Introduction

The 17th Sabah state election was held on 29 November 2025. A total of 596 candidates from 23 political parties and 74 independent candidates were vying for 73 seats.

The fiercely contested election concluded with the Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) coalition emerging with the largest number of seats (29 seats), allowing its chairman, Hajiji Noor, to be sworn in as chief minister for a second term. GRS formed the state administration with its coalition partners, the United Progressive Kinabalu Organisation (UPKO), Pakatan Harapan (PH) and several independent assemblymen.

The most unexpected election result is the Democratic Action Party’s (DAP) crushing defeat, which was totally wiped out in all eight seats it contested, including the Chinese majority seats.

The Chinese votes were always regarded as the “fixed deposit” for DAP, which was contesting under its PH coalition, the political vehicle of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.

This article will explain and analyse why the Sabah Chinese decided to switch allegiance and voted for Warisan instead.

Pre-Election Drama

The state election was due by November 2025, and the state assembly was only dissolved towards the end of its term. This delay was largely shaped by an alleged mining corruption case, the recurring flood and the social injustice controversy involving the death of a secondary school student, all of which threatened to disrupt the chief minister’s position. These constraints left him with only a narrow window to call an election that would be to his advantage.

Meanwhile, the collaborative arrangement between GRS-PH and PH-BN created its own complications, particularly over seat allocations, which remained a major headache for Hajiji as chief minister and GRS chairman. Ultimately, the Sabah State Legislative Assembly was dissolved on 6 October 2025.

Results in the Chinese Majority Seats

Out of the 73 seats contested, there are five Chinese majority seats, namely Luyang (65%), Likas (65.9%), Api-Api (45%), Elopura (41.3%) and Sri Tanjung (55.8%). All these seats were won by Warisan candidates in the 2025 state election, which were previously won by DAP and PKR in the 2020 polls.

This marks the first time since 2004 that DAP has had no representation in the Sabah State Legislative Assembly.

Figure 1 demonstrates clearly that there has been a sharp decline of support in all seats contested by DAP and PKR candidates (under the PH umbrella) in Chinese majority areas.

Factors Affecting the Chinese Voters

There are five main factors affecting the Chinese voters’ inclination in this election.

First, the rise of state nationalism. The strong “Sabah for Sabahans” sentiment has made many urban Chinese far more critical of candidates’ accessibility, responsiveness and perceived commitment to local issues. In reality, this has been expressed as a preference for local parties and leaders as well as a growing wariness towards what is seen as “anti-Peninsular Malaysia political party sentiment” and ability.

Against this backdrop, the campaign style of federal DAP leaders in Sabah appears to have backfired. When the Minister of Housing and Local Government, Nga Kor Ming, indicated his intention to “adopt” Tawau, it was widely read as patronising. His remark reinforced the perception that Peninsular-based parties regard themselves as more “superior” or authoritative over Sabah’s local leadership, fuelling resentment among Sabahans, including those of ethnic Chinese.

Second, the Malaysian Agreement 1963 (MA63) issue. Sabah’s 40% entitlement to federal revenue has become a key grievance among the locals.  However, DAP remained silent on the subject and even appeared to support an appeal against the court decision, which further agitated many local voters.

Sabahans have long sought the restoration of this entitlement under the constitution and increasingly believe that only local parties can be trusted to defend and fight for these rights. For many, the 40% entitlement is not an abstract legal entitlement but a concrete foundation to strengthen state finances and accelerate long-overdue improvements to the state’s infrastructure.

Third, the overall disappointing performance of DAP. As part of the PH-led federal government, DAP had previously campaigned strongly on issues such as recognition of the United Examination Certificate (UEC) and anti-corruption reforms. However, it is now widely perceived as a “silent party” that no longer champions the Chinese community’s concerns as it once did.

Instead, many Chinese voters feel that DAP has compromised on major issues that it previously stood for, sparking a sense of disillusionment and weakening its credibility among its traditional supporters.

Fourth, internal conflicts within DAP. Factionalism within the party contributed to the erosion of support. DAP’s decision to drop an incumbent state assemblyman and a former organising secretary from the candidate line-up led these two and other followers to leave the party and join the opposition, inevitably splitting the DAP vote.

