Part of an ongoing article series on renewable energy / climate crisis in Southeast Asia.

Introduction

The newly inaugurated President Prabowo Subianto embraces the global trend towards a greener world with renewable energy. Latest observations suggest he acknowledges that a government committed to green policies will win the global competition in the long run.

However, Indonesia faces a tough reality—81% of the country’s electricity demand is met by fossil fuels. Last year, coal contributed 62% of energy generation.

His predecessor, former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, laid the foundation for Prabowo’s energy agenda. This includes international deals for funding – such as the Just Energy Transition Plan (JETP) and the Net Zero Community of Asia – as well as regulations that support Prabowo’s administration.

Prabowo made a rather rapid move in his first week in office. He set a two-week deadline for his energy minister to reform energy subsidies and decreed the creation of a contingency plan for revenue lost from fossil fuels by setting a new revenue target of Rp3 trillion (US$190 million) from the carbon market.

Although this number is small, it indicates the government’s commitment to earning revenues from the green economy in the long run.

Solving the energy transition enigma without compromising his promise of an 8% economic growth is the game being played.

Challenge to Subsidy Reform

Although the new administration is still adjusting and fine-tuning, its energy policy is straightforward. The administration has identified two priorities: reforming subsidies and increasing the use of biofuel. The end goal is to achieve energy security.

Subsidy reform is not a new policy agenda, with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono setting the scene almost two decades ago. However, due to its sensitivity, it has always been considered a “hot potato” issue that can either boost or harm a president’s popularity.

Subsidy reform is required because the subsidy does not effectively help the poor. The government has identified that 20–30% of the subsidy does not benefit the intended low-income group.

Following Prabowo’s direction, Minister of Energy Bahlil Lahadalia suggests two policy options: 1) direct cash transfer (Bantuan Langsung Tunai – BLT) to low-income households and; 2) a mixed approach combining traditional commodity-based subsidies with targeted cash transfers.

These suggestions are not new. The BLT has been around for a long time, yet the problem persists. The challenge lies in the data accuracy of BLT beneficiaries and efficiency in disbursing the money.

In addition, corrupt practices affecting the BLT program are also rampant, particularly in the lower rungs of governance. For instance, a village chief in Sampang, East Java, embezzled US$22,000 from the BLT fund in 2023.

Furthermore, according to the Deposit Insurance Agency, only 49% of adult Indonesians have bank accounts, while the rest are still unbanked. Disbursing the BLT fund properly becomes a challenge, as recipients may not have a bank account and must rely on cash distribution, which is susceptible to corrupt practices.

The government’s policies thus lack details and no further details are provided.

A question emerged: Why did Prabowo set a two-week deadline within the first month of his presidency?

The answer is simple. Prabowo needed to adjust and reallocate the state budget as soon as possible. This rationale aligns with the need to reallocate funds from energy subsidies to support economic programs to achieve the 8% GDP growth target and fund the free lunch program that costs US$28 billion annually.

Biomass and Biofuel

As mentioned above, the end goal remains energy security. This government aims to achieve this by pursuing biomass co-firing and biofuel as options to reduce the country’s dependence on fossil fuels. The Biomass co-firing strategy aligns well with Indonesia’s agricultural industry, as it absorbs biomass such as empty fruit bunches, rice husks and wood pellets to generate energy.

Biomass and biofuel are Prabowo’s mainstays in energy transition and energy. Two reasons explain this. Firstly, he is averse to letting Indonesia be dependent on energy imports. Secondly, with Indonesia’s vast potential to produce biomass and biofuel domestically, Indonesia might create its own giant-sized renewable energy industry.

In addition, the agenda came about on the heels of the previous government’s discovery of 8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in the South Andaman. This lucrative discovery is a strategic opportunity for Prabowo’s administration to seize and bolster its ambition for energy sufficiency and security.

Other Steps

One of his earliest actions was to remove various regulations that hindered the gas exploration process, cutting from 320 to 140 permits. Furthermore, the appointment of Simon Aloysius Mantiri as the new CEO of the state-owned oil and gas company Pertamina indicates that Prabowo aims for total control and loyalty from Pertamina to execute his energy agenda.

Prabowo has also aimed to boost the production of cooking oil and push down LPG imports. These actions align with the goal of reducing reliance on energy imports. To pursue this, for example, the government has announced plans to double the production of cooking oil from 1.7 million to 3 million tons per year.

