Arief Arman – Stratsea https://stratsea.com Stratsea Mon, 16 Jun 2025 03:54:41 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.5 https://stratsea.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/cropped-Group-32-32x32.png Arief Arman – Stratsea https://stratsea.com 32 32 Free Speech and the Freedom to Punch Your Face https://stratsea.com/free-speech-and-the-freedom-to-punch-your-face/ Mon, 16 Jun 2025 03:54:39 +0000 https://stratsea.com/?p=3153
Qur’an burning incidents have occurred as an expression of Islamophobic sentiments. Credit: Anis Coquelet/Unsplash

Introduction

Salwan Momika, a refugee from Iraq based in Stockholm, Sweden, was murdered in the last week of January this year, with many claiming that the execution was a form of retaliation for his Qur’an burning stunt. One is compelled to ask if such a response is warranted.

The incidences of Qur’an burning over the past couple of years have certainly raised eyebrows. Amidst conversations on freedom of expression, to what extent can such freedom be carried out?

Many studies have been conducted to investigate the relationship between certain religious traditions and violence, with some scholars accepting the conflictual image of religion projected by the media, seeking the reasons for supposedly violent predispositions within religions.

Yet, another discussion must be carried out, one that touches on the far-reaching effects of colonisation and the search for identity that many people in the Global South face, especially as minority populations in Europe.

The Context of Hate

In Reflections on the Special Issue: Burning of the Qur’an, Leiden-based academic Verena Meyer highlights that such a quagmire has often revolved around the construction of an imagined “us” against an imagined “them”. Perpetrators of these acts – often of Caucasian descent and non-Muslim (or at least presenting as such) – engage in provocation to get a reaction from others, particularly Muslims to whom such an offence has been directed.

Taking cues from Saba Mahmood’s response to the 2005 cartoon controversy (when Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten depicted Prophet Muhammad SAW in a sacrilegious manner), Meyer informs us that by universalising semiotic ideologies, secular liberals have missed the point. This is especially in saying that Muslims must stop taking such cartoons seriously (and, in extension, the burning the Qur’an). After all, to them, no real injury has been inflicted by such depictions.

Momika – who was not of Caucasian descent – burnt the Qur’an in front of the Swedish Parliament (Riksdagen) and outside of the grand mosque in Stockholm. He informed the media that his intention was to ban the Qur’an altogether because – as he claimed – it encourages violence.

At the time of the incident, it was considered legal in Sweden to burn the Qur’an. Momika mentioned he had received permission from the local Swedish police to burn the Holy Book in the public eye.

According to Swedish court decisions, the burning of books, including those that are sacred to religious communities, is considered the practice of freedom of expression and assembly. Such actions are thus protected by law and cannot be banned by the police even if they would threaten public order and security.

There are suggestions that such insulting acts are calculated political manoeuvres to gain the support of those who are against immigration. Some of these incidences take place in countries that are pro-immigration; for instance, there are more than 3.5 million immigrants living in Nordic countries.

In the Netherlands, anti-Islam rhetoric has led to the victory of Geert Wilders and his far-right Party for Freedom (PVV). Wilders follows neoconservatives in their view that Islam is a totalitarian ideology, “which after communism and fascism poses the third greatest threat to modernity.” Similar rhetoric has also been peddled by Dutch MP of Somali origin – Ayaan Hirsi Ali – all of whom have stoked the fire of animosity towards Muslims.

Unfortunately, most conversations revolve around why Muslims react so strongly to a seemingly innocuous act since the burning of the Qur’an is often deemed to be nothing but lighting fire to a book—a text deemed “problematic” through the lens of Islamophobes.

The tendency to universalise semiotic ideologies – and the implication of “I get to decide whether this or that is offensive, and you should not be offended either way” – is a reluctance, or perhaps inability, to understand the varied perspectives on language and the cultures to which that language is expressed.

This is despite tolerance, inclusivity and diversity being key tenets of the secular liberal creed. If anything, such reluctance suggests a lack of intelligence – especially of the emotional quotient.

Historically – and in relation to the cartoon controversy – Denmark’s blasphemy laws have been used only against the defamation of Christians and Jews. Similarly, the laws against Holocaust denial in many European nations prohibit the denigration of the Jewish community, but there are no equivalent laws to protect Muslims.

One might question the equation of Jewish genocide with the persecution suffered by adherents of the Islamic faith, but oppression is oppression, whatever the scope may be.

The question is this: has there been focus on non-violent responses by Muslims on the issue of the burning of the Qur’an?

We should look no further than the example of Syrian refugee Ahmad Alloush – who announced that he would burn the Torah and the Bible in front of the Israeli embassy in Stockholm. On the day, however, he declared in front of the press that he would never burn the holy book of another faith.

In fact, if we are to refer to the Qur’an itself, “He has revealed to you (O Prophet) the Book in truth, confirming what came before it, as He revealed the Torah and the Gospel.” (Al-Imran:3)

“Confirming what came before it” is a reference to the previous divinely revealed Books, sent to the servants and prophets of God. From the Islamic perspective, these Books testify to the truth of the Qur’an, which in turn also testifies to the truth these Books contain, including the news and glad tidings of Muhammad SAW’s prophethood and revelation of the Glorious Qur’an.