At the same time, DAP’s organisational structure in Sabah appeared weak. DAP Sabah state chairman, who was the incumbent assemblyman for Luyang, shifted to contest in Likas in an attempt to “save” the seat, while his own protégé was parachuted into Luyang. This strategy backfired, leading to the loss of both seats to Warisan.

These developments reflected PH and DAP’s misreading of the political temperature in Sabah, as they assumed that Chinese voters would continue to support DAP regardless of the candidate

Fifth, governance and corruption concerns. Allegations and conspiracies surrounding the Sabah mining bribery case – a scandal linked to Anwar’s senior political secretary and former aide that broke in the final week of the campaign – only reinforced negative perceptions of the PH coalition overall. This deepened voters’ mistrust and strengthened the determination of some Chinese to vote against the coalition.

Last but not least, the presence of an alternative political party. Warisan’s performance indicated that Chinese voters were no longer confined to choosing between PH, BN or GRS.

Warisan is increasingly regarded as a more credible and effective advocate for Sabah’s autonomy and rights, as well as for issues like anti-corruption, the 40% federal revenue entitlement and the full implementation of MA63. This has given Chinese voters a local option to vote for, one that is aligned more closely with their preferences.

Conclusion

While the Sabah state election might not directly determine the outcome of Malaysia’s upcoming general election, which must be held by February 2028, it serves as an early referendum on Anwar’s leadership and the performance of the unity government.

What is particularly striking is the shift among Chinese voters, long regarded as the backbone of DAP and PH. The results signal that the Chinese electorate can no longer be treated as a “fixed deposit”. If these warning signs are ignored, PH and DAP may face serious headwinds in the upcoming state elections in Sarawak and Johor. The outcome in Sabah also presents a stress test for the stability of the federal unity government and raises the question of whether its current model will remai

Introduction

Prime Minister Anwar is now halfway past his premiership and has served longer as prime minister than his three immediate predecessors. In June 2025, the Merdeka Center released data regarding his approval rating, which stood at 55%; this is a mere 1% increase from his rating in November 2024 (Table 1).

This article aims to discuss a contradiction: while Anwar is facing numerous struggles at home (reflecting his mediocre approval rating), he remains popular abroad, presenting himself as a vocal Malaysian leader and the current holder of ASEAN chair.

Anwar’s Diplomatic Spotlight

When Thailand and Cambodia clashed and exchanged artillery fire, Malaysia grabbed the opportunity to step in as a mediator. Anwar positioned himself as a regional peacemaker, projecting an image of statesman and international leader.

The Thai-Cambodia dispute provided a chance for Anwar to showcase himself as a skilful diplomat who also managed to balance the vested interests in the conflict—the United States’ and China’s. In fact, Anwar mentioned that he had received a compliment from President Donald Trump who described it as a “fantastic job”.

Ironically, the government’s “success”

On top of that, Anwar’s engagement with world leaders has enhanced Malaysia’s international profile. Hosting China’s President Xi Jinping in April 2025 gave him a diplomatic spotlight. As ASEAN chair, Anwar is the first Malaysian leader to be invited to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit, and he would deliver his inaugural remark at the SCO Plus Summit in Tianjin University, China.

Moreover, Trump may attend the ASEAN Summit in October this year. This seems to suggest that despite the tariff-related tension, Anwar has managed to maintain the bilateral relations with the United States on an even keel.

Moreover, Anwar has p

His rhetoric has been framed as a political necessity and reinforced his image as a defender of the oppressed.

However, this stance is now being tested by the controversial nomination of a pro-Israel US envoy to Malaysia. The move has triggered backlash, with critics accusing the government of hypocrisy and enquiring whether the incoming envoy’s stand will match the US’ foreign policy decisions.

Anwar’s Domestic Struggles

Nevertheless, beneath the polished optics of his diplomatic engagements, things at home were still far less reassuring.

On 26 July 2026, a protest spearheaded by the Malay-dominated Perikatan Nasional (PN) called for Anwar to step down. This signifies that troubling issues at home may pose a threat to Anwar’s position as prime minister.

First, the economic discontent among the people. The expansion of the Sales and Service Tax (SST) from 1 July has directly impacted the prices of essential household items and services, squeezing the rakyat further.

Furthermore, the rationalisation of RON95 petrol subsidies and rising electricity bills, which are set to be implemented by the end of this year, has sparked public furore.

