Introduction

On 7 December 2022, a former terrorist inmate committed a suicide bombing at a police station in Astana Anyar, Bandung, West Java, killing one police officer and wounding eight people. The perpetrator was later identified as Agus Sujatno or Agus Muslim or Abu Muslim.

The National Police (Polri) Chief General Listyo Sigit Prabowo stated that Agus was imprisoned in Nusakambangan prison for his involvement in the Cicendo Bombing 2017 and finished his sentence in October 2021. Listyo added that Agus was reluctant to join the deradicalization program. This case has raised doubt over the effectiveness of Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) deradicalization program.

Agus and Deradicalization Program

According to fellow former inmate Hendro Fernando, Agus refused to join deradicalization program in prison, earning him the category of “red” or high-risk inmate. After his release, Agus stayed in Sukoharjo, Central Java, with his family. Hendro suggested that Agus re-joined the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) network in Central Java.

Although there are still limited details about Agus’ deradicalization and rehabilitation programs, many people have voiced out their criticism against BNPT, the national body charged with executing deradicalization program. For instance, member of Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) Commission III, Santoso, argued that with regards to its deradicalization program, BNPT tends to focus on spending the allocated budget instead of genuinely trying to foster tolerance. In other words, it focuses on the “output” instead of the “outcome”.

This criticism was echoed by terrorism observer Al Chaidar, who opined that BNPT’s deradicalization program should be re-evaluated. He went further by calling for BNPT’s dissolution if the program is found to be ineffective.

The Mandate of BNPT

Based on the revised law on terrorism, Law No. 5/2018, BNPT has an overarching mandate to implement the country’s counterterrorism (CT) efforts, including formulating and implementing policies; coordinating the policies, and; conducting counter-radicalization and deradicalization programs. 

The public have high expectations toward the agency due to its overarching mandate. BNPT’s deradicalization programs have been heavily criticized because the programs preach to the converted; they mostly engage prisoners who are already disengaged or distancing themselves from violent actions. The programs also tend to focus on instilling the loyalty of the prisoners to the national ideology of Pancasila in a seminar or lecture setting. Nonetheless, BNPT also provides entrepreneurship training for the inmates, hoping that it would be useful for them once they finish their sentences and return to their respective hometowns.

The public may be more familiar with BNPT as an agency that runs deradicalization programs. In fact, however, BNPT is not the only agency which carries out this mandate. Other organizations are tasked with this as well. The Directorate General of Correction has been working closely with various civil society organizations (CSOs) in designing such programs for inmates. For instance, DGC has been partnering with Search for Common Ground (SCFG) Indonesia in creating a conflict management training program for the inmates.

Unfortunately, the coordination between BNPT and DGC tends to be poor. It remains unclear who should bear the responsibility in managing and implementing the in-prison deradicalization program.

The special CT unit in Polri, Detachment 88, also has its own program under Unit Identifikasi dan Sosialisasi (Directorate of Identification and Socialisation – Idensos). Nevertheless, it is unlikely for inmates or former inmates to participate in both Idensos and BNPT’s deradicalization programs.

Interestingly, in 2021, some former terrorist inmates petitioned to dissolve BNPT. Many of the signatories were former terrorist inmates who are under the care of Idensos. The petition claimed that BNPT’s program is ineffective and that Detachment 88’s program is more effective. Although Detachment 88 asserted that they were unaware of the petition, the petition itself indicates that inmates or former inmates do not view deradicalization program as a collaborative initiative between relevant institutions.

The Challenge of Reintegration Program

In the past few years, Polri has arrested hundreds of terrorist suspects. Polri arrested 232 and 370 terrorist suspects in 2020 and 2021 respectively. The revised law on terrorism has also empowered the security apparatus to carry out preventive detention. However, majority of terrorist suspects will only serve their sentence for three to four years as their involvement in terror plots tend to be limited. Upon their release, monitoring the movements of the former inmates and providing a regular reintegration program can be very challenging as these people are scattered across the country.

Both governmental and non-governmental agencies have attempted to provide reintegration programs for the former inmates. These programs try to assist the former inmates to reintegrate into society. For example, BNPT has developed Kawasan Terpadu Nusantara (Archipelago Integrated Area – KTN) that provides an opportunity for former inmates to work as farmers. KTN has been developed in West Java, Central Java, East Java and West Nusa Tenggara thus far.

