Targeting the Northern Hub

Myanmar resistance forces are pushing the line with the latest drone attack against a civilian aircraft that was about to take off for Mandalay from Kachin State’s Myitkyina Airport. On 20 February 2026, a suicide drone struck a Myanmar National Airlines (MNA) ATR-72-600 aircraft, causing damage to its nose, fuselage and tail.

As expected, nobody claimed responsibility, given the likelihood of blowback from the international community—much of which is cheering for the rebels, not the military-backed Myanmar government. The latter recently concluded a general election that is neither accepted nor endorsed by much of the world, including ASEAN Member States (AMS).

According to one theory, the drone was targeting the adjacent Northern Command headquarters but was shot down by airport security, causing it to crash into the passenger plane. The military headquarters share the same border fence with the airport.

Nevertheless, it was too close for comfort by any measure. The attack marked a significant step up in escalation, given that rebel forces have generally left civilian targets – much less commercial passenger aircraft – alone.

Myitkyina Airport serves as a critical air transport hub for the northern Kachin State, facilitating the movement of people and goods to major cities like Yangon and Mandalay. Attacks on such infrastructure are intended to undermine governance and disrupt regional stability.

While the airport remained operational, 2025 saw resistance forces successfully using FPV drones against other high-value military targets in the region. For example, in May 2025, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) used a drone to down a military Mi-17 transport helicopter in nearby Shwegu.

The 12 February 2026 FPV drone strike on the airport was intercepted, resulting in no damage to infrastructure, though it did cause flight cancellations.

Resistance forces in the region had already been using similar drone technology in other operations, such as the 8 February strike that destroyed a radar station at the nearby Nant Paung Air Base.

The lack of direct hits on Kachin airport in 2025 suggests that the more recent attacks in February 2026 – including the FPV drone strike on 12 February – represent a “significant escalation” in the resistance’s ability to penetrate the capital’s high-security airspace.

This highlights a shift toward precision-guided, low-cost technology that is difficult for traditional security to detect.

The Rise of the “Autonomous” PDF

Attacking a heavily fortified site guarded by approximately 20 junta troops at every entrance and protected by Air Defence Operation Commands requires a level of coordination.

The Myanmar government immediately accused the KIA and the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the latter of which is officially the armed wing of the National Unity Government (NUG), formed in response to the 2021 military coup.

But over the years, the term PDF has become a catch-all for newly emerged militia groups taking up arms against the junta. Not all PDF units fall under the NUG’s command and control.

A report released in May 2025 states that while the “Integrated” and the “Allied” PDFs are part of the NUG’s formalised military structure, the “Autonomous” and “Localized” PDFs operate without direct oversight from the NUG. These last two categories each have their own networks and generate their own funding through donations as well as small-scale business activities.

For the long-standing resistance forces such as the KIA and the NUG, both of whom seek global support against the military-backed government of Myanmar, civility and international norms must be respected. But when it comes to the actions of autonomous and localised PDFs, these long-standing organisations enjoy plausible deniability.

As Myanmar reaches a new threshold, such as the recently concluded general election, fighting on the ground will have to be understood in a post-election context. While the 20 February attack was widely seen as an escalation, no one can predict where this leads.

The “Lone Wolf” Threat to Chinese Interests

Some in the resistance community are not ruling out attacks on the Chinese pipeline that runs from the Rakhine State to Kunming in Yunnan province. While China has an agreement with the Myanmar government and long-standing ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) such as the Arakan Army (AA) to provide protection for the pipeline, independently organised PDF units who do not report to any long-standing groups could become that “lone wolf” behind such an attack.

In May last year, the PDFs’ highly coordinated offensive – Operation 9/A Nyar Myae – overran four Mandalay townships, forcing government troops to abandon a key off-take station for the Chinese gas and oil pipelines.

Approximately 50 government troops were killed during this one-day coordinated offensive targeting 12 government positions in the Mandalay region. The operation involved around 12 distinct resistance groups operating within the region. In response, government forces launched several days of intermittent clashes and conducted retaliatory airstrikes.

Beijing’s Heavy Hand: Relinquishing the Gains

By late 2025, Myanmar troops retook most positions; Chinese intervention played a key role in the resistance surrendering territory.

During the campaign to recover previously lost territories, there was no evidence indicating that the PDFs were utilising the pipeline as collateral. This demonstrates a shared recognition by both resistance forces and government troops of the strategic significance of the Chinese pipeline. Furthermore, any direct intervention by China could result in adverse consequences for all parties involved.

Beyond the PDFs in Mandalay, approximately 245km east, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) was compelled to return Lashio, which is the junta’s main defensive position in northern Shan State.

About the same time, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) was pressured to relinquish recently secured territories, including Mogok, a world-famous ruby mining centre, back to the junta.

The return of Nawnghkio, Kyaukme and Hsipaw allowed Myanmar to reopen the critical trade highway between Mandalay and the Chinese border. These handovers were made possible through China-mediated negotiations in October 2025, during which Beijing abandoned any pretence of acting as an impartial mediator.

The resistance forces’ setbacks at the hands of China were a stark reminder that nothing comes easy in Myanmar’s rugged conflict zones, where EAOs, PDFs and regime forces all play for keeps. The PDFs likely felt jaded after retreating from the Mandalay positions they had seized in May 2025. They were also frustrated with the TNLA, which had ordered them to do so. Hard feelings aside, one thing the resistance can agree on is that they cannot withstand Chinese pressure.

But has China crossed the line—no one in the resistance forces would say. There is little choice but to absorb the blow, regroup and continue fighting even if the playing field is an uneven one.

So why seize territory only to return it to the junta under Chinese influence? Groups like the MNDAA, the TNLA and the PDFs may not be willing to confront China directly about their objection. These groups understand fully the diplomatic and strategic costs if they choose to upset China. But the autonomous PDFs operate under no such constraint. For them, it becomes a matter of timing and opportunity, not principle.

Resistance forces in Myanmar have shown their objections in actions such as attacks on Chinese interest in Myanmar following the 2021 coup. Chinese-owned factories in Yangon’s industrial zones were burnt, as protesters accused Beijing of backing the coup. Frustration exists, indeed; the question is whether and through whom it finds an outlet.

The Three-Month Government and the Technocrat Façade

Thailand, the sick man of Asia, roared back to life at the recent general election that delivered an overwhelming mandate to a pro-establishment party.

This is the same party that just a little over two years ago was no more than a medium-sized regional outfit not known for much other than a pro-cannabis platform.

The Bhumjaithai Party’s (BJT) victory, with 193 seats in the 500-member Parliament – up by 122 from the 2023 general election – allows incumbent Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul to continue in his role.

Late last year, Anutin was asked to assume the premiership for three months by the reformist People’s Party (PP), which had the most seats in Parliament at the time, in exchange for BJT support for constitutional reform. He accepted the offer but reneged on the deal, refusing to reduce the legal power of the 200-strong Senate, which is, according to observers, stacked with BJT allies.

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But he made something of those three months in power by bringing in technocrats to fill key cabinet posts – foreign affairs, commerce and finance – and allowing others to fight over the remaining seats.

The move played well with voters as BJT members are not known for possessing any kind of expertise. Images of these technocrats were plastered on posters all around the country, with Anutin at the centre.

The result of the February 2026 general election was welcomed, as expected, by the country’s private sector, citing continuity and stability.

The Legacy of the King Cobra

BJT was founded by veteran politician Newin Chidchob in January 2009 after leading a high-profile defection from the Thaksin Shinawatra-aligned People’s Power Party (PPP) to support the rival Democrat Party in forming a new government and making Abhisit Vejjajiva the prime minister.

Newin is the namesake for the political term “cobra”, used in Thailand to describe those who betray their allies. The defection in January 2009 essentially made him a king cobra. A cable from the US Embassy in Bangkok described him as an “infamous dirty trickster” known for his “abrasive personality”. BJT’s power base is centred in the Khmer-speaking Buri Ram province, the Chidchob family’s long-standing political stronghold.

Today, BJT, the party that Newin created and continues to influence, has become the ultimate case study in Thai money politics.

Coming in second at the polls was the progressive-leaning PP with 118 seats (10 million votes at the national level), a drop from 151 (14 million votes) from the 2023 general election, making them the lar

Before the recent election, PP stated that they would not join a coalition with BJT as the lead. PP insiders said the decision was made on principle, citing the fact that BJT had gone back on its promise to push through constitutional reform.

Still, PP supporters felt let down by the decision to allow BJT to take the top post, but PP leaders would not go so far as to admit mistakes were made.

