Introduction

It is arduous to understand the topology and the commitment of those previously convicted of terrorism to abandon violence. Numerous theories have been developed to explain either deradicalization or disengagement. This article proposes a new tool based on Desifter Theory to facilitate a comprehensive assessment of the individual. Via this theory, individuals would be assessed based on six channels of influences, namely, “Heaven”, “Head”, “Heart”, “Home”, “Habit”, and “Hand” (Figure 1). Such assessments would subsequently determine the type of interventions to be appropriated to the individual (i.e. customized intervention) for their desistance from terrorism.

A Glimpse of the 6H

“Heaven” entails how the individual not only perceives heaven but what they believe must be done to gain acceptance there. Generally, heaven is deemed as an exclusive reward that is difficult to attain. While attaining heaven is based on personal “performance”, daily lives would also be affected their environments, specifically how their country is governed. Therefore, in this channel of influence, individuals’ perceptions of the government and its legitimacy will be assessed.

“Head” refers to how introspective an individual is in finding alternative narratives. Often, terrorists deem their narratives as absolute truths. Through introspection, former terrorists may break away from such absolutism while replacing it with non-violent beliefs.  

“Heart” looks at the level of maturity and the deterrent effect of the criminal justice system. An individual’s level of maturity can change internally or externally. For former terrorists, this would include getting married, having children, continuing education, and even disappointment with their old groups. Meanwhile, the criminal justice system may also deter former terrorists from re-offending. Usually, the length of time an individual serves in prison influences the level of deterrence.

The author’s interpretation of “Home” is family as it is the smallest unit of interaction for former terrorists. Family can be on both sides of the coin; a family can be a supporter of terrorism or can be a pull factor in encouraging former terrorists to abandon violence.

“Habit” consists of networks, social relations, and integration. Addressing this channel is key to enabling former terrorists to abandon their old groups and to join new ones. This is done by understanding how former terrorists change their habits or environment.

Lastly, “Hand” includes factors that support a former terrorist care for themselves and their families upon their release. Special attention should be placed on their economic well-being. The more they can care for themselves, the higher the likelihood of them staying away from their previous group. This also means smoother reintegration with society.

Method

To demonstrate the effectiveness of this assessment tool, the author began by conducting a survey with 124 former terrorists in Indonesia. These former terrorists resided in 12 provinces throughout Indonesia. The impetus of the survey was to understand: 1) their condition and whether they have cut off communication with their terrorist groups, and 2) if they were willing to publicly share their experiences of abandoning terrorism in a bid to prevent others from following their footsteps and to encourage other terrorists to do the same. Of the 124 former terrorists, only 36 were willing to become involved in such efforts within a one-year frame.

To understand how they abandon terrorism, the 36 individuals were next invited to a semi-structured interview and were assessed via a behaviour checklist. Assessment from the checklists include inputs from the individual and those around him such as his wife, neighbors, and companions from the regional police. Questions for the interview and the checklist were developed based on the 6H.

To develop a typology, the author employed a software, atlas.TI, to compile the results of the semi-structured interviews and checklists. This facilitates the development of a gradation of desistance from terrorism of these 36 individuals.

Result

From the semi-structured interviews and checklists, there were 13 factors that were uncovered to influence individuals in desisting from terrorism. Collectively, these 13 factors outline what is manifested in the thoughts and behaviours of the 36 individuals. These 13 factors were subsequently classified into two groups, “Seen” and “Unseen.” This refers to what is visible and not visible in their abandonment of terrorism (Figure 2).

Seen and unseen factors are then manifested into what is still in thought and has become a behavior. A gradation of desistance can then be developed based on the number of factors one possessed.

As outlined in Figure 3, the desifter typology can be classified into four categories: primary desifter, secondary desifter, tertiary desifter, and quarternary desifter. The typology formation is based on the interval between qualifications. For example, primary desifter has n factors between 0-1 (intervals:2). This means that the lesser the n factor, the more likelihood the individual has abandoned terrorism. Therefore, it is desirable for individuals to be in the primary desifter category.

