Background

The return of Donald Trump to the White House may cause new tensions geopolitically, which will not spare Southeast Asia.

Indonesia has also been under the spotlight since Prabowo Subianto took over the reins as Indonesia’s president. As the biggest democracy in the region, the country aspires to become a significant power in Asia.

Nevertheless, it faces a complex, crucial challenge with regards to how and what strategy Prabowo’s foreign policy will adopt to navigate the competition between China and the United States.

Indeed, Prabowo may likely contrast former President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s more passive approach to foreign policy. Prabowo seems determined to consolidate Indonesia’s place on the global stage and solidify its role as an emerging power in the region.

Such a vision will encourage Prabowo to focus on national security, e.g., Indonesia’s role in the South China Sea as well as China’s activity vis-à-vis the Taiwan question.

Nevertheless, Indonesia’s economic dependence on China imposes crucial constraints that Prabowo will need help to manage.

Trump’s return means that the US administration may pursue policies that erode Prabowo’s ability to keep Indonesia neutral within the parameters of its bebas (free) and aktif (active) foreign policy. This may eventually press Prabowo to make that hard choice between closer alignment with the United States or China.

Dynamic Engagement

Prabowo’s foreign policy views have shown signs of dynamic engagement with the two superpowers. Prabowo visited China in the second week of November 2024, where he met with President Xi Jinping and signed MoUs on cooperation in multiple sectors, particularly infrastructure, trade, and energy.

A key takeaway of the visit was the promise of increased investment in the blue economy. The agreement will not only regulate the role of fishing vessels but also the production and sale of marine products. Perhaps more importantly, the visit concluded with a commitment by China to support Prabowo’s free meal program, a key point in his campaign.

These are positive signals denoting Indonesia’s intent to maintain good relations with China despite growing regional tensions.

His second strategic destination of balanced engagement was the United States. The trip was an opportunity to recalibrate Indonesia’s position with the United States and explore future possibilities for economic and security cooperation with Washington.

Indeed, the visit facilitated Indonesia’s attempt at diversifying its economic portfolio, potentially inviting US investors to participate in sectors such as semiconductors and technology. The response was also positive; President Biden declared the importance of Indonesia and establishing new collaborations.

Nevertheless, how Trump will engage with Indonesia is another question. Politically, Prabowo’s move to open a dialogue with both superpowers separately shows his attempt at keeping a more politically-friendly approach in exercising the bebas dan aktif foreign policy.

In larger context, Jakarta has given signals that it is also open to breaking free from the United States’ economic influence. Through his foreign minister, Prabowo has indicated Indonesia’s interest in becoming a member of BRICS, a move that signifies his willingness to be somewhat independent from the Western-centric global order.

Specifically, the outcomes of both trips indicate that Prabowo is sidestepping the pressure to closely align with either of the two, as well as assuming a nuanced neutrality to maximize Indonesia’s geopolitical flexibility.

Running Up That Hill

Indonesia has based its philosophy of non-alignment on a vision that mirrored the political conception of Mohammad Hatta. Historically, one can see how this vision manifested clearly during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, with his “one million friends and zero enemies” foreign policy.

However, maintaining neutrality will become more intricate today. That is because, after Trump’s victory, his administration may step up pressure on Southeast Asian nations to align with Washington’s China containment strategy, seeking not only greater economic cooperation but also military support.

From a geopolitical perspective, developments in the South China Sea increase the complexity of maintaining a neutral position. The geopolitical tension stems from China’s attempt to expand its military influence across the zone, which includes areas of territory disputed by other countries like the Philippines. Indonesia, which claims an exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea, is particularly vulnerable to Chinese incursions.

A recent furore erupted when Prabowo, during his visit to China, seemingly agreed to China’s interpretation of the nine-dash line, a move that landed him as a subject of criticism over alleged foreign policy inexperience. While this has continued to put certain quaters on edge, it has also been interpreted as a step to managing the tension with China.

For Prabowo, therefore, the challenge will be in finding a balance between national security and the economic benefits of partnering with Beijing.

Yet this will be an increasingly uphill task in the near future. Trump’s administration may compel Prabowo to put pressure on China, potentially jeopardizing Indonesia’s own relations with the Middle Kingdom.

On the other hand, Indonesia cannot do this easily; China is arguably Indonesia’s most essential economic partner. Indeed, it can also be argued that this dependence on China may have become a potential vulnerability for Indonesia.

The Taiwan Question

Another critical issue that needs further examination is Taiwan, with which Indonesia has recently increased diplomatic engagement. This move could exacerbate tensions between Washington and Beijing, with the former putting pressure on Jakarta to take a more pro-stability stance in the Taiwan Straits.