Poor and regrettable decision aside, PP has been constantly tested from the moment it surfaced as Future Forward eight years ago. The party has been dissolved

At the moment, 44 of their leading members face bans from politics by the Supreme Court for supporting a proposal to soften the punishments under the lese-majesté law.

PP’s predecessor, the Move Forward Party, came in first in the 2023 election but was denied the fruits of victory by the junta-appointed Senate. However, this was no sweat off Pheu Thai’s (PT) back, and PT wasted little time in putting together a ruling coalition.

During its two years in power, PT went through two prime ministers—both were removed by the Constitutional Court on ethical grounds.

The Fragility of the Reformist Front

Much of the support for PP was concentrated in urban areas, while BJT invested in local power brokers locally known as “Big Houses”. BJT also moved to put family members of these Big Houses on its party ticket to ensure t

Another big factor that helped BJT was the downfall of PT and the jailing of its nominal leader, Thaksin, who made a Faustian deal with the conservative elites to secure his return from 15 years of exile in exchange – at least he thought so – for his safe return to Thailand.

The move alienated his supporters, particularly those at the grassroots level. PT was hoping their populous policy would win them back, but the digital wallet scheme faced significant resistance and implementation challenges. Thailand’s economy grew only 2.5% for the full year of 2024.

This time around, to form a government, BJT has decided to form a coalition with PT. This is awkward indeed, as it seems like yesterday when BJT abandoned PT following the leaking of a private conversation between Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Cambodian strongman Hun Sen.

BJT’s departure in July 2025 left the PT-led government hanging by a thread with a slim majority. The Constitutional Court later ruled that Paetongtarn had committed gross ethical violations and removed her from office.

Where Are the Democrats?

Following in PP’s footsteps towards the opposition bench was the Democrat Party of former prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, who announced before this election that his party would not join any government that has the Khla Tham Party (KT) in the coalition.

The Democrats cited concerns about corruption and unethical business practices among KT members. Incidentally, KT performed rather well with 58 seats, while the Democrats won only 22.

The deeper meaning of the Democrat Party’s position on KT, said political observers, is to signal that the party is prepared to sit on the opposition bench with the PP.

KT’s nominal leader, Capt Thamanat Prompao, was convicted of conspiring to import heroin to Australia, with the ruling handed down on 31 March 1994, sentencing him to six years’ imprisonment. A plea bargain with Australian authorities got him released after four years.

During Anutin’s three-month administration, Thamanat expressed interest in the defence ministry portfolio but was not appointed. He may pursue this position again; however, Anutin could also seek the role, as he aims to enhance his collaboration with the military.

Both PP and the Democrats are expected to use their time in opposition to reassess and refine their positions, as there is widespread scepticism regarding the longevity of the BJT-led coalition, which many believe will not endure beyond two years.

The specific manner in which this coalition might dissolve remains uncertain. While retaliation from PT is conceivable, BJT currently maintains strong momentum, whereas Thaksin’s party has reached its lowest point in years, compounded by the incarceration of its leader.

At present, political survival appears to be the foremost concern, superseding any ambitions for retribution.

Poll after poll leading up to the 2026 general election had PT, BJT and PP neck-and-neck in a three-way race. But in the final analysis, toxic nationalism won the day.

The Border Wall

During his short stint in office, Anutin also gave the army a blank cheque on Thailand’s handling of the Cambodia border conflict. Building a wall along the Thai-Cambodian border was the centrepiece of his election campaign. At the time when the two sides reached a ceasefire agreement in late December 2025, Thai troops were sitting on top of strategic hills and border localities previously used as Cambodian military positions.

Talk of military reform, which in the Thai context means removing the armed forces from national politics, forced PP to put the issue on the back burner as the public cried out for a stronger and bigger army that can “cripple” Cambodia’s military capabilities to ensure they would not pose a threat for many years to come.

The Thai public was angry about Cambodia laying fresh mines along the disputed areas on the border. But no one asked the Thai military commanders why they kept sending troops on foot patrol to these areas when all sorts of technologies are available to monitor the areas.

It did not seem to matter to the policymakers and defence planners that much of the area along the border is disputed and has yet to be demarcated. With physical barriers and troop reinforcement, short-term political gain, not sustainable solutions, is good enough for Anutin.

It remains to be seen how his administration will deal with the border issue. Were the rhetorics about the border something politicians say during campaigns, or will Anutin continue to give the military full power to do whatever they want on the border once his government is formed?

Anutin also vowed to clamp down on online scammers. He will not be able to do it without the support of Cambodian law enforcement, which is not going to work with their Thai counterparts if Thai politicians continue to conflate the border conflict with Cambodian leaders being in bed with cybercriminals.

Some Considerations

The fact that Anutin does not seem to be as ambitious as Thaksin, whose every move was seen as challenging the status quo, works in his favour. Anutin seems very satisfied with the vote count. But of course, time will tell if this election result has planted crazy ambitions in Anutin’s head the same way it did with Thaksin two decades ago.

If recent Thai political history teaches us anything, it is that when here-today, gone-tomorrow politicians get aspirations and try to be more than what they can be, only disasters will follow. The toxic nationalism that Anutin has been riding will die down once tension along the Cambodian border subsides. The people’s attention will turn to Thailand’s “sick man of Asia” status as critical topics like salary and job security, as well as pocketbook issues, hit Anutin like a freight train.

Electoral Ambitions vs Security Realities

In the beginning of this year, 11 PTT petrol stations in Thailand’s southernmost border provinces came under simultaneous arson and bombing attacks in the wee hours of Sunday, 11 January 2026.

The country is currently undergoing preparations for a nationwide poll to elect local administration organisation officials.

Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul said the attacks might have been connected to the local elections in this region, which has a history of political violence. Success at the local level can shape national party strategies for the upcoming general election scheduled for 8 February.  

But by afternoon, the National Security Council (NSC) issued a statement saying the spate of attacks had “disrupted the peaceful co-existence of people of all races and faiths in the region, and that it was a clear indication that the responsible party has no legitimacy and is not qualified to claim representation of the people of this area.”

NSC stopped short of directly blaming Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN), the long-standing separatist movement that controls virtually all of the fighters on the ground. NSC has maintained that such violence undermined the ongoing peace process and has conveyed its concerns to BRN through the Malaysian government, the designated facilitator for the peace talks.

Official peace talks between Thailand and the Patani Malay separatist movements started in February 2013. The two sides have never moved beyond what they called “confidence-building measures”.

Divergent Visions

A leap of faith was taken at the high-level official meeting in December 2025, in Kuala Lumpur, when chief negotiators of the two sides, after nearly two years of no talks, discussed this flimsy notion of “end state”. It is a loaded term that is supposed to encapsulate how this century-old conflict should be resolved.

The previous government under Paetongtarn Shinawatra refused to engage in any official talks with BRN until the movement ceased violence on the ground. Moreover, her government insisted that BRN must send their military leaders to the table.

Technical representatives of the two sides came together from  6 to 8 January to continue with the discussion on the end state.

Thailand was not prepared to put all their cards on the table, but BRN spelt out in real terms what this notion means. For th

Obviously, the Thai representatives at the table did not have the kind of mandate to negotiate such a matter. It is way above the negotiators’ pay grade.

Demands for Autonomy

BRN went on to say that agreement on power and resource-sharing will have to be worked out between the two sides; the most disturbing clause is the right to secession. Until then, this historically contested regi

A Thai government official from

But there is no guarantee that Parliament would pass such a law, as it would be political suicide. Political and administrative powers in Thailand are extremely centralised.

Moreover, the Thai public in general is not sympathetic to the plight and grievances of the Malays of Patani.

Thailand suggested that the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC), a bloated multi-agency body that focused on development – particularly pilot projects to be handed back to line ministries – could be an entry point for BRN. Needless to say, the January meeting ended badly.

The Signal

Three days later, 11 PTT petrol stations and the attached convenience stores across the region were attacked. All fingers pointed to BRN.

It is worth noting that BRN does not confirm or deny operations on the ground. BRN fighters operate on autopilot; combatants act independently of their political leaders, who intervene when they deem the fighters have violated ground rules or when coordinations are needed. Such an arrangement allows the movement’s political leaders and negotiators a plausible deniability.

Thai officials said that instead of reverting to violence to pres

They need to be certain if their model of governance is what the people want, Thai officials said.

The current wave of insurgency violence resurfaced in mid-2001 after a decade of relative calm but was not officially recognised until 4 January 2004, when scores of BRN combatants raided an army battalion and made off with about 350 pieces of military weaponry.

Civilian and soft targets, including public schools and sometimes Buddhist monks and teachers, were targeted in the early phase of this wave of insurgency until local civil society organisations and community leaders stepped up their criticisms against BRN, calling for greater respect for civility and rules of engagement.