Furthermore, Sura Fussilat reminds Muslims that “Good and evil cannot be equal” and encourages them (Muslims) to “Respond (to evil) with what is better, then the one you are in a feud with will be like a close friend.” (41:34).

Ahmad Alloush’s refusal to burn the Torah and Bible – the simple act of refraining – is indicative of not responding to evil with another evil. This reminder in Sura Fussilat should thus be the guiding and operating principle for Muslims in Euro-America, especially when facing provocateurs.

Why Burn the Hebrew Bible?

Conversations on freedoms of expression and its limitation would necessitate a revisiting of the past, especially in the European context. If we are to go through the dusty shelves of history, we would remember the disaster of Kristallnacht (the Night of the Broken Glass).

Metaphysical questions were raised regarding the burning of the Hebrew Bible by the Nazis on 9 November 1938. Part of the desacralisation process included the role of Hitler Youth in riding bicycles over the sacred scripture. This happened along Nikolaus Street in the small town of Fritzlar in Hessen.

In his compelling book A World Without Jews: The Nazi Imagination from Persecution to Genocide, Alan Confino talks about the move from purely racist reasons for Jewish persecution and murder to the role of “Nazi imagination” and the history of emotions of Germans during the Third Reich.

The undercurrent behind such motivations must be explored further, perhaps allowing us to view such atrocities from a different angle so as not to repeat them. Indeed, the role of emotions in such deliberations is often overlooked, as the intellect (pure reason) is often taken to be the sole determinant in the carrying out of policies then.

What is extricated here is the element of fantasy in the burning of the Hebrew Bible, in that “Jews represented time, symbolizing evil historical origins that had to be eradicated for Nazi civilization to arise.” Thus, Confino calls for a new way of thinking: historians ought to examine not only racial motivations but also fantasy and imagination.

It is unfortunate that Kristallnacht is justone example of the long tradition of European pogroms. The Kishinev Pogrom of 1903 in Russian Moldavia witnessed assaults on synagogues and the defiling of Torah scrolls as part of the frenzied violence that characterises such ethnic cleansing.

How does the historical example above relate to the contemporary issues of Qur’an burning? If the Islamophobe makes the argument that the burning of the Qur’an is merely a statement in favour of the freedom of expression, can we also make the seemingly absurd claim that the Nazis were practising their own freedom?

We see here how the burning of sacred scripture is not an innocent act but also a plot to cause harm to believers—be it those who practice Judaism or Muslims themselves.

What Blasphemy?

Laws prohibiting blasphemy were once widespread in many countries. Today, the stance has been relaxed, as many governments have decided on adopting a wider approach to what ought to be allowed within fundamental liberties.

Blasphemy and religious defamation laws are often criticised due to the perception that “mere ideas” are protected, as opposed to “actual victims”. Does the freedom of expression override the right to self-defence, even though the former is indirect and the latter direct?

From our point of view, the issue here is that we have lost the true value of words since we are bombarded with them daily. From updates of divorced celebrity couples to seemingly hollow rants by politicians tiptoeing the eggshells of political correctness, the true meaning of words has been sent to the dogs.

Another example is if someone insulted your mother directly to your face—would you or would you not respond? It is, of course, better not to respond, but it is only natural that one feels aggrieved towards such personal insults. This is a question of honour that many seem to overlook.

The decreasing importance of blasphemy – not only regarding Islam but also other religions, notably Christianity and Judaism – is a symptom of the broader evolution of religion in the West, especially in continental Europe.

The French historian and demographer Emmanuel Todd speaks of the three stages of religious evolution.

First, the “active stage”, where people are believers and practising. Second, the “zombie stage”, where religion was replaced by substitute ideologies including nationalism, social democracy, communism, liberalism and others – which fundamental values regulating individual lives, families and morality were not too different from religion. Third, and the one Europe is currently in, the “religion zero” stage, where the mental structures inherited from religion do not exist anymore. This leads to the profanation of all and any symbols: blasphemy only concerns the sacred, and when there is no longer anything sacred, there can be no blasphemy.

This situation is exemplified by the 2024 Paris Olympics opening ceremony.  There was a proud portrayal of what seems to be Leonardo da Vinci’s The Last Supper painting featuring drag queens and paedophilic insinuations. For those who still hold sacred symbols with reverence, such a display reeked of religious mockery, though the artistic director claimed otherwise.

Another example of outright vitriol – though not necessarily similar in its expression – is the actions of the American Freedom Defense Initaitive (AFDI) in 2012. Led by Pamela Geller, AFDI launched advertisements emphasising support for Israel and the “war on jihad” (whatever that means), with the downright racist framing of Palestinians as “savages”.

National advertisements were plastered on buses, train stations and billboards with the accompanying message: “In any war between the civilized man and the savage, support the civilized man. Support Israel, Defeat Jihad.” Compared to earlier Islamophobic campaigns, this message made an explicit connection to the state of Israel, which adds a different polemical layer to the provocations of Muslims.