In addition, Taiwan is strategically important for Indonesia. It is also home to a large Indonesian community, the second largest destination after Malaysia for its migrant workers. Indonesians number around 300,000 in Taiwan today.

Interestingly, the last presidential election saw almost 70% of Indonesian workers vote for Prabowo, driven by promises of reforms that would increase their protection as migrant workers.

Moreover, Indonesia is also a gem from the perspective of Taiwan’s. Indonesia is of its target countries for the New Southbound Policy, which sees Indonesia playing a vital role.

While closer relationship between the two is much desired by both sides, it might invite consternation from Beijing.

It remains to be seen if the Taiwan question could destabilize Indonesia’s relationship with China. One thing is certain: Prabowo needs to navigate this potential landmine tactfully.

Conclusion

Probowo has seen the rise of polarization in the international context and how foreign policy decisions could directly affect internal stability. He also understands that his political legitimacy is rooted in economic stability and the perception that Indonesia can prosper without outside interference.

A too-direct alliance with one of the two superpowers could disrupt the balance in Indonesia’s policy of non-interference. However, more studies should be undertaken to investigate how the public would perceive such a move by Prabowo’s administration. Finally, Trump’s return to the White House could also force Prabowo to make decisions that are unpopular with Indonesians. Yet, if the strategy is based on political autonomy and directed towards all without enemies, Indonesia could emerge as a new international player with Prabowo as a critical regional leader.

Introduction

Indonesia was rocked with a constitutional crisis recently following the House of Representatives’ (DPR) attempt to revise Law No. 10 of 2016 concerning regional elections (Pilkada). This attempt came the day after the Constitutional Court (MK) altered the conditions for candidacy in Pilkada with decisions No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024 and No. 70/PPU-XXII/2024.

On 21 August 2024, DPR swiftly convened a meeting of the legislative body (Baleg) with the aim of reversing MK’s decision, thus triggering a wave of national outrage.

A total of eight factions approved the discussions’ outcomes on the Fourth Amendment to the Pilkada law. These include Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra), Golongan Karya (Golkar), Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), Demokrat, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), all members of Koalisi Indonesia Maju Plus (Advanced Indonesia Coalition – KIM) supporting Prabowo Subianto and President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo.

This latest episode highlights the most recent attempt at undermining Indonesia’s democracy, but also how rules and regulations can be easily challenged by the political interests of undemocratic forces in the country.

However, widespread demonstrations, coupled with media protests and unexpected pushbacks from the country’s elite, forced DPR to backtrack. DPR has now announced that it will respect the decision of the MK.

A Constitutional Crisis?

To reiterate, the crisis was triggered when DPR attempted to repudiate MK’s ruling on Pilkada law. The brouhaha occurred after MK modified the threshold for parties to nominate political candidates in Pilkada, overturning the thresholds stipulated by the Pilkada law with the two decisions identified above.  

MK’s ruling lowers the threshold for political parties and coalitions to nominate regional heads even without seats in the DPRD, provided they meet the percentage requirements based on the final voter list (DPT). Parties with less than 20% seats at the Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD) or 25% of valid votes can now field their own candidates, according to MK’s decision.

However, DPR Baleg’s ruling retained the threshold of 20% of DPRD seats or 25% of valid votes for parties with seats in the DPRD, disregarding MK’s decision.

The second critical point concerns the minimum age limit for governor candidates. The Pilkada law sets the minimum age of 30 for governors and 25 for mayors/regents. MK’s decision No. 70/PPU-XXII/2024 confirms these limits, but DPR Baleg stipulated that these ages refer to the time of official inauguration of elected officials.

DPR curiously aligned its ruling with a previous decision by the Supreme Court (MA) rather than adhering to MK’s decisions.

The Fundamental Problem

One of MK’s main tasks is to ensure that all laws and rulings respect the 1945 Constitution. Therefore, MK’s decisions are final and binding on all institutions, including DPR. Ignoring an MK decision means violating the Constitution.

However, DPR attempted to circumvent this situation by appealing to MA, a move that remains unconstitutional as only the MK has the final authority on constitutional matters. Consequently, all reforms or laws that do not respect MK’s decisions must be considered unconstitutional.

DPR’s attempt to reverse MK’s ruling has triggered a slew of protests, evoking memories of 1998. Major demonstrations took place in Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Makassar, Semarang, and Bandung, where protestors often clashed with law enforcement.

Jokowi also curiously defended DPR’s decision as part of the electoral process, but Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P) and the Labour Party mobilized against him, accusing Jokowi and Prabowo of acting solely to maintain and expand the status quo in the country.

