Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita – Stratsea https://stratsea.com Stratsea Tue, 01 Nov 2022 22:50:42 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.5.5 https://stratsea.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/cropped-Group-32-32x32.png Prof. Anak Agung Banyu Perwita – Stratsea https://stratsea.com 32 32 Outlawing OPM: A Right Step in Ensuring Lasting Peace in Papua https://stratsea.com/outlawing-opm-a-right-step/ https://stratsea.com/outlawing-opm-a-right-step/#respond Tue, 04 May 2021 11:55:18 +0000 https://wp2.stratsea.com/2021/05/04/outlawing-opm-a-right-step/
Indonesia remains steadfast in ensuring peace in Papua. Officially labelling OPM as a terrorist group creates opportunities to achieve this. Credit: KOMPAS.com

Introduction

On April 29, 2021, the Indonesian government has labelled the Free Papua Movement (OPM) as a terrorist group. Such labelling is based on this rebel group conducting a series of violent attacks on unarmed, innocent civilians in recent years. The most notable indiscriminate attack by OPM was the brutal mass killing of 31 workers from PT Istaka Karya, who were building the Trans Papua project in Kali Yigi and Kali Aurak in Yigi sub-district, Nduga district on December 2, 2018. This article discusses the consequences of this labelling while proposing solutions for the government to counter this terrorist threat in Papua.

Legal, Political and Security Consequences of Government Labelling

Legal Consequences

This labelling has serious legal consequences for OPM’s leaders, recruiters, members and supporters both in Indonesia and overseas. This means that group members and supporters are punishable by Law Number 5 of 2018 in Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2003 on Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism. Articles 12-16 authorize their arrests by the Indonesian police and prosecutions, potentially facing three to 15 years imprisonment. Such arrests and prosecutions are meted not only to perpetrators of terrorism but also to its members, those providing financial support to the group, and those abetting the group’s members in conducting their attacks. Consequently, activists who carry out OPM’s propaganda under the pretence of human rights are now deemed as terrorists. Similarly, all financial donors to this group have violated Article 4 of the Law Number of 2013 on the Prevention and Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism Financing.

Political Consequences

This labelling will create tensions between Indonesia and OPM’s state backers. The Indonesian government now has a legal basis to seek the repatriation of OPM members and supporters from countries harbouring them. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that these countries will accede to repatriations while erroneously citing security concerns for OPM’s members. Confounding the situation is the domestic repercussions of failing to secure repatriations which may stem from Indonesia’s lack of bargaining power. Domestically, such failure would become fodder for opposition parties to paint the Indonesian government as weak and unable to uphold Indonesia’s pride internationally.

Simultaneously, this labelling may empower OPM members and supporters at home to attack the government politically by casting it as the “real terrorist” and “violators of human rights.” It is, thus, unsurprising if OPM was to covertly or openly work with opposition activists to disseminate government’s alleged human rights violations in Papua.

Security Consequences

Increasing clashes between OPM and government forces are expected in the coming months. OPM would likely increase attacks on military and civilian targets in Papua to express their anger at their new label. To protect its civilians and military, the government will respond to these attacks with counter terrorism operations.

Multi-Pronged Approaches to Ensure Peace in Papua

OPM terrorism is a complex issue that requires multi-pronged approaches to ensure lasting peace in Papua. These approaches entail addressing the security, legal and human rights, economic and political aspects of this issue.

Security Approach

The government needs to launch a joint and measured counter terrorism operation targeting OPM members and supporters across Indonesia akin to the current Madago Raya Operation. The Madago Raya Operation which targets the Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT) members and supporters in Central Sulawesi is a concerted effort involving the police (Polri), the military (TNI) and the state intelligence agency (BIN). The operation against OPM should be also based on solid intelligence to ensure the prevention of unintended casualties. This can be achieved by the police anti-terror unit, Detachment 88, TNI’s anti-terror units and BIN working closely together to conduct pre-emptive arrests of OPM members and supporters. Simultaneously, police attachés in Indonesian embassies overseas need to work with the police in their host countries to apprehend OPM members and supporters.

More importantly, the government needs to iterate and reinforce that this counter terrorism operation is to mitigate the OPM threat and not an attack on Papuans in general. This is to give a sense of security to Papuans residing outside Papua by preventing them from being wrongly stigmatized as terrorists. In other words, not all Papuans are terrorists and have equal rights to thrive in Indonesia.