Another ambition is to increase the share of palm oil-based fuel in diesel from 35% to 50%. The government aims to roll out palm-based B40 biodiesel by January 2025 and pursues the long-term goal of using B100 in the future.

These strategies could help Indonesia meet its energy sufficiency and security agenda. However, we should remember that these come with environmental risks. For example, some of these strategies depend on the production of palm oil, which cultivation may not necessarily align with the SDG and ESG agendas. Worse, the government set these targets above without alerting the private sector to take sustainable palm oil cultivation seriously.

Prabowo’s energy ambitions are progressive with high targets, adopting strategies that combine public and private collaboration.

His leadership style is also obvious in his appointment of individuals to key posts. His nomination of Hashim Djojohadikusumo – his brother and a prominent business leader, as the special envoy for environment and energy – as well as Simon – a cadre of Prabowo’s party – as Pertamina CEO speak volumes. Prabowo obviously prefers to station trusted men in strategic posts.

The appointment of Hasjim and Simon invited public criticism and scrutiny. Despite their position as trustworthy allies, we cannot ignore the fact that Prabowo may prioritize obtaining liquid capital for the state. This is why he needs people whom he trusts politically and who can attract investment.

Moreover, it is also in line with Prof. Mari Elka Pangestu’s argument at the Conference on Indonesian Foreign Policy 2024, who argued that to get the 2045 target, Indonesia needs a minimum of 6-8% growth annually and investment.

Conclusion

All in all, a point that is yet to be discussed is Prabowo’s ambition to chart his own footprints and legacy on environment and energy. His end goal is not to attain energy sufficiency and security, but also achieve an 8% economic growth at the same time. These are impossible to reach in five years’ time, or one presidential period in Indonesia. Definitely, Prabowo would seek a re-election in 2029 to achieve these and other goals.

Thus, as mentioned above, energy policy is a “hot potato” issue in Indonesian politics. His energy policy in the first five years would likely be populist and politically beneficial for him. After all, Prabowo is unlikely to adopt any unpopular policy.

Introduction

The Global South, an international relations concept that appeared for the first time around the 1960s, replaced the Cold War framework that dichotomized the world into the first, second and third worlds.

However, the Global South is not fully comprehended as a geographical construct but a concept that combines geography, geopolitics, shared history (former colonies) and economic state (developing countries).

While “Indo-Pacific” continues to reign supreme as the primary discourse of international architecture in this part of the world, the Global South has been gaining traction and momentum lately. Why is that?

First of all, this article does not argue that the Indo-Pacific concept is losing its relevance, but that prominent countries in the region such as Indonesia, India, China and Japan are increasingly more interested in the concept of the Global South. China, in particular, sees the Indo-Pacific concept as a Western concept that contradicts its own views of the world.

The discourse on Global South has been gaining momentum since last year and seemingly will continue to do so for the next two years at least. This all started when Indonesia and Japan became the chairs of the G20 and G7 respectively, whereby both voiced out agendas relating to the Global South, such as debt issues and financing for infrastructure projects.

India amplified this momentum when it became the G20 chair this year and pushed for the inclusion of the African Union as a permanent member, which is seen as a manifestation of India’s advocacy for the Global South.

This momentum will continue on for the next two years as both South Africa and Brazil will succeed as future chairs of the G20 consecutively. They are expected to place the agenda of the global south at the forefront.

Furthermore, South Africa, as the chair of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) grouping, also brought the Global South agenda to the summit. The expansion of the group – that now includes such countries as Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates – has also accorded the Global South “image” to the grouping.

The Global South is an old concept but still relevant and effective in mobilizing sympathy and solidarity. The US-China tension, like it or not, conjures the image of a Cold War between two superpowers. Though totally different and incomparable, the consequences of the power politics between the United States and China still reverberate around the globe, including in the Global South.

Hence, when a Global South country stands up and takes a different approach from the paradigm of the bipolar system, others would sympathize as well and follow suit. Indonesia demonstrated this when it invited Rwanda, Fiji, Senegal and Suriname to the G20 summit last year (their first ever participation), seeming as an act to strengthen the solidarity of the Global South. India echoed this when it took the initiative to convene the Voice of the Global South Summit, in which many countries participated.

