Introduction
Security threats to Malaysia go beyond sovereignty and territorial integrity issues. Malaysia’s security, as I argued elsewhere, must be conceptualised via the developing countries’ security framework. The dynamism and interplay between internal and external variables are key to the management of security predicament in the country. Like other developing countries, the idea and concept of-nation-state are still problematic. Social and political identity formation face great challenges, while economic activities and sources still rely heavily on commodities. Hence, Malaysia’s security challenges in 2022 and beyond continue to suffer from in-factor (domestic variables) problems such as a fragile state idea, societal structural issues, and competing identity and ideology. Simultaneously, the outside-factors (external variables) due to the changing structure of international landscape, also pose security challenges to the country.
Malaysia’s Existential Threats
Several existential issues remain a challenge to Malaysia’s security. The politics of race and religion are a major concern as Malaysia’s political system is race-based since independence. For decades, the United Malaya National Organisation (UMNO) has drawn commendable Malay support with little challenges. It was only recently that a new party albeit formed with seasoned politicians, Bersatu, attempted to challenge this dominance.
The Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), though claimed to be an Islamic party can be argued to be nationalist. Its support is largely limited to rural Malay-majority areas. As a partner member in the current government, PAS’ political statements and ideology had occasionally raised tensions with other members, potentially influencing their alliance moving into Malaysia’s 15th General Election. Its support for the Taleban government, for instance, poses challenging diplomatic tasks for the fragile coalition government.
Although UMNO appears to lose its majority at the 14th General Election, recent by-elections and state-elections show that UMNO is making a come-back. Political analysts, however, have been quick to point out that it is too early for UMNO to “celebrate” its return as it was argued that the opposition still commands large support. But the opposition appears to have failed in forming a united front against the Barisan Nasional (BN), which UMNO has been a dominant coalition partner. It was also argued that, in the last by-elections and state elections, UMNO had played the “racial card” of Ketuanan Melayu (Malay dominancy) by creating fear among the Malays of the possibility that Democratic Action Party (DAP) could once again dominate the government like it did during the Pakatan Harapan (PH) administration. (Abdullah, 2022)
In addition to politicians, Malaysia’s nation-building process have also been hampered by ultranationalist-religious movements (like Perkasa and Hindraf) that stoke fear-mongering sentiments to gain grass-root support. It is, thus, not surprising that racial as well as religious conflicts like May 13, 1969, the Memali, Jenalek, and Kampung Medan occur and continue to threaten the country’s stability.
Another major concern to Malaysia’s national security is threats from radical religious movements. For years, religious radicalism was treated as an in-factor, but since the September 11 incidents, Malaysia has jumped into the bandwagon by supporting the US-led campaign on War Against Terrorism (WAT). The current fight against religiously-inspired terrorism, however, could be a blessing in disguise for Malaysia.
Since independence, the government was confronted with religious radicalism in the form of demands for Malaysia to be established as an Islamic state. At one time, the backbone of these groups came from PAS members. This created serious political confrontation between two major Malay-based political parties – UMNO and PAS. Several leaders from both parties were arrested under the now abolished Internal Security Act (ISA), for their direct and indirect involvement in those radical groups. Through WAT, government policies and approaches against threats from local religious fundamentalism were strengthened.
Unfinished Statehood Building
The fragile notion of statehood also explains various traditional and non-traditional security threats faced by the country. Its state formation, inherited from colonialism, has been challenged by regional actors. The most salient threat is the territorial claim by the Sulu Sultanate, which is supported by the Manila, to control Sabah. The Sulu Sultanate claimed a major victory when the Paris arbitration ordered the Malaysia government to pay more than RM62 billion compensation to the heirs of Sulu Sultanate. The Malaysian government rejected the arbitration arguing that it was a unilateral decision made without Malaysian government representation. This became a moral boost for the sultanate that attempted to wrest control of Sabah by force in 2013. Jamalul Kiram, the self-proclaimed Sulu Sultan, was the figure responsible for the encroachment. Though Manila distanced itself from the incident, it had failed to issue strong condemnation for the act.
Non-traditional security threats i.e. illegal migration, Transitional Organised Crime (TOC) are also not new issues to Malaysia’s security. During the colonial period, Southeast Asia was divided into colonial powers’ sphere of influences through bilateral agreement. The British and Dutch in 1824, for instance, divided the Malay archipelagic area into two territories that is presently known as Malaysia and Indonesia. This agreement split ethnic groups and families into two different states which was difficult to accept as the idea of statehood was never fully comprehended by locals. Instead, they were inclined to identify themselves through their ethnicity rather than by forced political identity. Consequently, illegal transborder movements, as defined by state nowadays, is still an alien concept to them. For states like Malaysia, illegal transborder movements entail other security concern like terrorism, human trafficking, arms smuggling, and illegal fishing. This security concern is more pronounced in the eastern coast of Sabah.
Unfinished border demarcation also explains Malaysia’s predicament in facing with a territorial dispute with regional power – China. The overlapping maritime issue is not only relatively new and involve multiple regional players in Southeast Asia, but has only involved another major power, US. With such complexity and China’s willingness (or lack thereof) to resolve the issue, a stalemate or for the status quo to continue in the short-term. However, with China’s continued rise, claims over the South China Sea will become an increasing threat to Malaysia’s territorial integrity.
Finally, Malaysia’ security also relies on a stable international structure. The country is situated in a conflict-prone region. Conflicts in neighbouring countries would have spill-over effects to the country. During the Vietnam War, Malaysia hosted thousands of refugees. When Indonesia was in turmoil in the post-Soeharto period, Malaysia once again became a safe haven not only for economic migrants but also to radical Islamists. This is similarly seen with the Southern Thai and the Mindanao conflicts. Aside from being forced to accept thousands of refugees, Malaysia has also been accused of supporting separatist groups. These rows inevitably create diplomatic tensions with neighbouring countries and contribute to instability in the region.
Conclusion Current security challenges in Malaysia are sandwiched between fragile socio-political structure and the fluid nature of international system. Yet, the domestic sources of threat are still the main security challenges. The inability to address the domestic sources of threat coupled with an uncertain international order could drag the country into larger conflict in the future if not manage properly.
