indonesia’s success in its vaccine diplomacy is not attributed to the country’s “hard power” or a country’s ability to compel other countries to action through coercion, economic influence and military. In the areas of engagement, Indonesia’s active role in various multilateral organizations such as its 2019-2020 non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council, its de-facto leadership role in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), its membership in G-20 and its influential role in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) have pushed the country back into prominence after being previously perceived as an “invisible nation” by most international media outlets. As Indonesia grows in credibility in the areas of economic growth, governance, secular democracy and its contribution to peace and stability, it is expected that the country will continue to gain influence at the global stage.

Understanding Indonesia’s Soft Power in Diplomacy
There are two underlying themes on how Indonesia has managed to position itself as a voice of the developing world. The first is the country’s relative stability after long periods of political turmoil and its role in advocating the issues of developing countries throughout its history. Being a role model for developing countries, Indonesia is among the few that has managed to democratically transition from an authoritarian regime under Suharto from 1967-1968 to an electoral democracy. It also molded itself as a Muslim majority secular democracy and has managed to achieve great strides in the alleviation of poverty and maintaining consistent economic growth. And in 2020, Indonesia was upgraded from a lower middle-income country to an upper middle-income country by the World Bank.

Secondly, Indonesia’s inherent influence on developing countries due to its historical precedent in protecting its national interest by driving initiatives with other like-minded developing countries. In its approach to diplomacy, the country has always managed to successfully position itself as a champion for developing countries. The “bebas aktif” or free and active doctrine, which is at the core of Indonesia’s foreign policy, sets the tone of its engagement at the international stage. The policy itself was the result of the Cold War from 1947-1991 which saw clandestine warfare between the U.S. and the Soviet Union; both vying for global influence. For its survival, the fledgling Indonesia under Indonesia’s first president Sukarno deemed it necessary to remain strategically neutral to prevent Indonesia from being a puppet state of other bigger global powers. The free and active foreign policy later translated into Indonesia being the brainchild of the Asia-Africa Conference in 1955 and the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. The origin of the free and active foreign policy at first served the purpose of ensuring the country’s independence from external influence, but in doing so, it later evolved into greater activism at the world stage for Indonesia. One thing to note is that there has been a consistent adherence to this foreign policy doctrine, and as a result the country has been steadily building up its reputation as an advocate or the voice of the developing world.

Framing an Effective Public Diplomacy Campaign

On Indonesia’s diplomatic success in securing vaccine for itself through diplomacy, it can be argued that Indonesia has effectively leveraged effectively on its soft power. This also shows that although the country might be behind in terms of hard power compared to its developed regional peers, Indonesia can still influence global affairs by carefully framing its image. Indonesia has stepped up its public diplomacy campaign to frame it as a nation advocating for greater equality and a model of national resilience to other countries. This is especially true vis a vis the current military coup in Myanmar.

However, one down side of greater exposure in the international stage is that it will undoubtedly raise greater scrutiny to its domestic affairs. By making itself as a model of the developing world, Indonesia will undoubtedly be lambasted for its mishandlings of domestic affairs such as human right abuses, mistreatment of minorities and use of force against what it deems as “undesirable elements in the country”, among others. Indonesia should not be complacent of its diplomatic success. With greater international scrutiny comes the burden of setting the right example as it will affect the country’s credibility at the global stage.

Introduction

The proposed revision of the Information and Electronic Transaction Law (UU ITE) No.19/2016 by the government has led to speculations from civil society groups and members of the opposition that the government intends to expand its powers to include other avenues of criminalization under to an already ambiguous clause. The proposed revision will allegedly include a guideline to interpret the existing defamation clause despite calls from the opposition and public to completely remove the clause. These calls arose from perceiving the government being overzealous and having skewed interpretation of what constitutes as defamation. Due to recent rises in government arrests under the defamation clause, an attempt to further specify the clause with minimum community involvement raises concerns with the government’s growing authoritarian nature. Clamping down on government critiques on the internet only adds to further polarize Indonesian society under pro-government and opposition camps. The government as a political entity should instead focus on minimizing polarization by being a moderating force instead of resorting to restraining its citizens right to the freedom of speech.

The Defamation Clause: An Attempt to Maintain Stability in an Increasingly Politically Polarized Society?