Competition for the Global South Leadership

There seems to be competition between India and China for the leadership of the Global South. Both Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping have claimed that they represent the voice of the Global South on many international occasions, such as the Voice of the Global South Summit for Modi and the Belt and Road Forum for Xi.

Despite this, perhaps it is better to leave the Global South without a definitive leader. The Global South is unlike a regional grouping with a dominant player, such as Southeast Asia with Indonesia or Sub-Saharan Africa with Kenya.

Furthermore, the different levels of economic development among Global South countries means they have different interest that cannot be streamlined. Therefore, it is only natural that no one country is more dominant over the rest in the Global South. Collective leadership, equality and co-existence should therefore be the characteristics of the Global South.

Even if such is the case, what can bind these countries together?

The Bandung Spirit, which constitutes the Ten Bandung Principles (Dasasila Bandung) of peaceful co-existence, is still relevant and was unanimously adopted by all developing countries, even China and India. During his tour to several African countries and attendance at the recent BRICS summit, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo highlighted the Bandung Spirit as the founding principle of Global South cooperation.

The Absence of an Effective Framework

The Global South is lacking an effective institution or framework that can promote its agenda of South-South cooperation. The existing mechanism that has this function is the G77, yet this is not effective enough pushing the Global South agenda at the global stage.

India has made its own attempt with the virtual Global South Summit, but the impact is yet to be seen. BRICS+ is seen as a geopolitical rebalancing to the G7 rather than a global south institution.

The Indo-Pacific, in comparison, requires ASEAN to be in the driver seat as this regional grouping has the buy-in from all powers, big and small, who have a stake in the Indo-Pacific region. Hence, ASEAN can exercise its strategic autonomy to promote the Indo-Pacific agenda through its own mechanisms and fora.

So, what is the most feasible solution? Strengthening coordination between existing regional groups in the Global South – such as ASEAN, African Union, the Pacific Forum and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) would be the most feasible approach. Furthermore, it is necessary for major economies that have chaired international fora such as Indonesia, China, India, Japan, South Africa and Brazil to coordinate the agenda in their respective forum to ensure the continuity and consistency of Global South aspirations.

The Indo-Pacific Must be Driven by the Global South Agenda

Most Indo-Pacific countries classify as Global South countries as well simply by looking at their level of economic development. Thus, the Indo-Pacific agenda must serve the interest of developing countries. The agendas at the recent G20 Bali Summit, the G20 New Delhi Summit, ASEAN Jakarta Summit, Voice of the Global South Summit and the Belt and Road Forum focused on developments, financing, green economy, energy transition, blue economy, connectivity, infrastructure and technology, without any mentioning about military cooperation. Both India and China aspire to champion and emerge as the leader of Global South. Therefore, both should ensure that the benefits yielded from regional-level cooperation – be it at the ASEAN, Indo-Pacific or Asia-Pacific levels – can also be felt by the rest of the Global South. Jokowi emphasized this at the recent Belt and Road Forum, where he stressed that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) must be a just and inclusive project for all.   

All in all, the momentum of the Global South must not be missed and should be utilized to foster a South-South cooperation. Countries thus should turn towards their fellow Global South members as potential partners for development instead of solely relying on developed, often Western countries.

Introduction

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) has had an interest in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since its first summit in March 2021. The Quad has expressed its intention to support and collaborate with ASEAN through joint statements produced after each summit, clearly signalling a desire to be closer with ASEAN.

However, ASEAN Member States (AMS) have had their reservations. ASEAN’s sentiment tends to perceives the Quad as merely the latest attempt at marginalizing China in the Indo-Pacific region, which is not in line with ASEAN’s paradigm of an inclusive regional dialogue. A survey conducted by the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia (FPCI) found that 78,8% of respondents perceive a tension between the Quad and China, though at varying degrees.

It does not help that China is among, if not the biggest, trade partners with each of the AMS. This means each AMS and ASEAN as a whole stand to lose economically if there is a heightened tension between the Middle Kingdom and the Quad.

Despite this hesitation, the Quad members – the United States, Australia, India and Japan – have been trying to convince the region that the minilateral grouping is not meant to corner China, but to serve as an alternative cooperation partner to the region.

“QUAD’s” wish for ASEAN

In its past four joint statements, the Quad had consistently expressed its support for ASEAN’s centrality. The Quad acknowledges the strategic position and the role of ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical architecture.