These contradictions came at a critical time when the nation’s attention has been fixed on the upcoming Pilkada, with particular attention on Jakarta, where the governorship has been vacant since Anies Baswedan’s resignation in 2023 following his presidential candidacy.

Decision No. 60 gives PDI-P the opportunity to nominate its own candidate, a significant factor given the PDI-P’s defeat in the national elections, opening the possibility of an eventual coalition with the Labour Party.

At the same time, MK’s decision No. 70 placed definitive limits on the possibility for Jokowi’s youngest son, Kaesang Pangarep, to participate in regional elections because, at the time of candidate registration, he was not yet 30 years old.

Critics also say Jokowi mobilized his machines to allow Kaesang’s nomination so that he could continue exerting influence even after stepping down from his presidential post later this year.

By attempting to circumvent this decision, DPR shows its readiness to facilitate such questionable design, instead of providing checks and balances to the activities of the presidential office.

The Context

These developments cannot be extricated from trends of democratic decline and power struggle that have been happening in Indonesia for quite some time.

The recent general election saw significant developments taking place, including: 1) Jokowi’s shift away from PDI-P; 2) the revision of the election law that lowered the minimum candidacy age to facilitate Gibran Rakabuming Raka’s nomination as vice president and; 3) Prabowo Subianto’s victory in the elections.

The problem is, the effort to facilitate Kaesang’s nomination is indicative of an ongoing trend instead of a singular phenomenon. MK previously lowered the minimum age for candidates running for vice presidential post, a highly controversial move that paved the way for Jokowi’s eldest son Gibran to run.

The ruling was mired in ethical questions, not least because Jokowi’s new brother-in-law Anwar Usman was chief justice in MK, therefore undermining MK’s image and credibility as a product of democratization in the country. Anwar was later embroiled in ethical questioning and demoted from his chief justice post.

Furthermore, it instigated the trend to view Jokowi as intending to create his own political dynasty, despite past vows not to go down this road, primarily as a means to cement his political legacy.

To complicate matters, his pursuit of this is also backed by a large parliamentary coalition aligned with both the outgoing president and the president-elect, Prabowo Subianto. Jokowi, additionally, has shown he is not above punishing those that do not support his vision and vice versa. This is on full display during the umpteenth cabinet reshuffle that took place just recently.

Jokowi phased away cabinet ministers affiliated with the PDI-P with new figures connected to Prabowo, a move more strategic than political aimed at facilitating the next president.

Among these are Rosan Roesiani, chairman of Prabowo and Gibran’s national campaign team (tim sukses), as Minister of Investment, and Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, leader of Demokrat, as Minister of the National Land Agency.

The Unfinished Democratic Process

The constitutional crisis is the latest episode in a series of tensions rooted in the complex post-Suharto democratic transition. After the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998, Indonesia embarked on a democratization process that has never truly been completed.

The country’s political dynasties, oligarchs and other actors with undemocratic designs hindered the process, which was also affected by factors such as ethnic and religious conflicts, the slow evolution of the rule of law, systemic corruption and the influence of the military in the country.

This conflict is not merely a matter of institutional disagreement but touches on the very core of democracy: the separation of powers. MK was conceived as the ultimate guardian of the 1945 Constitution’s values, an independent institution tasked with protecting citizens’ rights and ensuring the government operates within constitutional limits.

If DPR continues to challenge MK’s decisions, there is a risk of further constitutional crisis that could severely undermine judicial authority, leading to a weakening of the system of checks and balances fundamental to any functioning democracy.

This situation could lead to a concentration of power in the hands of the executive or parliament, increasing the risk of power abuse and corruption—a trend already well underway in Indonesia, particularly during Jokowi’s period.

In a broader context, the erosion of the MK’s independence could foster a shift towards an authoritarian or illiberal regime, where civil and political liberties would be progressively curtailed.

Conclusion

Indeed, the recent events reflect deeper issues within the country’s democratic framework. The controversy between DPR and MK over the Pilkada law underscores a growing trend of political maneuvering that threatens the balance of power and the integrity of democratic institutions.

Nevertheless, the swift reaction from civil society demonstrates the resilience of democratic forces in Indonesia, though the underlying tensions – rooted in the unfinished democratization process post-Suharto – remain unresolved.

Left unchecked, these power tussles and attempts to undermine constitutional authority could lead to a dangerous erosion of democratic norms, pushing Indonesia towards a more authoritarian and illiberal political environment.

The stakes are high, as the future of Indonesia’s democracy hangs in the balance, with potential long-term consequences for the country’s rule of law and civil liberties.