Attacks against civilian targets have virtually disappeared but do happen once in a long while, usually as a stern warning to the Thai security forces. A case in point was the brief but dramatic spike in violence against civilian targets in May 2025, in response to the shooting death of Abdulroning Lateh, a key BRN leader from the military wing. As expected, Thai security forces denied killing Abdulroning.

While the attackers may not have been after body counts in these arson attacks, the 11 petrol stations are nevertheless civilian targets. A local political action group, The Patani, issued a statement calling on all sides to embrace humanitarian principles and to end attacks on civilian targets.

BRN sympathisers often cite economic injustices whenever private businesses come under attack. Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, said the corporate brands of these petrol stations and convenience stores may belong to PTT and 7-Eleven, but the people who suffer most from these attacks are the franchisees, not the corporations themselves. BRN said they felt the Thai side treated them as a “plaything”—throwing out some fancy words, like “end state”, but refusing to elaborate or act on it. They felt the current government resu

The Deadlock of Divergent Aspirations

On the surface, the statement by the designated Malaysian facilitator for the peace talks sounded promising: Thailand and the rebel Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) agreed to work towards an “end state”.

The term emerged from decades of establishment officials asking one persistent question: how will this all end?

For BRN, however, the end state means self-government through a regional assembly empowered to draft its own laws and manage local affairs, including taxation, education and power sharing with the central government. Most controversially, they seek the right to secede from the Thai state.

For the Thais, the end state is something that has to be negotiated.

But after more than two decades of on-again, off-again peace talks, the two sides can still find a common ground to guide the peace process towards a meaningful end. The furthest they have progressed is establishing a framework – the so-called Joint Working Group on Peace Process (JCPP) – under which both sides identified three priorities. These are the reduction of violence, public consultation and a political solution to end the conflict.

Little progress has been made on concrete details, however.

The previous government under then prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra refused to resume talks unless BRN stopped attacking Thai targets. They also insisted on negotiating only with BRN’s military wing—those who supposed

BRN countered that violence reduction must be negotiated, and any ceasefire would require monitoring by the international community.

Within days of taking power, the government under Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul announced the resumption of peace talks. No one was certain what he hoped to achieve, g

Thai and BRN chief negotiators met briefly in November 2025 to prepare for a high-level official meeting on 8 December in Kuala Lumpur. This time, the term “JCPP” was dropped and replaced with the Peace Dialogue Plan Implementation Framework (PDPIF). The content is more or less the same, but the rebranding creates an impression that Anutin’s camp is pursuing something fresh and new.

Rebranding the Stagnation

“But nothing fundamentally has changed,” said Asmadee Bueheng, a local writer and a close observer of the conflict. “Youth activists still face legal persecution for speaking out, and the controversial Emergency Law remain in place.”

This short-lived new beginning saw the end of the role of five internat

The press statement from Malaysia’s Office of the Facilitator for the southern Thai peace talks contained some promising words. But considering the background and context – how this high-level meeting suddenly materialised after nearly two years of no official talks – it is difficult to feel excited about any claims of success.

There were secret meetings, facilitated by Malaysia, to get BRN to stand down during last year’s Ramadhan (from 1 to 30 March), but Bangkok did not have anything to offer.

While a regional assembly may be too controversial at this juncture, other issues such as the Patani Malay ethno-religious identity, historical narrative and cultural space could have been pushed through to demonstrate the country’s willingness to meet BRN halfway. 

Instead, the Thai side offered nothing new beyond a different chief negotiator and fancy words that confused more than clarified any meaningful intent.

The Living Memory of Tak Bai

BRN combatants, who have been operating on an autopilot mode in which a set of broadly defined rules of engagement are normally observed, are reminded of the Tak Bai massacre in 2004 when 85 young Malay men died at the hand of Thai security forces. As many as 78 of them died from suffocation because they were stacked on top of one another, and seven were shot dead at the protest site.

Thailand never made a closure on this incident, as the statute of limitations expired 20 years after the incident, but the security forces continue to pay the price for the incident. The massacre became an important part of the rebels’ narrative.

Based on the public statement released after the December meeting, it appears that the Thai representatives could have taken this chance to respond to the longstanding grievances expressed by BRN and the people of Patani.

In short, the recent high-level meeting itself represents progress only because peace talks had been put off for some time.

But the meeting’s modest output risks creating false hope among local people who want to see meaningful talks resume. It came at a time when Anutin was facing a desperate political situation following poor handling of flooding in the South.

Moreover, his unchecked support for the army over the border clashes with Cambodia could backfire against his mid-size party if the current frantic nationalism loses steam and his base in the northeast begins demanding attention to bread-and-butter issues – or, in their case, rice and fish – as the cost of military operations takes a toll on their livelihoods.

As with the far south conflict, allowing the army to define “national threats” limits the scope of solutions. For more than two decades, this threat perception has confined the peace process to a tiny box of confidence-building measures. It has merely served as a talk shop that never advances because bureaucrats cannot agree on the nature of the violence, much less the needed concession for peaceful coexistence with the Malays of Patani.

Calling it a “conflict” means recognising the historical grievances of the Malay people and legitimising BRN. But calling the combatants anything other than criminals invites counterattacks not just from the hawks but from a public that has long believed official claims that these Melayu fighters are drug-crazed yo

The “Criminal” vs “Conflict” Narrative

Yet, even after security officials came to the realisation that they had been barking up the wrong tree – that religion is not the driving force of the struggle, but Malay nationalism – they lacked the political will to explore terms for peaceful coexistence with the Malays. Instead, they relied mainly on military-led counterinsurgency measures.

According to Asmadee, nothing has changed under the current Thai government. The controversial Emergency Law and Martial Law remain in place, and political activists continue facing harassment from security agencies and through judicial channels. Mi

Moreover, five youth leaders from The P

The participants were asked if they would support a formal referendum on RSD – not independent Patani – if the law permits it. The Fourth Army Area, the command in charge of the Thailand’s counterinsurgency in this restive region, was displeased and directed the police to press charges.

Ironically, The Patani is often the group security officials consult – and at times ask to intervene – when addressing extremely sensitive issues with BRN. The Patani criticises all sides – Thai authorities and BRN – when rights are violated and rules of engagement, civility and humanitarian norms are disrespected.

Anutin will certainly go to the polls in February 2026 claiming to have accomplished something for the far south—more than the previous government, at least. If his Bhumjaithai Party becomes a coalition member of the next government, the current negotiating team could receive another mandate. Whether they can develop the political courage to be more creative than their predecessors – or convince the conservative establishment to open space for critical dialogue – remains to be seen.

Introduction

The collapse of the four crime families and other Kokang warlords in late 2023 reverberated throughout Myanmar, delivering an unmistakable warning to armed groups and criminal networks: that no one remains beyond reach – regardless of connections or perceived power – if they target Chinese citizens with scams.

For years, these criminal syndicates operated scam centres and conducted illicit activities along the Sino-Myanmar border. Their control of the Kokang Border Guard Force (BGF) positioned them as allies of Myanmar’s powerful military junta.

Their fortunes reversed when China determined that the situation had become intolerable. Beijing gave the Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA) – a coalition comprising the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) – an authorisation to dismantle these operations after Myanmar’s generals refused to act against their Kokang allies. The four families fled, seeking protection from the junta as their empire crumbled. With nothing to offer in exchange for sanctuary, Myanmar’s generals arrested them and extradited them to China. Many received death sentences, while others faced life imprisonment for their crimes.

The End of Tolerance

The downfall of the Kokang family and BGF resonated throughout Myanmar, including with the 7,000-strong Karen BGF led by Col Chit Thu, a powerful warlord controlling substantial territory along the Thai border.

Approximately a decade ago, Chinese criminal syndicates began relocating to Karen BGF territory, constructing compounds housing entertainment complexes, brothels, casinos and cyber scam centres generating billions of dollars annually. Chit Thu maintained publicly that he merely collected rent and bore no responsibility for his tenants’ activities.

However, witnessing the merciless dismantling of the Kokang and their BGF allies instilled apprehension in Chit Thu. Hoping to distance himself from the stigma of association with the Tatmadaw, Chit Thu announced in January 2024 that his organisation had withdrawn from the Tatmadaw’s chain of command. The rebranded Karen National Army (KNA) still gets referred to by media and locals as BGF, however. Despite his efforts, Chit Thu could not escape the tarnished reputation.

By 2025, international tolerance had reached its limit. The US Department of the Treasury sanctioned KNA as a transnational criminal organisation in May. In November, a smaller group operating under a ceasefire arrangement with the junta – the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) and its top four leaders – joined the sanctions list. The United States simultaneously launched a new Scam Center Strike Force targeting these cybercriminals. DKBA is a signatory to the government’s National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), a nationwide accord hastily assembled by the Thein Sein government in October 2015.