The Quad also sees the importance of ASEAN unity aside from its centrality. In all of its joint statements, the Quad has always mentioned the terms ASEAN “centrality” and “unity”, treating both terms as essentially inseparable. However, the Quad also recognizes ASEAN disunity in addressing political-security issues to some degree, particularly in addressing the ongoing disputes in the South China Sea and Myanmar crisis.

ASEAN’s Wish for the Quad

ASEAN’s core principle in the Indo-Pacific is inclusivity. This principle has been stated and written in all of ASEAN leaders’ speeches and ASEAN documents. For the grouping, the principal idea behind inclusivity is that the Indo-Pacific cannot exclude China from the picture.

On the Quad side, the word “inclusive” has been expressed since its first joint statement in March 2021. They added the word in addition to “free”, “open” as well as “resilient Indo-Pacific”. Compared with former President Trump’s Indo-Pacific concept, which did not use the word, this is a notable paradigm shift.

We may not have a clear picture as to what the Quad really means when it talks about “inclusivity”, however, it appears that the Quad have readjusted its parameters to better align with ASEAN’s paradigm of an inclusive Indo-Pacific. Thus, it can be argued that the core principles of both the Quad and ASEAN on Indo-Pacific are more compatible now.

More Attention to ASEAN

Does ASEAN Matter? may be the title of Dr. Marty Natalegawa’s latest book, but the same question can be asked to the Quad members. Does ASEAN really matter to the minilateral grouping?

The word “ASEAN” is mentioned more frequently with each subsequent joint statements produced by the Quad. The first joint statement only mentions ASEAN once. The second (September 2021) mentions it four times. The third (May 2022) mentions six times. Significantly, the recently concluded summit in Hiroshima produced a joint statement that mentions ASEAN a whopping 13 times.

Through this indicator, we can simply conclude that ASEAN is getting more attention from the Quad members, an acknowledgment that the Quad sees ASEAN as a strategic regional partner.

The Room for ASEAN-Quad Cooperation

During Cambodia’s 2022 ASEAN Chairmanship, ASEAN leaders committed to operationalizing the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Since the adoption of AOIP in 2019, analysts have criticized the concept for not offering something new and lacking details on steps to operationalize it.

However, this is perhaps where the words of a Singaporean senior diplomat Bilahari Kausikan ring true when he said that the AOIP is an old wine in a new bottle. We could not ignore the fact that it is never easy to operationalize it and that ASEAN should work towards getting buy-in from and mobilizing its dialogue partners to achieve such objective.

Engaging the Quad is a worthwhile option to consider. The latest joint statement from the Hiroshima summit expresses that “We will continue to strengthen our respective relationship with ASEAN and seek opportunities for greater Quad collaboration in support of the AOIP.“

This shows the Quad’s political will and readiness to be engaged by ASEAN. In a previous joint statement, the Quad specified the cooperation areas to include digital connectivity, clean energy, climate resilience, disaster resilience and energy. These are in line with AOIP’s four pillars of maritime cooperation, connectivity, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and economics.

A Potential ASEAN-Quad Meeting?

Engaging the Quad is timely and relevant to ASEAN. Quad has demonstrated that it is not merely a security-oriented minilateral grouping, but also one that focuses on connectivity, regional resilience, economics and other dimensions which align with the AOIP.

There is a possibility to actualize the ASEAN-Quad engagement under Indonesia’s ASEAN chairmanship this year. President Joko Widodo has stated that the Quad as well as the Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS) security pact should be viewed as partners and not as competitors. This is the first time any ASEAN leaders has openly said the possibility of engaging with the Quad, even with the AUKUS. For Indonesia, this statement is a shift of position considering how sceptical Jakarta viewed the Quad and AUKUS before.

To propose for an ASEAN-Quad summit at the sideline of this September’s ASEAN Summit would be too much to ask, but an informal meeting of the foreign ministers between ASEAN and the Quad is a possibility worth considering.

On the other hand, it is also worth asking why there should be an ASEAN-Quad summit when all Quad members are already ASEAN Dialogue Partners. An exclusive meeting between ASEAN and the Quad could may also be too sensitive, if not treated as an outright provocation, to China.

Despite this, ASEAN could not afford to ignore the Quad as an important grouping in the Indo-Pacific, just as ASEAN could not afford to ignore China in Indo-Pacific discourse. Thus, engaging the Quad could be argued as part of ASEAN’s exercising its centrality and inclusivity.