The inclusion of the defamation clause was first enforced as law back as UU ITE No.11/2008before its eventual amendment as UU ITE No.19/2016. The government’s rationale for the law was to limit the dissemination of negative content as the number of internet users in Indonesia increases. The ambiguous nature of the defamation clause has resulted in many cases of individuals invoking the law against one another to settle petty disputes. It has also been allegedly abused by the government to criminalize political dissidents. According to an interview with the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (KontraS ) Deputy Coordinator Rivanlee Anandar mentioned that in its current implementation, police officers are given jurisdictional mandate to summon alleged suspects to the police station for questioning without prior consideration of the context, speaker, intention and the content of the speech making this a case of “guilty until proven innocent”. During an interview with the Ministry of Communication and Informatics (Menkominfo) Spokesperson Dedy Permadi, he mentioned that the government’s solution to remedy this debacle will be to provide a “guideline” for the interpretation of the defamation clause. However, the revision would ostensibly be favourable to the government, will only further open avenues of criminalization of political dissidents.

It is worth noting that despite its well-intentioned purpose to ensure a healthy internet space for its citizens, the same law has numerously been abused to silence political critiques. It is worth noting that there are indications of the rise in abuse of the defamation clause occurring during the course of President Joko Widodo’s administration. The rise in these numbers was largely attributed to the increasing political polarity of Indonesian citizens as a result of the heated presidential elections back in 2014 and 2019. Rivanlee mentioned that of the reported 31 Indonesians were currently being processed for crimes under the UU ITE Law, a majority of these cases were for alleged defamation against the President, Police, local government institutions and high-ranking political appointees. However, it is imperative to view this data within the context of the existing political dynamics occurring during the contentious presidential elections in the past. During the 2014 and 2019 elections, both pro-Jokowi supporters and opposition actively used political buzzers in social media to sway the public. Some of these allegations towards the government at times took an inciting tone for example accusing Jokowi as a communist, anti-Islam and a Chinese puppet etc. Some of these allegations were outlandish and misleading that the election was no longer a matter of which candidate has a better program for the country, but who is a better Muslim, more anti-communist and anti-foreign interest. Some of the fake news included incitements that provoked acts of treason against a legitimately elected government.

The Problem with Exploiting Political Polarization

One underlying theme seems to highlight the root problem of the ongoing plan to revise the UU ITE Law: growing polarity. This has manifested into a war of words between both pro-government supporters and the opposition on the internet with one crying foul against the other over the abuse of the defamation clause. This growing political polarization is well illustrated by a survey released by Indikator Politik Indonesia (IPI) in 2020 which showed that from a total of 1200 respondents 36% believed that Indonesia’s democracy was deteriorating while the same survey also found 57.7%  believed that the government had used excessive force towards people with diverging views. This data shows a growing perception of the government’s willingness to criminalize its citizens for expressing their political opinion as a quick fix to issues that stemmed from political polarization of its people. Ironically, there are also instances the government has also indirectly endorsed its supporters to use the same tactics used by his opposition against them in the internet which only fuels the growing mistrust towards the government in terms of allowing constructive critique crucial for the functioning of a democratic society. The growing mistrust with each other has led to a political deadlock over what the government views as an attempt to sabotage a democratically elected government and the opposition’s claim of the government growing increasingly authoritarian.

This phenomenon underlines a flaw in the Indonesian democratic system where instead of finding ways to reduce polarization, both parties seek to use it to achieve political ends. Both the opposition and the government as major players with a large political following should serve as a moderator instead of actively instigating attacks against the other. The government should also leverage on its influence on its supporters to be open to constructive criticism especially towards its programs instead to resorting to buzzers to silence critiques and evoking the defamation clause. The opposition as a legitimate representative of the political interests of the society should also leverage its influence especially in the areas in encouraging proper conduct of expressing their dissatisfaction to the government instead of resorting to personal slander and spreading false news. In a well-functioning democratic society, the first response to such polarity would not be to suspend the freedoms of its citizens, instead address the underlining cause of political polarity. It is worth noting that the existing UU ITE has clauses against the discriminatory use of race, ethnicity, religion and ethnic groups (SARA). The government should instead strengthen such laws in its government institutions and political parties should play a role in promoting a self-regulating normative body that prevents the use SARA issues towards its followers and members. Culminating from this, the government could consider removing the defamation clause altogether.