Growing concerns over the rising cost of living and inflation, compounded by wage stagnation, are especially troubling for M40 and B40 groups. If the economic concerns are not properly addressed, this would leave the M40 and B40 behind and might incentivise them to vote against Anwar’s Pakatan Harapan (PH).

Second, the slow rollout of reforms. The institutional reforms, particularly in the areas of the judiciary, anti-corruption and the separation of powers, are progressing slower than promised.

The recent judicial void in Malaysia, as its chief justice retired without a successor, has raised many questions and concerns about judicial independence and the prime minister’s power and role in the appointment of judges.

On top of that, Anwar has publicly stated that political appointments made by the government to individuals should be allowed. This has been fully condemned by the civil society organisations, as such appointment as a reward for loyalty is the foundation of cronyism.

These episodes had contributed to the mistrust and a decline in credibility among civil society voters who were once strong supporters of Anwar’s Reformasi agenda.

Third, Anwar is also facing headwinds from within his own party as well as the Unity Government. Former deputy president Rafizi Ramli’s failure to retain his post in the recently concluded Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) election led to his resignation as economy minister.

Following this, he has started his own podcast—Yang Berhenti Menteri (YBM, The Minister Who Quits), with a debut episode of 122k views. Rafizi’s decline of the offer to be the second PKR deputy president and to remain as an ordinary party member may deepen divisions within PKR.

Furthermore, the case of Rafizi’s 12-year-old son being attacked in a mall shocked the country because politically linked physical attacks, especially targeting children, are exceptionally rare. The timing of this attack is suspect, with Rafizi himself stating that it is a warning against him to refrain from being outspoken on certain issues.

Fourth, the relationship between PH and Barisan Nasional (BN). Although PH and BN have cooperated in previous state and by-elections, the extent to which this collaboration can be sustainable and replicated is unknown despite the proven vote transferability between these two coalitions.

The testing grounds will be the upcoming Sabah, Malacca and Johor state elections as the two negotiate on the allocation of contesting seats.

In addition, the recent move of Minister of Trade and Industry Tengku Zafrul Aziz from the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) to PKR has intensified internal dissatisfaction within UMNO, with growing sentiment that his portfolio must remain under UMNO’s purview.

Last but not least, the underperforming cabinet. Anwar’s cabinet appears to rely excessively on the prime minister to respond to every single national issue. From the recent death case of a school bullying victim to the controversy surrounding the display of an upside-down Malaysian flag, ministers have been conspicuously absent from facing the public or taking the lead in public communication.

Instead, all these issues are consistently deferred to Anwar, creating the perception that governance is being conducted as a one-man performance rather than through collective cabinet responsibility.

Conclusion: Balancing Act

Anwar’s mid-term performance reveals a premiership caught between two arenas.

Abroad, he has successfully carved out a role for Malaysia as a respected regional leader, peacemaker, trade negotiator and moral voice for the Global South. Nevertheless, domestically, his administration is weighed down by economic discontent, policy incoherence, slow reforms, internal party divisions and an underperforming cabinet.

The lesson is that international status cannot replace domestic legitimacy. Global recognition may temporarily shield Anwar from critics, but without addressing the local bread-and-butter issues and restoring faith in his reformist credentials, his administration risks losing his own long-time supporters.

If the prime minister could translate international goodwill into domestic gains, such as channelling new trade deals into jobs or maximising his global reputation to drive investment and institutional reform, he will be able to reconcile these two arenas. If not, his premiership would be remembered as one where Malaysia’s image shines abroad, but the government’s credibility falters as home. In conclusion, Anwar needs to devote more attention to addressing pressing domestic challenges than focusing predominantly on courting potential foreign investment deals if he intends to remain as prime minister.

Introduction

Founded in 1949, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) was one of the founding members of Malaya, alongside the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC).

However, MCA has long been perceived as playing a subordinate role within Barisan Nasional (BN), particularly vis-à-vis UMNO, which has historically dominated the coalition among these three parties.

In the 15^th general election (GE15) held in 2022, MCA secured only two parliamentary seats, while UMNO garnered 27 seats. This outcome contributed to the formation of the current “Unity Government” between BN and Pakatan Harapan (PH).

Despite being part of the ruling coalition, MCA was excluded from cabinet appointments. Meanwhile, UMNO and the Democratic Action Party (DAP), former rivals, had begun cooperating closely in electoral campaigns.