Earlier this year, Chinese Assistant Minister of Public Security Liu Zhongyi made two successive visits to the Thailand-Myanmar border, pressuring both countries to take action. Thailand complied by cutting utilities and internet access, only to see them replaced by generators, Starlink terminals and smuggled fuel. Ironically, these measures impacted local communities more severely than the criminal operations.

KNA and its criminal associates released approximately 7,000 people from the scam centres, allowing them to flee to Thailand for processing and return to their home countries. Chinese nationals comprised the largest group.

Th

Evacuations and Optics

Eight months later, in late October 2025, an assault on KK Park, one of the Chinese-run notorious compounds in the Myawaddy area, forced approximately 1,700 mostly foreign nationals to flee across the border to Thailand. They came from 21 different countries—most were Chinese nationals.

Four weeks later, in late November 2025, Myanmar soldiers, this time joined reluctantly by KNA troops, attacked the Shwe Kokko compound, forcing thousands to flee as troops demolished over 100 buildings in a desperate demonstration to the international community that Myanmar’s military government takes law and order seriously.

Not everyone is departing Myawaddy, however. Many scammers have chosen to remain, dispersing throughout Myawaddy Township to continue illicit operations from privately rented homes, dormitories and hotels, according to Mizzima News.

Both KK Park and Shwe Kokko sit within Myawaddy Township, the Myanmar border town adjacent to Thailand’s Mae Sot district. The two compounds occupy territory controlled by KNA.

The crackdowns have proven inconsistent. A Thai security officer said weeks before the October assault on KK Park, KNA had been relocating Chinese site managers and “bosses” from these scam compounds to a new location north of Mae Sot.

“They (KNA) were charging substantial sums of money and splitting it with Myanmar authorities,” said a Thai security officer monitoring the border situation. The attack against Shwe Kokko a month later followed the same pattern, with site managers and those who could afford it being evacuated before what was supposedly a surprise attack, the officer said.

Mizzima News, citing local sources, reported that Chinese nationals believed to be crime syndicate members were evacuated on the evening of 17 November 2025 by KNA troops, the night before the raid on the Shwe Kokko compound.

“They won’t let us go outside. All the doors are locked. There are no more Chinese inside, only us Myanmar people and some other foreigners. The building lights are off, and we’re not allowed to use phones. I think they freed the Chinese and are keeping us as hostages,” a 22-year-old Myanmar woman inside one of the buildings told Mizzima News.

Observers suggest Myanmar wants to demonstrate to the world that it takes crime seriously and that it regards the upcoming general election as significant. However, compelling Chit Thu’s KNA to destroy the source of his wealth, from which the government gets a cut, has not achieved the desired public relations outcome.

Speaking in Bangkok, Prof Yanghee Lee, former UN Special Rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar, called on ASEAN and the international community to adopt a more active role and principled engagement to bring about change in Myanmar.

“Unfortunately, Myanmar possesses abundant natural resources that other countries want. Once the election concludes, many countries will reach out and enter the country, which will be devastating news for the people of Myanmar. It will be on our watch that the people of Myanmar will be crushed even more,” Prof Lee said.

Shifting Alliances

Indeed, the fragile dynamics between DKBA, an NCA signatory, and Karen National Union (KNU), a major rebel outfit fighting the junta, erupted on 21 November when they clashed in a brief gunfight near Min Let Pan village, approximately 16km south of Myawaddy.

According to a DKBA liaison officer in Mae Sot, stray gunfire struck their position, triggering limited retaliation—standard operat

KNU, however, characterised the incident in a 25 November statement as a “coordinated attack”. A subsequent ground assessment uncovered an active scam compound in the area housing more than 2,000 foreign workers, predominantly Chinese.

According to a Thai intelligence officer on the border, DKBA had closed the Hpalu-Wawlay Road – strategically crucial as it has been the site of intense fighting between the Tatmadaw and resistance forces – as leverage to secure the return of the 230 captured fighters. Within a week, KNU returned all captured DKBA members and their weapons.

As the Tatmadaw intensified operations to retake the area around Min Let Pan, KNU warned on 2 December that it could no longer guarantee the safety of the 900 remaining foreign nationals refusing to evacuate a compound.

In their statement, KNU spokesman Padoh Saw Taw Nee called on China to pressure the Tatmadaw to halt heavy weapons fire and aerial bombardment, warning that lives hung in the balance.

In a statement dated 6 December, KNU accused the Tatmadaw of deliberately targeting unarmed civilians with mortar fire into the Shunda Park compound, noting that some rounds strayed across the border, forcing villagers on the Thai side to flee.

KNU suggested that some people trapped in the compound might be high-value criminals and urged the international community to intervene quickly.

KNU said 2,460 out of 2,665 persons had been transferred from Shunda Park to Thai authorities. Many had fled the compound independently, refusing to surrender to Thai authorities, possibly from fear of persecution back home. The borderlands remain a volatile mosaic of shifting alliances, criminal enterprises and desperate civilians—a testament to a decades-old conflict now deeply entangled with the global scourge of cyber-scamming.

Resumed Talks

After nearly two years of stagnation, peace negotiations between the Thai government and the rebel Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) are getting back on track. Leaders from both sides met recently to acquaint themselves and prepare for a high-level official meeting next month, facilitated by Malaysia.

Thailand’s newly appointed chief negotiator for the conflict, Gen (rtd) Somsak Rungsita, along with National Security Council (NSC) Secretary-General Chatchai Bangchuad, met with BRN chief negotiator Anas Abdulrohman in Kuala Lumpur on 11 November 2025.

According to a press statement from the Of

A BRN officer from the negotiation team said the organisation acknowledges the short time the current government of Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has in office but pledged the movement would do its utmost to ensure continuity.

The last high-level talks with the BRN – the longstanding separatist group that controls combatants in Thailand’s far south – were held in Kuala Lumpur on 6-7 February 2024.

Past Setbacks

As for the meeting next month, the two sides will pick up where they left off—discussing the Joint Comprehensive Plan toward Peace (JCPP). This framework identifies three key items: reduction of violence, public consultation and a political solution to end the conflict, which has claimed over 7,700 lives since the current wave of insurgency resurfaced in January 2004. The region is the historical Malay h

Initially, they had planned to delve deeper into these three items. However, fierce criticism from insiders of the then-ruling Pheu Thai Party, particularly Prof Surachart Bamrungsuk, sidelined the negotiators and effectively put formal talks on hold for nearly two years.

Surachart was upset that the Thai team had not made the reduction of violence a binding commitment and lashed out at international donors for not pressuring the BRN to end its violent tactics; he said their role in the peace process has helped to legitimise BRN.

Still, quiet discussions between BRN and Thai representatives continued outside the formal track. During a meeting at the beginning of this year, the Thai side requested a temporary ceasefire during the holy month of Ramadhan, which ran from 1 to 30 March 2025.

BRN agreed on the condition that international observers be permitted on the ground and an unspecified number of detainees be released. The then-defence minister Phumtham Wechayachai rejected the proposal, insisting the government would only negotiate if BRN ended its campaign of violence and that they would only talk with those who have command-and-control over militants on the ground.

When political discussions hit a brick wall, BRN’s military wing took charge to map out the next move. On 9 March, a 10-strong BRN unit attacked the Sungai Kolok district office in Narathiwat, killing two Defence Volunteers (security details for the Ministry of Interior officials) and wounding eight others.

The combatants left behind a car packed with explosives that detonated during the

Differing Definitions of “Peace”

Today, with Pheu Thai and Surachart out, NSC has returned to the fold. A public event was organised by NSC on 29 October where all former chief negotiators were invited to share their experiences. They largely echoed the same points: that there is continuity despite political instability, a commitment to peace and that Thailand’s territorial integrity remains paramount.

But academic and peace expert Mark Tamthai, who led the negotiation team under former premier Abhisit Vejjajiva, said Thailand has yet to understand the nature of the conflict in the far south and therefore has not developed the necessary tools to extinguish it.

“At first, there is the simplistic view that people take up arms because they are upset with the state. But the reality is more complicated than that,” said Mark, a retired professor of peace studies at Chiang Mai’s Payap University.

Mark believes there must be a better way to involve the public because their participation could help strengthen the peace process and generate traction.

“My other question is why the peace process doesn’t seem to be going anywhere. We take a step forward and then take a step back. Why is that?” he asked.

One reason the process seems circular is that both sides define peace differently.