Finding a Middle Ground

There is no denying the government’s right to protect its interest to carry out its development agenda. In doing so, however, the government could do better than evoke authoritarianist ideals to subdue critiques from civil society and the opposition. A middle way around the ongoing debacle should be one of bridging differences, reconciliation and commitment. One being the involvement of civil society groups and members of the opposition with the ongoing government task force’s revision of the UU ITE via feedbacks and recommendations. Public involvement with the project will ensure that plans to provide guidelines to the defamation clause does not infringe the right of Indonesians to voice their political opinion and more importantly come up with agreeable standards on how to determine an act as defamation. Secondly, the government should leverage its position as a role model to educate and promulgate proper ways to voice political opinion that is respectable and fair towards its political institutions, political parties and voter base instead of resorting to arrests made under the defamation clause. This advice should also be extended to opposition parties as legitimate representatives of Indonesia’s democratic institutions. Political parties should be self-regulating and put clear guidelines on how proper politics are conducted and should not deviate from properly addressing the shortcomings of the incumbent government’s programmes.

It is also advisable that the government applies an internationally acknowledged standard of determining the difference between free speech and hate speech under the Rabat Plan of Action in which Indonesia is a signatory to. In this aspect, the government or the police must pass a rigid threshold test for expression that are considered criminal offences mainly through the context of the critique, the speakers position in society, the speakers intent, content or form (whether it contains incitement, extent of the free speech and likelihood to incite crime.

Introduction

The recent arrest of the hardline Islamic vigilante group Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) leader Rizieq Shihab signifies that Indonesia has yet to address concerns of hardline Islamic ideology in the country. The prominence of those like Rizieq in Indonesia belies a deeply rooted problem of rising hardline Islamic ideology which is partly driven by the continuous politicization of Islam by Indonesian political elites. Amidst the reality of growing Islamic conservatism in Indonesia, it is uncertain whether the government can maintain a secular constitution or whether it will accommodate Political Islam for the sake of future stability.

Secular Nationalism vs. Political Islam: The Dynamics of Indonesian Muslims

Indonesia has always had an uneasy relationship between secular nationalism and Political Islam. This “tense” relationship stems from Indonesia’s early inception as an independent state. During the formulation of Indonesia’s constitution, Indonesia’s first President Sukarno tried to bring together three factions for the task of nation building during the country’s post-independence period. The three factions in question were the nationalist, the communist and the Islamist camps with their respective political parties represented during the Preparatory Committee for Independence (PPKI) to draft the preambles for the Indonesian constitution or the Jakarta Charter. The first draft of the Jakarta Charter included the obligations for Muslims to abide by the Sharia Law. The requirements for Muslims to follow the Sharia Law were later removed by secular Muslim nationalists under the guidance of Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta arguing that Hindu and Christian dominated provinces of the former East Indies would refuse to join the new Indonesian State if the constitution were to contain Islamic elements. Eventually, the secular nationalist won and instilled a secular constitution for Indonesia under the 1945 constitution which formed the basis of Pancasila or the five principles ideology. Later in the course of Indonesia’s history, the communists were purged by Suharto and the Orde Baru (New Order) leaving nationalist politicians to go head-to-head with proponents of Political Islam.

The rise of Political Islam only came about after Suharto’s fall. Political Islam, which was previously repressed by Suharto, saw resurgence partly due to the dissatisfaction of conservative Islamic elements in Indonesia or the “Santri” who decried the domination of Islamic Seculars or the “Abangan”, Chinese, and Christians in Suharto’s cabinet. The Santri’s saw the collapse of the Indonesian economy during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis as the results of corruption and moral failures of the secular government. This culminated in tensions between Christian and Muslim communities, further propagated by socio-economic disparities, and led to violent conflicts in various cities. The emergence of hardline fringe groups occurred in reaction to the alleged injustices by Suharto’s regime who was deemed to favor the secular Islamist and Christian groups. The instability caused by the fall of Suharto’s regime was the precursor to the rise of organizations such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI).

