Introduction

Indonesia’s political landscape has solidified following major elections last year. President Prabowo Subianto has continued his predecessor’s political consolidation strategy of sporting a big coalition of parties in the parliament, thus almost effectively neutralising any potential opposition.

This has raised concerns about the weakening of the checks and balances system, the absence of alternative policy debates and accountability.

His ability to accommodate multiple political parties from various backgrounds, including various Islamic ones, influences the makeup of his big and fat cabinet. These Islamic parties have successfully secured ministerial positions despite their opposition of one another in pre-Prabowo years. They prioritise influence and political access to power and policy making rather than disputing issues of governance, indicating a conformity with pragmatic and transactional form of politics.

This article attempts to critically examine the dynamics and future trajectory of Islamic political parties.

Decline of Votes

In the 2024 general election, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) only secured 3.87% of the votes, which effectively pushed them out of the legislative body for the first time (the parliamentary threshold is at 4%). Prior to this, Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB) was the last Islamic party that lost all their parliamentary seats, which happened in the 2009 election.

However, despite PPP’s decline, the remaining Islamic-based parties experienced a slight increase in votes. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB) secured 11,72% of the votes, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) gained 9,14% and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN) earned 8,28%. These three parties now occupy 169 out of the available 580 seats.

The decreasing number of Islamic parties in Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) could point to the dimming vibrancy of political Islam in the legislative body. This also proves that the majority of Muslim voters do not vote for Islamic parties, which comprise less than a third of all DPR seats.

For example, members of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) prefer to vote for Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P) and Prabowo’s Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra) over PPP or PKB, to which NU has historical affiliation and attachment. A reason for this is that nationalist parties like PDI-P has attracted more NU adherents by establishing Islamic wing organisations such as Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (BAMUSI).

Pragmatic Politics

Meanwhile, new Islamic parties such as Gelora Party and Ummat Party emerged, participated and failed in the last election. Like PBB, both parties obtained a very small fraction of votes (less than 1%). This seems to point out that the appetite for new Islamic parties, instead of the more established ones, is still very low.

Based on the past trends, it is almost impossible for new parties, including non-parliamentary ones, to get plenty of votes instantly. This explains why the parties’ elites shifted and adjusted their strategy in order to survive in the current landscape. 

For example, these non-parliamentarian Islamic parties pragmatically chose to foster an alliance with Prabowo’s Koalisi Indonesia Maju (Onward Indonesia Coalition – KIM), instead of improving the cadre and internal systems.

Elites of Gelora and PBB also campaigned for Prabowo, for which they were well rewarded with strategic positions in the cabinet. PBB’s Yusril Ihza Mahendra is now Coordinating Minister of Law and Human Rights. Gelora’s Anis Matta and Fahri Hamzah are both vice ministers in different portfolios (Foreign Affairs as well as Housing and Residential Area respectively).

This is despite their parties failing to pass the parliamentary threshold.

PKB’s pragmatism is also on full display, having joined Prabowo’s KIM that later became KIM Plus, despite previously backing his rival Anies Baswedan. Prabowo later teased the party for “returning to the right path” after their accession to his coalition.

PKB was later awarded two crucial positions. Its chairman Muhaimin Iskandar now serves as Coordinating Minister of People’s Empowerment while its executive Abdul Kadir Karding functions as Minister of Migrant Worker Protection.

Similarly, Prabowo’s loyalist PAN secured nine ministerial positions, whereas PKS, which joined under the KIM Plus arrangement, obtained one.

Securing a cabinet position is significant to these parties for multiple reasons.

Firstly, it accords access to state resources which, through various means, could be utilised to strengthen their base and finance operations such as future political campaigns. By controlling a ministry or a state institution, a political party has the ability to create and distribute jobs as well as projects that keep its internal members occupied.

Secondly, it allows parties to shape policies and control programmes that align with their political agenda. Moreover, a minister’s good performance will reflect positively on their party’s public image and credibility.

Thirdly, securing top ministerial position ensures a degree of political protection from legal scrutiny and law enforcement, although this may depend on that party’s relationship with coalition leaders and Prabowo himself.