Pragmatically, the operationalization of the AOIP should start with opening and widening ASEAN engagements. The Indonesian chairmanship has pushed ASEAN to engage more with the Indian Ocean Rim Organization (IORA) and Pacific countries; why not with the Quad as well?

Furthermore, the Quad is an alternative of source for ASEAN to meet its development plan. The Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025 estimated that around US$110 billion is required to build connectivity hardware and software from 2016 to 2025. ASEAN cannot be only relying on one partner; ASEAN should work with all available partners. The momentum for cooperation is there. All in all, there is no doubt that the Quad has an appetite to get closer to ASEAN. The ball is now in ASEAN’s court. If the metaphorical ball means exposing ASEAN to geopolitical risk, we should remember that ASEAN story has always been about taking geopolitical risk and exercising our strategic autonomy.

Introduction

The “Indo-Pacific” concept and strategy have been tabled by various countries and regional organisations in the world, including the United States, Japan, Australia, India, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Canada, France and Germany. The last few years also saw an uptick in the use of the term “Indo-Pacific” by world leaders, usually to denote the new strategic geographical landscape where the Indian and Pacific oceans intersect.

It can be argued that two notable leaders were responsible for the gaining traction of the term in recent memory, though the term itself has been articulated earlier. In 2007, Japan’s late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe introduced the “Indo-Pacific” concept to the Indian Parliament in a speech entitled the “Confluence of the Two Seas”. This marks the beginning of countries co-opting and developing the concept constructively and inclusively.

Former Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa of Indonesia also contributed to the discourse, suggesting the idea of an Indo-Pacific Treaty in which he emphasized the importance of the dynamic equilibrium principle in managing regional power politics. Although the idea failed to launch, this is evidence that Indonesia has also actively contributed to the construction of the concept.

China Containment?

The debate on “Indo-Pacific” was limited to foreign policy establishment for a while and it did not receive much attention until President Trump assumed office in 2017. Since then, unfortunately, the discourse on the “Indo-Pacific” concept has been implicitly placing China as the target of policy objective thanks to a series of policies introduced by the administration.

Let us cast our sight on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) to exemplify this point. The Quad consist of the United States, Japan, Australia and India, functioning as a minilateral arrangement formed in 2007 by the initiative of Japan. These four countries have placed Indo-Pacific as their framework of cooperation.

The Quad has been a source of global tension lately due to its ostensible posturing towards China. Former US State Secretary Mike Pompeo’s speech in the Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting in Tokyo 2020 openly mentioned China as the objective and raison d’être of Quad. This confirmed Beijing’ suspicion that the “Indo-Pacific” construct was devised as a geopolitical strategy to contain China.

To make matters worse, there are indications that Beijing tends to view the “Indo-Pacific” concept as a product of the West and assume the latter has an exclusive ownership to its parameters. Such view and assumption are arguably erroneous. Truth be told, nobody can claim exclusive ownership to the definition, crux and parameters of any term, be it the Western countries or others. Instead, countries should approach the “Indo-Pacific” concept as a public good and not limited as a strategy to contain certain powers. This is especially important if the world were to establish a more inclusive and collaborative process to tackle global challenges, which require a prosperous, modern, developed, stable and peaceful Indo-Pacific region.

We should remember that “Indo-Pacific” is still a developing concept and thus no country can exclusively own the terminology. As a concept, it is open to all interpretation, which means any country, including China, can contribute to its construction.

China itself still firmly upholds the concept of “Asia Pacific” in its geopolitical and geoeconomic engagements. This is not a surprise. The “Asia-Pacific” concept was developed and driven by economic cooperation which is aligned with China’s foreign policy interest. China, thus, has played a pro-active role in its construction and promotion.

Deteriorating Global Landscape

The idea of why China should adopt the concept is because there is a need to shift the paradigm of the “Indo-Pacific” concept from one that is contentious to a collaborative platform. The deterioration of today’s geopolitical context demands this.

The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war is a game-changing event in today’s multipolar world. The war has permanently changed the European security outlook and architecture. Additionally, the Russian invasion of Ukraine sparks regional concern in the direction of China-Taiwan dynamics, bearing in mind that Beijing and Moscow just signed the “no limits” strategic partnership weeks before the invasion. Therefore, it has given rise to more debates and concerns about regional security as well as power politics in the Indo-Pacific region. Adding to that is Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s imprudent visit to Taiwan which was followed by other US lawmaker delegations to the island republic, which has pushed the US-China relations to its lowest point.