After Suharto’s fall, the new government had to grapple with growing instability and growing tensions between the Abangan and the Santri in the political sphere. During this time FPI allegedly served as an “attack dog” of the National Police (Polri) and the National State Intelligence Agency (BIN) while keeping their hands clean from any human rights violations. In this sense, FPI served as a proxy of state security officials to silence opposition while also serving as a tribute to appease the growing conservative Islamic base. This relationship was also why an organization like FPI could have existed for so long: it is an effective political tool.

Recently, FPI has fallen out of favour with the government with the arrest of its leader and its subsequent disbandment. The Coordinating Minister of Politics, Law and Human Rights Mohammad Mahfud MD’s citing Rizieq Shihab’s speeches on supporting ISIS as a reason for his arrest shows the government was at least aware of FPI’s ideological affiliations in the past, yet taken no earlier actions, is puzzling.

The Potency of Religious-based Politics and FPI’s Effectiveness as a “Muslim Agitator”

FPI and its leader Rizieq Shihab’s growing influence in the political arena, prior to its disbandment, also signals the growing influence of conservative Islam in Indonesian politics. The 2017 Jakarta’s gubernatorial election, between the incumbent Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (also known as Ahok), against the former Minister of Education Anies Baswedan, signifies this longstanding conflict between secularism championing progress and reforms against a more conservative view of Islam in Indonesian politics. Ahok was widely popular for his effective and no-nonsense approach to governance, however his brash approach and the fact that he is a Chinese-Christian, did not resonate with hardline Islamic groups who labelled him kafir (infidel). The aftermath of the election marks the rise of strong conservative Political Islamic.

The main cause for concern regarding FPI’s influence is the fact that Rizieq is undoubtedly, an effective agitator and a strong rallying point for hardline Islamic elements seeking more political clout. Under the umbrella of 212 alumni, a union of Islamic groups spearheaded by FPI that joined in a mass protest against Ahok for alleged blasphemy in 2016, hardline Islamic groups went on to shape the course of the 2019 presidential elections. The election turned out to be one of the most divisive in the course of Indonesian democracy, where it saw an alarming increase of the political narratives. Incumbent President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) ran against former Military General Prabowo Subianto who did not hesitate to capitalize on the growingly conservative Islamic voter base and align himself with FPI and the 212 to garner support.

After Prabowo’s defeat, and his appointment as a minister in President Jokowi’s cabinet, the FPI and 212 alumni lacked a political figure to forward its hardline agenda. Undoubtedly this will be a cause for concern in future presidential elections, even with Rizieq behind bars, the political activism of hardline Islam will undoubtedly align itself with a new political figure. Judging by the effectiveness of the 212 alumni, it is highly likely that future political candidates will capitalize their influence in future elections. The irony in the use of hardline Islamic voices is the fact that Indonesian political elites are more pragmatic than they are religiously motivated. The fact that Prabowo, a candidate who came from a nationalistic oriented political party, the Great Indonesia Movement (Gerindra), was willing to court conservative and hardline Islamic elements to win depicts a worrying future for Indonesian democracy and its secular constitution.

Addressing the Problem

One cannot solely blame Indonesia’s growing conservatism on organizations like the FPI, since a political entity like FPI only gets in legitimacy by riding the tide of rising Islamic conservatism in Indonesia. Two research findings from Pew Research Center (PRC) conducted in 2013 found that 72%  of Muslims in Indonesia favours having the Sharia Law as the law of the land with a staggering 50% believing that the Sharia Law should be enforced to non-Muslims. In 2020, PRC highlighted that 96%  of Indonesians believed religion to be important as it equates having religion as having good moral values, making Indonesians one of the most religiously devout public on earth. Based on the data above, there are strong indications that more Indonesian Muslims want Islam to play a more significant role in Indonesia’s governance. However, the hard-handed tactics used by hardline Islamic organizations and the continuously exclusionary political narratives of Islamic-affiliated political candidates towards Indonesian religious minorities seem to paint a bleak picture of what their version of “Islamic” Indonesia might be.