“For the government, peace is the absence of violence, as well as the people of Patani living within the framework set by the government. They are not allowed to make too many demands, such as self-determination rights, and there can also be no seminar on a public referendum,” Mark said. “If these demands continue to surface, in the state’s view, then the fire in the south has yet to be put out.”

Mark said BRN and local civil society agree with the state on the first point—that regional violence must end. But the second point involves opening a political space where no issue is off-limits. This is where the two sides differ greatly, as demonstrated by the ongoing court case against political activists in the far south.

“I’m glad that the new chief negotiator (Gen [rtd] Somsak) wants to hear what the local people are saying. But you must be serious about wanting to listen; you can’t let them speak and then turn around and charge them with what

Mark also pointed to JCPP as an example of progress that can only go so far. “But when the issue of public consultation comes up, some people retreat. Why? Because public consultation doesn’t fit their definition of what is politically permissible,” he said.

Hurdles

The upcoming high-level meeting will not be a walk in the park. It comes at a time when flimsy charges are being levied against five civic actors, scheduled to appear in the Pattani Criminal Court on 20 November 2025, to face charges of advocating separatism during a 2023 seminar that they had participated in.

What got on the nerve of the region’s military command was the mock referendum, which asked participants a hypothetical question on whether they would support the idea of a referendum on rights to self-determination if Thai law p

Moreover, old issues like public consultation under the framework of JCPP remain far from resolved. BRN has informed Thailand that its representatives should be permitted to enter the far south to conduct in-person public consultations.

This request was rejected by the Thai army, whose leaders feared a public relations nightmare. One military intelligence officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, asked to imagine an outpouring of public support for BRN delegates; such a scene would not only embarrass the Thai side but also shatter its long-standing claim that the Malays of Patani side with them.

Making the Most of Limited Time

After nearly two years of a halted formal process, BRN considered the setting up of a negotiating team as somewhat pretentious, considering the government has only less than four months in office before a general election is called. Yet, it could set a precedent for the incoming administration, especially if the ruling Bhumjaithai Party is part of the coalition and tasked with conflict resolution in the far south.

“We are looking to make the most of it given the limited time in office of this government,” one BRN operative said.

BRN has already stated it is willing to settle for something less than full independence. The ball now seems to be in Thailand’s court to reciprocate.

For Artef Sohko, president of The Patani – a political action group that often acts as an interlocutor between BRN and Thai government agencies – the clock is ticking. The next wave of BRN leaders might not be as accommodating as the current ones.

If the Thai government continues to kick the can down the road, the next generation of BRN leaders could retreat from their commitment to work within the Thai Constitution. Artef is one of the five civic actors being charged with advocating separatism for participating in a mock referendum.

The challenge for the current and incoming government is enormous. It is unclear if Bhumjaithai has the appetite or the mindset for a challenge that demands creative policy and serious thought about what aspects of Thailand’s nation-state construct must be revised for the sake of peace and peaceful coexistence with the Malays of Patani.

Moreover, violence in this historically contested region has been on the rise, with combatants (who are operating quite freely) straying outside the normal theatre of conflict. Last month’s gold heist in Narathiwat, where over 36.5 million baht worth of gold was stolen, as well as a

No Luck Anwar

The Malaysian government has been mediating the peace talks in Thailand’s far south since 2013, but when it comes to Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, luck has not always been on his side.

Every time Anwar succeeded in getting the Thai government to accelerate progress, Thai politics invariably intervened, prolonging the peace process that has never been a high priority for any Thai administration.

Coming into power in November 2022, Anwar – a figure who has endured prison and a long political struggle – inspired excitement among M

However, when Srettha Thavisin assumed premiership in August 2023, he largely ignored the far south, unwilling to antagonise the Thai Army and its uncompromising counterinsurgency stance. Furthermore, Srettha focused on maintaining a delicate political balance that had enabled Thaksin Shinawatra’s return from exile—a Faustian bargain with the conservative establishment that required careful nurturing. Upsetting the military was not part of that deal.

Yet, the Malaysian-facilitated peace process had been developing for over a decade, and Bangkok could only delay for so long. A nudge from Anwar three months into Srettha’s term led to the appointment of Chatchai Bangchuad, then deputy secretary-general of the National Security Council (NSC), as chief negotiator—the first civilian in the role in 12 years.

This move allowed the Peace Dialogue Panel and Bari

Complications

But in the far south, nothing comes easily. When a draft of the JCPP was leaked, it drew harsh criticism from military and political insiders. Professor Surachart Bamrungsuk, a Pheu Thai insider, relentlessly attacked the NSC-led team, accusing them of exceeding their mandate and criticising European donors for not pressuring the

In reality, both Thai and BRN negotiators were participating in mediation training in Europe, and a Japanese organisation even offered to host high-level talks in Tokyo. Furthermore, Thailand participated in a back-channel discussion with BRN through foreign mediation without Malaysia’s participation. But the process never advanced beyond confidence-building measures. The political leadership above the negotiators showed no real intention of offering concessions to BRN or the Patani Malays.

Thai institutions have never been united on the south, even on basic issues like whether to classify BRN as a criminal organisation or as combatants. International NGOs face wrath for using the term “armed conflict”, and bodies like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation are criticised for engaging the BRN. Any hint of legitimacy for the insurgents provokes Thai ire—even as its negotiators are sent to meet with them.

U

But as an interlocutor, Malaysia faces a complex challenge: its proximity and refusal to support separatism require all Malaysian leaders to carefully balance between respecting Thailand’s territorial integrity and acknowledging the historical grievances of the Patani people.

Artef Sohko, president of The Patani, a local political action group, believes Malaysia must do more than just urge Thailand to come to the table. He argues that Thailand needs creative ideas, and Malaysia – with international help – can provide them.

“Negotiation is a give-and-take process,” Artef said, “but Thailand only wants to take.”

He points out to Thailand’s relentless push for a ceasefire, which does little to advance conflict resolution and more for public consumption, as Thai leaders are in a constant campaign to garner public endorsement.

In comparison, Malaysia was successful in mediating the peace process between the Moros and the Philippines government. That was because Malaysia was able to get a firm commitment from Manila for concession and compromise before it took up the mediation role. Malaysia did not make the same demand with Thailand before it committed itself as the mediator in February 2013.

While Malaysian officials discuss the southern Thai conflict with Thai NSC officials regularly, Dato Mohd Rabin Basir, the designated facilitator, has not had much luck reaching the army generals, the lynchpin behind conflict resolution in the far south.

Instability in Bangkok

But obstacles and roadblocks are nothing new in the quest for peace in this historically contested region known as Patani. Thailand’s political instability continues to take its toll.

In August 2024, the Constitutional Court removed Srettha on ethical grounds. He was replaced by Paetongtarn Shinawatra, Thaksin’s daughter, who was shielded by party elders. Her deputy, Phumtham Wechayachai, refused to resume talks unless BRN stopped its violence first. BRN replied that violence reduction was negotiable but demanded international monitoring of any ceasefire.

Thailand rejected these demands, despite BRN’s agreement to negotiate under the Thai Constitution—effectively taking independence off the table. Instead, Bangkok stuck to its old strategy: trying to identify and negotiate directly with the leaders of BRN’s military wing despite not knowing their identities and being unwilling to offer meaningful concessions. BRN insisted that protocol must be respected and insisted that the government do not get to pick and choose who in the movement they want to meet.

The Pheu Thai-led government feared that entering talks amid ongoing attacks would make them look weak. Ironically, it was not BRN tha

Malaysia was called upon to mediate again, this time with the United States and China observing. Anwar also nudged Bangkok to restart the peace talks. A new, diverse negotiating team was planned, including retired generals, a former diplomat and a village chief from the far south, with an announcement set for September 2025.

But on 29 August, the Constitutional Court remo

Anwar, as ASEAN chair, had earlier appointed Thaksin as an advisor on Myanmar and the far south—a move that yielded no results. Thaksin’s influence evaporated entirely on 9 September, when the Supreme Court ruled that his hospital detention was an attempt to avoid his reduced jail sentence. He is now back in jail.

Now, the peace process for the far south is once again in limbo, likely delayed until after the next general election. It makes little sense for a four-month government to appoint a negotiating team only to dissolve it shortly after. But for Anwar, the pursuit of peace in Thailand’s deep south remains a story of promise and perseverance, continuously unravelled by the political fortunes of its neighbour.

Prelude

The five-day clashes between Thai and Cambodian troops that erupted on 24 July 2025 near Prasat Ta Muen Thom temple were more than another flare-up in a long-standing border dispute. It was the inevitable result of two nations trapped by historical grievances, domestic political posturing and a failure of bilateral diplomacy.

The conflict displaced more than 300,000 people and left at least 43 dead; it was the deadliest confrontation between the two countries in a decade.