A notable instance occurred during last April’s Ayer Kuning by-election in Perak, whereby DAP deputy chairman Nga Kor Ming and UMNO campaigners jointly chanted “UMDAP Mantap” (UMNO-DAP Solid), symbolising their newfound collaboration.

These developments have triggered debates during MCA’s divisional-level annual general meetings, prompting the question of whether the party should remain within the BN coalition or chart a new pathway. This article analyses the factors affecting MCA in determining its decision to remain in or exit BN.

To Stay or Exit?

While there is a debate whether MCA should continue to stay within BN, it is interesting to note that there is no voice asking MCA to exit BN from Johor grassroots members. This fact is crucial, as Johor is the only state in Malaysia whose entire state executive council (EXCO) is formed by BN, whereas others are jointly governed by a

On the other hand, there is a growing chorus, particularly outside of Johor, urging MCA to reconsider its partnership with UMNO. There are several factors affecting MCA’s decision to stay or part ways with BN.

First and foremost, the seat allocation during elections.

The main concern revolves around whether MCA will be given slots to contest in the upcoming state elections (notably in Sabah, Johor and Malacca) and the 16^th general election.

If BN and PH persist with an incumbency-based formula for seat distribution, MCA is likely to retain only its current two parliamentary seats in Ayer Hitam and Tanjung Piai – which are both located in Johor – and seven state assembly seats in Bekok (Johor), Yong Peng (Johor), Paloh (J

This constraint raises existential concerns among MCA members, as those from other states might not stand a chance to contest in the upcoming elections. Consequently, aspiring MCA politicians, if denied the opportunity to contest in the elections, may seek alternatives. This explains why a substantial number of former MCA leaders joined Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia’s (Bersatu), which caters to Bumiputera voters.

Furthermore, if BN continues to enforce the rule that prohibits any component party from contesting a seat after two consecutive losses, i

Second, the historical relationship between UMNO and MCA.

MCA’s partnership with UMNO could be traced back to pre-independence Malaya when the leaders from both parties made contact in the Communities Liaison Committee and formed the Alliance Party, a precursor to BN.

MCA’s participation in electoral politics and independent movements in the mid-1950s had strengthened its popularity within the Chinese populace, which contributed to the victory of the Alliance Party.

However, over the decades, MCA has relied on UMNO’s campaign machinery and its extensive grassroots networks, particularly in Malay-majority mixed constituencies that are traditionally MCA’s main electoral base.

This historical interdependence continues to inform voices within the party advocating for the MCA to maintain its status quo.

Third, the marginalisation of MCA members from government posts.

During BN’s rule, MCA members were appointed to local governance roles, such as board of visitors at hospitals or district-level village heads. These posts, which were traditionally distributed among UMNO, MIC and MCA members, are now reportedly filled by DAP members under the current government arrangement, further fuelling dissatisfaction within the MCA grassroots.

In fact, there is not even a single MCA ca

Fourth, the perception of the Chinese community towards MCA.

Since the 2000s, MCA has been struggling to receive electoral support from Chinese voters. MCA was perceived as subservient to UMNO and ineffective in speaking up or safeguarding Chinese rights, especially in language and education.

If MCA continues to partner with UMNO, it would be hard for MCA to regain Chinese votes. The party’s repeated compromises on key issues have eroded public trust, while younger voters increasingly view MCA as outdated, lacking both autonomy and a strong and independent political identity.

Fifth, UMNO’s close relationship with DAP.

Recently, 30 DAP leaders made a historic visit to the UMNO headquarters for a briefing on technical and vocational education and training (TVET) hosted by Deputy Prime Minister and UMNO President Ahmad Zahid Hamidi.

However, this unprecedented stopover by DAP was perceived as not just another “official” visit; it bore clear political motives.

For DAP, the “ice-breaking visit” was seen to be a goodwill gesture to UMNO in preparation for the upcoming Sabah state elections. On the other hand, for UMNO’s leadership, the visit by DAP was a way to show to its grassroots supporters that DAP is a friendly partner and Malays should not be afraid to vote for DAP. This is also being perceived as UMNO sending a signal to MCA that it can be easily replaced by DAP and that any attempt at manoeuvring behind UMNO’s back will not be tolerated.

Last but not least, MCA needs to consider the possibility of exploring other collaborations.