Of the 36 individuals, 21 were classified as secondary desifters (~58.3%) and 11 were classified as tertiary desifters (~30.6%). Notably, there was only one who fell into the Quartinary desifter category (~2.8%).

This highlights two important observations: 1) worryingly, only 3 individuals were in the primary desifter category (~8.3%) and 2) a total of 33.4% of the 36 individuals were in the tertiary and quarternary Desifter categories. This not only highlights a higher risk of them being recidivists but intervention for these individuals are admittedly difficult.

Conclusion

This tool based on Desifter theory provides a means to assess former terrorists and their propensity to recidivism. By assessing former terrorists based on 13 “Seen” and “Unseen” factors, a gradation of desistance from terrorism can be determined. In this study, only about 8.3% of the 36 individuals assessed posed little risk of recidivism. Additionally, extrapolating these results to the entire former terrorist population in Indonesia would, thus, highlight a significant risk of terrorist recidivism and the challenges of deradicalization. However, further research is required to ensure a representative sample size.

Introduction

Suicide bombing attacks are often used by terror groups as a tactic to attack their targets. Explosives are usually placed on the perpetrator’s body and detonated at a target location or near intended victims. In Indonesia, this tactic is commonly used by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), both terrorist groups. Notably, suicide bombings have become increasingly widespread after the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) and its affiliated groups such as JAD.

Originally, such attacks in Indonesia were aimed at far enemies; the United States and its allies. However, such targets became less viable due to increasing challenges such as tightening of security. This led to a shift to more accessible targets, particularly those preventing them from achieving their goals. Unsurprisingly, Indonesia’s National Police (Polri) is on top of their target list. Consequently, Polri has lost officers and its infrastructures damaged due to this crime.

On Wednesday (07/12), Polri was once again targeted via a suicide bombing on the Astana Anyar Sector Police (Polsek) headquarters while officers were carrying out morning routine. There were two fatalities, the perpetrator and an officer, and a total of nine injured officers. This attack was not spontaneously conducted. Instead, it was carefully planned through numerous surveys. This is evident from the time chosen to conduct the attack. Understanding the routine at the headquarters meant higher likelihood of inflicting significant damage.

Perpetrator and Motives

Through investigations, the 35-year-old male perpetrator was a terrorist recidivist. His main motive could be ideological based on collected evidence. This included a motorcycle bearing a message against the Revised Criminal Code.

There are only a handful of similar cases in the past revealing an ideological motive. In 2021, a female youth who attacked the National Police Headquarters was found to have a note revealing her ideological motive. Apart from demonstrating their ideological existence, particularly after the fall of IS in Syria and Iraq, this inhuman way is also a propaganda tool for recruitment into terrorist groups.

Why are Former Terrorists Reengaging in Violence?

Terrorism can be viewed through a Triple H approach, namely “heaven”, “home”, and “habit.” “Heaven” entails the religious legitimization of violence conferring afterworld rewards to perpetrators. “Home” is the actor’s relationship with family members. Here, “home” is a double-edged sword: relationships can help ex-terrorists remain deradicalized or it can drive them back to violence. “Habit” can be understood as habits, environmental influences, and networks that can influence a former terrorist actor towards recidivism.

Largely, former inmates of general crimes would be deterred from reoffending upon their release. This is due to the deterrent effect of imprisonment and the inmates adopting positive behaviours. Unlike general crimes, terrorism is driven by ideology. Indonesian terrorists believe that the criminal justice system they live in, including punishments in correctional institutions, is part of their “holy” struggle. Conversely, the regulations governing the criminalization of terrorists in Law no. 5 of 2018 only regulate criminal acts of terrorism based on their actions, not their pro-violent ideology. It is, thus, unsurprising when former terrorism inmates continue to espouse such ideology after their release.