While both sides hastily blamed each other for the violence, the deeper causes lie in unresolved colonial-era wounds, militarised nationalism and leaders exploiting tensions for political gains rather than pursuing lasting solutions.

A Cycle of Provocation and Empty Diplomacy 

The 28 May clash, which left one Cambodian soldier dead, and the subsequent 8 June handshake agreement between regional commanders to de-escalate followed a predictable script: a brief violence, a performative diplomacy by local commanders and a return to the status quo.

The pattern of escalation, temporary ceasefire, and renewed tension reflects the inadequacy of existing bilateral frameworks rather than the absence of diplomatic mechanisms. The Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) and various military-to-military agreements have repeatedly failed to prevent conflict because they address symptoms rather than underlying structural problems.

Cambodia’s trench-digging earlier in 2025 and Thailand’s response with a military buildup were deliberate provocations, yet neither side was willing to de-escalate meaningfully. 

The real breakdown came on 18 June, when Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen leaked a private call with then Thai prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra, exposing her criticism of a Thai general as an “opponent” who “just wanted to look tough”.

The leak was not accidental—it was a calculated move to undermine Thailand’s leadership and exploit its civil-military divide. The resulting protests in Bangkok forced Paetongtarn’s suspension, leaving the military in control of border policy. 

Paetongtarn’s private acknowledgment of military intransigence – describing a senior commander as an “opponent” who “wanted to look tough” – revealed the disconnect between political leadership and military institutional interests. The resulting street protests and her subsequent suspension by the Constitutional Court demonstrate how border affairs have become a litmus test for political legitimacy in Thailand.

Colonial Ghosts and the Politics of Grievance

The Ta Muen Thom dispute cannot be understood without acknowledging the colonial legacy poisoning bilateral relations.

Thailand’s refusal to fully accept French-drawn borders – exemplified by its lingering bitterness over the 1962 International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling that gave Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia – has fostered a nationalist narrative of historical victimhood.

Similarly, Cambodia’s 2003 anti-Thai riots that led to the burning down of the Thai Embassy in Phnom Penh were triggered by a claim by local Cambodian media that a Thai actress was reported to have said Angkor Wat, one of the world’s most important archaeological sites, once belonged to Thailand. The incident reveals how easily historical resentment can be weaponised.

Unlike the Thai-Malaysian border, where technical demarcation proceeds without major incident, the Thai-Cambodian frontier remains politicised.

Malaysia avoids inflaming Thai sensitivities over “lost” territories. The Thai national narrative around “lost territories” to British Malaya – particularly Kedah and Kelantan – demonstrates how colonial-era concessions have become embedded in national identity.

The persistent refrain that “it was ours and we gave it to the British for the sake of peace” illustrates how territorial loss remains a source of national trauma, even when, as with Malaysia, the current relationship remains stable because neither side politicises historical grievances. Despite this, separatist insurgency in Thailand’s Malay-speaking south demonstrates how nation building is never straightforward.

Thailand’s relationship with its colonial past reveals a unique psychological burden among Southeast Asian states—as the only nation in the region never formally colonised, Thailand nonetheless lost significant territories to European powers through forced treaties and diplomatic pressure.

Cambodia – under successive governments – has no such restraint. For Hun Sen and now his son, Prime Minister Hun Manet, anti-Thai rhetoric is a tool to consolidate power amidst economic struggles and a faltering transition from the father’s 40-year rule.

The July 2025 crisis exemplifies how both Thai and Cambodian leaders have consistently chosen to exploit historical resentments rather than educate their populations about colonial injustices and the need for pragmatic accommodation. This pattern of behaviou

For Thailand, the leaked phone conversation between Hun Sen and then prime minister Paetongtarn exposed the fundamental contradiction between diplomatic pragmatism and public nationalist expectations.

Cambodia’s approach reflects different but equally problematic dynamics. Hun Manet’s handling of the crisis must be understood within the context of a difficult political transition from his father’s four-decade rule. With ordinary Cambodians frustrated by economic conditions but lacking outlets for political expression due to media control and a parliament dominated by the ruling party (120 of 125 seats), external conflict provides a convenient mechanism for consolidating nationalist credentials and diverting attention from domestic f

Structural Impediments to Resolution

The fundamental challenge facing Thai-Cambodian relations lies not in the absence of diplomatic mechanisms but in the structural incentives that make conflict more politically useful than resolution for leaders in both countries.

Hun Manet needs nationalist credentials to establish legitimacy independent of his father’s legacy while facing economic pressures that limit his ability to deliver material improvements for ordinary Cambodians.

In Thailand, the military’s institutional interests in maintaining political relevance amid reform pressures align with public nationalist sentiment in ways that constrain civilian political leadership.

The Pheu Thai government’s effective marginalisation following the leaked phone conversation demonstrates how quickly external conflicts can destabilise domestic political arrangements. One can also make the argument that the Pheu Thai government had it coming; the writing was on the wall when they made an incompetent young lady the prime minister.

The Internationalisation of a Local Conflict

Both nations have reached out to members of the international community to present their case.

Cambodia succeeded in getting the United Nations Security Council to convene an emergency meeting but could not convince the council to issue a resolution for an immediate ceasefire. Cambodia was hoping that the council would suggest that the matter be taken up at ICJ, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. But that did not materialise either.

According to a diplomat from

“The Thais were sophisticated and technical in their messaging, citing the Geneva Convention, breach of anti-mine and anti-cluster munition obligations,” he added.

Thailand’s rejection of ICJ’s jurisdiction, based on its negative experience with the 1962 Preah Vihear ruling, illustrates how past legal defeats can constrain future diplomatic options. However, this stance also reflects a deeper strategic calculation: accepting ICJ jurisdiction would require acknowledging the legitimacy of colonial-era maps and potentially accepting unfavourable rulings on other disputed territories.

Meanwhile, Cambodia’s push for ICJ involvement, while appearing to take the moral high ground internationally, serves multiple domestic political purposes.

It positions Hun Manet as defending national sovereignty through legal rather than purely military means, potentially appealing to international opinion while demonstrating resolve to domestic audiences. However, the impact of civilian casualties from Cambodian rocket attacks on Thai schools and hospitals undermines this strategy by providing Thailand with its own moral arguments.

This is affirmed by a Bangkok-based diplomat who said Cambodia was on the verge of obtaining the moral high ground with its request to ICJ and for outside mediation but shot itself in the foot with its attacks on civilian targets in Thailand.

Both sides’ attempts to claim moral authority – Thailand’s targeting of military rather than civilian infrastructure and Cambodia’s appeal to international law – reveal an understanding that regional and global opinion increasingly matters in territorial disputes. However, the use of cluster munitions by Thai forces and civilian casualties from Cambodian attacks demonstrate how quickly moral positioning can be undermined by military necessities.

From a bird’s eye view, Cambodia appeared to be positioning itself as a smaller nation standing up to Thailand’s “aggression”, leveraging international sympathy. Thailand, on the other hand, emphasises restraint – limiting airstrikes to military targets – to claim the moral high ground, despite allegations of cluster munitions.

Moreover, nations with more military might prefer bilateral mechanisms in settling disputes, while countries with a smaller army tend to go for multilateral forums.

Meanwhile, the involvement of the United States and China as observers in the Malaysian-mediated talks underscores how local conflicts could become proxy battlegrounds for great-power competition. Both superpowers cited peace and stability in Southeast Asia as their reason for involvement, but all eyes are on the China-funded naval base in Cambodia.

Geopolitical Competition and Regional Implications

While the presence of the United States and China signals how bilateral disputes increasingly serve as proxies for broader geopolitical competit

This shift carries significant economic implications, particularly regarding the estimated one million Cambodian migrant workers employed in Thailand and the potential US$300 billion in gas reserves in the disputed Gulf of Thailand area. The connection between Hun Sen’s decision to leak the private phone conversation and Thaksin Shinawatra’s alleged refusal to advance the offshore gas deal suggests that territorial disputes have become instruments for advancing broader economic and political agendas.

The deployment of F-16 fighter jets by Thailand served primarily symbolic purposes, demonstrating military superiority while remaining within bounds that would not trigger broader international intervention. This calculated escalation reflects a sophisticated understanding of how to project strength without crossing red lines that might invite foreign criticism.

Implications for Regional Security Architecture

The Malaysian mediation effort, while producing a temporary ceasefire, illustrates both the potential and limitations of ASEAN’s

The pattern of regular meetings between military commanders, direct communication channels between defence ministers and ASEAN observer roles represents an attempt at institutionalisation of conflict management rather than conflict resolution. These mechanisms may prevent escalation to full-scale war but do little to address underlying sources of tension. If ASEAN is willing to come this far, perhaps Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim can guide it a little further along this line.