If MCA decides to part ways with BN and to contest future elections independently, MCA might face a multi-cornered fight with BN/PH and Perikatan Nasional (PN). This is not viable for MCA politicians contesting in Malay-majority mixed seats, as they would lose critical support from BN-aligned voters.

Another alternative is to follow suit with Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) and join PN. However, given the pronounced ideological difference between MCA and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), getting broad-based voter support from its own base presents significant challenges. The awkward position faced by Gerakan within PN serves as a cautionary tale for MCA.

Conclusion

Regardless of the factors, the party needs to carefully weigh its options in order to remain relevant in Malaysia’s evolving political landscape. The most important task is for MCA to rejuvenate its party leadership and ability to attract more credible and younger members.

MCA also needs to ensure its party machinery is strong enough to function independently and adapt quickly to changing political expectations and voter sentiments. As MCA marks its 76^th anniversary this year, the decision to stay or exit is not only strategic, but also an existential one. In the shifting terrain of Malaysian politics, time is not on MCA’s side as public confidence continues to decline with each passing election cycle.

Introduction

The Democratic Action Party (DAP) has long been a dominant force in Malaysia’s political landscape, part

Founded in 1966, it advocates a centre-left, social democratic platform and was historically associated with the “Malaysian Malaysia” slogan – championing equal rights regardless of ethnicity.

For decades, it functioned as a principal opposition force against the long-ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition and, more specifically, against the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), BN’s Chinese-based component party.

DAP’s confrontational stance and vocal defence of Chinese education and civil liberties earned it both staunch support among Chinese voters and criticism as being anti-Malay or anti-Islam.

In recent years, however, DAP has transitioned from its traditional oppositionist posture to a key partner in Malaysia’s ruling coalition under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s Madani government. Meanwhile, its recent internal election signifies DAP’s evolving ideological identity and strategic repositioning, particularly in relation to ethnic representation and governance.

New Election, New Era

DAP concluded what is arguably the most intense internal party election in its history on 16 March 2025.

There are three noteworthy points to be analysed.

First, the results mark a symbolic end to the era dominated by the Lim family, signalling a generational transition in leadership and political strategy.

The most notable development was the removal

Lim, who served as secretary general from 2004 to 2022, barely retained his seat in the 30-member Central Executive Committee (CEC), placing 26^th out of 30. His sister, Lim Hui Ying – Malaysia’s Deputy Finance Minister – failed to secure reelection despite the existence of a female candidate quota.

Other close allies of the Lim faction, such as Teresa Kok (MP for Seputeh, Kuala Lumpur Territory) and Lim Lip Eng (MP for Kepong, Kuala Lumpur Territory), were similarly defeated.

In the run-up to the election, the Lim family launched a “Kit Siang’s birthday tour” to galvanise grassroots support for Guan Eng’s continued leadership—a move interpreted as a pre-emptive bid to maintain influence amid waning support, yet it does not seem to be working out in favour of Lim’s family.

Gobind Singh Deo, son of the late party icon Karpal Singh, received the highest number of votes for the second consecutive election and was appointed as the new party chairman.

The secretary general role remains with Anthony Loke, who is also Malaysia’s Minister of Transport. He has formally succeeded Lim Guan Eng in 2022.

This leadership reshuffle effectively ends the Lim dynasty’s hold over the party. For context, Lim Kit Siang, the family patriarch, served as secretary general for 30 years and as chairman for an additional five years until his retirement in 2022.

Table 1. List of the newly elected CEC members, their ages and the votes obtained

Second, the election outcomes do not only represent a shift away from the Lim family but also indicate a broader generational and ideological renewal within the party.

The new CEC is largely composed of MPs or State Assembly representatives in their 30s and 40s, many of whom grew up during DAP’s rise to national prominence and tasted political power during the party’s brief stint in government (2018–2020).

This younger cohort is more open to engaging Malay voters directly and is working to project a more inclusive, multiracial image. Their multilingual capabilities and cross-ethnic social networks enhance DAP’s strategic goal of becoming a truly Malaysian party.

The rebranding is particularly significant in combatting long-standing accusations of Chines

Third, a significant milestone in this party election is the inclusion of two Malay leaders – Syahredzan Johan (MP for Bangi, Selangor state) and Young Syefura Othman (MP for Bentong, Pahang state) – in the CEC. They garnered 2,065 and 1,943 votes, respectively. Syahredzan was appointed as one of the party’s four vice chairmen, while Young Syefura became assistant publicity secretary.