Many countries generally use two approaches to terrorists from reoffending, namely deradicalization and disengagement. Deradicalization focuses on changing their ideology, while disengagement focuses more on social settings which have implications for their behavior. The author has proposed a new approach called Desistance from Terrorism to study how a person can escape from the snares of terror and -ism.

Desistence can be interpreted as the stage where a criminal stops committing crimes. There are two forms of desistance, namely primary desistance and secondary desistance. Primary desistance can be interpreted as a change in a person’s behavior to stop being a criminal. Not only is this temporary, there is still no clear measurement of the point at which a person stops. Secondary desistance is defined as the process of criminal taking on the role of non-perpetrators of crime. This entails a more permanent change as it requires criminals to constantly evaluate their attitudes.

Taking a leave from secondary desistance, Desistence from Terrorism looks at multi-factors about a person’s potential to stop being a terrorist. These factors consist of three channels, the first channel contains parameters regarding basic needs, narratives and networks. The second channel is the core channel which consists of family, self-introspection, maturity, economic activity, and deterrence. While the third channel consists of trust in the law, integration, social relations, and situational opportunities. When these three channels are not adequately addressed, the perpetrators will likely return to committing acts of terror.

Based on this and what has been gathered thus far, there were numerous factors that were inadequately addressed which led to the perpetrator conducting the attack on the Astana Anyar Polsek headquarters. These factors include the ideological narrative which is still pro-violence, unmet basic needs, failure to reintegrate into society and continued links with terrorist networks. Therefore, Desistance from Terrorism is a more comprehensive tool to facilitating a long-lasting change in former terrorists.

Recommendations for Stakeholders

As this attack refocuses attention to terrorism, more should be done to ensure public safety. To facilitate this, there are three policy recommendations. The first is for law enforcement agencies, especially the National Police, to immediately strengthen their premises’ security throughout Indonesia (target hardening). This is because of the potential of this attack to trigger similar actions in other regions. Improving security can be done by using crime prevention via a situational approach.

Additionally, it is crucial for stakeholders responsible for intervention to identify the ideological motives of perpetrators. Such interventions must also be tailored specifically to the needs of each perpetrator. Recognizing the need for large resources, civil societies would play a crucial supportive role in this endeavor. Finally, there is a need to increase public awareness and to co-opt them into the fight against terrorism in Indonesia. The recent attack highlights the real threat of terrorism in the country. Terrorism is not a ploy engineered by the authorities but is a social problem continues to exist.  Anyone can potentially become a victim of terrorism, not only security forces because acts of terror occur unexpectedly.

Introduction

Indonesian terrorist groups have conducted 11 attacks since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. These attacks resulted in the killing of two police officers, seven civilians and seven terrorists, and injuring three police officers and 20 civilians. Ten attacks were perpetrated by two Indonesian pro-Islamic State (IS) groups, namely Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) and Jamaah Anshorud Daulah (JAD), with one carried out by a lone wolf. MIT, based in Poso, Central Sulawesi, carried out seven attacks while JAD carried out three. Two of the most recent attacks took place in South Sulawesi and Jakarta. On March 28, 2021 two members of JAD conducted a suicide attack on a Catholic church in Makassar, South Sulawesi killing them and wounding 20 people. Several days later, equipped with an airsoft gun, a female extremist, Zakiah Aini, attacked the Indonesian National Police headquarters in Jakarta with herself as the only casualty.

Five Important Indications from the 11 Attacks

These 11 attacks highlight five important indications about the current terrorism developments in Indonesia.

First, although JAD only conducted three attacks, its attacks attracted more attention than MIT’s attacks because they employed families to conduct the attacks and that their attacks were dispersed around Indonesia, namely in South Kalimantan, Central Java and South Sulawesi whereas the attacks conducted by MIT were limited to Central Sulawesi. Additionally, JAD’s attacks, especially the ones that included bombings, were deadlier than attacks by MIT. JAD’s Makassar suicide attack alone could have resulted in the killing of 20 civilians had it not been for the church’s security guard stopping the perpetrators from entering the church premises and detonating their explosives there. Previously, on  May 13, 2018, JAD members conducted a series of similar suicide attacks on churches and a police station in Surabaya killing at least 20 people including the perpetrators and their accomplices consisting of three families; ten family members in total.