Legal and Human Rights Approach

To ensure that the counter terrorism operation does not violate human rights, the government needs to remain steadfast in investigating and prosecuting unlawful killings and tortures committed by any Indonesian security personnel and all indiscriminate attacks on innocent civilians committed by OPM. To maintain transparency of the counter terrorism operation and to avoid the excessive use of security forces, the government also needs to allow human rights observers from the National Commission of Human Rights (KOMNAS HAM) to monitor and to advise the government in avoiding human rights violation. Additionally, the government needs to employ police investigators, public prosecutors and judges who understand the human rights aspect of OPM terrorism. This is to ensure a fair and legal prosecution of OPM members that also respects their human rights.

In anticipation of large-scale massive arrests of OPM members and supporters, the government needs to build new detention centres and prisons to house them. To also ensure that senior members do not rebuild their networks and organize attacks from inside the prison, the government needs to place them in maximum-security prisons.

Economic Approach

An unfortunate, unavoidable impact of this counter terrorism operation is on Papuan’s livelihoods despite the government’s efforts to minimize it. For instance, houses and businesses could be damaged due to clashes between OPM members and the security forces. The government needs to financially compensate those affected by OPM terrorism and the government’s counter terrorism efforts. This is particularly important as the government strives to win the people’s hearts and minds.

Political Approach

The government needs to conduct an assertive international diplomacy by persuading OPM state backers to abandon their support for OPM and repatriate OPM members to Indonesia, forcefully if required. Refusal to do so can lead to economic ramifications by the Indonesian government. For instance, embargoing the import of their products to Indonesia and their conduct of businesses in Indonesia. The government should not be concerned with potential backlash of such assertive diplomacy due to its strong and close relationships with major international economic powers such as Singapore, China, Japan and Hongkong. With their understanding and continued support of the government’s decision on OPM through their continued investment in Indonesia, Indonesia’s economy would remain relatively unaffected. However, the Indonesian government should endeavour in its efforts to diplomatically persuade these state backers before resorting to such measures.

Simultaneously, the government needs to consider establishing a new desk within the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs to manage the complexities surrounding OPM terrorism. The desk chief will manage the counter terrorism operation and other law enforcements in Papua under the supervision of the Coordinating Minister of Political, Legal and Security Affairs.

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Indonesian Military Under Terrorist Attack https://stratsea.com/indonesian-military-under-terrorist-attack/ https://stratsea.com/indonesian-military-under-terrorist-attack/#respond Mon, 26 Apr 2021 00:00:00 +0000 https://wp2.stratsea.com/2021/04/26/indonesian-military-under-terrorist-attack/
A mother being comforted after her son, a TNI personnel, was fatally injured by MIT terrorists (above). In its fight against terrorism, TNI continues to be targeted by violent extremists. Heightened security measures are needed to prevent future attacks on its personnel and installations. Credits: KOMPAS.COM/Idon

Introduction

On November 27, 2020 the Indonesian anti-terror police unit Detachment 88 dismantled a pro-Islamic State extremist group, called Mujahidin Pohuwato, and arrested eight of its members. As reflected in its name, the group is based in Pohuwato, Gorontalo province, on Sulawesi Island. They were initially a non-violent Islamic revivalist group, Tablighi Jamaat, who were radicalized through social media such as Facebook, Telegram and WhatsApp groups. The group planned to attack various hard targets such as the Mananggu sub-district military headquarters and police stations in Pohuwato and Marisa. They also planned to rob members of the Pohuwato local parliament and an Indonesian Chinese store owner. This article explains the group’s interest in targeting the military and proposes solutions to prevent future casualties of TNI personnel.

TNI Targeted on Numerous Occasions

Islamic extremists target Indonesian military headquarters for two reasons. First, they perceive military personnel as anshar thaghut (helpers of tyrants), who prevent them from establishing an Islamic state based on their interpretation of Islamic law. Regardless how military personnel present themselves as pious Muslims, they will continue to be deemed as unbelievers by extremists and, thus, worthy to be attacked. Second, they intend to seize TNI’s weapons in light of limited alternative sources. This means that military presence in an area does not always deter extremists. Instead, extremists could be attracted to its weapons cache.

Mujahidin Pohuwanto’s plan to attack a military installation was not the first terror plot on the TNI. Previously, in April 2011, a member of Ashabul Kahfi group, Muhammad Syarif, killed a military personnel in Cirebon, West Java whom he considered as an anshar thaghut. In April 2020 another pro-IS group, Muhajirin Anshar Tauhid, also planned to attack the district military headquarters in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara to seize their weapons.