All of these suggest that Islamic parties are moving in the same direction, further casting into question the purpose of the party’s Islamic ideology and identity. Evidently, what is relevant to them now are power, access to financial opportunities and bureaucratic connections. The line between Islamic and nationalist parties has thus become blurrier. 

This strategy to “play safe” clearly aims to avoid risks of becoming an opposition. It seems that to these parties, electoral survival and political influence outweigh ideological rigidity. Consequently, however, it also contributes towards the disappearance of diverse voices and views in the political landscape, thus a symptom of Indonesia’s declining democracy.

Status Quo Yes, Opposition No

In February 2025, student protests and demonstrations erupted across big cities in Indonesia. Under the banner of Indonesia Gelap (Indonesia in Darkness), such demonstrations aimed to express public dissatisfaction with Prabowo’s policies, such as the free meal programme, budget cuts and many more. Some students were arrested by local police while others were allowed by local governments to share their opinion.

These protests reflect the public’s growing frustration towards the perceived government’s failure to deliver goods and services. Yet, despite their magnitude, Islamic-based parties remained silent.

In the last decade, PKS had actively positioned itself as the primary opposition. They had challenged government policies and advocated for the needs and aspirations of the conservative Muslims, its vote base.

However, PKS’ recent reluctance to criticise the government shows a shift in the political dynamic, one that marks the erosion of the checks and balances system as alternative voices become restricted.

Likewise, the largest Islamic organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah, might replicate the attitude of these Islamic parties, contributing to a homogenised political discourse in which dissenting views struggle to gain traction. A key figure in Muslimat NU, Khofifah Indar Parawansa, recently stated that NU will continue being a loyal supporter of Prabowo’s administration.

This situation raises concern about why more religious elites are taking part in maintaining the status quo rather than becoming an opposition.

Ideally, an opposition serves the fundamental role in any democratic system by providing scrutiny, offering policy alternatives and acting as a counterbalance to the government. Without it, policies risk being unchecked, leading to lack of accountability and potential overreach.

Conclusion

All in all, the stance of Islamic-based parties today is clear: they are close to the government and reluctant to be an opposition. Consequently, they cannot be relied on to express alternative voices and provide checks and balances against the government. This forces the people to take to the streets to express their dissatisfaction and dislike towards the government’s policies. If this trend continues, Indonesia’s democratic space would continue to shrink under the weight of political conformity, while demonstrations and online protests would become more frequent.

Actors in the current political landscape can be said to adopt the “wait and see” approach to Prabowo’s policies. It remains to be seen how Islamic political parties would react to key government agendas and legislative priorities, especially if these could affect their chance at getting re-elected in the next contestation.

Introduction

Prabowo-Gibran’s victory in the 2024 Presidential Election, with 58% of the total votes, could influence the future relationship between President Joko Widodo and his party, PDI-P. The former seems to have a decent post-presidency prospect in the next government, while the latter is more likely to function as an opposition. The PDI-P-Jokowi tension has been heating up long before the election and reaching its peak during and after the election.

Before this transpired, a series of occasions indicated internal party friction. In 2015, the party’s chairman, Megawati Soekarnoputri, frequently reminded its members during internal party meetings that PDI-P’s status is above the government and all party members will always be party officials, even though one is a President. She also insisted that Jokowi was just a regular party member without PDI-P. This statement annoyed Jokowi as the media still portrayed him as the party’s puppet. Subsequently, Jokowi appeared to behave differently towards PDIP, slowly distancing away from the party and wielding his power beyond the party as indicated in the recent election.

Jokowi’s presidency and administration will end soon as Prabowo-Gibran will be the official successors in October 2024. It also means that in a few months, PDI-P will no longer be on the government’s side as they are the winning party in the state parliament. In the next five years, this party will act as an opposition; a similar function to 2004-2014 during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s tenure (SBY). Thus, the political landscape in Indonesia is set to change with PDI-P likely to lead the opposition together with Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and Nasdem Party. This consequently spells the continuation of the Jokowi-PDIP.