Another important observation is the worrying trend of shrinking room for dialogue between the West and Russia as well as China respectively. This is evident in many international forums held this year. For instance, by the end of 2022 alone Southeast Asia would have hosted three global meetings including the Group of 20 (G20), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and ASEAN-related summits. Meetings that have been conducted by the time of writing saw the pressure to disinvite Russia. Diplomats who attended these meetings have recounted to the author whereby they witnessed American and Russian ministers avoiding walking past each other on conference sidelines. These small yet significant gestures definitely minimize the value of dialogues and could work counter-productively for the Southeast Asia’s stability.

Therefore, against the backdrop of current geopolitical circumstances, it would be more productive for all powers to instead approach the “Indo-Pacific” concept not as a stage for competition, but as a platform for collaboration.

Why “Indo-Pacific”?

The answer is simple: most powers, both major and middle ones, have adopted it in their foreign policy strategy. China is yet to be part of it, and in history, there has never been a successful geopolitical concept that excluded certain powers. For instance, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was a US initiative, failed due to its exclusive nature and aim to curb communism during the Cold War.

But why should China adopt it at all in their foreign policy outlook? Answering the question is tricky, yet it is worth for China to consider. China’s adoption would contribute to dispel the assumption that the Middle Kingdom is a closed power that does not wish to engage others on international stage. Indeed, all this while, China has been reluctant to debate on or even discuss the concept. Instead, it would indicate that as a country, China is open to collaborate with others to solve global problems. China’s contribution to the discourse would enrich, challenge, test, or even complement existing arguments on the concept.

An example of how China has the capability to do so is at full display during the State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s policy speech at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta a few months ago. He made a reference to the ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and stated, “we would like to increase synergy and cooperation with ASEAN on the implementation of the Outlook to produce cooperation outcomes at an early date.“

Furthermore, “Indo-Pacific” was also acknowledged during the latest bilateral meeting between President Joko Widodo and President Xi Jinping of China. With that, China has not only acknowledged and supported AOIP but also become a complementary partner to the AOIP.

The acknowledgement of the terminology will also invigorate China’s initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Global Development Initiative (GDI), and Global Security Initiative (GSI). As a comparison, the United States’ push for the Indo-Pacific initiatives is embodied in Build Back Better, the Quad, Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS), and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), all of which have been immensely influential in shaping the region’s geopolitics in recent memory. Japan is doing the same with the Asia-Japan Investing for the Future Initiative.      

Therefore, China’s adoption of the “Indo-Pacific” terminology may work in its favour by pushing forward its initiatives in the region. At the same time, the region would also receive benefit from a multitude of initiatives and programmes competing and complementing each other.

Therefore, the author suggests China should adopt to the term simply because the people in Southeast Asia does not wish to see the concept emerge as a point of contention that could trigger further destabilization in the region. For the interest of Southeast Asians, the concept needs to be accepted by all relevant powers. Learning from the past, we cannot exclude a certain power to make any concept work effectively to ease tension and promote cooperation. Without China in the debate, the discourse will always be dominated by the assumptions that China is being contained and that Southeast Asia will be forced to choose sides. Although ASEAN actively promotes its interpretation of the concept via AOIP, the idea of an inclusive Indo-Pacific that ASEAN is propagating will never realize without China’s buy-in.

This suggestion of China adopting “Indo-Pacific” would never be successful without the openness of the West to see China be in the same circuit. Yet, this is possible and interesting because the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy uses the term of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”. But what does “open” mean exactly here? Could it mean open to all kind of ideas, suggestions and countries to be partake in the process?

China’s adoption of the concept could test the meaning of Free and Open Indo-Pacific. The author once asked this question to a friend in Washington D.C. and the answer is neither supporting nor not supporting China adoption of the concept.

Conclusion

Southeast Asia sits at the intersection of the two strategic oceans and has felt the rising tension between major powers lately. Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto said in the Shangri-La Dialogue 2022 that “we need a benevolent big power.” To have that, we need every country to engage in confidence building measures through dialogue and discussion. A debate on the “Indo-pacific” concept, one which sees the participation of China, is a good point to start with.