We should not underestimate extremists’ interest in attacking military headquarters because despite their lack of capabilities, they remain committed to executing their attack plan. A research by PAKAR, an Indonesian-based NGO that studies terrorism, discovered that not only had Mujahidin Pohuwanto members surveyed the Mananggu sub-district military headquarters, but one of its members, Fijal Kadue, was also set to conduct the attack in late 2018. Equipped with a bow, two arrows and a knife, he left his home and went to the military headquarters. As the headquarters was seemingly vacant, he decided to delay his attack while waiting at the house of a fellow member. However, upon seeing the member’s sister covered only with a towel, he became aroused. Consequently, he decided to cancel his attack altogether because of his impure thoughts.

Lax Security in Koramil

There are 332 district military headquarters (known as Kodim) and an estimated 7,252 sub-district military headquarters (known as Koramil) across Indonesia. Although extremists target both district and sub-district headquarters, Kodim seems to be a harder target than Koramil. This is due to Kodim housing large numbers of personnel and enforcing strict security. A Kodim usually has a gated entrance/check point manned by one or two personnel equipped with a rifle. Such security points can stop extremists from entering the headquarters. Conversely, Koramil contains a small number of personnel (around 7-10) and has a lax security. Its unguarded entrance has no check point making it easy for extremists to penetrate its compound. For this reason, it is not surprising that Koramil are more targeted by extremists than Kodim.

Need for Heightened Monitoring and Coordination by Military Intelligence

The cases of Mujahidin Pohuwato and Muhajirin Anshar Tauhid emphasize the urgency for military intelligence to intensify their efforts to monitor extremist groups, particularly online. This is evident when members of both groups, initially non-violent with moderate interpretation of Islam, became radicalized by pro-IS recruiters through social media. Thus, the military cyber unit needs to aggressively detect extremist online radicalisation activities, identify and conduct surveillance on individuals keen on pursuing terrorism. Upon collecting strong evidence of potential attacks, it is imperative for the unit to work with the intelligence officers in Kodim and Koramil for further investigations. For quicker mitigation of threat, military intelligence officers need to coordinate their work with Detachment 88 who could be investigating the same plotters and are authorized to conduct arrests.

Three Measures to Prevent Future Attacks on TNI

To prevent future attacks on Kodim and Koramil, it is crucial for TNI to implement the following measures. First, TNI facilities can be further secured by building fences around its Kodim and Koramil compounds while ensuring manned check points are installed at all entrances. Minimally, these fixtures will hinder attacks, giving Kodim and Koramil personnel added reactionary time.

Second, TNI needs to empower its village supervisory non-commissioned officers (Babinsa) to suss out suspected extremists in villages under their supervision and report them to the Koramil commander, who will then report to the Kodim commander. With the information supplied by the Babinsa, the Koramil commander will be better able to determine if the suspected extremists pose a serious security threat to the Koramil. If the threats are legitimate, the Koramil commander can ready his men for potential attacks while working with Detachment 88 to apprehend them prior to their attacks.

Third, TNI needs to monitor ideological infiltration by extremists into its personnel as according to the former defence minister, Ret. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, around 3% of TNI members were exposed to extremism. Unfortunately, there have been several of such infiltrations. In the most recent case, the Mujahidin Pohuwato group had infiltrated the Koramil in Mananggu. One of its members, Miman, befriended and elicited a Koramil personnel to share information on the headquarters’ weapons depot. The information was crucial in assisting the group plan its attack on the Koramil while seizing military weapons. Other prominent examples include the cases of the late Yuli Harsono, Daeng Koro and Lesmana Ibrahim. These men were not only recruited by extremists, but participated in attacks on military installations and the public. The former Second Private Yuli Harsono did not only steal ammunitions from a military ammunition  depot in Bandung, West Java in 2001-2003 but he also killed two police officer in Central Java in 2010. The former special forces member Daeng Koro helped the late Santoso, the leader of Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT), a pro-IS terrorist group based in Poso, Central Sulawesi develop MIT. He was responsible for a series of attacks in the province. The former naval intelligence officer, Lesmana Ibrahim, provided refuge for a perpetrator of the Jakarta Petra Church bombing in 2001.

To address such infiltration, TNI needs to screen its personnel’s contacts to reduce any possible interactions with extremists keen on involving them in unsanctioned missions. TNI also needs to ban its personnel from attending extremist religious gatherings and their access to online extremist propaganda. Additionally, extremist preachers should be banned from preaching at the mosques in military compounds.

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