Breaking the Wheel

Resolving the Thai-Cambodian border disputes requires addressing three fundamental challenges: 1) developing new national narratives that acknowledge colonial legacies without perpetuating grievances; 2) creating domestic political incentives for leaders to pursue accommodation rather than confrontation and; 3) establishing regional mechanisms capable of addressing root causes rather than merely managing symptoms.

The July 2025 crisis demonstrates that without addressing these structural factors, even successful mediation efforts will likely prove temporary. Both sides are quick to accuse the other of ceasefire violation but not doing enough to work towards creating an atmosphere conducive for peace and peaceful coexistence.

The pattern of escalation, ceasefire and renewed tension will continue as long as both countries’ political systems reward nationalist posturing over pragmatic accommodation. The broader implications extend beyond bilateral relations to the credibility of regional security architecture and the ability of middle powers to manage territorial disputes in an era of great power competition. The Thai-Cambodian case may well serve as a test of whether Southeast Asian nations can develop effective mechanisms for addressing colonial legacies and managing territorial disputes, or whether these issues will continue to serve as sources of instability and vehicles for external power competition.

Introduction

The morning of 24 July 2025 started off with a brief but fierce gunfight between Thai and Cambodian troops dispatched to a poorly demarcated area around a disputed ancient Hindu temple, Prasat Ta Muen Thom, which is accessible by the people of both sides.

As expected, Thailand and Cambodia accused each other of starting the fight. The risk for deadly confrontation was obvious given recent developments and the military buildup in the area. But neither side had the political courage to rethink their strategy for fear of looking weak in the eyes of their constituency. 

Lack of unity between the political leaders in Bangkok and the Thai army made policy coordination that much more difficult. Cambodia, on the other hand, was getting on Thai troops’ last good nerve with the digging of trenches around the disputed area earlier this year.

To recap, armed clashes erupted on 28 May 2025, resulting in the death of one Cambodian soldier. Ten days later, on 8 June 2025, regional commanders from both sides met and agreed to fill up the trenches and withdraw their soldiers from the disputed location. They shook hands and posed for a photo and then retreated to their previous positions before the confrontation in late May.

But the absence of clashes does not spell peace. Cambodia was determined to take this case, along with other disputed territories on the border, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ); the Thai government rejected the idea, saying it is committed to bilateral negotiations through the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) and will not accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction.

Things went downhill quickly on 18 June 2025 after Cambodia’s President of the Senate Hun Sen leaked a private phone conversation he had with the then Thai prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra three days earlier.

Besides the appearance of kowtowing to Cambodia, Paetongtarn made a critical remark about one of her senior military commanders, referring to him as an “opponent” who just “wanted to look tough.”

Street protests erupted in Bangkok as demonstrators called for her resignation.

Colonial Legacy Complicates Resolution

Asking Thailand and Cambodia leaders to think constructively about border affairs may be unrealistic given that the disputes are rooted in the colonial past—a legacy from which Thailand has struggled to move forward.

Thailand’s refusal to accept its colonial legacy goes beyond simply lamenting past losses. Consider Siam’s “lost” territories to British Malaya: the surrender of what are now northern Malaysian states – Kedah and Kelantan – continues to shape the Thai national psyche. “It was ours, and we gave it to the British for peace’s sake,” goes the common refrain.

The Thai state does not make a big issue of these “losses”, partly because Malaysia does not politicise the issue or rub it in Thailand’s face. Demarcation along the Thai-Malaysian political border is conducted by technical officials from both sides without incident, although separatist insurgency in Thailand’s Malay-speaking South serves as a reminder that post-colonial nation-state const

Nonetheless, Thailand is not alone in dealing with historical hangups. In 2003, deep-rooted resentment in Cambodia resulted in an anti-Thai riot that ended in an arson attack against the Thai embassy in Phnom Penh after a Thai actress was reported to have said Angkor Wat, one of the world’s most important archaeological sites, belongs to Thailand.

Instead of making the hard choice between explaining to their respective citizens about the injustice of the colonial past and the need to come to terms with it, Thai and Cambodian political leaders took the easy way out by exploiting this resentment for quick political gains. 

International Arena Becomes Battlefield

The competition extends beyond the battlefield as military actions coincided with intense diplomatic outreach, with both Thailand and Cambodia attempting to control the narrative. Both countries have turned to ASEAN, the United Nations and members of the international community to present their respective cases.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet succeeded in getting the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to an urgent meeting “to stop Thailand’s aggression” but fail to get the Council to issue a resolution to call for an immediate ceasefire.

Thailand, in turn, has accused Cambodia of committing war crimes for targeting civilians and of violating a major

Thailand fell short of calling on the treaty’s secretariat to send a fact-finding mission to investigate the incident. The blast site is part of a larger minefield, known as the K5 Belt, where the Thailand/China-backed Khmer Rouge fought the Vietnam-supported People’s Republic of Kampuchea throughout the 1980s. Both sides had flooded the area with landmines that, 50 years later, have yet to be fully removed. Neither Thailand nor Cambodia is a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Thailand is unable to convince members of the international community of its justification to reject Cambodia’s proposal to allow ICJ to rule on the overlapping claims of the Ta Muen Thom Temple. The country has not been able to move on from the 1962 ICJ ruling that, based on the French map, gave the Preah Vihear temple to Cambodia. Thailand reluctantly accepted the ruling but continued to dispute the area surrounding the temple.

Pursuing the road towards ICJ may put Cambodia in a positive light in the eyes of the international community, but – as one Bangkok-based diplomat noted – this path was undermined when Cambodian rockets landed on Thai public schools, hospitals and a convenience store.

Taking the Moral High Ground

With a high number of displaced people and damaged properties, both sides appeared to have exercised some degree of restraint and confined the fighting to the border provinces. No major infrastructure or commercial assets in the border region have come under attack.

Footage of Thai villagers and school children running for cover prompted Thai citizens, particularly the conservative nationalists, to inflict more punishment on Cambodia. Their past public campaign forced previous Thai governments to go against Cambodia’s effort to obtain the United Nations World Heritage Site status for the Preah Vihear temple, which was granted in 2008.

Thailand’s deployment of F-16 fighter jets demonstrated the country’s superior military power. By limiting air and artillery attacks to military targets, Thailand appeared to be seeking international respect for embracing international norms.

Thailand’s race to the moral high ground may not be an easy climb, however. The Cambodian government was quick to point out that Thai airstrikes and artillery fire had damaged the Preah Vihear temple, not to mention the use of internationally prohibited cluster munitions.

In a statement dated 25 July 2025, the Thai army said cluster munitions were used for military targets only. The problem with cluster bombs is that a significant percentage of submunitions fail to detonate upon impact, leaving behind unexploded ordnance, turning the area into de facto landmines.

In the past, the aftermath of border gunfights followed a similar pattern: Thai and Cambodian troops would sit together the next day, eating lunch with their bare hands in a traditional style, showing the world that both countries have patched things up and moved on. This time, however, the fallout will be more costly in many ways. Lives have been lost, and raw emotions have poured out on social media, creating narratives beyond the control of any state agency’s public relations machines. Anyone with a mobile phone can now report on developments as they see fit.

Mediation in Kuala Lumpur

With Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim mediating the negotiation, Thailand and Cambodia came face-to-face in Malaysia as representatives from the United States and China observed the talks. Cambodia got the ceasefire that they wanted, starting on the midnight of 28 July 2025. The two sides vowed to meet regularly with Malaysia, while fellow ASEAN Member States (AMS) will serve as observers.

In the coming days, Thailand is expected to tell the world that its military might had forced the Cambodians to stand down. Domestically, the Thai army will use this opportunity to strengthen its institution and remain politically assertive amid a growing call for reform, which, in Thailand’s context, means armed forces should stay out of politics.

For Cambodia, the narrative is likely to centre on how a small nation stood up to a neighbour, one that failed to diminish Cambodia’s fighting spirit despite its superior firepower. Cambodia will use this crisis to solidify Prime Minister Hun Manet’s nationalist credentials. But given Cambodians’ restlessness due to economic downturn, this will not be easy.

The transition of power from strongman Hun Sen to his son, Manet, has been difficult, as the young leader has yet to convince his countrymen that he can lead them to a better future.

After leading Cambodia for four decades, his father left him with big shoes to fill. The world watched Hun Sen as he went through wars and genocide, emerging politically powerful and financially wealthy. The same cannot be said for Cambodia’s people, who are currently struggling to make ends meet.