The Crack Inside Government

During the ten years of Jokowi’s administration, Megawati was very critical of his policies and had publicly expressed her disappointment. An example is Jokowi’s appointment of those he deemed reliable as key ministers in his rather than senior members of PDI-P. The current Coordinating Minister of Maritime Affairs and Investment, Luhut Binsar Panjaitan (LBP), is heavily relied on by Jokowi, due to their close ties since Jokowi was a mayor in Solo. Arguably, LBP is among those with whom PDI-P disagrees with for inclusion into Jokowi’s administration. LPB had played a massive role in narrating the election postponement as well as sounding the idea for the third term of Jokowi as President, which further distanced relations between Jokowi and PDI-P.

Jokowi’s reliable ministers have also offered him a clear post-presidency prospect rather than PDI-P. Seeking political power after stepping down from the presidency through his son is a rational decision, yet it created factions inside the party. Although PDI-P has been a political vehicle for him in the last two decades and Jokowi wining all the elections he contested, PDI-P’s support for him has not only waned but also deteriorated to vocal criticisms.

Therefore, Jokowi’s attitude towards PDI-P indicates that he does not want to regarded as an ordinary member of the party once he steps down from the Presidential Palace. As long as Soekarno’s family members, such as Megawati Soekarnoputri and Puan Maharani, is in charge, Jokowi cannot lead the party. Instead, Jokowi is more likely to be a party chairman of Gerindra or Golongan Karya (Golkar), two big players in the Prabowo-Gibran coalition.

The current relations between Jokowi and PDIP create a crack inside the government, impacting the change of current government officials. While senior members of PDI-P are still in their respective ministerial positions, Jokowi added the chairman of Democrat Party, Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (AHY) as a new minister. Being granted a Cabinet position, Democrat Party, a party in the Prabowo-Gibran coalition, has returned to be part of the government after nine years as an opposition.

Democrat Party and PDI-P has hardly been friendly towards each other as demonstrated by the decades long frosty relationship between Megawati and former Democrat Party’s chairman, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Therefore, Democrat Party could not or at least would not join the government as long as Megawati is still in charge. Interestingly, Jokowi has chosen such bold step to show his position by opposing Megawati’s stance with the appointment of AHY as minister.

Jokowi-PDI-P: A Burning Bridge?  

Further deterioration is envisaged due to several critical factors. First, the unforgettable 2024 Presidential Election, with plenty of controversies and changes in regulation, will be regarded as a means to weaken PDI-P. In this election, votes for the party declined, and their Presidential candidates received the lowest votes at 16%. Such systemic loss cost PDI-P a crucial position in the government side.

One of the controversies was the social assistance program known as bansos distributed days before the election day. While this program was intended to assist the less fortunate throughout the archipelago, it cannot be dissociated from the notion that the program was to indirectly facilitate support for Prabowo-Gibran. This was attributed to Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani, allocating the state’s budget to distribute for this program under the instructions of Jokowi.

Notably, the Minister of Social Affairs, Tri Risma Harini who is a PDI-P cadre, was not involved despite his ministry being responsible for implementing the program. This demonstrated Jokowi’s intentional exclusion of PDI-P-associated ministers from state project in critical days before the election. Moreover, ostensibly in an attempt to break the party’s grip on its strongholds, Jokowi increased the volume of social assistance especially in the Central Java and East Java regions.

Second, PDI-P is slated to be a strong opposition against the upcoming Prabowo’s administration. Being in the government, PDI-P is aware of efforts to stymy the oppossition such as the use of the current state budget and the lack of state officials who oppose the government. Interestingly, while Jokowi’s and Gibran’s PDI-P party status are still unclear as no official resignations have been announced, the duo would be part of the upcoming government.

PDI-P is also unlikely to join the government for various reasons. In his latest maneuvers, the relationship between Golkar and Jokowi is strengthening rather than PDI-P and the latter. Additionally, Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI), a party in the Prabowo-Gibran coalition, has recently reported PDI-P cadre, Ganjar Pranowo who ran in the election, to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) on suspicion of corruption. PDI-P’s disappointment with Jokowi could stem from his silence over the matter. Collectively, Jokowi’s relationship with PDI-P is bound to deteriorate with the former favoring Prabowo-Gibran; outweighing his loyalty to PDI-P. An important question to ask is whether the bridge between Jokowi and PDI-P is set to burn? In other words, could it culminate to a burnt relationship as exemplified by the PDI-P-Democrat Party relationship?