In previous party elections, Young Syefura was the sole Malay representative in the leadership. The dual election of Malay leaders signals DAP’s strategic recalibration: it recognises that it could no longer rely solely on urban, Chinese-majority constituencies. As many as 96% of Chinese voted for DAP in the 2022 general election, whereas only 18% of Malays voted for DAP.

While no official data exists on DAP’s Malay membership, Syahredzan has already announced efforts to recruit more Malay members and voters. These appointments reflect the party’s understanding of the demographic and electoral imperatives of a Malay-dominated society—and an electoral system that rewards broad-based, interethnic appeal.

Between Muting and Maturing

As DAP transitions to a new generation of leadership, the party faces a delicate balancing act: sustaining the loyalty of its traditional Chinese support base while expanding its appeal among Malay and other non-Chinese voters. This requires not only a shift in rhetoric but also demonstrable commitment to inclusive governance and coalition pragmatism.

Moreover, the party’s entry into the unity government has already been met with mixed reactions, particularly from its core Chinese electorate. While the party continues to enjoy overwhelming Chinese support, it has been notably subdued on issues historically central to its platform—such as Chinese vernacular education and minority rights. Critics have even labelled it “a silent party”.

Hence, the party’s current dilemma is how to avoid becoming an “MCA 2.0”—a euphemism for being seen as compliant or ineffective within a Malay-majority government.

Being in power means DAP can no longer simply critique from the sidelines; it must deliver tangible results. If it fails, it risks losing credibility and electoral support.

Nevertheless, the prospect of Chinese voters shifting back to MCA remains unlikely. A more probable outcome would be voter apathy and abstention.

The deeper challenge lies in how DAP balances its “Malaysian Malaysia” ideals within the constraints of Malaysia’s racially stratified political landscape. Its transition from antagonist to conformist illustrates the compromises required under coalition governance. Whether DAP can maintain ideological clarity while expanding its electoral reach remains to be seen.

In short, DAP’s future depends on whether it can reconcile its activist roots with the compromises of coalition politics without losing the ideological clarity that once defined it. If it can achieve this balance, DAP may yet complete its transformation into a truly national party with multiracial appeal. If not, it risks fading into the same irrelevance that befell the very parties it once opposed.

Introduction

The aftermath of Malaysia’s 15^th General Election (GE15) plunged the nation into a hung parliament for first time in its history, creating an unprecedented period of uncertainty. This is because no single party managed to clinch a simple majority of 112 parliamentary seats from the 222 seats contested in the GE15.

The Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition, led by then-opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim, only managed to capture 81 seats, whereas the Perikatan Nasional (PN) coalition, led by the former Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, trailed behind with 74 seats.

Furthermore, Barisan Nasional (BN) suffered major upsets by garnering only 30 seats. The remaining seats were captured by Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS) with 23 seats, Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) with six seats, Parti Warisan with three, Parti Bangsa Malaysia (PBM) and the Malaysian United Democratic Alliance (MUDA) with one each as well as other parties and independent candidates (eight).

Some individual parties won more seats than others. Best performing parties include Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) of PN with 49 seats; Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) of PH with 40 and 31 seats respectively; United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) of BN with 26 seats; and Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu) of PN with 25 seats.

The GE15 was significant for several reasons. Firstly, as mentioned above, Malaysia experienced a hung parliament for the first time in history whereby no single coalition won a simple majority to form a government. Secondly, the subsequently formed government was the result of a hefty compromise among opposing coalitions, principally PH, BN and GPS. Thirdly, PAS emerged as the biggest winner and swept all parliamentary seats in Perlis, Kelantan

The election results clearly indicated that the PH failed to gain the support from majority of Malay voters. Most of the Malay polity appear to have shifted their support from UMNO to the new Malay-Muslim nationalist bloc PN, spearheaded by PAS and Bersatu. The PN coalition captured about 54% of the Malay electorate in Peninsular Malaysia. PAS’ performance is noteworthy. Its share of seats jumped from 14 in GE14 (2018) to 44 in GE15, showcasing the effectiveness of its campaign this time around. PAS also swept all seats in aforementioned states and came very close to dominating the share in Kedah (one out of 15 contested seat went to PH). This is on top of the fact that all of these northern states are governed by PAS with their leaders as menteri besar (chief ministers).