Meanwhile, a notable initiative from a non-governmental organization (NGO) is DeBintal Foundation which was established in 2020. DeBintal is run by former terrorist inmates and supervised by Detachment 88. The foundation owns a poultry farm in Bekasi, West Java. Despite the good intention, DeBintal Foundation has received severe criticism from the “high risk” individuals. They accused DeBintal Foundation members as murtad (apostates) because they are working with Detachment 88.

Although there have been several initiatives from the government and NGOs, most of these are based in Jakarta and its neighboring cities. Regular visit to monitor the progress and current conditions of ex-inmates in all parts of Indonesia would be very taxing. Hence, the role of the regional government is important.

 In 2021, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo issued Peraturan Presiden tentang Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme Tahun 2020-2024 (Presidential Regulation on the National Action Plan for the Prevention and Countermeasures of Violent-Based Extremism Leading to Terrorism 2020-2024). The regulation acknowledges the importance of engaging regional government in the country’s Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) efforts.

On this front, BNPT has been working with P/CVE CSOs in assisting the regional government to create their own Regional Action Plan (RAP). There are a few regional governments which have issued their own RAP, such as Aceh, Central Java and Central Sulawesi. These Plans enables the identification of necessary activities and partners in assisting the reintegration process of former inmates. However, it is still a long way to go before we can see all regions to issue their own RAP, as the process to produce one depends on the political will of regional leaders and relevant regional bodies.

Enhancing the Coordinating Role of BNPT

Dissolving BNPT may not be an appropriate solution to enhance Indonesia’s deradicalization program. Although BNPT’s programs are found wanting, Indonesia still needs a coordinating body to manage and organize all of its P/CVE initiatives.

BNPT should focus more on its coordinating role as there have been plenty of valuable initiatives in Indonesia done by both governmental and non-governmental agencies. However, sometimes the initiatives overlap with each other which leads to a waste of resources. BNPT should make the best use of its Indonesia Knowledge Hub (IK-HUB) platform to map out the existing initiatives. The platform is a work in progress and needs a lot of improvements. Relevant users should be able to easily access and navigate the site, as well as understanding the available data on the platform.

Introduction

At the end of April 2022, the Madago Raya operation task force fatally shot Askar alias Pak Guru who was a member of East Indonesia Mujahideen (MIT) in a shootout in Parigi Moutoung Regency, Central Sulawesi. His death brought the number of MIT members down to two men. Pivotal to this was the joint operation between the Indonesian National Police (Polri) and the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI). However, TNI was not immediately involved in the operation initially codenamed “Camar Maleo” in January 2015. TNI only became involved upon Polri’s request for assistance in September 2015. By then, the operation was re-coded as “Camar Maleo III”. Assistance was requested as Polri encountered difficulties in conducting the mission due to the difficult terrain, exacerbated with its personnel lacking skills in jungle warfare. More adapt to such terrain and warfare, TNI’s involvement was expected to improve the success of the operation.

Within months of its involvement, TNI slain Santoso, the leader of MIT. Despite its initial success, the operation protracted for seven years with two members still on the run. Many hoped for the Madago Raya operation to end soon. Locals have voiced their concerns about the never-ending operation because it has disrupted their daily lives. Upon assessing the current situation in Poso, TNI Commander-in-Chief Gen. Andika Perkasa believes that the situation in Poso is now more stable. Thus, he hopes that the police would call for the termination of the operation. Gen. Andika added that TNI has gradually began to withdraw its forces from Poso since March 2022.

This operation piqued debates on the involvement of the military in counterterrorism. Engaging TNI in counterterrorism is a sensitive issue in Indonesia due to its repressive nature during the New Order. This article will not only discuss the common concerns about involving the military, but also identifies other factors which should be addressed.

The Debates on TNI’s Involvement in Counterterrorism

The relatively successful, though protracted, operation should bring us to discussions on enhancing the effectiveness of the military for future operations. Although TNI is well-known for its capabilities in jungle warfare, its personnel were still impeded by Poso’s difficult terrain. However, discussions on military effectiveness are often downplayed particularly due to various socio-political issues. Instead, the bulk of the attention is on limiting the military’s role in counterterrorism because of fears that granting a greater involvement for the military would lead to extensive human rights violations and the return of the military to its internal security role.