Ordinary Cambodians are frustrated with the current conditions, but they are without outlets to voice their complaints. Indeed, the Hun family members control all media platforms, both online and offline. The National Assembly has 125 seats with Hun Sen as the president of the ruling Cambodia People’s Party; five seats are occupied by friendly oppositions.

Cambodia is turning to Vietnam and China while shutting down economic ties with Thailand. Whether this will offset the loss of income from one million Cambodian migrant workers who depend on Thailand for employment, on the other hand, remains to be seen.

The Pheu Thai-led government had initially clashed with the army over how to handle border affairs with Cambodia—specifically whether to close checkpoints as punishment or keep them open while pursuing diplomatic solutions. However, the Pheu Thai Party-led administration has been effectively sidelined after Hun Sen leaked the phone conversation, forcing the government to run for cover.

Following a petition from a group of senators, the Constitutional Court on 1 July 2025 suspended Paetongtarn from her post pending an ethics investigation. Since then, the Thai government has been on the defensive as the public calls for either a fresh election or the prime minister’s resignation.

Few expect the government to survive beyond the first quarter of next year. The army, since then, has been pretty much calling the shots on the border affairs.

It is not clear why Hun Sen chose to turn on the Shinawatra, a long-time family friend. Many theories have been floated, but the one that made the most sense was Thaksin’s refusal to push through the offshore gas deal in the Gulf of Thailand.

The 27,000-square-km of gas-rich area is claimed by both countries. Talk of a win-win arrangement between the two governments kicked off a storm of criticism in Thailand against the Shinawatra family, whom the public accused of standing to gain from the deal. According to one estimate, the disputed area is believed to hold at least US$300bn worth of reserves.

The clashes that erupted last Thursday claimed the lives of more than 38 people on both sides and displaced more than 300,000. In Kuala Lumpur, the two leaders agreed to meet regularly, starting with their regional military commanders. They also agreed on direct communications between the leaders and their defence ministers.

But there is nothing really new about this, as the two countries have gone through this before. The solution to the border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia may not necessarily lie in the bilateral mechanism but in the internal politics of Thailand and Cambodia. Considering the internal crisis that the two countries are going through, mustering the needed political courage to make peace with one another may not be high on the agenda of either country.

IEDs in Tourist Destinations

Actions speak louder than words. In Thailand’s southernmost border provinces, where a two-decade separatist insurgency has claimed over 7,700 lives, the dominant rebel group, Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), keeps its intentions shrouded in mystery. 

Such tactics have irritated the Thai security apparatus ever since this wave of insurgency returned to the Malay-speaking South over two decades ago. It will continue to be that way as long as the Thai state and other stakeholders, such as Malaysia, do not support BRN in setting up a recognisable and functional political wing that can engage and explain its stance to the world.

The unearthing of 11 improvised explosive devices (IED) in Krabi and Phuket – two of Thailand’s top destinations on the Andaman coast – sent a shockwave in all directions. This is despite efforts by policymakers in Bangkok to minimise the incident by not linking it to the insurgency in the far south.

The two suspects caught at a police checkpoint in Phang-nga are from Pattani. Their confessions led police to more hidden bombs: one in an abandoned motorcycle near Phuket International Airport, two buried at Patong Beach and one at Promthep Cape.

The Australian and Canadian governments, on 1 July and 4 July 2025, respectively, issued separate updated terrorism warnings to their citizens travelling to Thailand in response to the arrests of two suspects.

One of the two IEDs found in Krabi was planted on a seawall at Ao Nang Beach near the commercial area; the second was discovered beneath a banyan tree at Noppharat Thara Beach.

All IEDs were deactivated by explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officers using high-power water cannons.

The then Defence Minister Phutham Wechayachai was reluctant to link the IEDs to the conflict in the far south and urged reporters to exercise caution in their coverage to avoid possible chaos. Security officials at the operational level, however, said the bomb circuits and design suggested BRN involvement.

Policymakers and security officials agreed that the bomb size – which, according to one military intelligence officer, had an explosive radius o

The two suspects, while providing information leading to the locations of other IEDs, claimed they were merely hired to drive the vehicle, according to media reports quoting unnamed official sources.

True to form, BRN neither confirms nor denies its involvement, though duri

Faltering Peace Process

BRN made no public statement about the IEDs but indicated that in the absence of a formal peace process, increased violence intensity and attacks outside historically contested areas are inevitable. The attack against the Sungai Kolok district office exemplified this, occurring after secret negotiations over a Ramadhan ceasefire were exhausted, setting the stage for combatant intervention.

The last such press conference followed a February 2024 meeting, where both sides agreed in principle to work on the roadmap for the talks—the Joint Comprehensive Plan towards Peace (JCPP). Since then, BRN has largely stayed out of the public eye, with sporadic video statements offering only fragmented glimpses into the movement and its demands.

The peace process began unravelling soon after the February meeting when Prof Surachart Bamrungsuk, a key advisor to the ruling Pheu Thai Party, publicly criticised the JCPP.

He slammed the Peace Dialogue Panel for failing to curb BRN violence and accused international mediators and donors of neglecting Thailand’s national security. The Panel was badly isolated, and it may not recover, as hardliners pushed through uncompromising recommendations, like classifying BRN as a “terrorist” organisation as a way to pressure Malaysia – the designated mediator/facilitator – to deport the movement’s leaders.

In the second half of 2024, the Thai government was in disarray after the Constitutional Court ousted Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin for ethics violations in a cabinet appointment. The cabinet’s dissolution left the Peace Dialogue Panel obsolete—a status that persists today, as no new team has been appointed. 

Incoming Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra inherited the southern Thai crisis. Unwilling to burden the political novice, senior officials in the security sector pushed the agenda way down in the list.

Bangkok now insists it will only resume talks if the BRN halts violence—a demand the rebels reject, arguing that de-escalation or ceasefire must be negotiated and that international observers must be allowed to monitor any ceasefire on the ground.

Thailand’s refusal to compromise frustrated Malaysia, the designated mediator for the so-called peace process, Dato Mohd Rabin Basir, the facilitator who has been trying to reached out to the army for serious di

Escalating Violence

Paetongtarn’s political inexperience was exposed last month when Cambodian strongman Hun Sen leaked a recording of her criticising Thailand’s military over the border standoff with Cambodia. The scandal damaged both her credibility and the Shinawatra family’s political standing.

Some observers say this could be the beginning of the end of the family that has been dominating Thai politics for more than two decades.

Meanwhile, violence in the Deep South has escalated over the past six years, with a sharp uptick in March 2025 after Thailand rejected BRN’s counter-proposal for Ramadhan ceasefire. Talks collapsed, and the rebels launched a bold assault on Sungai Kolok’s district office in Narathiwat on 8 March 2025, killing two security personnel and wounding 10 before detonating a car bomb.

These locally hired security officials, known as Defence Volunteers, have been told to quit their jobs and to refrain from acting as spies for the Thai security apparatus, or else they would be considered legitimate targets.

The shooting death of a senior member in the BRN military wing, Abdulroning Lateh, on 18 April 2025, triggered further retaliation, including attacks on monks and civilians—a breach of the group’s usual rules of engagement.

The incident prompted a wide range of condemnation from civil society organisations and direct intervention from The Patani, a political action group who called on the BRN leadership to respect the commitment they made with members of the international community and to respect humanitarian principles, international norms, and civility.

BRN later reaffirmed its policy of avoiding civilian targets in a press statement but made no reference to any particular incident. The message, aimed at reining in fighters, eventually restored attacks to “legitimate” military and government targets. 

Conflict and Political Crisis

Combatants stepping ou

Operations outside the Malay-speaking South have also occurred periodically, usually as a retaliation against Thai security forces for alleged violation of the unwritten ground rule. In August 2019, for example, Bangkok was hit by six small bombs as the city hosted meetings of Southeast Asian foreign ministers and their counterparts from the United States, China, Japan, the European Union, and other world powers.

In August 2016, 13 bombing incidents struck Hua Hin and four upper Southern provinces – Phuket, Surat Thani, Trang, and Phang-nga – in a 48-hour span in what then-prime minister Prayut Chan-ocha called “an attempt to create chaos and confusion.”

Today, Thailand has once again found itself in a political crisis, with the Constitutional Court on 1 July 2025 suspending Prime Minister Paetongtarn pending an investigation into her conduct over the phone conversation with Hun Sen. The Pheu Thai party is also under pressure from the opposition and the public to call fresh elections or face a vote of no confidence.

Peace talks are expected to resume if and when the People’s Party (PP) takes control of the government. The party has shown willingness to accommodate the demands of BRN and the Malay-speaking region. How far PP is willing to go, on the other hand, remains to be seen.

But if the current coalition survives the ongoing politic