Explaining the Green Tsunami

This result is the best performance for PAS since its establishment in 1951. In past elections, PAS had only managed to capture around 12 to 15 seats generally, with its best result recorded in GE10 (1999), winning 27 seats.

GE13 was popular in for a phenomenon penned as the “Chinese tsunami”, whereby voters of ethnic Chinese were seen to have swung to vote for opposition. This time around, a “green tsunami” was coined, mainly to denote the swing of the Malay electorates to PAS (green is the colour of PAS).

Many factors contributed to the green tsunami.  

First, though all three main coalitions actively campaigned in the cyberspace, PN fared exceptionally well in TikTok. PN had successfully leveraged on the power of TikTok in affecting first time voters’ political inclination. According to the statistics by Suruhanjaya Pilihan Raya Malaysia (Election Commission of Malaysia), 16% of the 6.9 million new voters (almost 1.4 million) were voters aged between 18 and 20.

PN created a lot of contents in TikTok with such messages as anti-LGBT, anti-communism and anti-liberalism which were widely circulated among the youth. Such populist messages amplified PAS’ profile, which many candidates are young preachers with a huge following. These include Ustaz Muhammad Fawwaz Mohd Jin, a 39-year-old preacher with a degree from Al-Azhar University in Egypt, that had beaten PKR’s Nurul Izzah in Permatung Pauh.

Second, PAS had a very clear and focused on its campaign narrative. It centred the whole campaign on the issues of corruption charges faced by UMNO leaders and the need for governance reform. The former was especially targeting President of UMNO Zahid Hamidi, whose corruption charges remain active. The result was clear: UMNO and BN were totally undermined by PAS and PN.

Third, PN had become the next best alternative to the Malays who no longer believe in UMNO and never trust PH, owing to its DAP element (a majority Chinese party). There is a perception among the Malays that UMNO is only interested in looking out for their own interests at the expense of the people. Moreover, Malay young voters did not feel indebted towards UMNO, unlike their parents and grandparents who harbor a sense of gratitude towards UMNO. Therefore, many Malays voter for PN instead.  

Fourth, throughout the years, PAS has groomed a bunch of new and young professionals as their candidates and leaders. These young leaders are not just religiously educated but come from a variety of backgrounds. For instance, the Member of Parliament for Bachok Mohd Syahir Che Sulaiman is a young professional with a background in economics and had worked as the Assistant Vice President for Strategic Planning and Business Development in Sime Darby, a conglomerate.

Fifth, PAS has an extensive grassroot machinery especially in the rural areas. The preachers were able to reach out to every corner of society. PAS has also established tahfiz schools since the 1980s, graduates of which are now voters who likely constitute part of PAS’ core supporters.

Sixth, BN leaders were extremely disappointed following the loss of almost all Chinese-majority seats in GE13 (2013). The “Chinese tsunami” were blamed on ethnic Chinese for voting against BN. This had prompted UMNO to implement more Malay centric policies since then to try to win over the Malay polity votes. This shift in the political discourse years ago set up a perfect context for PAS to operate in.

Going Forward

With the rise of PAS, the party has successfully penetrated into all states except East Malaysia as well as Johor and Negeri Sembilan in the Peninsular. PAS is no longer an “east coast party” in the Peninsular but had emerged with an almost national presence. This situation brings up few important messages.

First, PAS’s success disrupted the Malay political landscape. Either PAS or Bersatu will surely become the main mouthpiece of the Malay nationalist agenda, while UMNO will become a weaker representative of the Malays. PAS has not only retained its main base (especially in Kelantan and Terengganu) but also managed to gain new voters. As a result, PAS and PN will be emboldened to further champion their Malay-Muslim nationalist and right-wing agendas.

Second, BN might face disintegration if UMNO does not undergo reform and restructuring soon. UMNO’s politics and style of politicking are no longer appealing to the people especially the Malays after years of being dogged by corruption charge

Due to the “green tsunami”, there is a chance that the ruling coalition could buckle under the pressure of Malay-Muslim interest, especially to win Malay voters in the next election. Therefore, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim would be forced to confront the dilemma of either supporting his progressive policies or giving in to the conservative agenda of PAS and PN.  Regardless, Malaysia has entered a new era of political experience. The green tsunami was an impressive political feat for PAS, but it is worth questioning whether the tsunami would remain beyond its initial wave or is simply a one-off phenomenon.