Under the mandate of the revised law on terrorism, Law No. 15/2018, the Indonesian government is supposed to issue a Presidential Regulation (Perpres) on the Rules of Engagement (RoE) of the military in counterterrorism operations. This Perpres should have been issued a year after the ratification of the revised law. Yet, it has been four years since the ratification and there are currently no updates on when the Perpres would be issued. Unfortunately, the Perpres issue would only become news headlines following any related incidents. For instance, in March 2022, House Commission I member Maj. Gen. (Rtd) T.B. Hasanuddin called for the government to expedite the issuance of the Perpres on TNI in counterterrorism following the death of eight civilians in Papua who were killed by an armed criminal group (KKB) in Papua. He asserted that the military should be deployed in operations against KKB and the Perpres would serve as a legal protection for the military in carrying out its duties. He even used a strong rhetoric that KKB has violated human rights due to their brutalities. Ironically, human rights violations have always been the main concern of involving the military in counterterrorism operations. By highlighting the brutal acts of KKB against innocent civilians, it serves to neutralize any concerns about the military’s human right abuses. Additionally, it shifts the discourse to the urgent need to deploy the military against KKB threats.

In recent years, the Indonesian government has released a draft of the Perpres several times. This enabled the public to assess the draft and provide feedbacks. Civil society organisations in Indonesia opposed the draft due to the clauses that they believe will allow TNI to be involved in all stages of counterterrorism measures, including preventive, enforcement, and rehabilitation programmes. They asserted that it would only exacerbate the overlapping responsibilities already shared by key stakeholders such as Polri, National Intelligence Agency (BIN), and National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT).

Intense opposition to the draft is ostensibly due to the men behind the draft itself. According to a 2020 investigation, the Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Legal, and Human Rights assigned the Ministry of Defence to craft the draft of the Perpres. The Ministry also involved other relevant stakeholders from the military to provide suggestions, such as the TNI Headquarter, TNI’s Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), TNI’s Legal Office, and representatives from the special forces. Due to the military dominance, the draft represents the institutional belief and interests of TNI. Despite attempts to accommodate public opinions, there is little impact to the draft as drafters are dominated by the military officers. It was also found that TNI lobbied house members to support the draft.

Pondering Beyond the Established Debates

Ironically, the prolonged debates also created a “gray area” for TNI in conducting its activities. The existing regulations are truly vague which emphasizes an urgent need for a Perpres that can draw clear boundaries. Regardless of the on-going criticism, TNI has carried out various counterterrorism efforts, including counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation programmes. The territorial command structures, which enables TNI to have its own representatives at each regional level down to the village level, regularly carry out Management Territorial (Pembinaan Teritorial or Binter) to improve the living conditions of the people and encourage them to support and protect the national ideology of Pancasila. In Poso, they conducted various activities to “win the hearts and minds” of locals and distance them from the influence of MIT members. These activities included renovating houses, providing health care services, and holding seminars on the dangers of radicalism and terrorism. TNI will not be changing its policy of using Binter to counter terrorism especially when it has always been an intrinsic part of TNI’s mandate since its establishment.

The Perpres is also urgently needed to provide legal protection for the newly minted unit, Special Operations Command (Koopsus). TNI reinvigorated the Special Operations Command (Koopsus) in 2019 in which 80% of Koopsus’ duty was claimed to be on intelligence and surveillance. On paper, Koopsus is not an official intelligence agency, hence there would be limitations on how it conducts missions. Interestingly, one of the early deployments of Koopsus was an evacuation of Indonesians from Wuhan, China. This deployment was not a counterterrorism operation per se. Nevertheless, Koopsus’ capabilities were necessary in the operation as a pre-emptive measure against unwanted terrorist attacks during the evacuation process. Without a clear and legitimate regulation, similar deployments in the future might be subjected to criticism as public will assume that the deployment is beyond the scope of the unit’s duties.

We cannot deny the fact that increasing TNI’s involvement in counterterrorism will allow the military to gain more state resources and justify the existence of its territorial command structures which has always been the target of military reformers. These issues are relevant and should be addressed accordingly. However, it has been more than four years since the revised law on terrorism was ratified and the debates remain stagnant. There are also other areas of debates that should have been explored to understand what should be done to improve the military’s capabilities and maximise their contributions to the country’s counterterrorism efforts.