Second, despite their threats of attacking Chinese nationals during the pandemic, police, police informants and non-Muslims remained the main target of Indonesian terrorists. The police remain as targets as they continue to prevent terrorists from achieving their goals of enforcing Islamic law and establishing an Islamic State based on their interpretations. This is in addition to the arrests and killing of JAD members by the police. Non-Muslims are targeted because the group is following the call issued by IS-Central to attack ‘God’s enemies’ in March 2020 in their al-Naba newsletter.

Third, though the pandemic has reduced the amount of funds channelled to these terrorist groups, this has no impact on their motivation to conduct attacks. In the first half of 2020, these groups experienced a reduction in financial contributions of up to 72% as compared to what they received in 2019. This reduction is due to the loss of jobs and dwindling businesses experienced by their members and donors. To alleviate this financial constraint, groups have turned to robbery. Subhan’s group planned to rob a bank and stores owned by Chinese Indonesians in Centra Java in March 2020. However, their plans were foiled with their arrests prior to executing their plans. Conversely, MIT successfully robbed health department officers in Poso in August 2020. They seized food and electronic devices carried by the officers without inflicting any casualties. Despite their dire financial problem in the first eight months of the pandemic, their commitment to conducting attacks is unaffected as evident from the increasing number of attacks during this period. As compared to the eight attacks in 2019, there were 11 attacks since the start of the pandemic.

Fourth, from January to April 9, 2021 police have arrested 112 terrorist suspects. However, this does not mean a lack of foot soldiers for terrorist groups because recruitment continues to take place both offline and online. Additionally, an estimated 1,000 official JAD members remain free despite their obvious affiliation to the Islamic State and their support for the terrorist attacks conducted by their fellow members. For this reason, we should expect new perpetrators to surface from these recruitments.

Fifth, the attack at the national police headquarters signifies an urgent need for the Indonesian government to improve the security of their facilities and their early detection of terrorist threats. The fact that Zakiah Aini was able to penetrate the police headquarters shows that government facilities are not guarded well enough. To prevent future terrorist penetration, the government needs to secure its facilities with a security system like that implemented at airports. This requires the government to install x-ray machines and full body scanners in its facilities. The government also needs to improve its database and surveillance of terrorists to detect and disrupt their plans prior to fruition.

Working Together to Prevent Future Attacks

The Indonesian government and society need to take the following steps to prevent future attacks. First, the government through the National Counter Terrorism Agency (BNPT), Indonesian National Police, the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Social Affairs need to set up deradicalization centres in the 18 provinces where extremists, particularly JAD members and their associates, operate. These provinces include North Sumatra, South Sumatra, Bengkulu, Jambi, Lampung, Banten, Greater Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java, West Nusa Tenggara, South Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, East Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Maluku and Papua. The government should also issue a bill making it mandatory for JAD members who are still free and their associates to participate in the deradicalization programs conducted in these centres. The program participants should be assessed to have completed the programs only when they have abandoned extremism completely. Therefore, these programs should not be constrained within a specific timespan. This means that the participants should attend these programs until they are assessed to be deradicalized. To ensure a correct assessment of the participants’ level of extremism, by working with CVE and counter terrorism experts, the government needs to create a thorough assessment tool that can measure the participants’ level of extremism.

Second, the government needs to empower local government and civil societies to help the central government run deradicalization programs in the centres. Such empowerment includes providing trainings to ensure that they can run both nationally standardized and individually tailor-made programmes.

Third, the government needs to work with private businesses to fund these centres. The large number of centres and the length of the deradicalization programs require large amount of money. As the government is financially tied with mitigating the COVID-19 pandemic, seeking assistance from private businesses to fund these centres is ideal.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of BNPT.