Once again, we observe how the argument for “freedom of expression” is applied here, with many citizens in democratic countries being indifferent to the framing of “us” against “them”. Meyer’s earlier point of view is thus not novel but shows how such framing persists to this day.

There is a growing number of international scholars who argue that the protection of religious sensitivities should take precedence over freedom of speech. One such academic is a Malaysian named Murni Wan Mohd Nor who contends for an alternative interpretation of human rights which is in relation to – and not separate from – widely accepted religious and moral values.

It is only logical to assert that unrestricted speech – taking the form of insults, slander, and libel (among others) – will have a negative bearing on the relationship between people in a specific country and beyond. In the alternative interpretation of human rights suggested by Murni, unrestricted speech would not be an issue, thus minimising (if not completely removing) insults, slander and libel. In this environment, respect between people is not contrived.

Furthermore, Jasmine Zine – through her paper entitled The Canadian Islamophobia Industry: Islamophobia’s Ecosystem in the Great White North – highlights the fact that there are more orchestrated methods in which Islamophobic networks operate to support and maintain an industry of hate.  

Zine mentions that the distinguishing factor between Islamophobia and other forms of oppression is that there is an active industry behind purveying anti-Muslim rhetoric. These methods add to the impact of state policies and systemic anti-Muslim racism. As an industry that brings lucrative profit, it is understandable why many individuals, organisations and even nation-states have decided on partaking in such promotion of hate. Therefore, anti-Muslim racism takes a life of its own once the necessary rhetoric has been peddled.

Zine argues that the “Islamophobia industry” comprises media outlets, political figures, far-right white nationalist groups, Islamophobia content creators as well as individual donors who fund such campaigns. It is not a stretch to opine that these different facets can be linked to one another, as the vilification of Muslims seems to be a profitable business.

The Islamophobia industry is constituted through intertwined interests among diverse groups mentioned prior, with their activities generating a handsome revenue by monetising anti-Muslim bigotry, hence why these networks are characterised as an “industry”.

A report reveals that more than US$200m was spent towards promoting fear and hatred of Muslims in the United States by various organisations. This was the amount recorded between 2008 and 2013. There is no doubt that the amount of funds pumped into this nefarious industry has increased over the years.

Emotions

Considering the rise of affect theory in various academic domains, greater emphasis must be given to how emotions play a part in decision-making processes—from individuals to governments. Indeed, if we are to overlook the power of emotions, we are doing a disservice to understanding the human being in totality.

It is quite ludicrous that the role of emotions in decision-making processes is only just seeing the light of day. If we are to backtrack and attempt to understand how the status quo has been established, we should not look further than Enlightenment thinking—the sine qua non of the period was the divorce of reason from emotions, as the assumption of the day was that the latter had a negative impact on the former.

In relation to Zine’s argument on the Islamophobia industry, we observe the link between the toying with the emotions of the people in a specific polity and the justification for policies to cater to those emotions.

Remember how the War on Terror was promoted by both George W Bush and Tony Blair after 9/11? The encroachment of the Middle East in general, and Iraq specifically, was justified on the basis of emotions—the fear that weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) were housed in Saddam Hussein’s turf. The WMD intelligence proved to be illusory, leading to a violent insurgency, and thus the War on Terror lost the public support of Americans the world over.

The sentiment of hate peddled then also revolved around the relationship between Sunnis and Shias in Iraq, which was often exaggerated by media houses in the Global North. This is just one of many examples of affect theory in international relations.

We also must constantly keep in mind that unlike war – which has traditionally been understood to have a starting point and an end – counterterrorism operations (made legitimate after 9/11) embody a paradox that is both “continuing” (necessitating constant surveillance) and “imminent” (necessitating urgent action), thereby creating a perpetual, self-justifying violence with no clear endpoint.

The normalisation of state-sanctioned violence through counterterrorism efforts has blurred the lines between “wartime” and “peacetime”, whereby war and violence are not observed as an exception but as an ongoing condition that requires an exorbitant amount of funds to be channelled to the cause of “peace-making”.

Lessons Learnt?

The incidences of Qur’an burning in Europe have opened a Pandora’s Box. However, it must be asserted here that there is no advocacy of a “victim mindset” for Muslims. What this means is that Muslims have the responsibility to educate those who do not know better about their faith. Such an effort can be categorised under the banner of jihad– a true struggle in upholding values of mercy inherent within the Qur’an and the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW).

If we are to counter the notion of unrestricted freedom of expression, it is simply by laying out a utilitarian argument. If we are engaging in a conversation on the greatest good for the greatest number – especially tied to notions of democracy, where the majority is assumed to have a decision in matters – would it not make sense to curb excesses in speech if it takes the form of outright instigation—insults, slander and libel? Since such acts are carried out by mostly fringe groups or solo actors, does it represent the majority? As pointed out by Zine, we cannot deny the fact that there are those who profit from such fearmongering and antagonisation of different communities. Unless and until such an admission takes place, the issue of Qur’an burning and attendant debates on freedom of expression will not cease.

]]>