There is also a concern that discussions on military effectiveness might be exploited by the military to gain more material benefits for the institution. However, enhancing military effectiveness is not only about increasing military budget and acquiring advance equipment. It is also to ensure that the military can adapt to the changing threats and environment, receive adequate training and education, and develop appropriate doctrines. Koopsus, for instance, comprises of personnel from the military’s special forces of each service, but it would take time for the personnel to adjust themselves with the unit’s joint doctrine. Training and experiences would be valuable for the unit to improve its capabilities.

Notably, discussions on military effectiveness tend to be minimal among public. Further, there are limited academics or activists who have the knowledge and technical expertise that could enhance the military effectiveness. The military would, thus, be better suited and should be given a degree of autonomy to technical issues. Nevertheless, the involvement of civilians who have such knowledge is also important to create a good mechanism for checks and balances. By doing so, the debates will not only revolve around socio-political issues but also ensuring that the country has a capable and functioning military.

Lastly, there is a valid fear that involving the military would only exacerbate the perennial problem of overlapping responsibilities among relevant stakeholders. However, overlapping responsibilities cannot be solely blamed on the military. It has always been an acute problem among governmental and non-governmental agencies. The government should ensure the implementation of Perpres No. 7/2021 on the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE). One of the clauses stipulates the creation of an integrated database on P/CVE efforts. This would supplement the upcoming Perpres on TNI’s Rules of Engagement (RoE) in counterterrorism.

Conclusion

Deploying the military is not the ultimate solution to eradicate terrorism in Indonesia. However, TNI’s role is inevitable when threats escalate beyond the capabilities of Polri. Current debates on TNI’s involvement in counterterrorism often sidestep discussions on the effectiveness of TNI in such operations. Instead, debates largely centre on limiting its role for fear of human rights abuses by TNI. What is crucial for Indonesia’s counterterrorism efforts is firstly for the issuance of PerPres on RoE to be expedited. The much-needed PerPres will not only enforce boundaries on the military but also provide legal protection to TNI when carrying out its duties. Secondly, debates on military effectiveness should be intensified with the involvement of capable civilian authorities. Such discussions should go beyond increasing military budget and acquiring advance equipment. Through such discussions, TNI would be capable of mitigating future threats to Indonesia including terrorism. Lastly, there must be stronger efforts to deconflict overlapping responsibilities in counterterrorism. This would include the implementation of regulations facilitating the creation of an integrated database on P/CVE.

This article is published in the memory of Colonel (P) Heri Oktavian, the Commander of KRI 402-Nanggala, an RSIS Strategic Studies Alumnus.

Introduction

Following the KRI Nanggala 402 incident, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo visited East Java to meet families of sunken Indonesian submarine crew. President Jokowi promised that the Indonesian government would provide scholarships for the children of the 53 submariners until they complete their bachelor’s degrees. Jokowi also promised that the government will build houses for the families in their desired locations in East Java. Were these promises ad-hoc policies? What are the official regulations in providing protection and welfare (i.e. social security scheme) for TNI personnel? This article also highlights potential issues of governmental assistance to the families of these fallen submariners.

Revising Current Regulation on Scholarships Better than Ad-hoc Policies

In 2020, Jokowi issued Governmental Regulations (Peraturan Pemerintah/PP) No. 54/2020 on the amendment of Government Regulations No. 102/2015 on compensation for the Indonesian Armed Forces, the Indonesian National Police, and civil servants under the Ministry of Defence (MinDef). With this regulation, compensations for families of deceased soldiers increased. This insurance scheme is managed by state-owned insurance company Asuransi Sosial Angkatan Bersenjata (Asabri) which engages other relevant counterparts for the disbursement of financial compensations. An example of this relationship is Asabri engaging Mandiri Taspen banks to distribute the old age saving funds (Tabungan Hari Tua/THT), Work Accident Benefit (JKK), and scholarships.

However, Jokowi’s promise of providing scholarships for all the fallen submariners’ children seems at odds with regulations PP No. 54/2020. In this regulation, the government will provide scholarships up to two children of deceased soldiers, capped at IDR 30 million (USD $2,100) per child. In a prior regulation, scholarships were granted to only one child capped at IDR 30 million. In other words, under regulations PP No. 54/2020, the government is not obligated to provide such scholarships to beyond the second child.