The question that the Indonesian government will now have to grapple with is whether to accommodate Political Islam given the increasing number of conservative adherents. Recent government crackdowns of hardline elements have led the government to be deemed “thogut”, a leader that goes against the wills of god, which is also an increasingly “popular” narrative used by political candidates to discredit its competitors. While Rizieq’s arrest is a step in the right direction, albeit too late in its execution, the growingly conservative Indonesian Islamic environment will be prime ground for other similar figures to emerge. Indonesian news’ preoccupation with hardline Islam and the extensive coverage of Rizieq’s arrest will only serve to frame him as a martyr in the eyes of Islamic conservatives. The government could do better to increase moderate Islamic narratives in the media as a counterbalance to the over-exposure of hardline Islamic agenda and give more progressive Islamic organizations greater exposure to the public such as the two largest Muslim organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhamadiyah.

In a way, a rational measure would be to institutionalize a moderate form of Islam in Indonesia’s religious curriculums and Islamic boarding schools to ensure that any materials do not deviate from Indonesia’s secular constitution. Additionally, as a countermeasure, having already signed the 2018 anti-terrorism law into law, the government must take a more proactive role in ensuring that religious sermons and political campaigns do not include hate speeches or calls to overrule Indonesia’s secular constitution and the Pancasila as a counterweight towards growing religious conservatism.

Introduction

Indonesia’s adoption of the Omnibus Law back in late October of this year despite strong concerns and rejection from communities highlights growing concerns that the Indonesian government seems to be out of touch with ongoing negative public sentiment caused by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The government’s preoccupation on long-term post COVID-19 economic recovery signified by the justification of signing the Omnibus Law could potentially have dire consequences to the country’s stability and could potentially undo years of economic progress.

Omnibus Law: A Misguided Post Pandemic Economic Recovery Strategy

The Omnibus bill, also referred to as the job creation bill, was signed into law by the House of Representatives (DPR) in late October with the hopes of providing a much-needed re-haul to the country’s labour system and natural resources management. The first mention of the law was made by President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) back during his presidential inauguration on October 2019 with the first draft of the bill circulated to the public on February 2020. The then 905-page law has included the amendment of 79 prevailing laws concerning labour, spatial planning and environment management to improve bureaucratic efficiency and address existing red tapes during the process of application for a business permit. President Jokowi during the Presentation of the Government Statement on the Bill of the State Budget for 2021 fiscal year stated that the adoption of the Omnibus law will serve to support Indonesia’s post COVID-19 pandemic recovery.

However, the signing of the bill has been met with strong opposition which later escalated into mass protests in the streets of Jakarta by labour unions, university students and civil society groups after it was signed into law. Protesters has decried the government for its lack of transparency and protested the lack of prior consultation with relevant stakeholders within the community. There has also been public sentiment that the signing of the bill was rushed and that the government had been prioritizing non-pressing issues amidst Indonesia’s worsening COVID-19 infection rate. The signing of the Omnibus Law suggests that the government of Indonesia is underestimating the prolonged impact of COVID-19 to the economy and the mass unrest the pandemic has on the population.

By signing into law a bill that affects the livelihoods of many workers mostly impacted by the COVID-19 such as labours effected by mass layoffs, the government only seems to be playing with fire. With overemphasis on long-term recovery instead of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the government has effectively sidelined the need for stricter health protocols and adequate testing regime to mitigate larger economic losses incurred by the country. This indicates that there seems to be a mismatch between the government long-term economic ambitions and realities on the ground.

With recent data indicating that Indonesia has reported a total of 450 thousand COVID-19 cases as of October, The Institute for Economics and Finance (INDEF) has projected that Indonesia could suffer IDR 127 trillion (USD 8.7 billon) due to the ongoing pandemic, and with infective policies currently in place, and the lack of consistency in enforcement of appropriate health protocols, there is valid reason to worry that Indonesia economy will take a much longer time to recover.

Urgency of the Omnibus Law: A Less than Lukewarm Reception?

There are a few clauses within the Omnibus Law which affects the most vulnerable communities during the COVID-19 pandemic, firstly, under the new law, factory workers will be hired on contract basis instead of being provided with permanent contracts upon employment. Labour unions has pointed out that under the new clause, labour will be hired through third party outsourcing entities which will render them powerless against their employers due to the lack of clarity on whom would pay the severance packages (employer or the outsourcing entities). Secondly, the government will reassign minimum pay which was previously set to district levels to now provincial levels. Complaints about this clause centred on the argument that minimum pay based on district levels are larger of that based on the provincial level. Lastly, if speculations are true, the elimination of work period contract and opting for contract for life will render workers without adequate healthcare and retirement package.