The regulation also specified that scholarships will be granted via lump sum payments instead of periodic payments. Such lump sum payments have a potential downside. With limited financial acuity, a lump sum payment, specifically meant for education, may be used for both educational and non-educational intents. Consequently, families may face difficulties sustaining long-term education for their two children.

To overcome such limitations, Jokowi’s administration ensured that all the fallen submariners’ children could securely pursue higher education. The Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Navy co-signed an agreement on scholarships for the children of these submariners from elementary school to university. In contrast to the insurance scheme, the agreement stipulates that the government will disburse payment to the families periodically with disbursements potentially till 2044. Scholarships will also cover both tuition fees and living costs.

The co-signed agreement is not the only scholarship avenue for these children. MinDef is also providing scholarships for the children. The Minister of Defence, Prabowo Subianto, stated that the children of submariners will be able to pursue education in MinDef’s affiliated educational institutions, such as Taruna Nusantara High School and University of Defence (Universitas Pertahanan). Additionally, the Mayor of Surabaya is also granting scholarships for the children of submariners residing in Surabaya.

There is, however, one important consideration of having numerous scholarship avenues for these children. Although they could fill loopholes of the current insurance scheme, it might create confusion among the families if there is a lack of coordination between the governmental agencies awarding these scholarships, particularly a centralized contact point for scholarship enquiries.

More importantly, rather than ad-hoc policies, the Indonesian government could have revised the existing regulation. The government should not only increase the monetary amount of scholarships and recipients, but also create specific schemes which ensure that payments to families are utilized solely for their children’s long-term education. One such scheme could entail an annual disbursement of payment at the start of a new school year with the amount that would be disbursed to commensurate with the level of education. Therefore, an initial assessment of educational costs is required to develop a tiered payment that supports a burden-free education for these children and their families. Additionally, this tiered payment should be regularly reviewed to align with any price changes.

Housing Grants for Families: An Abrupt Policy?

Though Jokowi promised to build houses for these families in their desired locations, PP No. 54/2020 does not mention such housing grants. Instead, it mentions a House Ownership Credit (KPR) scheme for soldiers. In facilitating this promise, news about this housing grants were delivered in piecemeals. For example, in early June 2021, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (Kementerian PUPR) stated its responsibility in building the houses for these families  in Sidoarjo and Surabaya, East Java. Later, the Navy Chief of Staff, Yudo Margono, shared that the families can either live in those houses or sell them.

Collectively, these suggest that such housing grants were an abrupt policy without thorough prior assessments. Such assessments are crucial in understanding the exact needs of these families as they move on in their lives. This would also enable sufficient financial assistance is rendered to these grieving families. Unfortunately, it is now too late to conduct such assessments. These public promises must be honoured by the Indonesian government where failure, actual or perceived, will risk public backlash.

Need for Coordination for Psychological Counselling and Employment

Jokowi’s administration is also committed to caring for the families’ mental wellbeing. The Minister of Social Affairs, Tri Rismaharini, stated that the ministry will dispatch psychologists to provide counselling for the families. The ministry has also requested assistance from the Surabaya local government to provide counsellors to support its efforts. Besides psychologists, the Social Affairs Ministry will create job opportunities for the families to work in the ministry. Minister Rismaharini also highlighted that the ministry will assist the families gain employment at relevant governmental institutions, such as the Surabaya local government.

Similarly, these efforts were indicative of being reactionary and ad hoc. Moving forward, policies should be implemented to ensure close coordination between national and local governments to not only enable quick deployment of resources to provide emotional support but also help families gain financial stability. This is essential for a majority of TNI personnel who are the sole bread winners.

Conclusion

Jokowi is known for his impromptu statements. This spontaneity requires his administration to execute new promises rather than solely relying on existing regulations. Although Jokowi’s statements are for the greater good of the submariners’ families, rigorous planning is necessary for the long-term sustainability of policies. Well-designed regulations and effective coordination between relevant agencies are urgently needed. Initiatives to engage local governments, such as with the Surabaya local government, should be a feature in these regulations with relevant mayors playing a key role for smooth coordination between central and local governments. Noteworthily, in this instance, the close coordination between the Surabaya local government and the Ministry of Social affairs could be attributed to close personal ties. Surabaya Mayor, Eri Cahyadi, is the protégé of Minister Tri Rismaharini, formerly the Surabaya Mayor herself. Therefore, future efforts for similar incidents should rely on well-established regulations and effective coordination rather than on personal relationships.