The implementation of the Omnibus Law will undoubtedly have an impact on workers, especially due to the potential loss of income and social safety nets. This is also compounded by existing fears caused by COVID-19 which causes large amount of worker lay-offs. The Ministry of Manpower on April of this year mentioned that nearly 1.2 million workers from 74,439 companies have been laid-off or have been told to stay home indefinitely.  It is likely the number of people that will be further impacted by job loss will increase until the government prioritizes keeping the spikes of COVID-19 infections down. Despite the bleak economic outlook, the concerns from workers towards the Omnibus Law mostly stems from speculations due to the lack of government transparency. However, it is worth noting that the government’s attempt to re-organize Indonesia’s manpower to increase productivity are well justified. A survey from Japan External Trade Organization of 20 countries in Asia and Oceania shows that Indonesia’s manufacturing sector has the lowest productivity rate in comparison to its other Southeast Asian neighbours.

Another point of contention within the new Omnibus Law is that the simplification of granting land rights, opening land concessions for palm oil and regulatory compliance under the law will be directly under the central government instead of regional authorities. This include the government’s power to implement a national policy on environmental management, without excerpts mentioning the need for prior consultation with related communities owning community and tribal lands. The law has been seen by both environment groups and businesses alike as having the potential to further weaken environmental safeguards already in place since it provides a leeway for local business oligarchs to expand their business with impunity. Foreign businesses alike have also expressed their concerns regarding the new land rights and environmental law with 35 foreign enterprises reportedly sending a letter of concern to the Indonesian government. These foreign enterprises fear that the new law can negatively impact their business reputation, operations, regulations and environmental management.

Both cases concerning changes in the labour law and spatial planning suggest that the regulation lacks both a receptive response from Indonesians and positive sentiment from international businesses which the Indonesian government intends to attract. One key theme of the two arguments highlights two pressing concerns regarding the Omnibus Law: 1) it is untimely given existing economic concerns by those hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic and 2) highlights the need for further consultation with relevant stakeholders before it is enacted into law. Amnesty Indonesia further mentioned that the signing of the Omnibus Law undermined Indonesian workers need for political participation.

Health Security vs. Economic Growth

The COVID-19 pandemic also highlights Indonesia’s current inadequacy in providing adequate health care towards a large portion of its citizens. Current shortfalls in enforcing adequate testing regime’s, adequate communication, increasing hospital capacities and ensuring universal access will impede Indonesia’s ability to recover economically. The government needs to realize that as part of a broader economic recovery strategy, ensuring that consistent centralized policies need to be enforced to reduce reported COVID-19 cases. In terms of giving a much-needed boost towards Indonesia’s attractiveness to foreign investors, mismanagement of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic will cast doubts for  would-be investors of Indonesia’s ability to govern.

One key theme that emerges during the passing of the Omnibus Law is that the government needs to balance the need to keep the rate of COVID-19 infections down and the need for economic growth. The debacle of passing the Omnibus Law seems to indicate that the current administration seems to view aspects of health security as being unrelated to future economic growth. While there is no denying the need for the government to also invest their time and resources to think of strategies for post COVID-19 economic recovery, ensuring the health of the population cannot be separated with the need for economic growth. For Indonesia’s economy which relies heavily on domestic spending, services and hospitality sector it is crucial that the population have adequate assurance that the government has the pandemic under control. Many Indonesians are undoubtedly effected by the ongoing pandemic with lay-offs and economic uncertainty greatly diminishing the spending power of Indonesians which in turn further weakens the Indonesian economy. While focusing on economic reforms that focus on economic recovery may seem like a desirable option for the government to partake, such reforms cannot be pushed during times of mass unrest caused the ongoing pandemic especially without prior consultation with those mostly effected by the Omnibus Law. It is increasingly clear that such reforms need to wait, and instead the government needs to invest more time and attention in protecting the safety of what is runing the Indonesian economy: its citizens. Indonesia’s economy would not function while its people constantly fear the loss of their livelihoods caused by the pandemic.